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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides an analysis of the economic consequences of information sharing among 
banks about information on their borrowers, so-called “Credit Information Sharing”. 
Particularly, our research objectives are to assess the impact of credit information sharing on 
bank lending, bank risk, and bank-specific stock price crash risk. Our main data sources 
include the Bankscope database, Datastream, IFRS Foundation website, Deloitte, the World 
Bank’s Doing Business database, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database 
(WDI), the World Bank’s Global Financial Development database (GFDD), the World 
Bank’s Banking and Supervision Survey database. Our sample consists of banks around the 
globe during the period of 2005-2013. For the empirical investigation throughout the thesis, 
we employ a panel model and perform bank fixed (within) effects estimation augmented 
with time dummies. In addition, we provide several robustness tests, which include 
alternative measures, additional controls, a subsample analysis and an instrumental variable 
approach. 
In chapter 2, we investigate the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending for 
16,009 banks in 113 countries during 2005-2013 and the finding shows that bank lending 
increase with more credit information sharing. In addition, by assessing two–way 
interactions in the regression, we find that such impact is less pronounced with more 
transparent information environment and stronger creditor protection. In chapter 3, we 
examine the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk for 15,558 banks in 105 
countries during 2005-2013 and we discover that more credit information sharing reduces 
bank risk. Moreover, by evaluating two-way interactions in the regression, the finding 
reveals that such impact is less pronounced with more transparent information environment 
and more pronounced with more competitive banking markets. In chapter 4, with the sample 
of 1,402 listed-banks in 55 countries during 2005-2013, we explore the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank-specific stock price crash risk and the result notably shows that 
more credit information sharing via public credit registries has a negative impact on a stock 
price crash risk. Furthermore, by considering two-way interactions in the regression, such 
impact is less pronounced with more transparent information environment and more 
pronounced with weak regulatory environments in banking sectors. 
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Our findings suggest that policymakers should strive to achieve effective and efficient credit 
information sharing schemes to promote healthy and well-functioning banking sectors. As 
information sharing bridges the information gap between banks and their borrowers, banks 
are thus willing to extend more credit. Not only enhancing credit availability, banks become 
more stable and less likely to hoard negative information with a greater degree of credit 
information sharing. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Credit Information Sharing 
 Banking sectors are essential for countries at all stages of development and in all 
parts of the world (Levine 2005; Barth et al. 2009). When banks operate efficiently and 
allocate savings to the most productive investment, it enhances the performance of 
economies and stimulates economic growth (Levine 2005). Since bank lending is a source 
of external finance, especially in developing and emerging countries, a well-functioning 
banking system can help overcome income inequality and poverty. Thus, the functioning of 
banks has ramifications for the operations of firms and the prosperity of nations (Levine 
2004). 
 Unfortunately, banking systems do not allocate funds efficiently because they 
usually face information problems. Asymmetric information between banks and borrowers 
have long been the main issue in credit markets discussed by analysts and policymakers 
(Stigler 1961; Stiglitz & Weiss 1981). Generally, major roles of banks are to acquire 
information about borrowers and establish lending relationships with them to overcome 
asymmetric information in credit markets (Diamond 1991; Rajan 1992; Freixas & Rochet 
2008). A striking feature of banks is their services that they offer and the economies of scope 
between them. For example, accounts and payments’ services provide banks valuable data 
on the creditworthiness of clients as potential borrowers. A consumer who receives a regular 
paycheck pays credit cards in full and those and other bills on time is normally considered 
as a better credit risk than one that does not. 
 Both banks and borrowers possess different information about the risk of default, so 
banks are usually exposed to the problem of asymmetric information. The problem of 
asymmetric information between banks and borrowers can generally be classified as adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The adverse selection problem arises when individuals and firms 
seek out for loans. These clients have better information about its financial state and its 
ability and willingness to repay the loan than their lenders. When individuals and firms apply 
for loans, banks thus are not able to observe the true underlying characteristics and 
creditworthiness of them. Thus, it is difficult for banks to differentiate between good (safe) 
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and bad (risky) loan applicants (Akerlof 1970; Stiglitz 1985). Moreover, the moral hazard 
problem takes place after a loan is granted. Borrowers may use loaned funds to spend in 
ways that are not agreed upon or inconsistent with the interest of the banks. When banks are 
poorly informed about borrowers’ characteristics and post-lending actions, market failure is 
likely. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that under asymmetric information the demand for 
loanable funds exceeds the supply at the market equilibrium – even borrowers are willing to 
pay the market equilibrium interest rate are not able to get a loan (credit rationing).  
 To alleviate the problems caused by asymmetric information, banks usually engage 
in screening and monitoring of borrowers. For instance, they can interview loan applicants, 
visit their business before and after granting loans, and gather information from public 
records (Jappelli & Pagano 2002). If banks operate on a large scale, they can use these data 
for statistical risk management to grant and price loans based on past performance. 
Furthermore, collateral is commonly used as one of the tools to reduce asymmetric 
information (Bester 1985; Besanko & Thakor 1987). However, this requires that the 
borrowers have sufficient pledge-able assets or else they will not receive loans. 
Collateralization of loans is also often problematic especially for new firms, micro-
entrepreneurs and small-medium enterprise, which often lack fixed assets to present as 
collaterals. Thus, the use of collaterals is not able to fully solve the problems resulting from 
asymmetric information. Another remedy for banks, however, is to share with other banks 
information on their borrowers. Formal information sharing takes place through privately 
held credit bureaus and publicly regulated credit registries. Such credit information sharing 
institutions disseminate knowledge of total debt exposure, payment history, and overall 
creditworthiness, thus bridging the information gap between banks and borrowers. 
The theoretical literature suggests that there are four different mechanisms through 
which credit information sharing can alleviate the asymmetric information problem in 
lending. First, credit information sharing improves the knowledge of loan applicants’ 
characteristics so that banks can differentiate between safe and risky borrowers, reducing the 
problem of adverse selection (Pagano & Jappelli 1993). In the absence of credit information 
sharing, banks cannot distinguish between new pools of potential borrowers who are likely 
to repay and those who are likely to default. Since new loan applicants might have borrowed 
from other banks in the past, credit information sharing among banks can, therefore, help 
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banks grant loans safely. However, the effect of credit information sharing on the volume of 
lending is still not clear-cut. On one hand, credit information sharing increases the volume 
of bank lending when the problem of adverse selection in the absence of information sharing 
is so severe that safe borrowers are priced out of the market. On the other hand, credit 
information sharing decreases the volume of bank lending when safe borrowers participate 
in the credit market even in the absence of credit information sharing. The overall impact of 
credit information sharing on bank lending depends upon the extent to which increase 
lending to safe borrowers compensates for the reduction of lending to risky borrowers.   
Second, credit information sharing reduces the information monopoly a bank has on 
its borrowers (Sharpe 1990; Padilla & Pagano 1997). As banks acquire private information 
about their borrowers within their lending relationship, they have information advantage that 
allows them to charge higher interest rate from borrowers in the future, generating a hold-
up problem (borrowers are held up in one bank). With high-interest rate, borrowers exert 
less effort to repay and end up default, potentially leading to the collapse of credit market 
(Keeley 1990). When banks commit to sharing credit information among other banks, the 
extraction of information rents is restrained and in turn induces borrowers to step up their 
effort level to repay, reducing default rate. As a result of reducing default, interest rate 
decreases and bank lending in turn increases. 
Third, the information sharing mechanism exerts a disciplinary effect on borrowers 
by encouraging them to perform and maintain a good reputation because the information 
about their defaults is shared among other banks (Klein 1992; Vercammen 1995; Padilla & 
Pagano 2000). Credit information sharing encourages borrowers to repayment because it 
allows borrowers who default to be blacklisted. As blacklisted, borrowers may have 
difficulty getting credit in the future. To avoid this penalty, borrowers have the incentive to 
exert more effort, leading to lower default and interest rates and to more bank lending. 
However, as shown by Padilla and Pagano (2000), sharing merely information about a 
default has a potential impact on increasing bank lending; sharing information borrowers’ 
quality may not increase bank lending. This is because when sharing information sharing 
about defaults only, high-quality borrowers try harder to avoid default as to avoid being 
pooled with low-quality borrowers by outside banks. When banks share information more 
than just default, the high-quality borrowers exert less effort to avoid default because they 
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know that the bank will disclosure not only information about default but also the 
information about their intrinsic quality. Because information sharing eliminates information 
rents in the future; however, banks require a higher probability of repayment to be willing 
to lend and they may choose to refrain from lending altogether.  
Finally, credit information sharing among banks prevents over-borrowing which 
arises in the case of multiple bank lending (Bennardo et al. 2014). Borrowing from several 
banks induces borrowers to behave opportunistically by over-borrow from each bank. In 
such situation, banks may extend credit to already indebted people or firms. This multiple 
lending can thus cause a negative externality among banks because each bank’s lending may 
increase default risk for other banks. To prevent over-borrowing, banks’ natural response is 
to ration credit. Banks can also response by committing to share credit information among 
other banks. Credit information sharing allows banks to assess the outstanding debts of each 
borrower and adjust loan offers to applicants’ credit exposure so that banks can lend safely. 
With credit information sharing, banks no longer need to ration credit and charge higher 
interest rate; therefore, bank lending increases with credit information sharing. 
1.2 Motivation 
The impact of credit information sharing on bank lending is still ambiguous 
according to theoretical perspectives. The total change in lending depends on the force 
between the increase in lending to safe borrowers and the decrease in lending to risky 
borrowers. There are a few empirical studies exploring the impact of credit information 
sharing on bank lending, and they agree that bank lending increases with more credit 
information sharing (Jappelli & Pagano 2002; Djankov et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2009). 
Nevertheless, the literature still lacks the empirical evidence on the bank-level 
lending (supply side) evidence. Thus, in chapter 2, we aim to investigate the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank lending by providing an updated bank-level data around the 
globe. Specifically, we attempt to answer this question “How, and to what extent, credit 
information sharing affect the volume of bank lending?”. We rely on bank-level data to 
ensure that individual banks’ reactions to credit information sharing are not confounded by 
aggregate variation in credit allocation. Also, bank-level data helps to isolate variations in 
credit allocation arising from the heterogeneity of banks. Furthermore, studying the supply 
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side of bank lending is an approach consistent with theoretical analyses of information 
sharing in the credit market (Pagano & Jappelli 1993; Padilla & Pagano 1997, 2000; 
Bennardo et al. 2014). 
According to the theoretical literature, the effect of credit information sharing on the 
volume of bank lending depends on the severity of the asymmetric information between 
banks and borrowers. When the information environment is more transparent, more 
borrower information should be available and accessible to the public, such that the 
asymmetric information between banks and borrowers is less problematic. Therefore, in 
chapter 2, we examine whether the effect of credit information sharing on bank lending 
varies with the transparency of the information environment. In more transparent 
information environment, the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending should 
be less pronounced. 
In some circumstances, the asymmetric information between banks and borrowers 
may not be problematic. When banks are well protected in the event of default, they can 
easily force repayment, grab collateral, or even gain control of the firm (Townsend 1979; 
Aghion & Bolton 1992; Hart & Moore 1994, 1998). Thus, banks may be willing to extend 
more credits, regardless of the severity of the asymmetric information. In this regard, in 
chapter 2, we also examine whether the effect of credit information sharing on bank lending 
varies with the level of creditor protection through the legal system. The effect of credit 
information sharing on bank lending should be less pronounced with a high level of creditor 
protection. 
While the empirical analysis of chapter 2 is interesting, they lead to a very important 
issue about the economic consequence of credit information sharing on bank risk. Although 
credit information sharing facilitates bank lending decision and encourages banks to provide 
more credit, it does not always produce a positive repercussion on the stability of banking 
systems. From a positive perspective, the expansion of credits to a broader range of 
borrowers enhances overall economic growth. From a more negative perspective, an increase 
in lending may lead to greater access to credit for riskier borrowers. The disproportionally 
high entry of risky borrowers may lead to deteriorated bank portfolios with higher default 
rates. The high entry of risk borrowers may lead to increasing bank risk and probability of 
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banking crises. Therefore, in chapter 3, we attempt to explore the consequences of credit 
information sharing on bank risk. 
 In theory, there is a link between credit information sharing and bank risk. The theory 
predicts that credit information sharing may decrease bank risk. Specifically, credit 
information sharing can reduce adverse selection (Pagano & Jappelli 1993), increase 
borrowers’ effort to repay their debts (Padilla & Pagano 1997, 2000), and prevent excessive 
lending when each borrower may patronize several banks (Bennardo et al. 2014). Thus, 
credit information sharing should reduce default probability and translate into lower bank 
risk. However, the theory also predicts that credit information sharing may lead to looser 
screening requirements and lower level of post-lending effort in monitoring (Dell'Ariccia & 
Marquez 2006), contributing to rapid credit expansion and lending to riskier borrowers. 
Therefore, credit information sharing may increase bank risk. 
 Like chapter 2, the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk may vary with 
the transparency of the information environment. Thus, in chapter 3, we also investigate the 
impact of information environment on the relationship between credit information sharing 
and bank risk. In comparison to less transparent information environment, credit information 
sharing should have a weaker effect on bank risk in a more transparent information 
environment. The asymmetric information becomes less severe with more transparent 
information environment, such that promoting information sharing among banks may be less 
helpful in reducing bank risk. 
 Despite the focus of academic and policy debate on the impact of banking 
competition on bank risk (Allen & Gale 2004; Berger et al. 2009; Agoraki et al. 2011; 
Fernández et al. 2016), there is a potential interaction effect between credit information 
sharing and banking competition that could influence the level of bank risk. In competitive 
banking markets, adverse selection and moral hazard problems (associated with borrowers) 
is more intense compared to less competitive banking markets (Shaffer 1998; Dell'Ariccia 
2001; Marquez 2002). Banks in competitive banking markets have less incentive to screen 
and monitor borrowers after lending. Failure to adequately screen and monitor leads to 
riskier portfolios and weaker balance sheets with potentially negative effects on bank 
stability (Dell'Ariccia & Marquez 2006). With the role of credit information sharing in 
reducing adverse selection and moral hazard problems, its impact on bank risk could be more 
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pronounced in banking markets with a high degree of competition. To date, the interaction 
effect of credit information sharing and banking competition on the level of bank risk has 
never been tested before. Thus, in chapter 3, we also examine the impact of banking 
competition on the relationship between credit information sharing and bank risk. 
In Chapter 3, we examine the effect of credit information sharing on bank risk basing 
on the asymmetric information between banks and borrowers. In contrast, Chapter 4 attempts 
to explore a different type of risk which arises from the asymmetric information between 
banks and outside investors. This type of risk refers to downside risk or the risk of extreme 
losses. It is the ability of banks to make loans that cause banks to be opaque to outside 
investors. When banks make loans, they possess private information about borrowers, and 
the credit quality of borrowers is not readily observable and accessible by outside investors. 
This opacity enables corruption in lending and provides lending officers opportunities to 
conceal any bad projects or adverse operating outcomes for an extended period. Eventually, 
the unanticipated release of accumulated negative information may lead to the risk of 
extreme losses, namely crash risk. 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the concern of crash risk has been increasing. In the 
onset of the crisis, investors’ lack of confidence and fear of further decreases in prices have 
been identified among the various culprits behind the sharp price declines (Kim et al. 2013). 
Crash risk is an essential characteristic of return distribution and captures asymmetry in risk, 
especially downside risk or extreme negative return. Hence, it is important for portfolio 
theories, asset-pricing and option-pricing models (Kim et al. 2014; Kim & Zhang 2015). 
Unlike the risks from symmetric volatilities, crash risk is the risk of extreme losses which 
cannot be reduced through portfolio diversification (Mitton & Vorkink 2007; Barberis & 
Huang 2008; Sunder 2010; Kim et al. 2011b; Conrad et al. 2013). 
Previous studies show that there are several mechanisms that could generate crash 
risk. These mechanisms are referred to leverage effects (Black 1976; Christie 1982), investor 
heterogeneity (Romer 1993; Hong & Stein 2003) and volatility feedback effects (French et 
al. 1987; Campbell & Hentschel 1992). However, our study in Chapter 4 relies on another 
factor that increasingly captures much of attention in the crash risk literature. This factor is 
the information opacity that provides corporate managers incentives to conceal bad news 
(negative information) from outside investors (Jin & Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009). 
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According to the information theory of Jin and Myers (2006), the asymmetric 
information between corporate insiders and outside investors/stakeholders provides 
corporate directors, officers or employees an incentive to hide bad news. A wide range of 
incentives, such as compensation contracts, career concerns, and empire building, motivate 
managers to hide unfavorable outcome from their poor performance (Ball 2009; Kothari et 
al. 2009). If an insider conceals bad news (negative information) for an extended period, a 
firm’s share price may be overvalued, creating a bubble. When the bad news accumulates 
and reaches its upper limit, that bad news will be suddenly released to the stock market all 
at once. Consequently, the bubble bursts and a stock market crash (Jin & Myers 2006; Hutton 
et al. 2009). More importantly, hiding bad news prevents investors and board of directors to 
take an early action to correct or liquidate bad projects. As a consequence, unprofitable 
projects are kept alive and their poor performances pile up over time until a collapse of asset 
price occurs (Bleck & Liu 2007). 
As argued by Hertzberg et al. (2010), the incentive of hiding bad news is due to a 
loan officer’s career concern. Due to career concern, a loan officer tends to hide information 
about their assigned borrower’s repayment prospect that reflects poorly on their own report. 
This hidden negative information eventually prevents investors and the board of directors 
from taking timely abandonment actions or discerning negative net present value (NPV) 
projects at an early stage (Bleck & Liu 2007).  
Due to potentially bad news hoarding behaviors, we argue that credit information 
sharing among banks about their borrowers’ creditworthiness will discourage bank loan 
officers to engage in bad news hoarding behaviors and subsequently lead to a reduction in 
stock price crash risk. We base on our prediction on these following reasons. First, credit 
information sharing helps to monitor loan officers and to prevent corruption in lending. 
Second, sharing of borrowers’ information from one bank will be beneficial to another 
bank’s manager validating internal risk ratings and will prevent loan officers from being bias 
in their reports about borrowers. Third, credit information sharing improves comparability 
that discourages bad news hoarding within banks. Thus, more credit information sharing can 
improve bank transparency and help to curb bad news hoarding activities of loan officers. 
Consequently, the perception of investors about banks’ true underlying performance is 
improved and the risk of stock price crash is suppressed. Our prediction has never been tested 
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before so it is left to empirical investigation. Therefore, in chapter 4, we attempt to examine 
the impact of credit information sharing on stock price crash risk. 
 Nonetheless, how relevant would a credit information sharing scheme be if 
information environment was hardly opaque? This question leads to another attempt in 
chapter 4. In an environment with more transparent information environment, loan officers 
may have less ability to hide negative information because more information is accessible to 
external investors and loan managers. Therefore, in chapter 4, we examine whether the 
impact of credit information sharing on crash risk varies with the transparency of the 
information environment. 
Furthermore, the banking industry is known to be heavily regulated by regulators and 
authorities because they play an essential role in channeling savings to the most productive 
investment projects and thereby enhance the performance of economies (Barth et al. 2004; 
Levine 2004, 2005). Regulation and supervision are considered as an additional external 
governance force that acts macroeconomically at the banking industry level and 
microeconomically at the individual bank level (Barth et al. 2006; Beck et al. 2006b; De 
Andres & Vallelado 2008). When the banking regulatory environment is strict, banks are 
less likely to have enormous discretion to act in their own interests rather than in the interests 
of shareholders and debt holders. In addition, if banks face strict regulatory environments, 
they are more likely to allocate capital efficiently and have less ability to conceal bad news. 
Thus, in chapter 4, we also attempt to examine whether the impact of credit information 
sharing on crash risk depend on the strictness of the banking regulatory environments. 
 To sum up, our objectives in Chapter 2 are to examine the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank lending and explore whether such impact varies with the 
transparency of the information environment and the level of creditor protection. Our 
objectives in Chapter 3 are to investigate the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
risk and analyze whether such impact varies with the transparency of the information 
environment and the level of banking competition. Our objectives in Chapter 4 are to 
examine the impact of credit information sharing on bank-specific stock price crash risk and 
explore whether such impact varies with the transparency of the information environment 
and the banking regulatory environments. 
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1.3 Findings and Contribution 
 Using a cross-country sample of 16,009 banks in 113 countries during the period of 
2005 to 2013, the findings in chapter 2 reveal that credit information sharing and bank 
lending are positively associated. This finding is consistent with theoretical analyses 
suggesting that credit information sharing promotes bank lending. Our results also show that 
improved transparency of information environment mitigates the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank lending. Furthermore, we find that credit information sharing 
only affects bank lending through its interaction with credit rights. Specifically, credit 
information sharing reduces bank lending in countries with strong creditors rights, while it 
has no notable effect on lending in countries with very weak creditor rights.  
Chapter 2 contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we 
contribute to the emerging literature on information sharing in credit markets. We examine 
how information sharing impacts the volume of bank lending an effect ambiguous in theory 
and underexplored empirically. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence on the supply 
side of bank lending, which is still scarce. Unlike country-level data, bank-level data ensures 
that individual banks’ reactions to credit information sharing are not confounded by 
aggregate variation in credit allocation. In particular, bank-level data helps to isolate 
variations in credit allocation arising from (unobserved) heterogeneity of banks. In addition, 
because we utilize bank-level data, as opposed to firm-level data (Brown et al. 2009), we are 
able to study the determinant of bank lending volume from the banks’ viewpoint, an 
approach consistent with theoretical analyses of information sharing in the credit market 
(Pagano & Jappelli 1993; Padilla & Pagano 1997, 2000; Bennardo et al. 2014).  
Second, we employ the IFRS adoption as a proxy of transparency of information 
environment and provide evidence that the beneficial effect of credit information sharing on 
bank lending is lessened with the mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings support the role 
of IFRS in enhancing transparency of information environment and increasing the 
comparability of financial reports. Third, we complement Djankov et al. (2007) and find that 
creditor protection through the legal system is complementary to credit information sharing. 
Strong creditor protection is necessary to guarantee the effect of information sharing on 
lending. 
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Last, we use bank-level lending and more comprehensive measures of credit 
information sharing to revisit the cross-country association between credit information 
sharing, creditor rights, and bank lending. In general, previous cross-country studies 
(Jappelli & Pagano 2002; Djankov et al. 2007) only consider a dummy equals to one if any 
information sharing institution operates in the country, and zero otherwise. However, our 
study employs more comprehensive measures of credit information sharing from the World 
Bank’s Doing Business, which takes into account the scope, coverage, and accessibility of 
credit information available through either a private credit bureau or a public credit registry. 
In addition, we provide alternative measures of credit information sharing with private credit 
bureau coverages (% of adult population) and public credit registry coverages (% of adult 
population) to measure the level of credit information sharing through each agency. 
Using a cross-country sample of 15,558 banks in 105 countries during the period of 
2005 to 2013, our findings in chapter 3 reveal that credit information sharing is negatively 
associated with bank risk. This finding suggests that bank risk is lower in countries with 
more credit information sharing. Our result rules out the prediction of increasing bank risk, 
which may be due to looser screening requirements and lower level of banks’ post-lending 
effort in monitoring. The results in chapter 3 also show that the negative relationship between 
credit information sharing and bank risk is less pronounced in an information environment 
with a greater level of transparency. When the information environment is more transparent, 
borrower information is abundantly available and accessible to the public, such that 
promoting credit information sharing may be less helpful in reducing bank risk. Furthermore, 
in more competitive banking markets, credit information sharing is more beneficial in 
reducing bank risk than less competitive markets. In other words, the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank risk is more pronounced in more competitive banking markets. 
Chapter 3 adds to the existing literature in several aspects. First, we revisit and 
investigate the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk by using a wider range of 
countries around the globe. While Houston et al. (2010) provide an analysis of bank risk in 
69 countries, we expand the analysis to banks in 105 countries. Second, in addition to using 
bank Z-score index for gauging the level of bank risk, we also rely on another indicator of 
bank risk, which is a ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL). While the Z-score 
index measures the overall bank-risk and likelihood of failure, the ratio of non-performing 
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loans to total loans reﬂects the quality of the loan portfolio, reflecting the credit risk position 
of a bank (Berger et al. 2009; Delis & Kouretas 2011). 
Last, we add to the literature on information sharing and bank stability on one hand 
and the literature of banking competition and bank stability on the other hand. We 
demonstrate that there are significant and interactive effects of credit information sharing 
and banking competition. Far from having a neutral effect, we show that they have a 
profound influence on the level of bank risk. Our findings suggest that a credit information 
sharing scheme is more beneficial in a banking market characterized by high degree of 
competition. 
Using a cross-country sample of 1,402 listed-banks in 55 countries during the period 
of 2005 to 2013, our findings in Chapter 4 indicate that credit information sharing through 
public credit registries reduces bank-specific stock price crash risk, whereas the depth of 
credit information sharing and information sharing through private credit bureaus have no 
significant effect on crash risk. These findings reveal that banks in a country with more 
information sharing through public credit registries are less likely to experience crash risk. 
These findings are consistent with our conjecture that credit information sharing may prevent 
banks’ loan officers from concealing and accumulating bad news, which could lead to a 
future stock price crash. The insignificant impact of information sharing through private 
credit bureaus on crash risk suggests that the voluntary exchange of credit information 
among banks may not be sufficient to prevent bad news hoarding. Banks may self-select 
themselves into sharing credit information and may share only information that makes them 
better off. In addition, joining the private credit bureaus is not compulsory and they are less 
regulated than the public credit registries (Majnoni et al. 2004). Thus, less transparent banks 
may not join credit bureaus to share borrower information in the first place. 
Moreover, we find that the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk is less 
pronounced with more transparent information environment. With more transparent 
information environment, bank loan officers have less ability to conceal negative 
information about borrowers because more information is assessable to both investors and 
loan managers. Furthermore, according to three aspects of bank regulations, we find that the 
impact of credit information sharing on crash risk is more pronounced with less stringent 
capital requirements, low supervisory power and low degree of private monitoring. Our 
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results suggest that credit information sharing is much more helpful in reducing crash risk 
when the regulatory environments are weak, especially when the supervisory power is low. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the existing literature in several dimensions. First, our study 
adds to the growing literature on banks’ credit information sharing and its economic 
consequences. Prior works in this area has studied the impact of credit information sharing 
on enhanced credit availability (Pagano & Jappelli 1993; Padilla & Pagano 1997; Djankov 
et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2009), in lowering cost of credit (Brown et al. 2009), in reducing 
borrower-default rate (Jappelli & Pagano 2002), in reducing bank-lending corruption (Barth 
et al. 2009), in reducing bank risk (Houston et al. 2010) & banking crisis (Büyükkarabacak 
& Valev 2012), in increasing industrial growth (Houston et al. 2010) and  in enhancing job 
growth (Ayyagari et al. 2016). We add to the literature by investigating the role of credit 
information sharing in reducing bank-specific stock price crash risk, which captures 
asymmetry in risk or the third moment of the stock return distribution. This role is distinct 
from the effect of credit information sharing on stock return performance (first moment) or 
firm risk (second moment) documented in prior studies. Thus, our findings broaden our 
understanding of the economic consequences of credit information sharing on banks and 
investors. 
Second, we contribute to an empirical assessment of the effects of bank regulation 
and supervisions on bank development, performance and stability. Previous studies show 
that greater capital regulation stringency, greater supervisory power, and increased market-
based monitoring promote bank efficiency. We further provide evidence that they serve as 
external governance mechanisms and can be viewed as substitutes for better information 
sharing schemes in reducing crash risk. 
Last, our research contributes to the emerging literature that attempts to forecast 
future stock price crash risk (Jin & Myers 2006; Kim et al. 2011b; Kim et al. 2014). The 
literature on crash risk has captured much attention from both the investment community 
and academic researchers since the stock market collapse of 2001-2002 and 2008-2009. We 
complement prior studies on crash risk by examining a new factor that mitigates future stock 
price crash risk. Specifically, we discover that credit information sharing among banks about 
their borrowers is associated with lower crash risk. By examining crash risk, our study will 
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be beneficial to firms, shareholders and investors who might want to manage tail risk in the 
stock market and incorporate crash risk in their portfolio and risk management decisions. 
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 studies the impact of credit 
information sharing on the volume of bank lending. In addition, we test whether such impact 
varies with the transparency of the information environment and creditor rights. Chapter 3 
investigates the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. Furthermore, we test 
whether such impact varies with the transparency of the information environment and 
banking competition. Chapter 4 explores the impact of credit information sharing on bank-
specific stock price crash risk. Moreover, we test whether such impact varies with the 
transparency of the information environment and banking regulation & supervision. Chapter 
5 presents conclusion, limitation and a direction for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Credit Information Sharing and Bank Lending 
Decision: The Role of Information Asymmetry and Creditor 
Rights 
2.1 Introduction 
In credit markets, it is well known that information asymmetry leads to both adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems. Lenders are exposed to problems of information 
asymmetry, in which lenders are often not able to observe the characteristics of borrowers 
as well as their creditworthiness; thereby, cannot differentiate between safe and risky loan 
applicants. Besides the information about the borrowers’ characteristics, lenders may also 
not be able to control the actions that borrowers could take after receiving loans and the 
problems of moral hazard could arise. As a result of both adverse selection and moral hazard, 
lenders may increase interest rate and/or this may result in market equilibrium with credit 
rationing and suboptimal allocation of capital (Stiglitz & Weiss 1981).  
 There are several ways banks can overcome these asymmetric information problems. 
Banks may engage in screening and monitoring of borrowers. For instance, they can 
interview loan applicants, visit their business before and after granting loans, and gather 
information from public records (Jappelli & Pagano 2002). If banks operate on a large scale, 
they can use these data for statistical risk management to grant and price loans based on past 
performance. Furthermore, collateral is commonly used as one of the tools to reduce 
asymmetric information (Bester 1985; Besanko & Thakor 1987). However, this requires that 
the borrowers have sufficient pledge-able assets or else they will not receive loans. 
Collateralization of loans is also often problematic especially for new firms, micro-
entrepreneurs and small-medium enterprise, which often lack fixed assets to present as 
collaterals. Thus, the use of collaterals is not able to fully solve the problems resulting from 
asymmetric information. Another remedy for banks, however, is to share with other banks 
information on their borrowers. Formal information sharing takes place through privately 
held credit bureaus and publicly regulated credit registries. Such credit information sharing 
institutions disseminate knowledge of total debt exposure, payment history, and overall 
creditworthiness, thus bridging the information gap between banks and borrowers. 
16	
	
Theory shows that there are four mechanisms through which credit information 
sharing can alleviate the asymmetric information problem in lending. First, credit 
information sharing improves the knowledge of loan applicants’ characteristics so that banks 
can differentiate between safe and risky borrowers, reducing the problem of adverse 
selection (Pagano & Jappelli 1993).Second, credit information sharing reduces the 
information monopoly a bank has on its borrowers so that borrowers are not held up (Sharpe 
1990; Padilla & Pagano 1997). Third, the information sharing mechanism exerts a 
disciplinary effect on borrowers by encouraging them to perform and maintain a good 
reputation because the information about their defaults is shared among other banks (Klein 
1992; Vercammen 1995; Padilla & Pagano 2000). Finally, credit information sharing among 
banks prevents over-borrowing which arises in the case of multiple bank lending (Bennardo 
et al. 2014). 
Nonetheless, the theory makes no clear-cut predictions about the impact of 
information sharing on the volume of bank lending. On one hand, credit information sharing 
increases bank lending unambiguously if it reduces the information monopoly a bank has on 
its borrowers and induces borrowers to exert more effort to repay (Padilla & Pagano 1997) 
and if it prevents over-borrowing (Bennardo et al. 2014). On the other hand, credit 
information sharing may either increase or decrease the volume of bank lending with the 
composition of safe and risky borrowers (Pagano & Jappelli 1993) and the type of 
information being shared (Padilla & Pagano 2000). The question of how information sharing 
affects the volume of bank lending is, thus, left to the empirical study. 
There are a few empirical studies on the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
lending (Jappelli & Pagano 2002; Djankov et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2009). Their findings 
examine the impact of credit information sharing on firms’ access to credit (demand-side) 
and the volume of country-level aggregate lending. These studies agree that credit 
information sharing increases bank lending. Specifically, by analyzing the impact on firms’ 
access to credit, Brown et al. (2009) shows that credit information sharing improves access 
to credit for firms in transition countries of Eastern Europe. By examining the country-level 
aggregate lending,  both Jappelli and Pagano (2002) and Djankov et al. (2007) show the 
volume of private credit increases with credit information sharing.  
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However, the empirical evidence on the bank-level lending (supply side) evidence is 
still scarce. As the theory is ambiguous on the predicted impact of credit information sharing 
on bank lending, we attempt to fill in the gap by using a more recent data and providing a 
cross-country bank-level data analysis around the globe. Thus, our objective is to explore 
the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending. Although Fosu (2014) claims on 
his paper to be the first bank-level evidence of the effect of credit information sharing on 
bank lending, his finding is limited to African countries. It is not only meaningful to analyze 
the impact of credit information sharing schemes on credit market performance in African 
countries (Fosu 2014) or transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
(Brown et al. 2009) because information asymmetries are a pervasive problem affecting the 
performance of credit markets and credit information arrangements are one of the important 
institutions that significantly alleviate such problem and improve the credit allocation around 
the world (Djankov et al. 2007).  
Moreover, rather than using country-level data on lending (Jappelli & Pagano 2002; 
Djankov et al. 2007), we study the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending by 
using bank-level panel dataset around the globe. Bank-level data ensures that individual 
banks’ reactions to credit information sharing are not confounded by aggregate variation in 
credit allocation. In particular, bank-level data helps to isolate variations in credit allocation 
arising from (unobserved) heterogeneity of banks. In addition, because we utilize bank-level 
data, as opposed to firm-level data (Brown et al. 2009), we are able to study the determinant 
of bank lending volume from the banks’ viewpoint, an approach consistent with theoretical 
analyses of information sharing in the credit market (Pagano & Jappelli 1993; Padilla & 
Pagano 1997, 2000; Bennardo et al. 2014). 
 Unlike existing studies, another objective is to investigate whether the effect of credit 
information sharing on the volume of bank lending depends on the transparency of the 
information environment and creditor rights in each country. To examine the impact of the 
information environment, we argue that the problem of asymmetric information between 
banks and borrowers is less problematic when the information environment is transparent. 
In more transparent information environment, borrowers are relatively less opaque and 
banks can easily acquire necessary information about potential loan applicants. In such 
information environment, the benefits of credit information sharing among banks should be 
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relatively less effective in increasing bank lending. Our argument is also supported by Brown 
et al. (2009), who find that credit information sharing and firm-level transparency are 
substitutes in enhancing credit availability. 
 To examine the role of creditor rights, we rely on the study of Djankov et al. (2007) 
and Houston et al. (2010). Djankov et al. (2007) examine the association between credit 
information sharing, creditor rights, and private credit. However, our study is different from 
their study in two ways. First, we use a bank-level lending dataset to revisit such nexus. 
Second, we employ more comprehensive measures of credit information sharing from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business. When banks are better protected, banks can more easily force 
repayment, grab collateral, or even gain control of the firm (Townsend 1979; Aghion & 
Bolton 1992; Hart & Moore 1994, 1998). As a result, they are more willing to grant loans, 
regardless of the riskiness of borrowers. Thus, the effect of credit information sharing on 
bank lending should be less pronounced in countries with strong creditor rights. 
 To test our predictions, we use a cross-country sample of 16,009 banks in 113 
countries during the period of 2005 to 2013. After controlling for several bank-specific and 
country-specific factors, we find that credit information sharing is positively related to bank 
lending. This finding suggests that credit information sharing promotes bank lending. In 
other words, bank lending increases in countries where credit information sharing is 
intensely established. 
In addition, we also find that the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending 
is less pronounced with more transparency of the information environment. Specifically, 
mandatory IFRS adoption and greater extent of business disclosure attenuate the effect of 
credit information sharing on bank lending. Moreover, we find that credit information 
sharing only affects bank lending through its interaction with credit rights. The results show 
that credit information sharing reduces bank lending in countries with strong creditors rights, 
while it has no notable effect on lending in countries with very poor creditor rights. 
Our study in this chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we contribute 
to the emerging literature on information sharing in credit markets. We examine how 
information sharing impacts the volume of bank lending an effect ambiguous in theory and 
underexplored empirically. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence on the supply side 
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of bank lending, which is still scarce. Unlike country-level data, bank-level data ensures that 
individual banks’ reactions to credit information sharing are not confounded by aggregate 
variation in credit allocation. In particular, bank-level data helps to isolate variations in credit 
allocation arising from (unobserved) heterogeneity of banks. In addition, because we utilize 
bank-level data, as opposed to firm-level data (Brown et al. 2009), we are able to study the 
determinant of bank lending volume from the banks’ viewpoint, an approach consistent with 
theoretical analyses of information sharing in the credit market (Pagano & Jappelli 1993; 
Padilla & Pagano 1997, 2000; Bennardo et al. 2014).  
 Second, we use bank-level lending and more comprehensive measures of credit 
information sharing to revisit the cross-country association between credit information 
sharing, creditor rights, and bank lending. In general, previous cross-country studies 
(Jappelli & Pagano 2002; Djankov et al. 2007) only consider a dummy equals to one if any 
information sharing institution operates in the country, and zero otherwise. However, our 
study employs more comprehensive measures of credit information sharing from the World 
Bank’s Doing Business, which considers the scope, coverage, and accessibility of credit 
information available through either a private credit bureau or a public credit registry. In 
addition, we provide alternative measures of credit information sharing with private credit 
bureau coverages (% of adult population) and public credit registry coverages (% of adult 
population) to measure the level of credit information sharing through each agency.  
In summary, this chapter attempts to answer these following questions, which are 
graphically displayed in Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2: 
1. How, and to what extent, credit information sharing affects bank 
lending? 
2. How, and to what extent, information asymmetry (as measured by 
IFRS adoption and BDI) and creditor rights affect the relationship 
between credit information sharing and bank lending? 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
literature and provides empirical evidence as well as an outline of hypotheses development. 
Section 3 provides a description of data and methodology. Section 4 provides the empirical 
results and robustness tests are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the conclusion.  
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2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 Credit Information Sharing and Bank Lending 
 Theoretical Framework 
 In principle, exchanging information about borrowers can have four effects on credit 
markets. First, it reduces adverse selection faced by the lenders (Pagano & Jappelli 1993). 
Second, it reduces the hold-up problem stemmed from the lenders’ ability to extract 
informational rents from borrowers within lending relationships (Sharpe 1990; Padilla & 
Pagano 1997; Von Thadden 2004). Third, it acts as borrower disciplinary device to reduce 
moral hazard problem making borrowers exert more effort to repay (Vercammen 1995; 
Padilla & Pagano 2000). Fourth, after revealing the overall indebtedness of borrowers, it 
reduces over-borrowing that is a result of the borrowers’ ability to borrow a small amount 
from multiple lenders and become over-debted (Bennardo et al. 2009, 2014). 
 The first effect is that information sharing can reduce adverse selection in lending. 
Exchanging credit information provides banks with more knowledge of loan applicants’ 
characteristics and allows more precise prediction of repayment rate. According to Pagano 
and Jappelli (1993), they show that credit information sharing reduces adverse selection in 
bank lending. In the pure adverse selection model developed by Pagano and Jappelli (1993), 
they show that information sharing improves the pool of borrowers, decreases defaults and 
reduces the average interest rate. If banks exchange their private information about their 
borrowers’ quality, then they can correctly identify the applicants who are creditworthy and 
price their loans better. Since all banks do not have the same information about all borrowers, 
information sharing among banks can help make the right decision to safely lend to the new 
loan applicants who previously borrow from other banks. As a result of this, the defaults 
decrease. However, the effect of information sharing on the amount of lending is still 
ambiguous because the change in the volume of lending depends on the force between the 
increase in lending to safe borrowers and the decrease in lending to risky one. Total lending 
increases if the increase in lending to safe borrowers is more than the decrease in lending to 
risky one. 
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The second effect is that information sharing reduces a hold-up problem, which 
occurs from banks having private information about firms. When banks possess private 
information, this creates an informational advantage against other competitors and allows 
banks to extract higher interest rate from their customers in the future (Sharpe 1990; Von 
Thadden 2004). According to Padilla and Pagano (1997), they make this point in the context 
of a two-period model where each bank has private information about their borrowers. From 
this informational advantage, it gives banks some market power to extract the informational 
rent by charging higher interest rate in the future; thus, creating a hold-up problem. Knowing 
this, borrowers put low effort to perform to repay their debts. However, with the presence of 
credit information sharing, it restrains banks’ bargaining power to extract information rents 
in the future. As a result, borrowers have greater incentive to invest effort in their project to 
ensure its success; thus, making borrowers more likely to repay, which in turn induces banks’ 
willingness to lower lending rates and extend more credit. Thus, information sharing in this 
case unambiguously increases the volume of bank lending. 
The third effect is that information sharing reduces moral hazard making borrowers 
become disciplined in their repayment. Klein (1992) shows that when the legal environment 
makes it difficult for banks to enforce credit contracts, information sharing can encourage 
borrowers to repay loans because they know that defaulters will be blacklisted. The 
disciplinary effect is also supported by Vercammen (1995). Padilla and Pagano (2000) also 
support this effect showing that sharing information about borrowers’ past default creates a 
disciplinary effect instead of sharing borrowers’ characteristics. Default information is a 
signal for bad quality for outside banks and a penalty like higher interest rate is needed. To 
avoid a penalty, borrowers exert more effort leading to lower default probability, lower 
interest rate, and higher banks’ willingness-to-lending. Contrasting with the result of Padilla 
and Pagano (1997), sharing information about borrowers’ characteristics in the model of 
Padilla and Pagano (2000) has no effect on default and interest rates. In addition, sharing 
borrowers’ characteristics in the model of Padilla and Pagano (2000) can even reduce 
willingness to lend because banks lose informational rents, so they require a higher 
probability of repayment which is unchanged in the model. It does not change because of 
the unchanged level of effort and default rate. 
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Finally, the fourth effect is that information sharing helps to reduce over-borrowing 
in multiple-lending relationships (Bennardo et al. 2014). Borrowing from several banks 
induces opportunistic behavior among borrowers, causing them to over-borrow (Petersen & 
Rajan 1994; Bennardo et al. 2014). Borrowers have incentives to take so much credit and 
end up default. Fearing over the overall indebtedness of their borrowers, banks may response 
by rationing credit, deny credit, or increase an interest rate. Bennardo et al. (2014) show that 
sharing credit information allows lenders to assess total outstanding debts of borrowers from 
all lending sources, so they can lend safely and over-borrowing, as well as default, are less 
likely. Hence, in general, information sharing expands the availability of credit.  
In summary, information sharing is considered to reduce default rate and interest rate 
but the effect on lending is still ambiguous across models. The predicted impact of 
information sharing on the volume of bank lending is ambiguous in the adverse selection 
model proposed by Pagano and Jappelli (1993), but the impact is positive in the hold-up 
model of Padilla and Pagano (1997) and in the multiple-bank lending model of Bennardo et 
al. (2009). Also, the types of sharing information determine the effect on lending volume as 
shown in the model of Padilla and Pagano (2000). Regarding to the model of Padilla and 
Pagano (2000), sharing only default data increases the volume of lending more than the level 
when banks also share borrowers’ characteristics. 
 Empirical Evidence 
On empirical front, most evidence supports that information sharing improves credit 
market performance. Country-level studies (Jappelli & Pagano 2002; Djankov et al. 2007) 
employ country-level aggregate data and confirm the positive effect of credit information 
sharing on bank lending to private sector. In addition, the study of Jappelli and Pagano 
(2002) find that the impact is similar regardless of the private or public nature of the 
information sharing mechanism. Public credit registers are less likely to be established in 
countries where private credit bureau already exists. Djankov et al. (2007) extend the study 
of Jappelli and Pagano (2002) by increasing the number of the country from 43 to 129 
countries around the world. They also find that the ratio of private credit to GDP rises 
following either the improvement of creditor rights or the incidence of credit registries. The 
effect of information sharing is stronger in the poor countries.  
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Regarding firm-level evidence, Love and Mylenko (2003) use a cross-sectional firm-
level data from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) and find that private credit 
bureaus are associated with lower firm’s financing constraints and a higher share of bank 
financing, while no significant effect of public credit registries on firm’s financial 
constraints. This contrasts the result from Djankov et al. (2007) who find the significant 
impact of public credit registries on credit to private sector in poorer countries. 
Extension of the work by Love and Mylenko (2003), Brown et al. (2009) employ 
both cross-sectional and panel estimations. They find that information sharing is related to 
improved credit availability and lower cost of credit to firms in 24 transition countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Using a cross-sectional analysis, they provide 
additional evidence that credit information sharing is beneficial to opaque firms more than 
transparent firms, and the impact is stronger in countries where legal environments are weak. 
This result suggests that information sharing and accounting transparency are substitutes in 
improving the availability of credit. By employing a panel data, they also find that 
information sharing improves access to credit and reduces the cost of finance in countries 
amid poor protection of creditors. However, information sharing has no effects on countries 
that creditors are well protected. This suggests that information sharing is a substitute for 
creditor rights, which is consistent with the result of Djankov et al. (2007). 
Regarding bank-level evidence, Grajzl and Laptieva (2011) use bank-level panel data 
on Ukraine and find that information sharing through private credit bureau increases the 
volume of bank lending while there is no significant effect of information through the public 
credit registry on the volume of credit. This insignificant impact of the public credit registry 
on the volume of credit is inconsistent with the result found by Djankov et al. (2007), in 
which the impact of public credit registry is positively correlated with the volume of credit 
in poorer countries. 
Covering African countries, Fosu (2014) explores the effect of credit information 
sharing on bank lending using bank-level data from African countries from 2004 to 2009. 
The results suggest that bank lending increases with credit information sharing. Furthermore, 
employing banking market concentration measures, he finds that the increase in bank lending 
decreases with banking market concentration suggesting that information asymmetry is less 
of a problem in more concentrated banking markets. Interpreting differently, banking 
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concentration is less harmful when there is more asymmetric information (no credit 
information is shared). 
As several of country-level, firm-level, and bank-level evidence support the positive 
impact of credit information sharing on the availability of credit, it is expected that credit 
information sharing to have a positive impact on bank lending. Therefore, we hypothesize 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Credit information sharing is expected to increase bank lending. 
2.2.2 Credit Information Sharing, Information Asymmetry and Bank lending 
 A major challenge for any economy is to optimally allocate savings to new or 
existing investment opportunity. There are two main problems that prevent the efficient 
allocation of savings to potential business investment opportunity. They are “information 
problem” and “agency problem”. 
The information problem arises from the informational differences between firms 
and investors. Firms typically have more information about their expected earnings from 
current and future investment opportunity. This information asymmetry makes it difficult 
for investors to assess the real profitability of the firm’s investment opportunity. The firms 
can even have an incentive to overstate their profitability that worsens the situation leading 
to market failure (Akerlof 1970). The result of information problem (so-called “lemons 
problem”) gives firms an incentive to disclose additional information that could facilitate 
investors’ decision (Akerlof 1970; Healy & Palepu 2001; Beyer et al. 2010). 
The agency problem arises because investors do not engage in a direct control of a 
firm and the use of the funds once it flows to the firm and the self-interested entrepreneur 
has an incentive to expropriate investors’ funds. If the investors invest in a form of equity of 
a firm, then the entrepreneur can make use of the funds by acquiring perquisites, paying 
excessive compensation, or making an investment decision that can be harmful to the 
interests of outside investors (Jensen & Meckling 1979). If the investors invest in a form of 
debt, then the entrepreneur can make use of the funds by investing in a highly risky project, 
issuing additional more senior claims or paying out received cash as a dividend (Smith & 
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Warner 1979). This moral hazard problem prevents direct transfers of information between 
market participants. 
Consequently, the information environment will be shaped by both information and 
agency problem. They give a rise to a role of financial reporting and an incentive for 
corporate disclosure (Beyer et al. 2010). Accounting theory states that financial reporting is 
required by investors for evaluating the return on potential investment and for monitoring 
the use of funds once committed. In addition, financial reporting can reduce information 
asymmetry by disclosing timely and relevant information (Frankel & Li 2004). Without a 
good quality and transparency of financial report, it is not possible for market participants 
like investors and creditors to fully and completely understand a company’s financial 
condition as well as risks involved and a real fundamental of the company. Moreover, 
transparency of financial statement is crucial for corporate governance as it allows boards of 
directors to measure the effectiveness of management and detect any serious financial 
condition in order to take early corrective actions. 
Therefore, both transparent accounting information and corporate disclosure with 
high quality and credibility would provide useful insight information for decision making by 
shareholders, stakeholders and potential investors in relation to capital allocation, corporate 
transactions and financial performance monitoring (Leuz & Wysocki 2008; Beyer et al. 
2010). However, generally, firms do not always disclosure all information and voluntarily 
disclosure partial information. Firms voluntarily disclosure their private information under 
conditions identified by the unraveling result1 (Grossman & Hart 1980; Grossman 1981; 
Milgrom 1981; Milgrom & Roberts 1986). If the unraveling result holds, a firm will provide 
all information voluntarily; however, in practice, the unraveling result has not been 
successful in explaining observed disclosure and this leads to less than full disclosure (Beyer 
et al. 2010). 
                                                
1 The conditions under the unraveling result are: (1) disclosure are costless; (2) investors know that firms 
have, in fact, private information; (3) all investors interpret the firms’ disclosure in the same way and firms 
know investors will interpret that disclosure; (4) managers want to maximize their firms’ share prices; (5) 
firms can credibly disclosure their private information; and (6) firms cannot commit ex-ante to a specific 
disclosure policy. 
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Despite the incentives of voluntary disclosure, Leuz and Wysocki (2008) explain the 
reasons why disclosure regulation is needed. First, sometimes it is difficult for managers to 
credibly convey information due to misalignment of insiders’ and investors’ incentives. 
Thus, disclosure requirement and accounting standards play a crucial role in allowing firms 
to commit to a certain level of disclosure and, at the same time, improve the credibility of 
reporting information. Second, because disclosures are considered as public goods, this 
causes a lack of incentive to voluntarily disclosure certain information, which can improve 
social welfare. Disclosure regulation thus comes into play when firms do not voluntarily 
disclose all private information. 
Therefore, we focus on the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) to measure the transparency of the macro information environment. IFRS 
is developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which operates under 
the oversight of the IFRS Foundation. The goal of the IASB and the IFRS Foundation is to 
develop a single set of global financial reporting standards that bring transparency, 
accountability, and efficiency to financial markets around the world. Those standards serve 
the public interest by fostering trust, growth, and long-term financial stability in the global 
economy. 
Studies show that IFRS adoption may improve analysts’ information environment by 
enhancing transparency and by increasing the comparability of the financial reports (e.g. 
Barth et al. (2008b); Bae et al. (2008)). Cross-border comparison of financial data becomes 
easy when the single set of accounting standard is applied globally; thereby, decreasing 
information acquisition costs, increasing competition and efficiency in the markets (Ball 
2006). 
Existing research studies on mandatory IFRS adoption initially examine the pre-
impact of mandatory IFRS adoption (Comprix et al. 2003; Armstrong et al. 2006; 
Christensen et al. 2007a). These studies find a positive market reaction to events that 
increase the likelihood of IFRS adoption, though the effect might be small in some countries 
(e.g. UK). Several other studies, on the other hand, observed the outcome of the capital 
market after the introduction of mandatory IFRS adoption. Some studies show that stock 
market liquidity and equity valuations increase after the introduction of mandatory IFRS in 
a country (Platikanova 2007; Daske et al. 2008). Moreover, IFRS reconciliations contain 
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new information that investors consider relevant for firm valuation (Christensen et al. 
2007b). Most accounting quality indicators have improved after mandatory adoption of IFRS 
(Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008; Chen et al. 2010). The mandatory IFRS adoption also increases 
both private and public information to analysts resulting in the improvement of analysts’ 
information environment (Ashbaugh & Pincus 2001; Byard et al. 2011; Horton et al. 2013). 
Consistently, empirical analysis on voluntary IFRS adoption is found to result in 
better transparency of financial reporting, higher accounting quality and lower information 
asymmetry, uncertainties and estimation risks (Leuz & Verrecchia 2000; Daske & Gebhardt 
2006; Hung & Subramanyam 2007; Barth et al. 2008b), lower bid-ask spreads (Leuz & 
Verrecchia 2000), increased analyst following (Cuijpers & Buijink 2005), lower cost of 
capital (Daske et al. 2013) and higher foreign institutional investment (Covrig et al. 2007). 
The key challenge for the study of voluntary IFRS adoption is the fact that firms 
choose whether and when to adopt IFRS reporting. It is difficult to differentiate between 
mandatory and voluntary IFRS when the adoption of IFRS is voluntary for certain sectors in 
the economy. A country may allow some firms to conform to IFRS; however, local GAAP2 
is still allowed for others such that it is impossible to observe the effects of IFRS adoption 
per se. Thus, we prefer using mandatory IFRS adoption as a proxy for asymmetric 
information environment. When a country mandatorily adopts IFRS, the macro information 
environment is more transparent compared to a country with no IFRS adoption. 
In addition to mandatory IFRS adoption, we employ an alternative measure of the 
transparency of information environment, which is the Business Extent of Disclosure Index 
(BDI). BDI is obtained from the World Bank’s Doing Business. This index measures the 
extent to which investors are protected through disclosure of ownership and financial 
information (World Bank’s Doing Business 2016). Particularly, BDI is a measure of the 
extent of disclosure of a firm’s conflict of interest. The index measures how well are minority 
shareholders protected from disclosure of transactions that involve conflicts of interests. 
Misbehavior or misuse of funds by entrepreneurs can eventually be harmful to the interests 
of shareholders and fund providers (Jensen & Meckling 1979). Greater business disclosure 
                                                
2 Local GAAP standards for Generally Accepted Accounting Practices. 
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would make firms more discipline and reduce the moral hazard problem. Thus, higher BDI 
is associated with higher level of transparency of information environment. 
Information asymmetry is the main explanation for credit rationing, suboptimal 
allocation of capital and inefficient investment decisions leading to an adverse economic 
outcome (Stiglitz & Weiss 1981; Myers & Majluf 1984; Diamond & Verrecchia 1991). 
Theoretical and empirical studies show that credit information sharing can mitigate 
information problems between banks and borrowers, leading to safe and credit availability. 
However, the usefulness of credit information sharing in reducing information gaps between 
banks and borrowers can be less effective in a country with more transparent information 
environment compared to one with lower transparent information environment. 
To the best of my knowledge, no empirical study attempts to study the impact of 
information asymmetry on the relationship between credit information sharing and bank 
lending. There is one study seeking to estimate the impact of information sharing on access 
to finance for firms. Specifically, Brown et al. (2009) suggest that firm-level accounting 
transparency is a substitute for credit information sharing in enhancing firms’ access to 
credit; the correlation between credit information sharing and credit access is stronger for 
opaque firms than for transparent ones. However, their study is related to firm-level survey 
data on access-to-finance but not the supply side of bank lending, which is an approach 
consistent with theoretical analyses of information sharing in the credit market (Pagano & 
Jappelli 1993; Padilla & Pagano 1997, 2000; Bennardo et al. 2014). 
Since the study on the impact of information asymmetry on the relationship between 
credit information sharing and bank lending is scared, we examine such impact by 
employing the mandatory adoption of IFRS and BDI as proxies for the macro information 
environment. Based on the support from the empirical evidence that the adoption of IFRS 
enhances transparency and information environment, we expect that the beneficial effect of 
credit information sharing on bank lending is reduced in countries with mandatory IFRS 
adoption. For an alternative proxy of information environment to IFRS adoption, we also 
expect that higher BDI would attenuate the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
lending. Formally, we hypothesize that: 
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Hypothesis 2: The impact of credit information sharing on bank lending is expected to be 
less pronounced when the information environment is more transparent (as proxied by IFRS 
adoption and BDI). 
2.2.3 Credit Information Sharing, Creditor Rights and Bank Lending 
Several papers have examined the effects of stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy of 
non-financial firms. John et al. (2008) find that stronger corporate governance is correlated 
with greater corporate risk-taking. At the same time, Acharya et al. (2011) find that stronger 
creditor rights lead to reduced corporate risk-taking in the form of diversifying acquisitions. 
Claessens and Klapper (2005) find that the various components of the popular creditor rights 
indexes have a differential effect on the likelihood of bankruptcy, while Brockman and Unlu 
(2009) find that companies are less likely to pay dividends in countries with weaker creditor 
rights. 
Recent papers investigate the role of creditor rights and credit information sharing 
and their interaction. The importance of creditor power and credit information sharing on 
the credit availability have been empirically studied by Djankov et al. (2007), and they find 
that both stronger creditor rights and the existence of information sharing institution are 
associated with the higher ratio of private credit (% of GDP). Their measure of information 
sharing used by Djankov et al. (2007) is based on a dummy, whose value is equal to one if 
any information-sharing institution exists in the country and zero otherwise. 
The impact of creditor rights and information sharing on bank’s behavior is also 
examined by Houston et al. (2010). They suggest that there is both a bright side and dark 
side from enhancing creditor protections. On the bright side, stronger creditor rights appear 
to encourage banks to take on more risks which helps provide valuable capital to private 
firms which enhances overall economic growth. On the downside, the dark side of greater 
risk-taking is that it significantly increases the likelihood of financial crisis. Unlike the 
conflicting effects of creditor rights protections, they argue that information sharing among 
creditors appears to be universally beneficial. Specifically, information sharing reduces 
information symmetries and enhances transparency, which reduces bank risk-taking and the 
likelihood of a crisis, while at the same time promoting economic growth.  
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The effects of creditor rights and information sharing on bank’s behavior are likely 
to be even more complex than considering one by one. Creditor rights and information 
sharing not only affect borrower’s incentives for risk-taking, which influence the risk of any 
specific loan, but they also may influence a bank’s willingness to lend to riskier borrowers, 
the bank’s mix of securities and loans, and the bank’s willingness to hold capital—all of 
which have important effects on the bank’s overall level of risk.  
According to Houston et al. (2010), for a given set of borrowers, we might expect 
that, all else equal, stronger creditor rights would translate into lower bank risk-taking 
because lenders are more likely to grab collateral, force repayment, or even gain control of 
the debtor that is in financial distress resulting in higher recovery rate or lower risk in the 
event of borrower’s default. In addition, borrowers are also less willing to take risks when 
they know that creditors are well protected. However, stronger creditor rights may encourage 
banks to provide loans to a wider (potentially riskier) set of borrowers and result in increased 
expected default rate in the bank’s portfolio. In their empirical study, they find that stronger 
creditor rights are correlated with higher bank risk-taking. Furthermore, they also find that 
information sharing among creditors reduces bank risk-taking and mitigates the effect of 
creditor rights on bank risk taking. 
Absent in the paper of Houston et al. (2010) is the influence of creditor rights and 
credit information sharing on the level of bank lending. There is potentially an interactive 
effect between creditor rights and credit information sharing on bank lending. One 
possibility is that the strong creditor rights grant more power to creditors when borrowers go 
bankrupt, making them more willing to extend credit to potentially riskier borrowers. 
Another possibility is the role of credit information sharing among creditors in reducing the 
costly information asymmetries, which also allow lenders to provide more loans. Based on 
two possibilities, we argue that information sharing might be less beneficial in increasing 
lending if creditors are well protected. Because banks know that they are well protected, so 
they are willing to lend to a broader and riskier set of borrowers while ignoring whether 
borrowers are a safe or risky type.  
Thus, if we consider creditor rights and information sharing per se, then we would 
see a positive individual impact on lending. However, if we consider their interaction, then 
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we could see that the impact of credit information on bank lending maybe less pronounced 
with strong creditor rights. Formally, we hypothesize as follows:  
Hypothesis 3: The impact of credit information sharing on bank lending is expected to be 
less pronounced when the protection of creditor through the legal system is strong. 
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2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
2.3.1.1 Data Sources and Sample 
The sample in this chapter consists of 16,009 banks in 113 countries during the period 
2005 – 2013. We only use data in the year 2005 to construct all explanatory and control 
variables for predicting the dependent variable in the year 2006.  We compile data from 
several different sources. The main database used in this chapter is the Bankscope Database 
to obtain bank-level accounting information. 
For explanatory variables, we rely on the World Bank’s Doing Business Database to 
obtain cross-country data on credit information sharing and the business extent of disclosure 
index (BDI). Data on IFRS adoption is obtained from three different sources which include 
the IFRS Foundation website, Deloitte and Simon Fraser University in Canada3. Data on 
the level of creditors’ protection through the legal system is extracted from the Dataset from 
LaPorta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2007)4. 
Other variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI) Database, the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI), the World Bank’s 
Bank Regulation & Supervision Survey Database, the Deposit Insurance Database, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the dataset from Easterly (2001) and La Porta et al. 
(1999). Further descriptions and links to data sources can be found in Appendix A. 
2.3.1.1 Variable Measurements 
2.3.1.1.1 Dependent Variable 
For the bank-lending variable, we extract total gross loans from the BankScope 
database. A total gross loan of each bank is defined as total amount of loans to household 
                                                
3 We cross-check the data within these three sources to ensure that the country mandatorily adopt IFRS and 
the effective date of the mandatory IFRS adoption is correct. 
4 La Porta et al. (1998) provide data on the creditor rights index to measure the power of creditors in the vent 
of borrowers’ bankruptcy. Djankov et al. (2007) extend the dataset of LaPorta et al. (1998) on creditor rights 
index to include as many as 129 countries. 
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and firms. The unit is expressed in term of million US dollars. In addition, we take a natural 
logarithm of total gross loans and take the difference between the natural logarithm of gross 
loans in the current period and the natural logarithm of gross loans in the previous period. 
Mathematically,  !"#$%&,( = *+, "#$%&,( − *+, "#$%&,(./  (2-1) 
Where *+, is a natural log function; "#$%&,( is total gross loans of bank ith at time t and "#$%&,(./ is total gross loans of bank ith at time t-1. We can interpret the changes in natural 
logarithms as percentage changes after multiplying by 100. We define the changes in the 
natural logarithms of gross loans as GLOAN. 
2.3.1.1.2 Explanatory Variables 
 Credit Information Sharing Proxy 
The key independent variable in our analysis the variable measuring the level of 
credit information sharing across countries. Generally, banks exchange information about 
their borrowers’ creditworthiness through information-sharing institutions. These 
information-sharing institutions exist as either privately held credit bureaus or publicly 
regulated credit registries. According to Djankov et al. (2007), a private credit bureau is a 
database maintained by a private commercial firm whereas a public credit registry is a 
database maintained by a public authority (e.g. central banks). Both information-sharing 
institutions consolidate information on the borrowers’ creditworthiness in the financial 
system and facilitate the exchange of credit information among banks and other financial 
institutions. However, the contents and scope of credit information available from credit 
information institutions may vary across countries. Some institutions may collect 
information on outstanding loans of large borrowers, while some others may provide 
extensive information consisting of demographic data, default records, late payment 
(delinquency), credit inquiries, ratings, payment of utility bills (Miller 2003; Djankov et al. 
2007). 
We thus use the depth of credit information sharing index (DEPTH) to capture the 
differences of information contents across countries. The index is taken from the World 
Bank’s Doing Business database. This index measures rules affecting the scope, 
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accessibility, and quality of credit information available through either private credit bureau 
or public credit registry (Djankov et al. 2007; Houston et al. 2010). The depth of credit 
information sharing index ranges from zero to six with higher values indicating better scope, 
accessibility, and quality of credit information available from either private credit bureau or 
public credit registry. The value of zero indicates that there is no private credit bureau or 
public credit registry operating in a country. The value of one is then added to the index with 
each one of the following characteristics: 
• Both positive information and negative information are distributed. 
Positive information is an information about loans outstanding and 
pattern of on-time repayments, whereas negative information is an 
information about late payments, number and amount of defaults, 
arrears or bankruptcies. 
• Data on individuals (households) and firms are distributed. 
• Data from retailers, trade creditors, and/or utility companies as well 
as financial institutions are distributed. 
• More than 2 years of historical data are available. Registries that 
erase data on defaults as soon as they are repaid would receive a 
score of 0 for this indicator. 
• Data are collected and distributed on loans with value below 1% of 
income per capita. A registry must have a minimum coverage of 1 
percent of the adult population to score a 1 for this indicator. 
• Laws give right to borrowers to inspect their own data. 
 Information Environment Proxy 
To measure the transparency of the information environment, we rely on two proxies 
which are the mandatory IFRS adoption and the Business Extent of Disclosure Index (BDI). 
Regarding mandatory IFRS adoption, we identify each country’s status of IFRS adoption 
and build a dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 for a country (and year) that 
mandatorily adopts IFRS and 0 otherwise. We name this dummy IFRS. For a country’s date 
35	
	
of IFRS adoption, we refer to the effective date of IFRS implementation. We define countries 
with mandatory IFRS adoption to be more transparent than those without. IFRS dummy with 
a value of one is associated with more transparent information environment. The list of 
countries with mandatory IFRS adoption is in Appendix B. 
Regarding BDI, the data is obtained from the World Bank’s Doing Business. This 
index measures the extent to which investors are protected through disclosure of ownership 
and financial information (World Bank’s Doing Business 2016). It ranges from 0 to 10 with 
a higher value indicating more disclosure of ownership and financial information to 
investors. Thus, a higher (lower) BDI indicates that the information environment is more 
(less) transparent. More detail of the components of BDI is in Appendix C. 
 Creditor Rights Index 
The measure of creditor powers in the event of borrowers’ bankruptcy is an aggregate 
measure of creditor legal protection created based on the methodology proposed by LaPorta 
et al. (1998). The index is ranging from zero to four. The index consists of 4 components: 
• Restrictions on reorganization: whether there are restrictions 
imposed, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividend, when a 
debtor files for reorganization. 
• No automatic stay: whether secured creditors can gain possession of 
assets after the petition for reorganization is approved, that is, 
whether there is no automatic stay or asset freeze imposed by the 
court on a creditor’s ability to seize collateral. 
• Secured creditor paid first: whether secured creditors are ranked first 
in the distribution of proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm as 
opposed to other creditors such as government or workers. 
• No management stay: whether the incumbent management does not 
stay in control of the firm during the reorganization, in other words, 
whether an administrator, not the management, is responsible for 
running the business during the reorganization. 
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A value of one is added to the index when a country’s laws and regulations provide 
each of these powers to secured lenders. A higher index indicates that secured lenders are 
better protected in case a borrower defaults. 
2.3.1.1.3 Control Variables 
We include a series of control variables to prevent the spurious relationship between 
credit information sharing and bank lending or avoid any relationship that could be driven 
by unobserved variables. To control for bank characteristics, we include bank’s size, profit 
margin, and efficiency. The size of each individual bank is empirically proxied by a natural 
logarithm of bank’s total assets (SIZE). We measure the profitability of each bank with a 
bank's net interest revenue as a share of its interest-bearing assets. This variable is a net 
interest margin (NIM). This variable measures the profitability of investing and lending 
activities. To control for the bank’s efficiency in operating on and off-balance sheet 
activities, we incorporate a ratio of total expenses to operating income (interest and non-
interest income). This ratio is simply a cost-to-income ratio (EFFICIENCY). Beside bank’s 
size, profitability, and efficiency, we also include a ratio of total deposits to total assets 
(DEP) and a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLR). 
To control for country-specific macroeconomic performance, we include a growth 
rate of gross domestic product (GDPG) and an inflation rate (INF). All are collected from 
WDI. The growth rate of GDP is included to capture the development of the economy 
(Djankov et al. 2007). Inflation is proxied by a consumer price index (CPI) to control for the 
price movement and uncertainty in the credit market. Uncertainty in the credit market arises 
from the banks’ difficulty in assessing the quality of credit because profits in real term 
become harder to predict during periods of high inflation. We also control for the banking 
market structure by including the ratio of three largest bank’s assets in a country to the total 
assets in the banking system (CCT3). Lastly, we include a capital stringency index 
(CAPITAL_STR), measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency in a 
country.  
2.3.1.1.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 2-1 summarizes all definitions and sources of variables as well as their symbols 
used in this chapter. Descriptive statistics for the main empirical results and robustness 
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checks are displayed in Table 2-2. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
The sample consists of 16,009 banks in 113 countries over the period of 2005 to 2013. From 
the table, on average, the change of the natural logarithm of total gross loans (GLOAN) has 
a mean about 0.089 (or 8.9%). The depth of credit information sharing index (DEPTH) has 
mean (median) of 5.01 (5), indicating that most observations in the sample have a high scope, 
accessibility, and quality of credit information available through credit information sharing 
agencies. For other alternative measures of credit information sharing, the private credit 
bureau coverage (PRIV) is about 79%, while the public credit registries coverage (PUB) is 
about 9.8%. Regarding the proxies of information asymmetry, the table shows that the mean 
of IFRS adoption (IFRS) is 0.305, meaning that more than half of observations have no IFRS 
adoption, while the mean of the business extent of disclosure index (BDI) is 6.42. The mean 
of creditor rights index (CR) is 1.54, showing that on average the degree of creditor 
protection is not high around the globe. 
 The summary statistics of main control variables are also shown in the same table. 
According to the bank characteristics controls, the mean of the natural logarithm of bank’s 
assets (SIZE) is around 6; the mean of the net interest margin (NIM) is around 4%; the mean 
of the cost-to-income ratio (EFFICIENCY) is around 71.6%; the mean of the deposit to asset 
ratio (DEP) is around 78.3%; and the mean of loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio (LLR) 
is 2.5%. For the macroeconomic controls, on average, the growth rate of gross domestic 
product (GDP) is around 2%, while the inflation rate (INF) is approximately 3.1 percent. 
Regarding the banking market structure, the banking market concentration ratio (CCT3) is 
on average 42.8%. Lastly, on average, the degree of overall banking capital stringency 
(CAPITAL_STR) is around 6 to 7. 
 In addition to the variables used in the main regression, we also present the summary 
statistics of the variables used as additional controls in robustness tests. The dummy of 
deposit insurance (DEPOSIT_INS) has a mean of 0.961 and a median of 1, implying that 
most of the observations in the sample have a deposit insurance regime. The effect of deposit 
insurance regimes might be absent due to the cluster of values around 1. Another additional 
control variable is the political stability index (POLITIC). The mean of POLITIC is 0.397 
on the scale of +/-2.5. 
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Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 reports the correlation between variables. The table shows 
that DEPTH is positively correlated with GLOAN, indicating that there exists a positive 
relationship between credit information sharing and bank lending. Regarding alternative 
proxies of credit information sharing, PRIV is positively associated with GLOAN and highly 
correlated with DEPTH. This highly positive correlation between PRIV and DEPTH 
suggests that a country with the high depth of credit information tends to have high coverage 
of private credit bureaus or vice versa. However, each variable enters the regression 
individually, so the problem of multicollinearity should be less of a concern. Another proxy 
of credit information sharing, PUB, is, in contrast, negatively associated with GLOAN and 
negatively correlated with DEPTH. The two proxies of information asymmetry, IFRS and 
BDI, are positively correlated with GLOAN, suggesting that mandatory IFRS adoption and 
higher extent of disclosure index tend to promote lending and vice versa. The creditor rights 
index, CR, is also positively correlated with GLOAN. Notably, DEPTH is negatively 
correlated with each of proxy of information asymmetry (IFRS and BDI) and creditor rights 
index (CR), implying that their relationships are going in the opposite direction. However, 
their interaction effects on GLOAN will be examined further with multivariable regression 
analysis. The methodology will be explained in the next section. 
2.3.2 Methodology 
According to our hypothesis H1, we expect that credit information sharing has a 
positive impact on bank lending. The regression equation is as follows: 
"0%12%!&,( = 34 + 3/627&,(./ + 38(	;&,(./8 )=8>? + 3@(A&,(./@ )B@>C + D( + E&+ F&,( (2-2) 
Where i, t and t-1 indicates the ith bank, year t and year t-1, respectively; "0%12%! is bank 
lending measured by the change in the natural logarithm of total gross loans (GLOAN); CIS 
is a credit information sharing variable proxied by the depth of credit information sharing 
index (DEPTH); X contains bank-specific variables, consisting of bank’s size (SIZE), net 
interest margin (NIM), a cost-to-income ratio (EFFICIENCY), a deposits to assets ratio 
(DEP), a loan-loss reserves to gross loans ratio (LLR); Y contains country-specific variables, 
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consisting of GDP growth (GDPG), inflation (INF), banking concentration (CCT3) and 
capital stringency index (CAPITAL_STR); D( is the year fixed effects; E& is the individual 
effects or the time-invariant component of the error term; and ε is an idiosyncratic error term 
or time-varying component of the error term. The coefficient 3/ reflects the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank lending. Thus, according to the hypothesis H1, we expect the 
sign of 3/ to be positive so that credit information sharing increases the volume of bank 
lending. 
 The year fixed effects. D(, are a set of time dummies included to control for economy-
wide events and technological innovation affecting all banks equally across countries, which 
vary over time. These year fixed effects capture, for example, the economy-wide institutional 
changes affecting the quality of rules and laws governing the country, fluctuation in the 
market interest rate shaping the supply and demand of credit, conditions in the public debt 
market, which also influence bank lending decision. The year fixed effects can also include 
exogenous macroeconomic shocks, such as the spread of the global financial crisis in 2008 
and 2009. The individual (or bank) fixed effects, E&, captures the time-invariant 
heterogeneity of banks. For instance, the bank-level heterogeneity is due to initial differences 
in the managerial practices, the age of establishment, etc. all of which could be potential 
confounding factors in estimating the effect of credit information sharing on bank lending.  
According to the hypothesis H2, we expect the effect of credit information sharing 
on bank lending to be less pronounced in a more transparent information environment as 
proxied by IFRS adoption or BDI. To test this hypothesis, we augment Equation (2-2) with 
one of the two proxies of the information environment and their interactions with the credit 
information sharing measure. The new regression model thus expresses as follows: "0%12%!&,( = 34 + 3/627&,(./ + 3?$7AG&,(./ + 3H$7AG&,(./ ∗ 627&,(./+ 38(;&,(./8 )J8>K + 3@(A&,(./@ )//@>L + D( + E& + F&,( (2-3) 
Where i, t and t-1 indicates the ith bank, year t and year t-1, respectively; "0%12%! is bank 
lending measured by the change in the natural logarithm of total gross loans (GLOAN); CIS 
is a credit information sharing variable proxied by the depth of credit information sharing 
index (DEPTH); ASYM represents one of the two proxies of information environment, 
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namely IFRS adoption (2MN7) and the business extent of disclosure index (O12); X contains 
bank-specific variables, consisting of bank’s size (SIZE), net interest margin (NIM), a cost-
to-income ratio (EFFICIENCY), a deposits to assets ratio (DEP), a loan-loss reserves to 
gross loans ratio (LLR); Y contains country-specific variables, consisting of GDP growth 
(GDPG), inflation (INF), banking concentration (CCT3) and capital stringency index 
(CAPITAL_STR); D( is the year fixed effects; E& is the individual effects or the time-invariant 
component of the error term; and ε is an idiosyncratic error term or time-varying component 
of the error term. The coefficient 3H reflects the extent to which degree of information 
environment moderates the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending; thereby, 
according to the hypothesis H2, we expect the sign of 3H to be negative such that the impact 
of credit information sharing on bank lending is less pronounced with a more transparent 
information environment. 
According to the hypothesis H3, we expect that the impact of credit information 
sharing on bank lending is less pronounced under the environment with better creditor 
protection. To test for the hypothesis H3, we augment Equation (2-2) with an index 
measuring the level of creditor protection and its interaction with the credit information 
sharing measure. The new regression model is thus as follows: "0%12%!&,( = 34 + 3/627&,(./ + 3?6N&,(./ + 3H6N&,(./ ∗ 627&,(./+ 38(P;&,(./8 )J8>K + 3@(A&,(./@ )//@>L + D( + E& + F&,( (2-4) 
Where i, t and t-1 indicates the ith bank, year t and year t-1, respectively; "0%12%! is bank 
lending measured by the change in the natural logarithm of total gross loans (GLOAN); CIS 
is a credit information sharing variable proxied by the depth of credit information sharing 
index (DEPTH); CR is creditor rights index measuring the level of creditor protection 
through the legal system; X contains bank-specific variables, consisting of bank’s size 
(SIZE), net interest margin (NIM), a cost-to-income ratio (EFFICIENCY), a deposits to assets 
ratio (DEP), a loan-loss reserves to gross loans ratio (LLR); Y contains country-specific 
variables, consisting of GDP growth (GDPG), inflation (INF), banking concentration 
(CCT3) and capital stringency index (CAPITAL_STR); D( is the year fixed effects; E& is the 
individual effects or the time-invariant component of the error term; and ε is an idiosyncratic 
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error term or time-varying component of the error term. The coefficient 3H reflects the extent 
to which degree of creditor rights affects the relationship between credit information sharing 
and bank lending; thereby, according to the hypothesis H3, we expect the sign of 3H to be 
negative so that the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending is less pronounced 
with better creditor protection. 
 In the robustness test, we re-estimate Equation (2-2) to Equation (2-4) with a few 
modifications and augmentations. We employ alternative measures of credit information 
sharing in each by replacing DEPTH with private credit bureau coverages (PRIV) and public 
credit registries coverages (PUB). Also, we add more country-level control variables that 
could potentially affect the volume of bank lending, including a deposit insurance dummy 
(DEPOSIT_INS) and political stability (POLITIC). In addition, we provide an instrumental 
variable regression by employing a legal origin dummy (LEGALORIGIN), ethnic 
fractionalization (ETHNIC_FRAC) and latitude (LATITUDE) as instrumental variables for 
credit information sharing and bank lending. 
2.4 Empirical Results and Robustness Tests 
2.4.1 Empirical Results 
2.4.1.1 The Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Lending 
Table 2-5 shows model selection and diagnostic tests for the regression analysis. All 
tests are applied to Equation (2-2) with no interaction terms. Next, we select the estimation 
technique based on the tests and apply it to Equation (2-3) and Equation (2-4)5. The tests 
show that the fixed effect regression is preferable to the pool regression and the random 
effect regression. Moreover, it suggests that the problems of heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation exist, so we adjust standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and cluster 
standard errors at bank-level to account for within-cluster correlation of the error term6. 
                                                
5 Adding interaction terms would not significantly change the overall results of the tests much. 
6 More detail of model selection tests and diagnostic tests can be found in the Appendix F. 
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Table 2-6 presents the regression results for Equation (2-2). In all regression results 
on the table, the growth rate of the logarithm of total gross loans (GLOAN) is used as a 
dependent variable and the level of credit information sharing is proxied by the depth of 
credit information sharing index (DEPTH). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
column 1 of the table reports the regression result for Equation (2-2). The coefficient of 
DEPTH (or 3/ in Equation (2-2)) is positive and significant (at 10% level), indicating that 
GLOAN is positively associated with DEPTH. The result is consistent with the hypothesis 
H1, suggesting that bank lending increases with more credit information sharing. 
By assessing the marginal impact of credit information sharing on bank lending 
holding all other variables at their sample mean, we find that a one-unit increase of DEPTH 
increases gross loans by approximately 2.3%. Total gross loans can increase up to 13.8%, 
should the depth of credit information sharing index increases to six (switching from a 
regime without credit information sharing to a regime with fully-fledged credit information 
sharing). Our result reflects the notion that banks are willing to extend more credit in 
countries with more credit information sharing because the information problems between 
banks and borrowers are less severe. In particular, information sharing among banks 
alleviates the problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, hold-up problem and over-
indebtedness that bank may face when they decide to extend credit (Pagano & Jappelli 1993; 
Padilla & Pagano 1997, 2000; Bennardo et al. 2014). As a result of a reduction in information 
problems, banks can price and lend to potential borrowers safely so that they are willing to 
grant loans.  
Our finding is consistent with several studies attempting to study the impact of credit 
information sharing on firms’ access-to-credit (Love & Mylenko 2003; Brown et al. 2009) 
and country-level private credit (Jappelli & Pagano 2002; Djankov et al. 2007). Those 
studies show that credit information sharing increases borrowers’ access to credit and the 
level of aggregate private credit. Our finding complements their studies by providing 
evidence that credit information sharing also increases the supply of individual bank lending. 
The increase in bank lending with more credit information sharing is also in line with the 
study of Fosu (2014), who provides the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending 
in African countries. However, our result suggests that the benefit of credit information 
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sharing on increasing bank lending is not limited to African countries but every country 
around the globe. 
As opposed to country-level data, examining bank lending with bank-level data 
ensures that individual banks’ reactions to credit information sharing are not confounded by 
aggregate variation in credit allocation. In particular, bank-level data helps to isolate 
variations in credit allocation arising from (unobserved) heterogeneity of banks. In addition, 
because we utilize bank-level data, as opposed to firm-level data (Brown et al. 2009), we are 
able to study the determinant of bank lending volume from the banks’ viewpoint, an 
approach consistent with theoretical analyses of information sharing in the credit market 
(Pagano & Jappelli 1993; Padilla & Pagano 1997, 2000; Bennardo et al. 2014). 
Regarding the bank-specific variables, we find that the bigger the size of the banks, 
as a proxy by total assets (SIZE), the larger the loans each bank offers. In addition, there is a 
significant positive correlation between net interest margin (NIM) and bank lending meaning 
that profitable banks lend more than less profitable banks. Less efficient banks, as reflected 
by a higher cost-to-income ratio (EFFICIENCY), tend to lend less compared to more 
efficient banks. Moreover, banks with lower a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLR) 
lends more. Regarding the macroeconomic control variables, a higher rate of real GDP 
growth (GDPG) is positively associated with bank lending; however, we don’t find that 
inflation (INF) affect bank lending decision. We also find that banking concentration (CCT3) 
and bank lending has no significant relationship. Last but not least, our results provide 
evidence that stringent capital regulation (CAPITAL_STR) is associated with lower bank 
lending. 
2.4.1.2 The Impact of Information Asymmetry on the Relationship between Credit 
Information Sharing and Bank Lending 
We have shown that credit information sharing increases bank lending; however, the 
impact can vary under different degree of the asymmetric information environment. 
Specifically, we test whether, and to what extent, the transparency of information 
environment affect the relationship between credit information sharing and bank lending. 
Information problems between banks and borrowers should be less problematic when the 
information environment is transparent. In more transparent information environment, 
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borrowers are relatively less opaque and banks can easily acquire necessary information 
about potential loan applicants. In such information environment, the benefits of credit 
information sharing among banks should be relatively less effective in enhancing bank 
lending.  
 Table 2-7 presents the regression results for Equation (2-3). The column 2 and 3 of 
the table show the regression results for Equation (2-3) which proxies the information 
environment transparency by the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The coefficient of the 
interaction term between DEPTH and IFRS (or 3H in Equation (2-3)) is negatively significant 
(at 10% level). Since the value one of the IFRS dummy proxies for more transparent 
information environment, the negative coefficient of the interaction indicates that IFRS 
attenuates the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending. This result supports our 
hypothesis H2 that the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending is less 
pronounced in a country with more transparent information environment as proxied by 
mandatory IFRS adoption.  
 By evaluating the moderating effect of IFRS on the relationship between credit 
information sharing and bank lending, we find that a one-unit increase of DEPTH is 
associated with an increase of GLOAN by 2.5% when the country does not adopt mandatory 
IFRS. However, when the country adopts mandatory IFRS, a one-unit increase of DEPTH 
will increase GLOAN by 2%. Although the coefficient of the interaction term is significant, 
the magnitude of the moderating impact of IFRS on the relationship between DEPTH and 
GLOAN is not enormous. 
The column 4 and 5 of the same table report the regression results for Equation (2-3) 
which proxies the information environment transparency by the business extent of disclosure 
index (BDI). The coefficient of the interaction term between DEPTH and BDI (or 3H in 
Equation (2-3)) is negatively significant (at 5% level). This negative significance of the 
interaction term suggests that the benefit of credit information sharing in increasing bank 
lending is lower as BDI is higher. Like the result of IFRS, the result with BDI as a proxy of 
information environment transparency supports the hypothesis H2 that the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank lending is less pronounced in a country with more transparent 
information environment. 
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 The moderating impact of BDI on the relationship between DEPTH and GLOAN is 
evaluated at the 25th and 75th percentiles of BDI. We find that DEPTH can increase GLOAN 
by between 2.4% and 2.5%, depending on the degree of BDI. Specifically, a unit-increase of 
DEPTH is associated with an increase in GLOAN by 2.5% when BDI is at the 25th percentile. 
However, the impact is reduced to 2.4% when BDI is at the 75th percentile. Therefore, we 
can see that there is a moderating effect of BDI on the relationship between credit 
information sharing and bank lending decision, although the magnitude of such effect is not 
strong. 
2.4.1.3 The Impact of Creditor Rights on the Relationship between Credit 
Information Sharing and Bank Lending 
 In this following section, we test how, and to what extent, the protection of creditors 
affect the relationship between credit information sharing and bank lending. Djankov et al. 
(2007) suggest that better creditor protection through the legal system is a substitute for 
credit information sharing in fostering credit market expansion. When banks are better 
protected, banks can more easily force repayment, grab collateral, or even gain control of 
the firm (Townsend 1979; Aghion & Bolton 1992; Hart & Moore 1994, 1998). As a result, 
banks are concerned less about the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard and they 
are more willing to grant loans. Thus, the positive impact of credit information sharing on 
lending should be less pronounced in countries with strong creditor rights. This prediction 
is our hypothesis H3. 
The regression results for Equation (2-4) are shown in Table 2-8. While the 
coefficient of DEPTH (or 3/ in Equation (2-4)) is positive, it is not significant. The impact of 
credit information sharing on lending is only significant through its interaction with CR. As 
displayed in Table 2-8, the coefficient of the interaction term between DEPTH and CR (or 3H in Equation (2-4)) is negative and significant (at 1% level). The significant interaction term 
suggests that the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending hinges on the level of 
creditor rights. At the same time, the negative sign of the interaction term reveals that credit 
information sharing decreases bank lending when the level of creditor protection is strong. 
According to Table 2-8, a one-unit increase of DEPTH can decrease GLOAN by up 
to 3.6%, depending on the level of creditor protection. Specifically, when the value of CR is 
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1, a one-unit increase of DEPTH decreases loans by 0.9%. For the CR value of 2, 3 and 4, a 
one-unit increase of DEPTH reduces loans by 1.8%, 2.7%, and 3.6%, respectively. 
Remarkably, when the creditor rights are very weak (CR = 0), credit information sharing has 
no notable effect on bank lending. Thus, the negative impact of credit information sharing 
on lending depends on the level of creditor rights and such negative impact increases with 
stronger creditor rights. 
Overall, our results on Table 2-8 do not support our hypothesis H3. Yet, there are 
two appealing implications. First, an increase in lending from stronger creditor rights can be 
reduced with credit information sharing. Due to strong creditor rights, banks have an 
incentive to extend more loans to a wider (potentially riskier) set of borrowers, regardless of 
the problem of information asymmetry. At the same time, credit information sharing may 
prevent such opportunistic behaviors by ensuring that excessive and potentially risky lending 
is not possible. Moreover, by enhancing borrowers’ incentive to repay, credit information 
sharing may reduce the riskiness of the pool of borrowers, so opportunistic lending is less 
likely. Second, we can infer from the results that credit information sharing is 
complementary to creditor rights. Credit information sharing has no value when creditor 
rights are very weak, but when combined with adequately strong creditor rights, it 
significantly affects bank lending. This implies that some degree of creditor protection is 
necessary to guarantee the effect of information sharing on lending. 
2.4.2 Robustness Tests 
 We conduct several robustness tests of our results. First, we proxy the level of credit 
information sharing in each country by two other measures, consisting of private credit 
bureau coverages (PRIV) and public credit registries coverages (PUB). Second, we augment 
each of Equation (2-2), (2-3) and (2-4) with additional control variables that could potentially 
influence the volume of bank lending. Third, we provide a subsample analysis for the 
robustness of our results regarding the hypothesis H2 and H3. Fourth, we provide another 
subsample analysis by excluding banks in the USA because majorities of banks in the sample 
comprise of the USA’s banks. Lastly, an instrumental variable approach is employed to 
check for the robustness of the main results. 
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2.4.2.1 Alternative Measures of Credit Information Sharing 
 As an alternative to the depth of credit information sharing index, we use private 
credit bureau coverage (PRIV) and public credit bureau coverage (PUB) to proxy for the 
level of credit information sharing in each country. The regression results with PRIV is 
shown in Table 2-9. Noted that higher PRIV indicates a higher level of credit information 
sharing through private credit bureaus. Regarding the hypothesis H1, the result in column 1 
still supports that bank lending increases with credit information sharing. Economically, a 
one-percentage increase in PRIV is corresponding to a 0.155% increase in GLOAN. 
 Moreover, the results in column 2 to column 5 show the hypothesis H2 remain 
consistent with both IFRS and BDI used as proxies of information asymmetry. Specifically, 
the coefficient of the interaction term between IFRS and PRIV is significantly negative. A 
one-percentage increase of PRIV increases bank lending by 0.125% when there is no 
adoption of IFRS, whereas the one-percentage increase of PRIV can increases bank lending 
by 0.085% when there exists IFRS adoption in a country. Regarding the coefficient of the 
interaction term between BDI and PRIV, it is also significantly negative. By evaluating at 
25th percentile and 75th percentile of BDI, we can see that a one-percentage increase of PRIV 
increases bank lending by 0.148% and 0.139% at 25th percentile and 75th percentile, 
respectively. Thus, both results with IFRS and BDI suggest that the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank lending is less pronounced with more transparent information 
environment.  
 We also conduct the sensitivity check for the hypothesis H3. The results are shown 
in column 6 and column 7. The results are in line with the main results, which are not 
consistent with the hypothesis H3. The effect of PRIV is only significant through its 
interaction with CR. The coefficient of the interaction term between CR and PRIV is 
significantly negative suggesting that the impact of PRIV on GLOAN is negative and more 
pronounced with higher CR. In particular, an one-percentage increase of PRIV reduces bank 
lending 0.012%, 0.024%, 0.036% and 0.048% for the value of CR equal to 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively. However, the impact of PRIV has no notable effect on bank lending when the 
value of CR is zero. As stated earlier, the possible explanation is that some degree of creditor 
protection is needed to encourage banks to extend more credit although costly information 
asymmetries may have been reduced with more credit information sharing. In addition, when 
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creditor rights are strong, credit information sharing reduces bank lending instead of 
increasing it by preventing excessive and/or opportunistic lending. 
 The regression results with PUB is shown in Table 2-10. Noted that higher PUB 
means more credit information sharing through public credit registries. The impact of PUB 
on bank lending is found to be insignificant in all models. One possible explanation of the 
insignificance of PUB could be that, as a result of banks’ credit information sharing through 
the public credit registry, the increase in lending to safe borrowers is exactly balanced by the 
decrease in lending to risky borrowers (Pagano & Jappelli 1993). Another possible 
explanation is that the public credit registries are developed by bank supervisors as to ensure 
bank stability by identifying the main debtors of the financial system and analyzing more 
carefully loan concentration risk (Majnoni et al. 2004). With the establishment of the public 
credit registries, bank supervisors can monitor banks’ activities and enforce banks’ reserve 
policies against problem loans. Thus, banks have less ability to lend to risky borrowers and 
become vigilant when they decide to grant loans. 
 Generally, a public credit registry has limitations when compared to a private credit 
bureau. It is quite common for public credit registries to set a minimum loan size and 
therefore to collect information only on loans in excess of this amount (Miller, 2003). 
Furthermore, the information from public credit registries consists mainly of credit data and 
is disseminated in consolidated form (so that details about individual loans are not available). 
In addition, public registries only collect data from supervised institutions like banks. In 
contrast, private credit bureaus offer details on individual loans and merge credit data with 
data from other sources (e.g., ﬁrms, leasing and ﬁnance companies, retail establishments, 
courts, tax authorities, and ﬁnancial statements), though they are less comprehensive in 
coverage (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). More importantly, in most cases, historical data are 
not made available to ﬁnancial institutions via the public credit registries (Miller, 2003). 
2.4.2.2 Additional Control Variables 
 We control for additional macro factors that could potentially affect bank lending. 
First, we incorporate a dummy variable indicating the existence of a deposit insurance 
regime in a country. This dummy is equal to 1 if the country has a deposit insurance regime 
in a country, while it is equal to zero if the country does not adopt a deposit insurance regime. 
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Theoretically, deposit insurance schemes are designed to prevent bank runs (when depositors 
attempt to withdraw their funds all at once) by supporting failing banks with necessary 
resources (Keeley 1990; Matutes & Vives 1996; Diamond & Dybvig 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. 2008). There is also the potential for contagious bank runs on other healthy banks 
(Allen & Gale 2000). Therefore, many countries enact deposit insurance schemes to improve 
banking sector stability and reduce the probability of systemic crises (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache 2002). 
 With deposit insurance, depositors are less concerned about their funds knowing that 
they will be reimbursed in case banks fail. This reduce the same type of fear that caused the 
bank run in the 1930s. Banks can increase their risk-taking behavior and willing to extend 
loans without concerning about the likelihood of bank run. Thus, banks in a country with a 
deposit insurance regime tend to lend more than in a country without such regime (Diamond 
& Dybvig 1986; Ivashina & Scharfstein 2010).  
Table 2-11 reports the regression results with a deposit insurance dummy 
(DEPOSIT_INS) as one of control factors affecting bank lending. The coefficients of DEPTH 
and its interaction terms with proxies of information asymmetry (IFRS and BDI) and creditor 
rights index (CR) remain significant across all regression results. Like the main results, 
DEPTH is only significant through its interaction with CR. Thus, our main results are still 
robust with DEPOSIT_INS as one of control variables. Looking at the coefficients of 
DEPOSIT_INS across all regression results, we see that some of them are significant. The 
coefficient of DEPOSIT_INS in the baseline regression (column 1) is positive and significant 
at 10% level, suggesting that there is a significant impact of deposit insurance regime on the 
volume of bank lending. One possible reason for explaining the insignificance of 
DEPOSIT_INS is that banks may increase risk-taking in non-lending activities. 
 We also control for the stability of political aspects in a country by including the 
political stability index (POLITIC) from the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 
2011). The index measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. High values mean more stable political 
environment. Political instability can affect both supply and demand of loans. On the one 
hand, when a country is politically unstable, it can have a great impact on investor and 
consumer confidence and it may make them reluctant to invest in new capital or enter new 
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markets. This would reduce the demand for credit. On the other hand, banks are also reluctant 
to extend new loans due to political instability and potential political turmoil. 
 Table 2-12 reports the regression results with political stability index (POLITIC) as 
one of control variable affecting bank lending. The inclusion of POLITIC has no effect on 
our main results. Thus, our main results are still robust with POLITIC as one of control 
variables. Looking at the coefficients of POLITIC across all regression results, they are 
positive and highly significant, suggesting that the stability of political environment is very 
crucial for bank lending decision. 
2.4.2.3 Subsample Analysis 
In this section, we provide a subsample analysis. We classify the sample based on 
each proxy of the information environment. Based on IFRS dummy, one subsample consists 
of observations with IFRS proxied for more transparent information environment, while 
another subsample consists of observations with NON-IFRS proxied for low transparent 
information environment. Based on BDI, one subsample consists of observations with the 
value of BDI above the sample median (HIGH BDI) to proxy for high transparent 
information environment, while another subsample consists of observations with the value 
of BDI below the sample median (LOW BDI) to proxy for low transparent information 
environment.   
Table 2-13 reports the subsample analysis based on IFRS and BDI. The subsample 
with IFRS in the column (1) shows that the coefficient of DEPTH is positive but not 
significant, whereas the subsample with NON-IFRS in the column (2) shows that the 
coefficient of DEPTH is positive and significant (at 10% level). In comparison to the 
subsample with NON-IFRS, the coefficient of DEPTH in the subsample with IFRS is not 
significant at all. This suggests that credit information sharing has an impact on bank risk 
only in the subsample with NON-IFRS adoption. Economically, when there is no adoption 
of IFRS, a one-unit increase of DEPTH is associated with 3.7% increase in lending. 
On the same table, the subsample with HIGH BDI in the column (3) shows that the 
coefficient of DEPTH is not significant, but the coefficient of DEPTH in the subsample with 
LOW BDI shown in the column (4) is significantly positive (at 5% level). This suggests that 
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not only the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk is more pronounced with LOW 
BDI, but such impact is not even significant with HIGH BDI. The one-unit increase of 
DEPTH is associated with a 3% increase to lending in the subsample with low BDI. Taken 
together, our main results related to the hypothesis H2 are still upheld with the subsample 
analysis based on IFRS and BDI as proxies of information asymmetry.  
In addition, we classify the sample based on the creditor rights index. One subsample 
consists of observations with the value of CR above the sample median (HIGH CR), while 
another subsample consists of observations with the value of CR below the sample median 
(LOW CR). According to our classification, HIGH CR is a group with high creditor rights 
index, whereas LOW CR is a group with low creditor rights index. The last two column on 
Table 2-13 reports the regression results for each subsample. The coefficients of DEPTH are 
statistically significant in both subsamples.  
However, the magnitude of DEPTH in the subsample with LOW CR is much greater 
than the subsample with HIGH CR. This indicates that the positive impact of DEPTH on 
lending decreases with the level of creditor rights. That is, a one-unit increase of DEPTH 
increases lending by 4.1% in the subsample with low creditor rights index, but its impact on 
lending decreases to 1.5% in the subsample with high creditor rights index. Thus, our main 
results are still robust to the subsample analysis based on the creditor rights index. 
2.4.2.4 Non-USA Sample 
 The main results may be driven by banks in the United States of America (USA) 
because the sample comprises of numerous banks in the USA. Thus, we subsample by 
excluding banks in the USA and re-estimate each of Equation (2-2), (2-3) and (2-4). The 
results are shown in Table 2-14. The number of the observation shrinks by almost half. 
Overall, the results show that exclusion of banks in the USA does not change our main 
results. We can see that the coefficient of DEPTH on column 1 is not only significant but 
also slightly higher than the one in the main sample. 
 By evaluating the marginal impact of DEPTH, the findings show that a one-unit 
increase in DEPTH is associated with a 4.4% increase in lending, consistent with the 
hypothesis H1. The hypothesis H2 is also robust. The adoption of IFRS slightly lower the 
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impact of credit information sharing on bank lending. Specifically, when the country does 
not adopt IFRS, a one-unit increase of DEPTH will increase lending by 4.9%. However, 
when the country adopts IFRS, a one-unit increase of DEPTH will increase lending by 4.6%.  
Regarding to the moderating impact of BDI, we find that a one-unit increase in 
DEPTH is associated with a 3.7% increase in lending at the 25th percentile of BDI, while the 
one-unit increase of DEPTH raises lending by 3.3% at the 75th percentile of BDI. Our results 
show that BDI has an impact on the relationship between credit information sharing and 
lending, although the impact of BDI is slightly. Furthermore, consistent with the main 
results, credit information sharing decreases bank lending ranging from 1.2% to 4.8% 
depending on the value of creditor rights index. Like the main results, credit information 
sharing has no notable impact on lending when the credit rights index is zero. 
2.4.2.5 Instrumental Variable Approach 
We perform an instrumental variable approach to avoid any potential endogeneity 
problem that could exist due to the reverse causality between credit information sharing and 
bank lending7. We select the instrumental variables based on the existing literature on law 
and finance (Easterly & Levine 1997; LaPorta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 1999; Beck et al. 
2003; Acemoglu & Johnson 2005). Specifically, we employ legal origins, ethnic 
fractionalization, and latitude as instrumental variables for DEPTH8. They are previously 
used in Barth et al. (2009), Houston et al. (2010), Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2012) and Fu 
et al. (2014) as instruments. Because our instruments consist of time-invariant variables, we 
use a two-stage least square (2SLS) with pooled OLS estimations rather than fixed effects 
estimations. 
 To test for the endogeneity of DEPTH, we perform the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity in a regression estimated with 
IV approach, the null hypothesis for which states that an OLS estimator of the same equation 
would yield consistent estimates: that is, any endogeneity among the regressors would not 
                                                
7 The reverse causality between credit information sharing and bank lending is less problematic in our study 
because we investigate the effect of credit information sharing agencies on the volume of bank lending of 
individual bank firms. 
8 Refer to Appendix G for the rationales behind selecting instruments 
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have harmful effects on OLS estimates (Durbin 1954; Wu 1974; Hausman 1978; Baum et 
al. 2007). A rejection of the null indicates that the effects of endogenous regressors on the 
estimates are meaningful, and instrumental variables approaches are necessary. This 
rejection means that DEPTH can be treated as exogenous under the null hypothesis. After 
we perform the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity, the estimation shows that the p-
value is 0.7816 so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Thus, we can treat depth of credit 
information sharing as exogenous. Nonetheless, we perform robustness tests for Equation 
(2-2) to (2-4) by employing an instrumental variable approach. The results are presented in 
Table 2-15, Table 2-16 and Table 2-17. 
 To test for the relevance and validity of the instruments of the credit information 
sharing, we perform the First Stage F-test and the Hansen’s J test. Specifically, with regards 
to the relevance of these instruments, we conduct an F-test of the excluded instruments in 
the corresponding first-stage regression. The null hypothesis of the test is that the 
instruments do not explain cross-sectional differences in the credit information measure. On 
all tables, we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level in all regressions. In addition, the 
Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected suggesting that the 
instruments are valid instruments, uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation9. 
 As we have confirmed the relevance and validity of our instruments, we continue to 
analyze the IV regression results of each table. First, we analyze the IV regression results 
for Equation (2-2). On Table 2-15, the first column reports the second stage regression, while 
the second column reports the first stage regression. The main result is still robust and 
consistent with our first hypothesis H1. The coefficient of DEPTH remains positive and 
significant. The result with IV approach confirms our main finding that bank lending 
increases with credit information sharing. Moreover, the IV coefficient is much larger than 
the coefficient of the fixed effect regression, indicating the presence of potential 
measurement error, which inflates the IV coefficient. Nonetheless, our conclusion does not 
                                                
9 By confirming the relevance and validity of our instruments, we are not claiming that these variables are the 
best instrumental variables, but we hold that these instruments are reasonably exogenous and have adequate 
explanatory power for the credit information sharing measure 
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depend on the instrumentation approach because DEPTH is not endogenous and poses no 
concern of endogeneity. 
 For Equation (2-3) and (2-4), we split the sample into two subsamples based on each 
of information environment proxies and the creditor rights index. The regression results of 
Equation (2-3) are reported in Table 2-16. The first four columns of Table 2-16 present the 
IV regressions of two subsamples that are split based on IFRS as a proxy of information 
environment transparency. The results are robust and consistent with our second hypothesis 
H2. The coefficient of DEPTH is only significant in the subsample without the mandatory 
IFRS adoption suggesting that the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending is 
more pronounced when the information environment is less transparent. Similar results are 
applied to the subsample based on BDI. In column 5 to column 8 of Table 2-16, the 
coefficient of DEPTH is only significant in the subsample with LOW BDI suggesting that 
the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending is more pronounced when the 
information environment is less transparent. 
 Regarding Equation (2-4), Table 2-17 presents the IV regressions of two subsamples 
which are split based on the value of creditor rights index. The value of creditor rights index 
above the median value of the sample is corresponded to the high level of creditors’ 
protection (HIGH CR), while the value of creditor rights index below the median value of 
the sample corresponds to the low level of creditors’ protection (LOW CR). The coefficient 
of DEPTH is positive and significant only in the subsample with LOW CR. This result does 
not pose a serious problem to our main results because our IV approach is based on pooled 
OLS estimations rather than fixed effects estimations. With pooled OLS estimations, the 
estimates may be biased and inefficient. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to examine the relationship between credit information sharing 
and bank lending of 16,009 banks in 113 countries during the period of 2005 – 2013. The 
theory makes no clear-cut predictions about the impact of information sharing on the volume 
of bank lending. Therefore, we provide an analysis by employing a bank-level data around 
the globe. Unlike previous studies, we provide bank-level lending (supply side) evidence, 
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which is consistent with theoretical predictions of credit information sharing in credit 
markets. 
The results show that credit information sharing has a positive impact on bank 
lending. This finding is consistent with theoretical analyses supporting that credit 
information sharing promotes bank lending. Since credit information sharing facilitates 
lending decision, banks tend to provide more credits in countries with more credit 
information sharing. With more information sharing, banks are more willing to lend as the 
asymmetric information between banks and borrowers are less problematic.  
Moreover, we examine the impact of information environment on the relationship 
between credit information sharing and bank lending. We proxy the transparency of the 
information environment by mandatory IFRS adoption and the extent of business disclosure. 
The results reveal that the positive association between credit information sharing and bank 
lending is less pronounced in countries with mandatory IFRS adoption and greater extent of 
business disclosure. When the information environment is more transparent, borrower 
information is plentifully available and accessible to the public. Therefore, the positive 
impact of credit information sharing on bank lending tends to be less pronounced with more 
transparent information environment.  
We also explore whether the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending 
varies with the level of creditor protection. We find that credit information sharing only 
affects bank lending through its interaction with creditor rights index. Our finding shows 
that credit information sharing reduces bank lending in countries with well-protected 
creditors, while it has no notable effect on bank lending in countries with low creditor 
protection. From this finding, we can infer that credit information sharing reduce an increase 
in lending from stronger creditor protection. Furthermore, we can infer that credit 
information sharing is complementary to creditor rights, such that some degree of creditor 
protection is required to guarantee the effect of information sharing on lending.  
Our results are robust to additional country-level control variables, subsample 
analysis, non-USA sample and an instrumental variable approach. The exception is the 
robustness test with alternative measures of credit information sharing. While we find that 
bank lending increases with information sharing through private credit bureaus, there is no 
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significant impact of information sharing through public credit registries on bank lending. 
The possible explanation may be because the increase in lending to safe borrowers matches 
the decrease to risky borrowers (Pagano & Jappelli 1993). Another possible explanation is 
that public credit registries are developed by bank supervisors to monitor bank activities by 
ensuring bank stability (Majnoni et al. 2004). 
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Table 2-1: Summary of Variables, Symbols and Sources 
Variable Description Original 
Sources 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
GLOAN 
Growth of 
Gross Loans 
The change of the natural logarithm of total amount of loans to 
households and firms (billion US dollars). It is calculated as the 
difference between the natural logarithm of gross loans in current 
period and the natural logarithm of gross loans in previous 
period. 
!"#$%&,( = *+, "#$%&,( − *+, "#$%&,(./  
Higher (lower) value indicates higher (lower) bank lending 
BankScope 
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
DEPTH 
Depth of Credit 
Information 
Sharing index 
An index that measures the scope and contents of credit 
information that being shared. It ranges from zero to six. The 
value of zero indicates that there is no public credit registry or 
private credit bureau operating in a country. The value of one is 
added to the index with each of the following characteristics: 
• Both positive and negative information are distributed. 
• Data on households and firms are distributed. 
• Data from retailers, trade creditors, and/or utility 
companies as well as financial institutions are 
distributed. 
• More than 2 years of data are available. 
• Data are collected and distributed on loans with value 
below 1% of income per capita. 
• Laws give right to borrowers to inspect their own data. 
Higher (lower) DEPTH indicates more (lower) credit 
information sharing level 
World Bank’s 
Doing 
Business 
PRIV 
Private Credit 
Bureau 
Coverage (%) 
This variable reports the number of individuals and firms listed 
in private credit bureau’s database with information on 
repayment, unpaid debt or credit outstanding from the past five 
years. The number is expressed as a percentage of the adult 
population (the population age 15 and above according to the 
World Development Indicators). If no private bureau operates, 
the coverage value is 0%. 
Higher (lower) PRIV indicates more (lower) credit information 
sharing level (through private credit bureaus) 
World Bank’s 
Doing 
Business 
PUB 
Public Credit 
Registry 
Coverage (%) 
This variable reports the number of individuals and firms listed 
in public credit registry’s database with information on 
repayment, unpaid debt or credit outstanding from the past five 
years. The number is expressed as a percentage of the adult 
population (the population age 15 and above according to the 
World Bank’s 
Doing 
Business 
59	
	
World Development Indicators). If no public registry operates, 
the coverage value is 0%. 
Higher (lower) PUB indicates more (lower) credit information 
sharing level (through public credit registries) 
IFRS 
International 
Financial 
Reporting 
Standard 
(IFRS) 
A dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 for a country (and 
year) that adopts IFRS and 0 otherwise. 
A value of one (zero) indicates more (less) transparent 
information environment. 
“IFRS 
foundation 
and IASB”, 
Deloitte and 
Simon Fraser 
University in 
Canada 
BDI 
Business Extent 
of Disclosure 
Index (BDI) 
This index measures the extent to which investors are protected 
through disclosure of ownership and financial information 
(World Bank’s Doing Business 2016). It ranges from 0 to 10 with 
higher value indicating more disclosure of ownership and 
financial information to investors. 
Higher (lower) index indicates more (less) transparent 
information environment. 
World Bank’s 
Doing 
Business 
CR 
Creditor Right 
index 
An aggregate measure of creditor legal protection created based 
on the methodology proposed by LaPorta et al. (1998). The index 
is ranging from zero to four. The index consists of 4 components: 
• Restrictions on reorganization: whether there are 
restrictions imposed, such as creditors’ consent or 
minimum divided, when a debtor files for 
reorganization. 
• No automatic stay: whether secured creditors are able to 
gain possession of assets after the petition for 
reorganization is approved, that is, whether there is no 
automatic stay or asset freeze imposed by the court on 
a creditor’s ability to seize collateral. 
• Secured creditor paid first: whether secured creditors 
are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds of 
liquidating a bankrupt firm as opposed to other creditors 
such as government or workers 
• No management stay: whether the incumbent 
management does not stay in control of the firm during 
the reorganization, in other words, whether an 
administrator, not the management, is responsible for 
running the business during the reorganization 
A value of one is added to the index when a country’s laws and 
regulations provide each of these powers to secured lenders. 
Higher index indicates that secured lenders are better protected 
in case a borrower defaults. 
LaPorta et al. 
(1998); 
Djankov et al. 
(2007) 
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Higher (lower) index indicates greater (less) protection of 
creditors 
B
an
k-
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SIZE Bank Size The logarithm of bank’s assets (billion US dollars) BankScope 
NIM 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a share of its 
interest-bearing (total earning) assets. It tracks the profitability of 
a bank’s investing and lending activities. 
BankScope 
EFFICIENCY 
Cost-to-Income 
Ratio 
This is a ratio of the overhead (or cost of running the bank) to 
operating income (interest and non-interest income), which 
reflects operations on both on and off balance sheet. This 
measures the bank’s efficiency. Overheads is data2090; Interest 
income is data2080; Non-interest income is data2085. This is 
similar to data4029 in BankScope. 
BankScope 
DEP 
Deposit to 
Asset 
This is a ratio of total deposits to total bank assets. Total deposits 
include total customer deposits (data11550), deposits of 
governments and municipalities (data38382) and deposits from 
banks (data11560) 
BankScope 
LLR 
Loan Loss 
Reserves to 
Gross Loans 
Ratio 
It is a ratio of total loan loss reserves (data2070 or data11080) to 
total gross loans (data2001 or data11100). This measure a reserve 
for losses expressed as percentage of total loans. The ratio is 
equivalent to data4001 or data18205 in Bankscope. 
BankScope 
C
ou
nt
ry
-S
pe
ci
fic
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
GDPG 
A growth rate 
of gross 
domestic 
products (GDP) 
This variable is a growth rate of GDP. It captures macroeconomic 
developments and a proxy for fluctuation in economic activities. 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI) 
INF Inflation 
This inflation variable is proxied by the consumer price index 
(CPI). It links to the fluctuation of price movement and higher 
inflation is associated with high nominal interest, reflecting poor 
macroeconomic management. 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI) 
CCT3 
Bank 
Concentration 
Ratio 
Assets of three largest banks as a share of total banking assets. 
Total assets include total earning assets, cash and due from 
banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed assets, goodwill, other 
intangibles, current tax assets, deferred tax assets, discontinued 
operations and other assets. 
World Bank’s 
Global 
Financial 
Development 
database; 
BankScope 
CAPITAL_STR 
Capital 
Stringency 
Index 
This is an index measuring the extent of both initial and overall 
capital stringency. The index ranges from 0 to 10. This index is 
constructed from following questions: 
1. Whether the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement is 
in line with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
guidelines 
World Bank’s 
Bank 
Regulation 
and 
Supervision 
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2. Does the minimum ratio varies as a function of an 
individual bank’s credit risk? 
3. Does the minimum ratio varies as a function of an 
individual bank’s market risk? 
4. Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which 
of the following are deducted from the book value of 
capital: 
a. Market value of loan losses not realized in 
accounting books? 
b. Unrealized losses in securities portfolios?  
c. Unrealized foreign exchange losses? 
5. What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of 
capital? (1 if the fraction is less than 0.75 and 0 
otherwise) 
6. Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by 
the regulatory/supervisory authorities? 
7. Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of 
capital be done with assets other than cash or government 
securities? 
8. Can initial capital contributions by prospective 
shareholders be in the form of borrowed funds? 
DEPOSIT_INS 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Dummy 
A dummy variable indicating if the country had or not explicit 
deposit insurance system and zero otherwise. 
Barth et al. 
(2006); Barth 
et al. (2013a) 
POLITIC Political 
Stability Index 
The indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence 
and terrorism. The value of year 2005 is used in this study. 
Higher values mean more stable political environment. 
World Bank’s 
Governance 
Indicators by 
Kaufmann et 
al. (2009) 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
LEGALORIGIN Legal Origin 
A dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has 
English legal origin and otherwise zero. 
Djankov et al. 
(2007) 
ETHNIC_FRAC 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
This variable captures the ethnic diversity in a country. It 
measures probability that two randomly selected people from a 
given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. 
Easterly 
(2001) 
LATITUDE Latitude 
This variable measures the geographical latitude of a country. It 
is calculated as an absolute value of the latitude of the country 
scaled to take a value between zero and one 
La Porta et al. 
(1999); 
Central 
Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) 
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Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics 
    Variable Obs. Mean Stdev. Min Max P25 P50 P75 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
va
ri
ab
le
 
  GLOAN  99,680  0.089 0.301 -8.510 9.410 -0.021 0.052 0.142 
E
xp
la
na
to
ry
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
C
IS
 
DEPTH  99,680  5.010 1.100 0.000 6.000 4.000 5.000 6.000 
PRIV  99,680  0.788 0.357 0.000 1.000 0.678 1.000 1.000 
PUB  99,680  0.098 0.110 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.0270 0.241 
A
SY
M
 
IFRS  99,680  0.305 0.460 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BDI  99,680  6.420 1.770 0.000 10.000 6.000 7.000 7.000 
  CR  99,680  1.540 0.880 0.000 4.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 
B
an
k-
sp
ec
ifi
c 
C
on
tr
ol
 
  SIZE  99,680  5.740 2.160 -6.250 20.400 4.510 5.510 6.760 
  NIM  99,680  0.040 0.040 -3.700 3.520 0.026 0.036 0.045 
  EFFICIENCY  99,680  0.716 0.377 0.000 9.890 0.578 0.677 0.783 
  DEP  99,680  0.783 0.197 0.000 2.750 0.749 0.844 0.895 
  LLR  99,680  0.025 0.042 -0.063 0.995 0.010 0.015 0.024 
C
ou
nt
ry
-s
pe
ci
fic
 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
  GDPG  99,680  0.020 0.029 -0.148 0.226 0.009 0.022 0.034 
  INF  99,680  0.031 0.045 -0.251 1.040 0.012 0.020 0.031 
  CCT3  99,680  0.428 0.176 0.073 1.000 0.322 0.351 0.548 
  CAPITAL_STR  99,680  6.830 1.350 0.000 8.000 6.000 7.000 8.000 
  DEPOSIT_INS  99,680  0.961 0.193 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  POLITIC  99,680  0.397 0.593 -2.500 1.590 0.374 0.502 0.635 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
   LEGALORIGIN  99,680  0.587 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
  ETHNIC_FRAC  92,795  0.375 0.220 0.000 0.930 0.100 0.500 0.500 
  LATITUDE  98,793  0.700 0.082 0.295 0.835 0.691 0.691 0.763 
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables. GLOAN is the change of the natural logarithm of total gross loans in current 
year and previous year; CIS represents credit information sharing measures; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; 
PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); ASYM 
represents information environment proxies; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a 
business extent of disclosure index; CR is a creditor rights index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total 
asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a 
ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated 
from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent 
of both initial and overall capital stringency in a country; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if 
the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; POLITIC is a political stability index; LEGALORIGIN is 
dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic 
fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude 
of a country. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 2-1 in this chapter. Obs is observation. Stdev is for standard deviation. 
Min is minimum. Max is maximum. P25 is 25th percentile of the sample. P50 is 50th percentile (or median) of the sample. P75 is 
75th percentile of the sample 
 
63	
	
Table 2-3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variable GLOAN DEPTH PRIV PUB IFRS BDI CR SIZE NIM COST 
GLOAN 1.000                   
DEPTH 0.208 1.000                 
PRIV 0.164 0.730 1.000               
PUB -0.049 -0.327 -0.534 1.000             
IFRS 0.043 -0.298 -0.416 0.674 1.000           
BDI 0.037 -0.133 -0.354 -0.257 -0.348 1.000         
CR 0.041 -0.184 -0.417 0.463 0.447 -0.489 1.000       
SIZE 0.061 -0.204 -0.254 0.361 0.413 -0.144 0.265 1.000     
NIM 0.109 0.054 0.167 -0.284 -0.415 0.161 -0.307 -0.368 1.000   
COST -0.137 0.189 0.149 -0.111 -0.074 -0.024 -0.065 -0.256 -0.036 1.000 
DEP -0.167 0.421 0.271 -0.131 -0.063 0.021 -0.022 -0.128 -0.037 0.138 
LLR -0.027 -0.200 -0.266 0.219 0.163 -0.116 0.168 0.326 0.026 -0.100 
GDPG 0.226 -0.213 -0.275 0.038 -0.083 -0.135 0.095 -0.034 0.183 -0.137 
INF 0.295 -0.268 -0.121 -0.091 -0.172 0.093 -0.064 -0.109 0.379 -0.131 
CCT3 0.001 -0.082 -0.329 0.338 0.454 -0.456 0.463 0.211 -0.261 -0.058 
CAPITAL_STR -0.231 0.446 0.687 -0.433 -0.413 0.351 -0.489 -0.217 0.189 0.174 
DEPOSIT_INS -0.119 0.290 0.288 -0.175 -0.001 0.036 -0.092 -0.071 -0.064 0.115 
POLITIC -0.168 0.215 0.070 0.076 0.359 -0.288 0.230 0.170 -0.449 0.078 
LEGALORIGIN -0.085 0.530 0.718 -0.706 -0.673 0.531 -0.593 -0.337 0.374 0.095 
ETHNIC_FRAC 0.057 0.092 0.333 -0.606 -0.751 0.403 -0.628 -0.296 0.466 0.015 
LATITUDE -0.065 -0.174 -0.282 0.271 0.594 -0.326 0.460 0.259 -0.458 0.029 
This table presents a (Pearson) correlation matrix of variables. GLOAN is the change of the natural logarithm of total gross loans in current 
year and previous year; CIS represents credit information sharing measures; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; PRIV is 
private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); ASYM represents 
information environment proxies; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of 
disclosure index; CR is a creditor rights index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest 
margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross 
loans;  GDPG is a growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 
largest banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency in 
a country; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and 
zero otherwise; POLITIC is a political stability index; LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has 
English legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; 
LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude of a country. 
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Table 2-4: Pearson Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
Variable DEP LLR GDPG INF CCT3 CAPITAL_STR DEPOSIT_INS POLITIC LEGALORIGIN ETHNIC_FRAC LATITUDE 
DEP 1.000                     
LLP -0.114 1.000                   
GDPG -0.100 -0.037 1.000                 
INF -0.290 -0.071 0.426 1.000               
CCT3 0.101 0.142 -0.042 -0.086 1.000             
CAPITAL_STR 0.233 -0.122 -0.410 -0.300 -0.389 1.000           
DEPOSIT_INS 0.070 -0.097 -0.240 -0.225 -0.163 0.238 1.000         
POLITIC 0.315 -0.048 -0.241 -0.527 0.460 0.068 0.194 1.000       
LEGALORIGIN 0.204 -0.228 -0.096 0.092 -0.441 0.629 0.102 -0.255 1.000     
ETHNIC_FRAC -0.013 -0.137 0.130 0.308 -0.447 0.387 -0.096 -0.472 0.771 1.000   
LATITUDE -0.014 0.024 -0.166 -0.307 0.119 -0.244 0.313 0.493 -0.603 -0.697 1.000 
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This table presents a (Pearson) correlation matrix of variables. GLOAN is the change of the natural logarithm of total gross loans in current year and previous year; CIS represents credit information 
sharing measures; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); 
ASYM represents information environment proxies; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; CR is a creditor rights 
index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR 
is a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in a 
country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency in a country; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of 
one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; POLITIC is a political stability index; LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has 
English legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude 
of a country. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 2-1 in this chapter. 
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Table 2-5: Model Selection and Diagnostic Tests 
Panel A: Poolability Test 
F(16818, 98607) 40.07 
F(16818, 98607) P-value 0.00 
The test of poolability is performed to determine the presence of individual effects, αi in the regression model. H0: αi=0 for i = 1, 2, 3…., 
N. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the individual effects exist and the OLS estimates suffer from the problem of 
omitted variables. 
  
Panel B: Hausman Test 
Chi-sq(10) 1135.86 
Chi-sq(10) P-value 0.00 
The Hausman test is performed to choose between the fixed effect model and the random effect model. H0: difference in coefficients not 
systemic. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the fix effect regression model is preferable to the random effect. 
  
Panel C: Modified Wald Test for Groupwise Heteroskedasticity in Fixed Effect Regression Model 
Chi-sq(16819) 393.4 
Chi-sq(16819) P-value 0.00 
The modified Wald test is performed to test for the presence of groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals. H0: σ"# = σ# for i = 1, 2, 
3…., Ng, where Ng is the number of cross-sectional units. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that there exist the groupwise 
geteroskedasticity. 
  
Panel D: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 
F(1, 14657) 506.629 
F(1, 14657) P-value 0.00 
The Wooldridge test is performed to test for the presence of serial correlation. H0: no first-order autocorrelation. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates that data does not have first-order autocorrelation. 
 
 
67	
	
Table 2-6: The Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Lending 
Variable 
GLOAN 
(1) 
DEPTH 0.023* 
  (1.94) 
SIZE 0.110*** 
  (3.53) 
NIM 0.504** 
  (2.03) 
EFFICIENCY -0.054*** 
  (-3.71) 
DEP -0.011 
  (-0.11) 
LLR -0.029*** 
  (-2.65) 
GDPG 1.574*** 
  (4.19) 
INF 0.093 
  (0.39) 
CCT3 0.048 
  (0.69) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.012** 
  (-2.24) 
Constant -0.410* 
  (-1.69) 
R-squared 0.274 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes 
Time Dummies Yes 
Observations 99,680 
The table presents the regression result for the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending. The dependent 
variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the change of the natural logarithm of total gross loans in 
current year and previous year; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; SIZE is bank size calculated by 
taking a natural logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP 
is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth rate 
of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest 
banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall 
capital stringency in a country. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 2-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy 
variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are 
applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 2-7: The Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Lending: The Role of 
Information Asymmetry 
Variable 
GLOAN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DEPTH 0.023* 0.023** 0.025** 0.023* 0.031** 
  (1.94) (2.36) (2.04) (1.92) (2.83) 
IFRS   0.09** 0.06*     
    (2.33) (1.78)     
IFRS * DEPTH     -0.005*     
      (-1.70)     
BDI       0.007** 0.006* 
        (2.23) (1.90) 
BDI * DEPTH         -0.001** 
          (-2.22) 
SIZE 0.110*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 
  (3.53) (3.51) (3.51) (3.50) (3.49) 
NIM 0.504** 0.487* 0.487* 0.504** 0.504** 
  (2.03) (1.87) (1.87) (2.03) (2.03) 
EFFICIENCY -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
  (-3.71) (-3.83) (-3.82) (-3.72) (-3.72) 
DEP -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.011 -0.011 
  (-0.11) (-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.11) 
LLR -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
  (-2.65) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.65) (-2.65) 
GDPG 1.574*** 1.546*** 1.544*** 1.574*** 1.567*** 
  (4.19) (4.12) (4.09) (4.17) (4.13) 
INF 0.093 0.080 0.081 0.093 0.094 
  (0.39) (0.34) (0.34) (0.39) (0.39) 
CCT3 0.048 0.038 0.039 0.048 0.049 
  (0.69) (0.53) (0.54) (0.69) (0.69) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** 
  (-2.24) (-2.28) (-2.27) (-2.23) (-2.14) 
Constant -0.410* -0.389 -0.392 -0.404* -0.375 
  (-1.69) (-1.58) (-1.59) (-1.70) (-1.47) 
R-squared 0.274 0.275 0.275 0.274 0.274 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of information asymmetry on the relationship between credit information sharing 
and bank lending. The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the change of the natural logarithm of total 
gross loans in current year and previous year; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS and BDI are proxies of 
information environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of 
disclosure index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a 
cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth 
rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in a 
country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency in a country. 
Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 2-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 2-8: The Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Lending - The Role of Creditor 
Rights 
Variable 
GLOAN 
(1) (2) (3) 
DEPTH 0.023* 0.023** 0.07 
  (1.94) (2.07) (1.30) 
CR   0.01** 0.045*** 
    (2.27) (3.43) 
CR * DEPTH     -0.009*** 
      (-3.79) 
SIZE 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 
  (3.53) (3.53) (3.52) 
NIM 0.504** 0.504** 0.505** 
  (2.03) (2.03) (2.03) 
EFFICIENCY -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
  (-3.71) (-3.71) (-3.74) 
DEP -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 
  (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.09) 
LLR -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
  (-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.65) 
GDPG 1.574*** 1.574*** 1.558*** 
  (4.19) (4.19) (4.17) 
INF 0.093 0.093 0.135 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.56) 
CCT3 0.048 0.048 0.054 
  (0.69) (0.69) (0.77) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** 
  (-2.24) (-2.24) (-2.24) 
Constant -0.410* -0.410* -0.488* 
  (-1.69) (-1.69) (-1.96) 
R-squared 0.274 0.274 0.274 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 99,680 99,680 99,680 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of creditor rights on the relationship between credit information sharing and bank 
lending. The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the change of the natural logarithm of total gross loans 
in current year and previous year; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; CR is a creditor rights index; SIZE is bank size 
calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio 
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of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 
is a concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital 
stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency in a country. Further detail of all variables is presented 
in Table 2-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at 
the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 2-9: Estimation Results with Alternative Proxy of Credit Information Sharing - Private 
Credit Bureau Coverages 
Variable 
GLOAN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PRIV 0.155* 0.150** 0.125** 0.153** 0.202** 0.155** 0.183 
  (1.92) (2.06) (2.03) (2.04) (2.13) (2.22) (1.53) 
IFRS   0.109*** 0.068*         
    (5.74) (1.74)         
IFRS * PRIV     -0.04**         
      (-2.72)         
BDI       0.010** 0.013     
        (2.22) (0.95)     
BDI * PRIV         -0.009*     
          (-1.69)     
CR           0.015** 0.07*** 
            (2.27) (3.43) 
CR * PRIV             -0.012** 
              (-2.24) 
SIZE 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.104*** 
  (3.77) (3.73) (3.71) (3.74) (3.74) (3.77) (3.64) 
NIM 0.490* 0.473* 0.468* 0.490* 0.490* 0.490* 0.478* 
  (1.93) (1.78) (1.76) (1.93) (1.93) (1.93) (1.87) 
EFFICIENCY -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.052*** 
  (-3.24) (-3.34) (-3.36) (-3.25) (-3.27) (-3.24) (-3.38) 
DEP -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 
  (-0.03) (-0.08) (-0.09) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.08) 
LLR -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
  (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.65) 
GDPG 1.641*** 1.614*** 1.634*** 1.640*** 1.637*** 1.641*** 1.606*** 
  (4.28) (4.18) (4.17) (4.25) (4.26) (4.28) (4.06) 
INF 0.067 0.054 0.035 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.046 
  (0.26) (0.21) (0.14) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.19) 
CCT3 0.066 0.056 0.053 0.065 0.067 0.066 0.062 
  (0.88) (0.73) (0.67) (0.87) (0.89) (0.88) (0.84) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.009* -0.009** -0.008* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* 
  (-1.94) (-2.03) (-1.79) (-1.95) (-1.91) (-1.94) (-1.92) 
Constant -0.515** -0.496** -0.439* -0.496** -0.489** -0.515** -0.434* 
  (-2.16) (-2.05) (-1.80) (-2.11) (-2.12) (-2.16) (-1.84) 
R-squared 0.272 0.273 0.273 0.272 0.272 0.272 0.273 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending. The credit information sharing is 
proxied by private credit bureau coverages PRIV. The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the change 
of the natural logarithm of total gross loans in current year and previous year; PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult 
population); IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment;  IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts 
IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; CR is a creditor rights index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural 
logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total 
assets; LLR is a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration 
index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index 
measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency in a country. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 2-1 in 
this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-
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level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Table 2-10: Estimation Results with Alternative Proxy of Credit Information Sharing - Public 
Credit Registry Coverages 
Variable GLOAN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PUB -0.076 -0.043 -0.042 -0.074 -0.062 -0.076 -0.202 
  (1.02) (0.87) (1.12) (-1.10) (-1.27) (-1.12) (-0.74) 
IFRS   0.104** 0.076*         
    (2.55) (1.93)         
IFRS * PUB     0.032         
      (1.02)         
BDI       0.012* 0.012     
        (1.86) (0.89)     
BDI * PUB         -0.04     
          (-0.45)     
CR           0.036** 0.045** 
            (2.27) -2.43 
CR * PUB             0.031 
              (0.71) 
SIZE 0.103*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
  (3.74) (3.69) (3.66) (3.71) (3.70) (3.74) (3.74) 
NIM 0.478* 0.466* 0.466* 0.478* 0.470* 0.478* 0.478* 
  (1.84) (1.73) (1.73) (1.84) (1.79) (1.84) (1.84) 
EFFICIENCY -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
  (-3.30) (-3.37) (-3.37) (-3.31) (-3.31) (-3.30) (-3.30) 
DEP -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
  (-0.04) (-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.04) (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
LLR -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
  (-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.65) 
GDPG 1.582*** 1.568*** 1.569*** 1.580*** 1.550*** 1.582*** 1.576*** 
  (3.68) (3.64) (3.64) (3.66) (3.57) (3.68) (3.66) 
INF 0.066 0.056 0.056 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 
  (0.27) (0.23) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) 
CCT3 0.077 0.068 0.066 0.076 0.071 0.077 0.074 
  (1.00) (0.86) (0.83) (0.99) (0.94) (1.00) (0.95) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.009* -0.010* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* 
  (-1.84) (-1.96) (-1.93) (-1.84) (-1.91) (-1.84) (-1.82) 
Constant -0.617** -0.593** -0.592** -0.598** -0.574** -0.617** -0.615** 
  (-2.41) (-2.28) (-2.29) (-2.37) (-2.25) (-2.41) (-2.41) 
R-squared 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.273 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending. Credit information sharing is 
proxied by public credit registry coverages PUB. The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the 
change of the natural logarithm of total gross loans in current year and previous year; PUB is public credit bureau coverage (% of 
adult population); IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment;  IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country 
adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; CR is a creditor rights index; SIZE is bank size calculated by 
taking a natural logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total 
deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is 
a concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital 
stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency in a country. Further detail of all variables is 
presented in Table 2-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 2-11: Estimation Results with Additional Control Variables 
Variable 
GLOAN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH 0.021* 0.020** 0.025** 0.024* 0.030* 0.021** 0.077 
  (1.89) (2.01) (2.06) (1.93) (1.85) (2.05) (1.29) 
IFRS   0.09** 0.06*         
    (2.32) (1.78)         
IFRS * DEPTH     -0.051*         
      (-1.68)         
BDI       0.007** 0.006*     
        (2.24) -1.91     
BDI * DEPTH         -0.001**     
          (-2.21)     
CR           0.01** 0.045*** 
            (2.27) (3.46) 
CR * DEPTH             -0.0086*** 
              (-3.69) 
SIZE 0.110*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 
  (3.52) (3.51) (3.51) (3.50) (3.49) (3.52) (3.52) 
NIM 0.504** 0.486* 0.487* 0.504** 0.504** 0.504** 0.505** 
  (2.03) (1.87) (1.87) (2.03) (2.03) (2.03) (2.03) 
EFFICIENCY -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
  (-3.71) (-3.83) (-3.83) (-3.72) (-3.72) (-3.71) (-3.75) 
DEP -0.011 -0.018 -0.018 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 
  (-0.11) (-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.10) 
LLR -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
  (-2.65) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.65) 
GDPG 1.574*** 1.546*** 1.545*** 1.574*** 1.568*** 1.574*** 1.558*** 
  (4.19) (4.12) (4.08) (4.17) (4.13) (4.19) (4.17) 
INF 0.093 0.080 0.081 0.093 0.094 0.093 0.135 
  (0.39) (0.34) (0.34) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.56) 
CCT3 0.049 0.039 0.040 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.055 
  (0.70) (0.54) (0.55) (0.69) (0.70) (0.70) (0.78) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** 
  (-2.18) (-2.22) (-2.21) (-2.17) (-2.07) (-2.18) (-2.18) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.022* 0.018 0.018 0.023* 0.024 0.022* 0.022 
  (1.74) (0.70) (0.74) (1.75) (0.75) (1.74) (0.78) 
Constant -0.424* -0.406 -0.408 -0.420* -0.390 -0.424* -0.502** 
  (-1.75) (-1.65) (-1.65) (-1.76) (-1.53) (-1.75) (-2.03) 
R-squared 0.274 0.275 0.275 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending with additional control variable. 
The additional control variable is DEPOSIT_INS. The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the change 
of the natural logarithm of total gross loans in current year and previous year; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; 
IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment;  IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; 
BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; CR is a creditor rights index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of 
total asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a 
ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated 
from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of 
both initial and overall capital stringency in a country; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the 
country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 2-1 in this 
chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level 
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are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Table 2-12: Estimation Results with Additional Control Variables (Continued) 
Variable 
GLOAN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH 0.019* 0.020** 0.022* 0.021* 0.035* 0.021** 0.08 
  (1.87) (2.06) (1.75) (1.84) (1.82) (2.07) (1.51) 
IFRS   0.1** 0.05         
    (2.30) (1.60)         
IFRS * DEPTH     -0.06*         
      (-1.70)         
BDI       0.007** 0.006*     
        (2.67) (1.91)     
BDI * DEPTH         -0.003**     
          (-2.32)     
CR           0.03* 0.038*** 
            (1.91) (3.43) 
CR * DEPTH             -0.007*** 
              (-3.79) 
SIZE 0.108*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 
  (3.44) (3.42) (3.42) (3.42) (3.42) (3.44) (3.44) 
NIM 0.503** 0.485* 0.485* 0.503** 0.503** 0.503** 0.504** 
  (2.00) (1.84) (1.84) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) 
EFFICIENCY -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
  (-3.87) (-4.00) (-4.00) (-3.89) (-3.89) (-3.87) (-3.91) 
DEP 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.010 
  (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
LLR -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
  (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.66) 
GDPG 1.576*** 1.547*** 1.545*** 1.574*** 1.568*** 1.576*** 1.560*** 
  (3.95) (3.87) (3.84) (3.91) (3.88) (3.95) (3.93) 
INF 0.051 0.034 0.035 0.049 0.050 0.051 0.092 
  (0.23) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.42) 
CCT3 0.062 0.053 0.053 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.068 
  (0.89) (0.73) (0.74) (0.88) (0.88) (0.89) (0.97) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.011* -0.011* -0.011* -0.011* -0.010* -0.011* -0.011* 
  (-1.89) (-1.94) (-1.94) (-1.89) (-1.79) (-1.89) (-1.89) 
POLITIC 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
  (-3.02) (-2.88) (-2.87) (-2.93) (-2.87) (-3.02) (-3.02) 
Constant -0.399 -0.376 -0.379 -0.363 -0.336 -0.399 -0.477* 
  (-1.61) (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.45) (-1.26) (-1.61) (-1.89) 
R-squared 0.275 0.276 0.276 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 99,680 
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The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending with additional control variable. 
The additional control variable is POLITIC. The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the change of 
the natural logarithm of total gross loans in current year and previous year; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS 
and BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a 
business extent of disclosure index; CR is a creditor rights index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total 
asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio 
of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated from 
the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of both 
initial and overall capital stringency in a country; POLITIC is a political stability index. Further detail of all variables is presented in 
Table 2-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at 
the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
  
76	
	
Table 2-13: Sub-Sample Analysis 
Variable 
GLOAN GLOAN GLOAN 
IFRS 
Adoption 
NON-IFRS 
Adoption HIGH BDI LOW BDI HIGH CR LOW CR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPTH 0.022 0.037* 0.04 0.03** 0.015* 0.041*** 
  (0.44) (1.84) (0.94) (2.61) (1.89) (3.52) 
SIZE 0.214*** 0.081*** 0.078*** 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.070*** 
  (5.20) (3.06) (3.26) (3.63) (5.08) (3.65) 
NIM 0.325* 0.775 1.520* 0.268*** 0.404*** 0.609 
  (1.98) (1.19) (1.83) (3.02) (3.11) (1.22) 
EFFICIENCY -0.029 -0.062*** -0.077*** -0.013 -0.007 -0.067*** 
  (-1.61) (-4.55) (-17.67) (-0.69) (-0.37) (-8.31) 
DEP 0.326*** -0.101 -0.060 0.186** 0.180*** -0.092 
  (5.35) (-1.40) (-0.57) (2.59) (2.80) (-0.97) 
LLR -0.028*** -0.209** -0.051*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.244*** 
  (-2.70) (-2.21) (-2.78) (-2.65) (-2.66) (-2.67) 
GDPG 1.376*** 2.033*** 1.275** 1.655*** 1.742*** 1.738*** 
  (3.46) (3.96) (2.59) (3.51) (3.65) (4.27) 
INF 0.426 -0.054 0.066 0.223 0.167 0.005 
  (0.86) (-0.35) (0.29) (0.78) (0.59) (0.04) 
CCT3 0.023 0.207* 0.130 0.024 0.101 0.046 
  (0.27) (1.87) (1.13) (0.31) (1.37) (0.39) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.008 -0.006 -0.018** -0.003 -0.003 -0.014 
  (-1.07) (-0.58) (-2.19) (-0.38) (-0.56) (-1.47) 
Constant -1.413*** -0.176 -0.353* -0.885*** -0.983*** -0.077 
  (-4.99) (-0.88) (-1.82) (-3.01) (-4.38) (-0.52) 
R-squared 0.338 0.27 0.273 0.303 0.304 0.271 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30,324 69,356 70,797 28,883 34,993 64,687 
The table presents the regression results of subsample analysis for the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending. The 
subsamples are classified based on proxies of informational environment and creditor rights index. "IFRS" is the group of 
observations with IFRS adoption proxied for high transparent information environment, while "NON-IFRS" is the group of 
observations with NON-IFRS adoption proxied for low transparent information environment. "HIGH BDI" is the group of 
observations with BDI above the median value of the sample, while "LOW BDI" is the group of observations with BDI below the 
median value of the sample. "HIGH CR" is the group of observations with CR above the median value of the sample, while 
"LOW CR" is the group observations with CR below the median value of the sample.  
The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the change of the natural logarithm of total gross loans 
in current year and previous year; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS and BDI are proxies of information 
environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure 
index; CR is a creditor rights index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest 
margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio of loan loss reserves 
to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated from the fraction of 
assets held by the 3 largest banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial 
and overall capital stringency in a country. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 2-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy 
variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all 
estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 2-14: Non-USA Sample Analysis 
Variable 
GLOAN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH 0.044* 0.043** 0.049** 0.044* 0.047** 0.044* 0.13 
  (1.89) (2.02) (2.23) (1.92) (2.01) (1.81) (0.91) 
IFRS   0.078* 0.05         
    (1.73) (0.78)         
IFRS * DEPTH     -0.03*         
      (-1.83)         
BDI       0.0065** 0.008*     
        (2.56) (1.78)     
BDI * DEPTH         -0.002*     
          (-1.69)     
CR           0.016** 0.05*** 
            (2.36) (3.52) 
CR * DEPTH             -0.012*** 
              (-3.68) 
SIZE 0.150*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 
  (5.41) (6.20) (6.19) (5.43) (5.37) (5.41) (5.40) 
NIM 0.312*** 0.294*** 0.295*** 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.313*** 
  (3.24) (2.63) (2.63) (3.24) (3.23) (3.24) (3.24) 
EFFICIENCY -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
  (-0.97) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-0.98) (-0.98) (-0.97) (-0.99) 
DEP 0.181*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.184*** 
  (3.58) (3.63) (3.64) (3.58) (3.57) (3.58) (3.66) 
LLR -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
  (-2.68) (-2.68) (-2.68) (-2.68) (-2.68) (-2.68) (-2.68) 
GDPG 1.562*** 1.561*** 1.558*** 1.557*** 1.553*** 1.562*** 1.536*** 
  (4.09) (4.10) (4.09) (4.06) (4.03) (4.09) (4.03) 
INF 0.175 0.160 0.162 0.174 0.175 0.175 0.221 
  (0.73) (0.67) (0.68) (0.73) (0.74) (0.73) (0.92) 
CCT3 0.063 0.052 0.054 0.060 0.061 0.063 0.070 
  (1.00) (0.77) (0.80) (0.96) (0.96) (1.00) (1.10) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
  (-0.95) (-1.05) (-1.08) (-0.95) (-0.89) (-0.95) (-0.95) 
Constant -0.882*** -0.824*** -0.831*** -0.806*** -0.784*** -0.882*** -0.874*** 
  (-4.80) (-4.48) (-4.46) (-3.97) (-3.55) (-4.80) (-4.85) 
R-squared 0.29 0.293 0.293 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.291 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,119 45,119 45,119 45,119 45,119 45,119 45,119 
The table presents the regression results of subsample analysis for the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending. All 
regressions exclude banks in the USA. The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is t the change of the 
natural logarithm of total gross loans in current year and previous year; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS and 
BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a 
business extent of disclosure index; CR is a creditor rights index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; 
NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio of loan 
loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated from the fraction 
of assets held by the 3 largest banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and 
overall capital stringency in a country. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 2-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are 
included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
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**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Table 2-15: IV Approach for the Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Lending 
Variable 
GLOAN 
(1) (2) 
DEPTH 0.116**   
  (2.03)   
SIZE 0.006*** -0.009 
  (3.04) (-0.54) 
NIM 0.371*** -0.152 
  (3.63) (-0.31) 
EFFICIENCY -0.072*** -0.011 
  (-5.38) (-0.43) 
DEP -0.043* 0.209 
  (-1.80) (1.42) 
LLR -0.017** 0.005*** 
  (-2.49) (4.18) 
GDPG 1.630*** -1.398 
  (4.71) (-0.62) 
INF 0.243 -5.102*** 
  (1.59) (-3.30) 
CCT3 -0.058* -0.583 
  (-1.88) (-1.21) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.003 0.113 
  (-0.65) (1.19) 
LEGALORIGIN  2.198*** 
   (4.53) 
ETHNIC_FRAC  -1.710*** 
   (-4.77) 
LATITUDE  -1.682 
   (-1.47) 
Constant 0.146** 5.456*** 
  (2.14) (4.92) 
R-squared 0.263 0.468 
First Stage F-test 14.88   
Second Stage F-test 95.64   
Hansen J 0.618   
Hansen J P-Value 0.734   
Observations 92,795 92,795 
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The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank lending. The estimation 
method is based on an instrumental variable approach. The instruments are legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and 
latitude. The 2nd-stage regressions are reported in the odd columns, while the 1st-stage regressions are reported in the 
even columns. 
The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the change of the natural logarithm of total 
gross loans in current year and previous year; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; SIZE is bank size 
calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-income 
ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a 
growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 
largest banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall 
capital stringency in a country. LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English 
legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a 
country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude of a country. Further detail of all variables is 
presented in Table 2-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 2-16: IV Approach for the Effect of Information Asymmetry on the Linkage 
between Credit Information Sharing and Bank Lending 
Variable 
GLOAN 
IFRS Adoption NON IFRS Adoption HIGH BDI LOW BDI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DEPTH 0.067   0.046*   0.059   0.042*   
  (1.08)   (1.78)   (0.88)   (1.67)   
SIZE 0.003 -0.018 0.008*** 0.028 0.008*** -0.017 0.002 0.008 
  (1.61) (-0.75) (4.94) (1.26) (5.17) (-0.72) (0.88) (0.59) 
NIM 0.260*** -0.282 0.485** -0.406 0.442* 0.617 0.332*** 0.051 
  (5.63) (-0.66) (2.45) (-0.77) (1.66) (0.82) (5.06) (0.13) 
EFFICIENCY -0.027 -0.000 -0.091*** -0.005 -0.086*** 0.007 -0.032 0.065 
  (-1.38) (-0.01) (-13.37) (-0.23) (-10.92) (0.32) (-1.43) (1.15) 
DEP 0.025 0.161 -0.070** 0.159 -0.056*** -0.105 -0.001 -0.177 
  (1.13) (0.83) (-2.39) (0.90) (-2.97) (-1.00) (-0.03) (-0.80) 
LLR -0.016** 0.005*** -0.127* -0.125 0.008** 0.035 -0.017** 0.001 
  (-2.46) (3.75) (-1.89) (-1.42) (2.38) (1.50) (-2.47) (0.67) 
GDPG 1.429*** -5.560 1.556*** -1.716 1.725*** -3.651 1.600*** -1.256 
  (3.11) (-1.28) (3.90) (-0.50) (3.54) (-1.04) (3.67) (-0.43) 
INF 0.053 -7.867*** 0.145 -2.107 0.278 -5.948* 0.118 -3.987* 
  (0.26) (-3.72) (0.97) (-1.31) (1.37) (-1.74) (0.93) (-1.79) 
CCT3 -0.015 0.492 -0.114** -1.750** -0.042 0.069 -0.033 -1.516** 
  (-0.36) (0.72) (-2.22) (-2.39) (-0.99) (0.13) (-0.88) (-2.01) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.007 -0.091 -0.018** 0.307*** -0.001 0.055 -0.010* 0.080 
  (1.20) (-0.70) (-2.55) (3.27) (-0.12) (0.51) (-1.86) (1.03) 
LEGALORIGIN  2.211***  0.232  2.083***  0.058 
   (4.03)  (0.32)  (4.22)  (0.10) 
ETHNIC_FRAC  -2.558***  -3.004***  -0.434  -2.998*** 
   (-3.52)  (-4.35)  (-0.80)  (-8.37) 
LATITUDE  -1.407  -0.972  -2.795*  1.064 
   (-1.07)  (-0.68)  (-1.81)  (1.07) 
Constant 0.175* 6.261*** 0.236*** 5.935*** 0.070 6.270*** 0.251*** 5.896*** 
  (1.73) (4.22) (3.10) (5.13) (0.98) (4.29) (3.27) (5.80) 
R-squared 0.284 0.509 0.271 0.588 0.257 0.601 0.292 0.601 
First Stage F-test 12.76   7.092   15.91   27.75   
Second Stage F-test 250.8   243.7   1818   135.9   
Hansen J 2.561   1.26   0.430   1.398   
Hansen J P-Value 0.228   0.437   0.807   0.491   
Observations 28,098 28,098 64,697 64,697 68,879 68,879 23,916 23,916 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of information asymmetry on the relationship between credit information 
sharing and bank lending. The estimation method is based on an instrumental variable approach. The instruments are legal origins, 
ethnic fractionalization, and latitude. The subsamples are classified based on proxies of information environment. "IFRS" is the 
group of observations with IFRS adoption proxied for high transparent information environment, while "NON-IFRS" is the group 
of observations with NON-IFRS adoption proxied for low transparent information environment. "HIGH BDI" is the group of 
observations with BDI above the median value of the sample, while "LOW BDI" is the group of observations with BDI below the 
median value of the sample. The 2nd-stage regressions are reported in the odd columns, while the 1st-stage regressions are 
reported in the even columns. 
The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the change of the natural logarithm of total gross loans 
in current year and previous year; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS and BDI are proxies of information 
environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure 
index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a 
cost-to-income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a 
growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest 
banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency 
in a country. LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise 
zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude 
which measures the geographical latitude of a country. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 2-1 in this chapter.  
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Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are 
applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
Table 2-17: IV Approach for the Effect of Creditor Rights on the Linkage between Credit 
Information Sharing and Bank Lending 
Variable 
GLOAN 
HIGH CR LOW CR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
DEPTH 0.049   0.107*   
  (0.53)   (1.94)   
SIZE 0.007*** 0.029 0.009*** -0.031 
  (3.10) (1.56) (4.57) (-1.22) 
NIM 0.265*** -1.083 0.341* 0.054 
  (3.47) (-1.15) (1.91) (0.11) 
EFFICIENCY -0.041* -0.032 -0.087*** -0.017 
  (-1.93) (-0.38) (-10.40) (-0.90) 
DEP 0.014 0.306* -0.021 -0.011 
  (0.52) (1.80) (-0.66) (-0.10) 
LLR -0.016** 0.004*** -0.149** -0.016 
  (-2.45) (3.95) (-2.35) (-0.45) 
GDPG 1.538*** -0.419 1.692*** -4.443 
  (3.44) (-0.12) (5.09) (-1.11) 
INF -0.050 -5.819*** 0.117 -4.958 
  (-0.33) (-2.96) (0.41) (-1.49) 
CCT3 -0.074** -0.079 0.159* -1.626 
  (-2.08) (-0.13) (1.85) (-1.15) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.003 -0.028 -0.022* 0.218* 
  (-0.40) (-0.26) (-1.82) (1.94) 
LEGALORIGIN  1.607***  1.436 
   (2.83)  (1.15) 
ETHNIC_FRAC  -1.712***  -0.751 
   (-2.72)  (-0.73) 
LATITUDE  -0.092  -4.245** 
   (-0.07)  (-2.56) 
Constant 0.315*** 4.949*** -0.179 7.306*** 
  (4.08) (4.00) (-1.23) (4.29) 
R-squared 0.287 0.443 0.26 0.563 
First Stage F-test 10.15   3.016   
Second Stage F-test 112.6   691.9   
Hansen J 2.219   0.813   
Hansen J P-Value 0.271   0.666   
Observations  28,563 28,563 64,232 64,232 
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The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit rights on the relationship between credit information sharing 
and bank lending. The estimation method is based on an instrumental variable approach. The instruments are legal origins, 
ethnic fractionalization, and latitude. The subsamples are classified based on creditor rights index. "HIGH CR" is the group of 
observations with CR above the median value of the sample, while "LOW CR" is the group observations with CR below the 
median value of the sample. The 2nd-stage regressions are reported in the odd columns, while the 1st-stage regressions are 
reported in the even columns. 
The dependent variable is bank lending measured by GLOAN. GLOAN is the change of the natural logarithm of total gross 
loans in current year and previous year; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; CR is a creditor rights index; SIZE 
is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; NIM is a net interest margin; EFFICIENCY is a cost-to-
income ratio; DEP is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; LLR is a ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans;  GDPG is a 
growth rate of GDP; INF is inflation; CCT3 is a concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest 
banks in a country: CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital 
stringency in a country. LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin 
and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE 
is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude of a country. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 2-1 in 
this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the 
bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Chapter 3: Credit Information Sharing and Bank Risk: 
The Role of Information Asymmetry and Bank Competition 
3.1 Introduction 
 The findings in chapter 2 show that credit information sharing promotes bank 
lending. As credit information sharing facilitates bank lending decision, it may encourage 
banks to provide more credits to a broader range of borrowers.  On the one hand, from a 
positive perspective, expansion of credits to a broader range of borrowers enhances overall 
economic growth (Levine 2005). On the other hand, from a more negative perspective, an 
increase in lending may lead to higher access to credit for riskier borrowers. The 
disproportionally high entry of risky borrowers may lead to deteriorated bank portfolios with 
higher default rates. The high entry of risky borrowers could lead to increasing bank risk and 
probability of banking crises. Although the results in chapter 2 suggest that credit 
information sharing increases bank lending, bank risk may increase or may decrease. 
Therefore, in this chapter, we investigate further whether credit information sharing is likely 
to influence bank risk. 
Bank stability is important for the growth of the economy, sustainability and going 
concern of the financial sector (Levine 1997, 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine 2009). The 
adverse consequences of the 2008-2009 ﬁnancial crisis have brought the renewed attention 
of the banking stability to increasing number of academics and policymakers. Widespread 
failures and losses of financial institutions can impose an externality on the rest of the 
economy, and the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 provides ample evidence of the 
importance of containing this risk (Acharya et al. 2017). Thus, it is necessary to understand 
the various factors that affect bank risk. 
Theoretically, credit information sharing among banks may decrease bank risk. 
Specifically, credit information sharing reduces adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems (Pagano & Jappelli 1993), increases borrowers’ effort to repay their debts (Padilla 
& Pagano 1997, 2000), and prevents excessive lending when each borrower may patronize 
several banks (Bennardo et al. 2014). This should translate into lower bank risk. However, 
the theory also predicts that credit information sharing may lead to looser screening 
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requirements and lower post-lending effort in monitoring (Dell'Ariccia & Marquez 2006), 
contributing to rapid credit expansion and lending to riskier borrowers. This may lead to an 
increase in bank risk. 
Several recent studies have examined the relationship between credit information 
sharing and bank risk at country level and bank level. Despite the ambiguous role of credit 
information sharing on bank risk, empirical studies point to the same direction that credit 
information sharing is associated with lower bank risk and less likelihood of banking crises 
(Jappelli & Pagano 2002; Brown et al. 2009; Houston et al. 2010; Büyükkarabacak & Valev 
2012). Furthermore, these findings show that credit information sharing reduces the adverse 
impact of creditor rights on bank risk (Houston et al. 2010) and reduces the adverse effect 
of credit boom on the likelihood of banking crises (Büyükkarabacak & Valev 2012). 
Although recent empirical studies have been drawn to the benefits of credit 
information sharing on mitigating bank risk, such impact may also be influenced by banking 
competition. The relationship between credit information sharing and bank risk has never 
been tested before under different degree of banking competition. Therefore, the second 
objective of this chapter attempts to examine whether the impact of credit information 
sharing on bank risk varies under different degree of banking competition.  
In competitive banking markets, adverse selection and moral hazard problems are 
more intense compared to less competitive banking markets (Shaffer 1998; Dell'Ariccia 
2001; Marquez 2002). Banks in competitive banking markets have less incentive to screen 
and monitor borrowers after lending. Failure to adequately screen and monitor leads to 
riskier portfolios and weaker balance sheets with potentially negative effects on bank 
stability (Dell'Ariccia & Marquez 2006). With the role of credit information sharing in 
reducing adverse selection and moral hazard problems (associated with borrowers), its 
impact on bank risk could be more pronounced in banking markets with a high degree of 
competition. Thus, there is potential interaction effect between credit information sharing 
and bank competition on bank risk.  
In addition, we study whether the relationship between credit information sharing 
and bank risk is also influenced by the level of the country information environment. Like 
the previous chapter, we proxy the transparency of information environment by the 
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mandatory adoption of IFRS and the business extent of disclosure index (BDI). When the 
information environment becomes more transparent, adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems are less problematic. Thus, the role of credit information sharing in reducing 
information problems can be less pronounced in a more transparent information 
environment. 
To perform an empirical investigation, we use a sample of banks around the globe 
during 2005 to 2013. To examine the association between credit information sharing and 
bank risk, we follow the study of Houston et al. (2010), whose investigation focuses on the 
effect of creditor rights and credit information sharing on bank risk, the likelihood of a 
financial crisis and economic growth. However, we complement the study of Houston et al. 
(2010) in several ways. First, we use a wider range of countries around the globe. While 
Houston et al. (2010) provide an analysis of bank risk in 69 countries, we expand the analysis 
to banks in 105 countries. Second, we employ cross-country bank-level panel data approach 
rather than cross-sectional estimation to address the issues. Third, we study the interaction 
between credit information sharing and banking competition and examine the influence of 
banking competition on the relationship between credit information sharing and bank risk. 
Overall, the results indicate that credit information sharing is negatively associated 
with bank risk. This finding suggests that bank risk decreases in countries with more credit 
information sharing. Our results rule out the prediction of increasing bank risk, which may 
be due to looser screening requirements and lower post-lending effort in monitoring. In 
addition, our results show that the negative relationship between credit information sharing 
and bank risk is less pronounced in a more transparent information environment. The 
adoption of IFRS attenuates the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. 
Furthermore, such impact is moderated by the greater business extent of disclosure index. 
These results suggest that improved transparency of the information environment mitigates 
the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. Our findings also reveal that the 
negative relationship between credit information sharing and bank risk is more pronounced 
in banking markets with a high degree of competition among banks. 
Our study in this chapter contributes to the existing literature on credit information 
sharing in two ways. First, we complement Houston et al. (2010) on examining the 
relationship between credit information sharing and bank risk; however, we explore a 
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broader coverage of banks in 105 countries with a more recent dataset. We additionally 
provide a similar result to them regarding the interaction effect between credit information 
sharing and creditor rights on bank risk. 
Second, our research contributes to the economic consequences of credit information 
sharing. To the best of my knowledge, our study is the first to provide empirical evidence 
about the influence of banking competition on the benefits of credit information sharing on 
bank risk. Given the significance and on-going debate on the role of competition in banking, 
the same level of credit information sharing may have different effects on bank risk 
depending on the competitiveness of the banks. 
To sum up, this chapter attempts to address these following questions, which are 
graphically displayed in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2: 
1. How, and to what extent, credit information sharing affect bank 
risk? 
2. How, and to what extent, information asymmetry and banking 
market competition affect the relationship between credit 
information sharing and bank risk? 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature 
and outlines hypotheses development. Section 3 explains data and methodology. Section 4 
presents the empirical results, the robustness tests, and the additional tests. Section 5 
provides the conclusion. 
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3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Credit Information Sharing and Bank Risk 
The theoretical literature explains that credit information sharing can reduce adverse 
selection, moral hazard (associated with borrowers) and hold-up problem as well as raising 
the discipline on borrowers’ debt repayment leading to an increase in bank lending and the 
reduction of default rate of individual borrowers (Jappelli & Pagano 2002; Djankov et al. 
2007; Brown et al. 2009; Nana 2014). Consequently, bank loan portfolio (or credit risk) is 
potentially enhanced by credit information sharing. 
For a given set of borrowers, we might expect that all else equal, credit information 
sharing would translate into lower bank risk. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) investigate the role 
of credit information sharing on reducing adverse selection in credit markets. They build a 
model where information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers lead to credit 
rationing. However, banks do not have the same degree of information about all borrowers 
– some banks are more familiar with one group of borrowers and other banks are more 
familiar with another group of borrowers. Sharing this information eliminates the 
information differences across banks, allowing them to make better judgments about lending 
to all borrowers. The improved information leads to more lending (Jappelli & Pagano 2002; 
Djankov et al. 2007; Nana 2014) and to lower default probabilities (Jappelli & Pagano 2002; 
Brown et al. 2009). 
Additionally, Padilla and Pagano (1997) highlight another benefit from credit 
information sharing. They suggest that information sharing among banks can reduce moral 
hazard problem associated with borrowers by reducing rents that each bank can extract from 
superior information that is unknown to outside banks. In their model, banks can develop 
relationships with borrowers and can accumulate proprietary information about them. Using 
their advantageous position, banks can extract information rents by charging high interest 
rates. The high-interest rates reduce entrepreneurs’ incentive to exert effort and increase 
moral hazard by involving in asset substitution, where borrowers use the funds to invest in 
riskier projects, leading to greater default probability. We know that a fundamental principle 
of credit risk management for banks is to write covenants into loan contracts that restrict 
borrowers from engaging in riskier activities; by monitoring borrowers’ activities to see 
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whether they are complying with the covenants and by enforcing the covenants if they are 
not, lenders can reduce or prevent the moral hazard behavior on the part of borrowers. With 
increased credit information sharing, it reduces the market power of banks to extract 
information rents, lowers moral hazard of borrowers and potentially reduces default 
probability. 
Furthermore, the benefits of credit information sharing have been addressed by Klein 
(1992) as well as Padilla and Pagano (2000). In that framework, borrowers are more likely 
to repay their debts because information about defaults becomes available to all lenders. The 
threat of higher future interest rates or outright exclusion from credit markets is a strong 
disciplining device motivating borrowers to pay on time and in full. As a consequence of 
borrowers’ information sharing, the marginal benefit of monitoring necessarily declines 
implying a lower equilibrium level of monitoring effort by the creditors; however, with 
lower equilibrium level of monitoring effort but a greater probability of repayment, the 
overall quality of loan portfolio should be better.  
Finally, Bennardo et al. (2014) also support the usefulness of credit information 
sharing. They argue that credit information sharing reduces the risk of over-borrowing as 
individual lenders can access information on the overall indebtedness of borrowers from all 
lending sources. This means that borrowers are less likely to over-borrow and end up default. 
It is obvious that when borrowers are over-indebted, they are unable to pay any amount to 
any single source of funds. 
Summing up, all models support that credit information sharing helps reduce default 
rate and translate into lower bank risk by lowering adverse selection, moral hazard associated 
with borrowers, increasing debt repayment and reducing potential over-borrowing. 
However, it is possible that the credit information may result in higher bank risk. The credit 
information sharing may induce banks to provide loans to a wider (potentially riskier) set of 
borrowers. While credit information sharing lowers the default probability of the individual 
borrower and increase lending, it may also lead to greater access to credit for riskier 
borrowers. The disproportionally high entry of risky borrowers alters negatively the 
composition of the pool of borrowers leading to greater default rates on the aggregate level. 
Jappelli and Pagano (2006) make the same point. This effect will increase the average 
expected default rate in the bank’s portfolio. 
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Recent theoretical research also shows that credit information sharing might be the 
cause of a banking crisis on the macro-level. In the model developed by Dell'Ariccia and 
Marquez (2006), as banks obtain private information about borrowers and information 
asymmetries across banks decrease, banks loosen their lending standards, leading to an 
equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower profits, and expanded aggregate credit. 
Thus, the lending boom that is induced by a reduction in information asymmetries leads to 
a higher probability of a banking crisis. Also, Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) argue that 
credit information sharing, when imposed by regulation rather than arising endogenously, 
leads to lower bank profits and greater banking system instability. Contrast to the theoretical 
model of Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006), Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) empirically 
explore the consequence of lenders’ information sharing using unique contract-level data 
and find that lenders’ entry into the credit bureau does not stop the use of guarantees, 
suggesting that credit information sharing does not loosen lending standards. 
Based on a theoretical point of views, it is still not clear-cut whether credit 
information sharing would increase or decrease bank risk. It may reduce the probability of 
default of individual borrowers and subsequently the risk of an individual one; however, the 
risk of the pool of borrowers may or may not be lower with more credit information sharing. 
Information sharing among banks may lead to a riskier pool of borrowers and loosen lending 
standard thereby result in higher bank risk and a higher incidence of the banking crisis. Thus, 
the conclusion cannot be drawn based on theory without empirical work. 
Empirical work has provided evidence investigating the impacts of credit 
information with international and country-specific analyses including both macro-level and 
micro-level evidence. On bank-level data, several papers use micro-level data from 
individual countries to examine empirically the effect of credit information sharing. 
Consistent with the predictions of Pagano and Jappelli (1993), Padilla and Pagano (1997) 
and Padilla and Pagano (2000), Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) find that credit 
information sharing reduces the likelihood of contract delinquencies and defaults, especially 
when firms are informationally opaque. In an experimental study, Brown and Zehnder 
(2007) show that the introduction of information sharing significantly raises repayment rates 
in a market where borrowers are mobile and relationship banking is not feasible. Houston et 
al. (2010) employ bank-level data and provide evidence that the existence and the depth of 
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credit information sharing lower bank-risk taking behaviors and the probability of banking 
crises. 
On the aggregate level data, Jappelli and Pagano (2002) show that credit levels are 
higher and default risk is lower in countries with credit information sharing. 
Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2012) as well as Houston et al. (2010) find that credit 
information sharing lowers the likelihood of banking crises. Both show that credit 
information sharing leads to an improved outcome not only on individual borrowers but also 
on the aggregate level. 
Beside bank-level and aggregate-level, there is empirical evidence by exploiting 
contract-level data to clearly identify the impact of information sharing. Luoto et al. (2007) 
and De Janvry et al. (2010) analyze the staggered use of a registry by the branches of a 
Guatemalan microfinance institution. They find an increase in loan performance, especially 
for borrowers that are aware of the existence of the registry. Doblas-Madrid and Minetti 
(2013) focus on the staggered entry of lenders into a credit registry for the US equipment-
financing industry. Entry improved repayment for opaque firms but reduced loan size. In a 
similar vein, Hertzberg et al. (2011) show how lowering the reporting threshold of the 
Argentinian credit registry resulted in less lending to firms with multiple lending 
relationships due to improved lender coordination. Lastly, Gonzalez and Osorio (2014) 
explore the impact of erasing negative borrower information from a Columbian credit 
bureau. Wiping out this information allowed borrowers to attract larger and longer loans 
from new lenders. However, the quality of these new loans was significantly lower than 
those of similar borrowers whose credit history had not been reset. 
In summary, theory and evidence illustrates that credit information sharing reduces 
bank risk as a consequence of a reduction in information asymmetries (Pagano 1993; Padilla 
& Pagano 1997), an increase in the incentives for debt repayment (Klein 1992; Vercammen 
1995; Padilla & Pagano 2000), a reduction in over-borrowing (Bennardo et al. 2014) and a 
reduction in default probability of borrowers on an aggregate-level (Houston et al. 2010; 
Büyükkarabacak & Valev 2012). Thus, we hypothesize as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Credit information sharing is expected to reduce bank risk. 
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3.2.2 Credit Information Sharing, Information Asymmetry and Bank Risk 
 Asymmetric information between banks and borrowers impedes efficiency in credit 
allocation leading to market failure and credit ration (Stiglitz & Weiss 1981). When the 
information environment becomes more transparent, the role of credit information sharing 
in reducing bank risk should be less prominent. Following Chapter 2, we employ two 
variables to proxy for the overall country-level information environment. These proxies are 
the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the 
Business Extent of Disclosure index (BDI).    
Several studies show that mandatory IFRS adoption improves analysts’ information 
environment by enhancing transparency and by increasing the comparability of the financial 
reports (e.g. Barth et al. (2008b) ; Bae et al. (2008)). Cross-border comparison of financial 
data becomes easy when the single set of accounting standard is applied globally; thereby, 
decreasing information acquisition costs, increasing competition and efficiency in the 
markets (Ball 2006). Similar to Chapter 2, we prefer using mandatory IFRS adoption as a 
proxy for asymmetric information environment. The key challenge for the study of voluntary 
IFRS adoption is the fact that firms choose whether and when to adopt IFRS reporting. In 
our study, it is difficult to differentiate between mandatory and voluntary IFRS as we are 
trying to see the impact of IFRS adoption on the information environment as a whole. A 
country may allow some firms to conform to IFRS; however, local GAAP is still allowed 
for others such that it is impossible to observe the effects of IFRS adoption per se. 
Besides the information on financial statements, the agency problem involves 
misbehavior or misuse of funds by entrepreneurs can eventually be harmful to the interests 
of shareholders and fund providers (Jensen & Meckling 1979). Disclosure of information 
related to conflict of interest may thus improve the information transparency. Thus, similar 
to Chapter 2. We employ the business extent of disclosure index (BDI) obtained from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business. This index measures the extent to which investors are 
protected through disclosure of ownership and financial information (World Bank’s Doing 
Business 2016). The index also gauges the extent of disclosure of firms’ transactions that 
involve conflicts of interests.  Higher value shows that more disclosure of ownership and 
financial information. 
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Taken together, both the mandatory adoption of IFRS and higher BDI should reduce 
the information gap between banks and borrowers to the extent that diminishes the impact 
of credit information sharing on bank risk. Therefore, we expect that the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank risk is likely to be less pronounced when there exists mandatory 
IFRS adoption and the business extent of disclosure index is high. Formally, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: The impact of credit information sharing on bank risk is expected to be less 
pronounced when the information environment is more transparent (as proxied by IFRS 
adoption and BDI). 
3.2.3 Credit Information Sharing, Banking Competition and Bank Risk 
Theories and empirical evidence supporting the impact of credit information sharing 
on bank risk is explained in the previous section. In this section, further argument is put 
forward to explain how the relationship between credit information sharing and bank risk 
would differ under different competitive environments in the banking markets. Overall, there 
is a large theoretical agreement suggesting a stronger impact of credit information sharing 
on bank risk in a highly competitive banking market. This is due mainly to the prominent 
roles of banks in the less competitive market (with high market power) in better monitoring 
and acquiring borrowers’ private information. 
Because of information asymmetry between banks and their borrowers that 
engenders adverse selection and moral hazard problem, banks have an incentive to invest in 
monitoring and acquiring borrowers’ private information to screen out borrowers that do not 
meet satisfactory lending standards (Cetorelli 2001). Failure to adequately perform these 
functions leads to riskier portfolios and weaker balance sheets, with potentially negative 
consequences for the stability of credit markets (Dell'Ariccia & Marquez 2006). 
Credit information sharing is a mechanism that can help to alleviate the problem of 
adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets (Pagano & Jappelli 1993). As a result, 
asymmetric information should be less of a concern and banks have less incentive to invest 
in private information acquisition and to build long-term lending relationships with firms 
based on the soft information. 
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When it comes to fulfilling the role of monitoring and acquiring borrowers’ private 
information through screening, banks with high market powers (lower competitive pressure) 
perform better while intense market competition may distort banks’ incentive to perform 
these roles (Thakor & Boot 2008). Thus, the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard 
should then be more of a concern for banks in the highly competitive banking market. And 
the role of credit information sharing can be more prominent in that market. In other words, 
the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk may be more pronounced when the 
banking market is characterized by high competition. 
To begin with, the adverse selection problem can be more severe in the highly 
competitive banking market. Supported literature focuses on banks’ inability to observe the 
characteristics of borrowers (heterogeneity of borrowers) and the imperfection of screening 
tools. Several studies show that both borrowers’ heterogeneity and the imperfect screening 
tests are intensified when the market becomes more competitive. 
Introducing exogenous credit-worthiness testing model, Broecker (1990) analyzed 
how the credit market competition affects the screening problem banks face in the choice of 
granting loans. The model suggests that competition in lending rates tends to reduce the 
average quality of loans. This is because borrowers that have been rejected at one bank can 
easily move and apply for loans at other banks so that the pool of funded projects will exhibit 
lower average quality as the number of banks increases. 
The setup in the study of Broecker (1990) is based on the two types of firms applying 
for loans with fixed size but differ in their ability to repay loans. Banks decide whether to 
grant loans by using independent and imperfect screening tests in order to reveal the true 
quality of firms and compete with each other by setting a loan rate. However, due to the 
imperfection of screening, the mechanism of the competitive market does not function 
properly leading to negative consequences for banks. On the one hand, increasing loan rates 
above competitors can increase profit through the usual price effect. On the other hand, it 
can worsen the quality of firms accepting loans, thus reducing its profit. A firm will indeed 
accept the least favorable loan interest rate only after being rejected by all other banks setting 
more favorable rates, but this implies that the firm has a low creditworthiness on average. 
This is a “winner’ curse” type implication of banks who perform the tests. Because of this 
winner’ curse problem, a higher number of banks performing screening tests decreases the 
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average creditworthiness of firms and increases the probability that a bank does not grant 
any loan. 
Similar to Broecker (1990), Riordan (1995) comes to the same conclusion about the 
negative consequence of increased competition on screening loan application. Auction 
theory is applied to the bank loan market and demonstrated how more intense market 
competition may damage overall market performance. Specifically, using the theory of 
common value auctions, he shows that higher number of competing banks worsens the 
informativeness of the signal that banks receive on firms’ loan quality and makes them more 
conservative in granting loans. These two results have a harmful impact on social welfare 
because they reduce the quality of banks’ portfolios and lead to the financing of less efficient 
investment projects. 
Further analysis of winner’s curse is also studied by Shaffer (1998). Shaffer shows 
that the average quality of a bank’s pool of borrowers declines as the number of competitors 
in the market increases. The intuition is based on the possibility that banks screening 
technologies may not accurately report the borrowers’ true characteristics. Suppose the 
screening model used by banks is indeed imperfect, in the sense that with a certain 
probability entrepreneurs of high quality can be identified as being of low quality, and vice 
versa. And the model also assumes that a bank cannot distinguish between a new loan 
applicant and someone who has already been denied credit by another institution. As a result, 
rejected applicants (either of high or low quality) can continue to apply to other banks; the 
more banks there are in the market, the higher the likelihood that a low-quality applicant 
receives credit. This occurrence is known as winner’s curse that is a bank that agrees to 
extend a loan may be winning the right to fund a lemon (Akerlof 1970).  
 Shaffer (1998) has extended the analysis of winner’s curse problems in lending in 
several directions. In particular, Shaffer has investigated the impact of banks’ use of 
common information filters (like shared databases and uniform screening criteria) on the 
winner’s curse problems in lending and he has characterized the factors affecting the 
incentives of banks for using such common filters. Further, his analysis addressed not only 
how the number of lenders affects an individual bank’s loan loss rate, but the study also 
demonstrated reasons for why de novo banks (recent entrants) will be particularly 
susceptible to adverse selection leading to loan loss rates being higher for these de novo 
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banks. In addition, Shaffer’s study reports important empirical evidence regarding the nature 
and magnitude of his theoretical predictions as well as an outline of the broader 
macroeconomic implications of his findings. 
 Increased competition also reduces the incentive of banks to invest in information 
acquisition and to screen. The relationship between the degree of competition and incentives 
of banks to screen is analyzed by Gehrig (1998). In a context where banks use imperfect 
creditworthiness tests to discriminate between good and bad projects, he shows that 
incentives to screen increase with the profitability of loans. Thus, more intense competition 
due to the entry of outside banks worsens the quality of banks’ portfolios because it reduces 
the investment that banks make to improve the precision of their screening tests. 
In a similar way to Gehrig (1998), Kanniainen and Stenbacka (1998) find that 
competition between banks will typically undermine the incentives of banks to avoid 
classification errors as the incentive to acquire information falls. Thus, these investigations 
identify a tradeoff between the degree of lending competition and the incentives of banks to 
acquire information, thereby constituting an information-based relationship between market 
structure and risk taking in lending markets. 
Also focusing on the incentive of bank screening, Cao and Shi (2001) argue that, 
because an increase in the number of banks operating in the market exacerbates the winner 
s curse, the number of banks active in performing screening and competing in supplying 
credit would actually fall; as a result, loan rates would be higher and credit quantities smaller 
than in a market with fewer banks. 
 Furthermore, Dell’Ariccia (2000) explores another model of bank screening and 
shows that, as the number of banks increases, the likelihood that banks will actually screen 
entrepreneurs, as opposed to lending indiscriminately, decreases. This worsens banks’ 
portfolio quality and diminishes their ability to withstand adverse macroeconomic shocks. 
His argument is based on the observation that entrepreneurs may be averse to being screened. 
For instance, the screening process may be time-consuming and in the process the firm may 
miss profit opportunities. Alternatively, an entrepreneur may not want to reveal the true 
creditworthiness of the project. 
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The heterogeneity of borrowers, in turn, affect the competitive mechanism; that is, 
the competitive market mechanism fails to function properly. In the highly competitive 
market, each individual bank has a small pool of borrowers; therefore, their information 
about borrowers is so disperse compared to banks in less competitive banking markets 
(Marquez 2002). As already mentioned, as the degree of competition increases, it lowers the 
quality/efficiency of banks’ screening. Consequently, more low-quality borrowers obtain 
financing, and banks may have to increase lending rates to compensate for the higher 
portfolio risk; thereby, leading to an inverse relationship between competition and level of 
lending rates (Dell'Ariccia 2001; Marquez 2002). The increase in lending rates may also be 
the best move for banks when the banking market becomes so competitive that the lending 
relationship between banks and borrowers no longer sustainable (Petersen & Rajan 1995). 
In the end, the consequence of higher lending rates intensifies the moral hazard problem 
associated with borrowers (Padilla & Pagano 2000). 
Besides the adverse selection problem, multiple studies show that the moral hazard 
problem associated with borrowers are less serious in the low competitive banking market. 
This is because banks with more market power have stronger incentives to monitor the 
projects of borrowers after lending and to establish long-term relationships. They can enjoy 
comparative advantages associated with the provision of credit monitoring services and they 
tend to engage in “credit reputation/rating” because making fewer high-quality credit 
investments can increase the return on individual investments and thereby encourage 
financial soundness (Boot & Thakor 2000; Fu et al. 2014). 
One might argue that market power (lower competitive pressure) allows banks to 
extract information rents by charging high loan interest rates to borrowers. Higher loan rates 
would distort entrepreneurial incentives toward the undertaking of excessively risky projects 
resulting in a reduction in the expected return of investment projects (Rajan 1992; Allen & 
Gale 2004; Berger et al. 2009; Allen et al. 2011). However, increased market power may 
induce banks to raise the lending rate but also strengthens the bank’s incentives for project-
specific monitoring (Caminal & Matutes 2006), though it reduces the total amount of 
loanable funds (Cetorelli & Peretto 2000; Cetorelli & Peretto 2012).  
Although an increase in interbank competition reduces the borrowing cost, which 
increases borrowers’ surplus, it breaks the lending relationship between banks and their 
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customers at the same time. This is because competition imposes constraints on the ability 
of borrowers and lenders to intertemporally share the surplus from investment projects 
(Petersen & Rajan 1995). The breakdown of lending relationship gives banks in a 
competitive market an incentive to compensate the lost by maximizing the value of deposit 
insurance put option in the current period by appropriately increasing risk (Besanko & 
Thakor 2004). Also, when the lending relationship is no longer sustainable, banks in a 
competitive market may be forced to compensate by charging higher interest rates than 
banks in a monopolistic market and that higher rates exacerbate the moral hazard problem 
of borrowers (Petersen & Rajan 1995; Dell'Ariccia 2001; Marquez 2002). 
So far, the moral hazard problem related to borrowers is mentioned and the problem 
is intensified in the highly competitive market. There is no concern for banks’ incentive to 
take more or excessive risk in the competitive market. The only focus is on how the 
competitive mechanism operates in the presence of market failures. However, according to 
the banking competition & stability literature, the moral hazard problem can also be 
associated the banks’ behavior itself and the problem is intense when the market is highly 
competitive (Keeley 1990; Allen & Gale 2004; Allen et al. 2011). Therefore, the role of 
credit information sharing may allow limiting bank risk through limiting their excessive risk-
taking behavior, which is common in the highly competitive banking market. 
Under traditional view, excessive risk-taking is inevitable in high competitive 
banking market and the banking system becomes fragile and may end up failure (Allen & 
Gale 2004). This is because banks in high competitive banking market earn less 
informational rents from their lending relationships with borrowers. As they lose market 
power to charge a higher interest rate, their profit margin goes down leading to lower charter-
value10. This makes banks less able to withstand demand- or supply-side shocks and 
encourages excessive risk-taking i.e. pursuing riskier investment to increase returns (Marcus 
1984; Keeley 1990; Demsetz et al. 1996) and have less or no incentives to properly screen 
borrowers (Boot et al. 1993; Allen & Gale 2004). This refers to “competition-fragility” 
literature. 
                                                
10 Keeley (1990); Besanko and Thakor (1993), Boot & Greenbaum 1992; Allen & Gale (2000); Hellmann, 
Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000), Matutes and Vives (2000), and Repullo (2004), among others. 
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In the spirit of the competition-fragility literature, borrowers’ information sharing 
among banks can alleviate the riskiness of banks’ investment in the competitive market. 
Additionally, information sharing among banks can ex-ante limit banks’ incentives to take 
on excessive risk on lending, which may be initially found to potentially end up default. 
Although banks were to involve in excessive risk-taking, information sharing can also 
discipline borrowers on repaying debts (Klein 1992; Padilla & Pagano 2000) and prevent 
them from over-borrowing from multiple-lenders (Bennardo et al. 2009, 2014). These results 
in lower bank risk and in turn prevent banks from over-lending and excessive risk-taking at 
the same time. 
As opposed to the competition-fragility literature, both Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) 
and Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) theoretically show that it is not always the case that 
high competitive banking market leads to bank risk and failure. This refers to “competition-
stability” literature. In particular, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that a reduction in loan 
rates from greater competition reduces the loans’ probability of default because lower rates 
provide borrowers an incentive to choose safer investments and less likely to default. 
Furthermore, they argue that banks in the lower competitive market have high market power 
to charge higher interest rate and exacerbate moral hazard of borrowers. By taking into 
account the fact that lower rates also reduce the banks’ revenues from performing loans, 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) additionally argue that the relationship between 
competition and the risk of failure is U-shape. 
However, both studies of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo (2010) may overlook the fact that credit information sharing among banks can 
provide borrowers an incentive to repay and keep up with a good credit history (Klein 1992; 
Padilla & Pagano 2000) and subsequently lower default rate (Jappelli & Pagano 2002). 
Particularly, credit reporting allows borrowers to build a credit history and to use a 
documented track record of responsible borrowing and repayment as “reputational 
collateral” to access credit outside of the established lending relationship (Love & Mylenko 
2003) and to keep up with a good repayment history (Padilla & Pagano 2000). In addition, 
banks with market power have more monitoring capacity and are efficient in monitoring 
their borrowers (Caminal & Matutes 2006). 
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To sum up, because banks’ screening abilities worsen with increasing competition, 
tougher competition exacerbate adverse selection and moral hazard problem associated with 
borrowers. Furthermore, competitive market induces moral hazard of banks to undertake 
excessive risk-taking to maximize profits. Thus, the effect of credit information sharing on 
bank risk is expected to be more pronounced in more competitive banking environment, 
compared to the market with the less competitive environment. To answer the second 
research question, the related hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of credit information sharing is expected to be more pronounced 
in the high competitive banking market. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
3.3.1.1 Data Source and Sample 
Our sample covers 15,558 banks in 105 countries during the period 2005 – 2013. 
Similar to the previous chapter, we gather data from many different sources and mainly rely 
on Bankscope Database for bank-level accounting information. Other data are taken from 
the World Bank’s Doing Business Database, the IFRS Foundation website, Deloitte, Simon 
Fraser University in Canada, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Database, the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI), the World Bank’s Bank 
Regulation & Supervision Survey Database, the Deposit Insurance Database, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the dataset from LaPorta et al. (1998), La Porta et al. (1999), 
Easterly (2001) and Djankov et al. (2007). 
In addition to the previous chapter, we collect data on banking competition from the 
World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). These data consist of the 
Lerner index, the three-largest bank asset concentration ratio, and the five-largest bank asset 
concentration ratio. Further descriptions and links to data sources can be found in Appendix 
A. 
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3.3.1.2 Variable Measurement 
3.3.1.2.1 Dependent Variable 
A comprehensive literature survey suggests that most of the bank risk indicators can 
be classified into two broad categories, consisting of accounting-based and market-based 
indicators. The first and traditional approach to assess the risk of a firm is an accounting-
based measure. It is based on the pure accounting information from balance sheet data (see  
Altman (1968); Altman and Katz (1976); Kaplan and Urwitz (1979); Ohlson (1980); 
Zmijewski (1984) among others). Key accounting ratios are identified and firm’s default 
probability is estimated by using multivariate discriminant or multinomial choice models. 
However, the consensus on the accuracy and stress prediction ability of these indicators are 
relatively low (Singh et al. 2015). 
These models have generally been criticized on three grounds: (1) the absence of an 
underlying theoretical model; (2) the timeliness of the information11; and (3) the lack of 
uncertainty and forward-looking component. The selected methodologies also introduce 
sample selection bias, generating inconsistent coefficient estimates (e.g., Shumway (2001); 
Chava and Jarrow (2004); Aggarwal et al. (2012)). In addition, conservatism and historical 
cost accounting mean that the true asset values may be very different from the recorded book 
values. Accounting numbers are subject to manipulation by management. Furthermore, 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) argue that since the accounting statements are prepared on a going-
concern basis, they are, by design, of limited utility in predicting bankruptcy. Since the ratios 
and their weightings are derived from sample analysis, such models are likely to be sample 
specific (Agarwal & Taffler 2008). 
Although the accounting-ratio-based approach is criticized for its lack of theoretical 
grounding, timeliness of information and lack of forward-looking component, it has 3 things 
in its favors as stated by Agarwal and Taffler (2008). First, corporate failure is generally not 
a sudden event. It is rare that firms with good profitability and strong balance sheets file for 
bankruptcy because of a sudden change in the economic environment. Usually, corporate 
                                                
11 These models base on past performance and information from a firm’s financial statement, which available 
only on quarterly and annually basis; thus, they fail to capture changes in the financial conditions of the 
borrowing firm and may or may not predict the future. 
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failure is the culmination of several years of adverse performance and, hence, will be largely 
captured by the firm’s accounting statements. Second, the double entry system of accounting 
ensures that window dressing the accounts or change in accounting policies will have 
minimal effect on a measure that combines different facets of accounting information 
simultaneously. Third, loan covenants are generally based on accounting numbers and this 
information is more likely to be reflected in accounting-ratio-based models. 
As opposed to the accounting ratio-based approach, the second approach is purely 
market-based. These are indices determined directly in the marketplace (e.g. stock prices, 
aggregate realized volatility, aggregate market leverage, turbulence (a measure of excess 
volatility relative to the market), liquidity ratios and credit condition (e.g., credit default 
swaps)). Similar to the traditional purely balance-sheet-based, most of these measures lack 
an underlying theoretical framework; however, the timely availability and continuous 
incorporation of information are prompt and help to improve the relative performance and 
predictive ability in some cases (see Vassalou and Xing (2004); Jorion (2005); Gropp et al. 
(2006); Agarwal and Taffler (2008); Campbell et al. (2011)). According to Fu et al. (2014), 
in the efficient markets, stock prices reflect all available information. Market variables are 
unlikely to be influenced by firm accounting policies. 
The combination of the pure accounting and market-based measures is the contingent 
claims based model (CCA) of Merton (1974) which provides a theoretical underpinning and 
answers some of these criticisms. The basic model is based on the priority structure of 
balance sheet liabilities and uses the standard Black–Scholes option pricing formula to value 
the junior claims as a call option on firms’ value with the value of senior claims as default 
barrier (Singh et al. 2015). The structural underpinning and the combination of market-based 
and accounting information help obtain a comprehensive set of financial risk indicators, e.g. 
Distance-to-Default (DtD), probabilities of default, credit spreads, etc. 
Moreover, CCA captures the current period instability (using volatility), a forward-
looking component (using stock prices) and balance sheet mismatch (using capital structure). 
It has been widely applied to assess the ability of corporates, banks, and sovereigns to service 
their debt. Applications to the banking industries follow CCA by interpreting a bank’s equity 
as a call option on its value given the limited liability of shareholders. This approach was 
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further refined by Vasicek (1984) and Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and is applied professionally 
in Moody’s KMV to predict default probability. 
Among market-based measures, the DtD approach of Merton has been widely cited 
and reviewed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Central Bank (ECB) and 
Office of Federal Research (OFR) as a tool for enhancing bank risk analysis. The DtD has 
gained prominence, partly due to its successful commercial implementation by Moody’s 
KMV. Several studies have examined the usefulness of DtD as a tool for predicting corporate 
and bank failure (Kealhofer 2003; Oderda et al. 2003; Vassalou & Xing 2004; Gropp et al. 
2006; Koutsomanoli-Filippaki & Mamatzakis 2009; Harada & Ito 2011; Aggarwal et al. 
2012; Qi et al. 2014; Jessen & Lando 2015). They have found DtD to be a powerful measure 
to predict bankruptcy and rating downgrades. Comparative analysis of DtD also suggests 
that DtD can be a powerful proxy to determine default (Hillegeist et al. 2004; Vassalou & 
Xing 2004; Agarwal & Taffler 2008; Bharath & Shumway 2008; Campbell et al. 2008; 
Jessen & Lando 2015). Further information about the DtD model can be found in the 
appendix. 
Beside its supportive comments, there are many criticisms about the Merton model. 
Because it is a structural model, it requires a number of assumptions. According to Saunders 
and Allen (2002), the underlying theoretical model requires the assumption of normality of 
stock returns. Furthermore, Hillegeist et al. (2004) suggest two fundamental problems with 
operationalizing Merton (1974) contingent claims approach: (1) Misspecification due to the 
restrictive assumptions of the model (e.g. single class of zero coupon debt, all liabilities 
mature in one-year12, costless bankruptcy, no safety covenants, default triggered only at 
maturity, etc.); (2) Measurement errors (e.g. value and volatility of assets are unobservable). 
 In this study, an accounting-based measure will be estimated for each bank because 
Z-Score index is widely used in the recent banking literature in measuring bank risk and 
stability (Boyd & Runkle 1993; Berger et al. 2009; Laeven & Levine 2009; Fu et al. 2014) 
and the estimation of the Z-Score index is based on an accounting basis. Also, to calculate a 
market-based measure of risk, many observations in the sample may be excluded because 
                                                
12 There is no distinction between different types of debts and assume that the firm only has a single zero 
coupon loan. 
103	
	
most banks in the sample are not listed. Therefore, our primary measure of bank risk is the 
Z-Score index. The Z-Score is an inverse of a bank’s probability of insolvency. A bank 
becomes insolvent when its asset value drops below its debt. Intuitively, the Z-Score index 
shows the number of standard deviations below the mean by which profits would have to 
fall so as to just deplete equity capital (Boyd 2006; Houston et al. 2010; Fu et al. 2014). In 
a simple word, Z-Score indicates the number of standard deviations in return on assets that 
a bank is away from insolvency and thus the likelihood of failure. This measure links to 
individual bank distress in term of proximity to bankruptcy or entry into bankruptcy. 
Particularly, this risk measure is monotonically associated with the probability of a bank’s 
default. A higher index shows that a bank is more stable and has a less overall risk. 
The calculation of Z-score combines profitability, leverage and the volatility of 
return into a single ratio as follows: 
$"% = '()"% + +,-./,-0'()"%  (3-1) 
where '() is the return on assets, 123 is the ratio of equity to total assets, and 0'() is the 
standard deviation (SD) of return on assets. Higher profitability ('()) and the capitalization 
levels ( 123) raise the Z-Score index whereas the uncertainty of profitability (0'()) lowers 
the Z-Score index. Following Agoraki et al. (2011) and Soedarmono et al. (2013), we use 
the data of ROA in the current year (t) and the two previous years (t-1 and t-2) to calculate 
the standard deviation of ROA at time t (three-period rolling window) in Equation (3-1). 
Due to the high skewness of the Z-Score index, we smooth out by taking a natural logarithm 
(Laeven & Levine 2009; Houston et al. 2010; Dong et al. 2014).  
For robustness check, we also include another indicator of bank risk, which is a ratio 
of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL). Non-performing loans potentially cause losses 
for banks (Berger et al. 2009; Delis & Kouretas 2011). While the Z-score index measures 
the overall bank-risk and likelihood of failure, the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans measures the quality of the loan portfolio reflecting the credit risk position of a bank. 
A higher ratio indicates riskier loan portfolio (or higher credit risk). Furthermore, we modify 
our calculation of Z-Score according to Agoraki et al. (2011) and Soedarmono et al. (2013). 
Instead of using the data of ROA in the current year and two previous years, we use ROA in 
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the current year and three previous years (four-period rolling window: t, t-1, t-2 and t-3) to 
calculate the standard deviation of ROA at time t. We then use newly calculated standard 
deviation of ROA to compute Z-Score and obtain the first modified Z-Score, 
Z_SCORE_4WIN. Similarly, data of ROA in the current year and four previous years (five-
period rolling window: t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4) are also used for calculating the standard 
deviation of ROA at time t. We then use newly calculated standard deviation of ROA to 
compute Z-Score and obtain the second modified Z-Score, Z_SCORE_5WIN. 
3.3.1.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
 Credit Information Sharing 
Like the previous chapter, we take data on the depth of credit information sharing 
index (DEPTH) from the World Bank’s Doing Business database. This index measures rules 
affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available through 
information-sharing institutions. The value of the index ranges from 0 to 6. The higher the 
value the better the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available from 
either private credit bureau or public credit registry.  Further detail of the depth of credit 
information sharing index can be found in Table 3-1. 
 Information Environment Proxy 
Like the previous chapter, we proxy the transparency of information environment by 
the mandatory IFRS adoption and the Business Extent of Disclosure Index (BDI). Data on 
IFRS adoption is taken from the IFRS Foundation website, Deloitte and Simon Fraser 
University in Canada. We create a dummy variable for IFRS adoption whose value is equal 
to one if a country (and year) mandatorily adopt IFRS and zero otherwise. The list of 
countries with mandatory IFRS adoption is in Appendix B. Data on BDI is taken from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business database. IFRS dummy with a value of one and higher value 
of BDI are associated with more transparent information environment. More detail of the 
components of BDI can be found in Appendix C. 
 Banking Competition 
In the studies of banking competition, various instruments are used to measure 
competition (or market power). There are two possible classifications of the instruments 
105	
	
used in the existing literature, a structural and non-structural approach. With regard to a 
structural approach, it consists of measurements that are not based on any model of industrial 
organization, such as the so-called structure-conduct-performance paradigm vs efficient 
structure hypothesis (Berger 1995) as well as the use of market concentration (e.g., Cetorelli 
and Strahan (2006)). Earlier studies use a structural approach such as concentration-based 
measures as a proxy for bank competition.  
However, there is a growing consensus that concentration measures are not good 
proxies for bank competition (Berger et al. 2004; Claessens & Laeven 2004; Beck et al. 
2006a). The measures of banking concentration, like Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) and 
N-bank concentration ratio13, have also been considered to be ambiguous indicators of 
market power/competition because they ignore the relationship between revenue and market 
contestability at the bank-level (Beck et al. 2006a; Berger et al. 2009; Skully & Perera 2012). 
Specifically, these measures of concentration do not take into account the competitive 
behavior of banks in a way that banks with different ownership behave differently and that 
banks might not compete directly with each other in the same line of business (Beck 2008).  
Furthermore, the concentration measures are computed at a nationwide level which 
may not always coincide with the market power exercised at the local level (Berger et al. 
2009). Some banking products are competed on an international basis, while other products 
more often compete on a local basis (Maudos & Solís 2009). Also suggested by Alegria and 
Schaeck (2008), the measures of concentration can be influenced and sensitive to the 
differences in the number of banks and so the choice can affect the inferences regarding the 
degree of competition (Skully & Perera 2012). Furthermore, concentration in banking 
market can affect bank stability through other channels other than competition (Berger et al. 
2004; Beck et al. 2006a; Beck 2008). Berger et al. (2004), Beck et al. (2006a), and Beck 
(2008), to some extent, confirm that concentration measures may not be a good measure of 
competition. The model of Marquez (2002) also points to the same conclusion that the 
number of banks may not be a good indicator for measuring market competitiveness. 
Also, noted that it is more favorable to use bank-level markup (Lerner index) instead 
                                                
13 N-bank is the number of banks. Three-banks and five-banks are commonly used in computation. 
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of a concentration ratio (three/five-asset concentration ratios) to measure market power to 
prevent our empirical analysis from capturing any misleading relationship between banking 
risk and competition. It may be the case that as bank failures increase, the resulting higher 
degree of concentration in the industry does not necessarily imply more market power for 
surviving banks (Beck et al. 2006a; Agoraki et al. 2011). Banks that do not fail are usually 
the more efficient bank, which effectively has lower costs in producing the same output 
(Beck et al. 2006a). 
 Regarding a non-structural approach, it includes diverse instruments based on the 
industrial organization economics (the so-called “new empirical industrial organization 
(NEIO)” literature. This literature has been developed primarily from the models of Iwata 
(1974), Bresnahan (1982), and Panzar and Rosse (1987). More specifically, the published 
studies use optimization models from which are derived indicators of competition such as 
the price-cost margin (Lerner index) (e.g. Beighley and McCall (1975); De Guevara and 
Maudos* (2004); Maudos and De Guevara (2004); Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005)). 
Some measures competition by employing the Breshnahan mark-up test (e.g. Shaffer (1993); 
Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994); Suominen (1994)). Moreover, some uses measures of 
competition such as the Panzar and Rosse test (H-Statistic) (e.g. Molyneux et al. (1994); De 
Bandt and Davis (2000); Bikker and Haaf (2002); Claessens and Laeven (2004); Shaffer 
(2004b)); the conduct parameter (e.g. Barros (1999); Neven and Röller (1999); De Pinho 
(2000); Kim and Vale (2001); Canhoto (2004); Coccorese (2005)) Tobin´s q  (Keeley 1990) 
and the Boone indicator (e.g. Boone et al. (2004); Boone and Van Leuvensteijn (2010)). 
The recent literature favors a non-structural approach such as the H-statistic, the 
Lerner index and the profit elasticity rather than a structural approach. Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) and Schaeck et al. (2009) derive country-specific Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-
statistics, which they subsequently regress on a number of explanatory variables using cross-
sectional estimation methods. H-Statistic measures the reaction of output to input prices 
gauging the competitive behavior of banks. However, it imposes certain restrictive 
assumptions on banks’ cost function. Specifically, under perfect competition, increases in 
input prices cause total revenue and marginal cost to move together, while in imperfect 
competition they do not (Beck 2008). 
Although the H-statistic of Panzar and Rosse (1987) is used routinely in the banking 
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literature to assess the degree of competition, it has numerous disadvantages. First, the H-
statistic maps the various degrees of market power only weakly and, therefore, cannot be 
viewed as a continuous variable (Maudos & Nagore 2005; Clerides et al. 2013). Secondly, 
although the H-Statistic method of Panzar and Rosse (1987) utilize bank-level data to 
measure bank market power, the implementation of it requires banking markets to be in the 
long-run equilibrium, which is unlikely in practice (Bikker & Haaf 2002; Shaffer 2004a; 
Berger et al. 2009). Some authors (see e.g. Shaffer (2004a) among others) convincingly 
suggest that the H-statistic does not map into a range of oligopoly solution concepts as 
robustly as the Lerner index does, mainly owing to partial failure to incorporate long-run 
structural adjustments. Also argued by Bikker et al. (2012), H-statistic can actually be used 
to test the only hypothesis relating to whether the bank operates in long-run equilibrium. 
Among the instruments with solid theoretical foundations, the Lerner index takes the 
lead in measuring competition. The main reasons for its popularity are its simplicity, its 
straightforward interpretation, and application to empirical studies and the fact that it does 
not pose stringent data requirements (Clerides et al. 2015). Many proponent of using the 
Lerner Index claims that: firstly, the Lerner index can be estimated for each bank in the 
sample so that its computation is based on information at bank-level observations (bank-
specific variables) for each country and this overcome small sample bias problem (Jeon et 
al. 2011); secondly, the evolution of market power can be analyzed by estimating a Lerner 
index for each year (Maudos & Nagore 2005); thirdly, it is suitable for examining the market 
power for banks in different ownership types, sizes and specialization (Claessens & Laeven 
2004; Brissimis & Delis 2011; Skully & Perera 2012); and finally, the Lerner Index 
incorporates both market concentration and demand elasticity so that it is preferable to the 
market concentration measures per se (Maudos & de Guevara 2007). 
Due to favorable arguments, the estimation of the Lerner index has been widely used 
in the banking sector as an indicator of degrees of competition. Some of the most important 
studies in this area are Shaffer (1993) for Canadian banks, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) for 
Italian banks, Maudos and Pérez (2003) for the Spanish banking sector, and Fernandez de 
Guevara et al. (2005), Maudos and De Guevara (2004) and De Guevara and Maudos* (2004) 
for a sample of countries of the European Union. 
The estimation of Lerner Index shows the ability of an individual bank to charge a 
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price above marginal cost. The divergence between product price and the marginal cost of 
production is the essence of gauging monopoly power (Maudos & de Guevara 2007; Skully 
& Perera 2012; Clerides et al. 2015). Generally, it is defined as follows: 
456756"% = 8./"% − :;./"%8./"%  (3-2) 
Where 8./"% is the output price of total assets proxied by the ratio of total revenues (interest 
and non-interest income) to total assets for bank i at time t and :;./"% is the marginal cost 
of total assets for bank i at time t.  
 Given that data on the output price is available but not the marginal cost, an important 
procedure is to estimate the marginal cost so that Equation (3-2) can be estimated. :;./"% 
is calculated by taking the derivative from the transcendental logarithmic (translog) cost 
function as shown below: 
<7 =;"% = >? + @A <7 =)"% + 12@# <7 =)"% # + 12 @#D <7 =)"% <7E"%DFDGA
+ >D <7E"%DFDGA + 12 >DH <7E"%D <7E"%HFHGAFDGA + IA%= + 12 I#%=#
+ IF%= <7 =)"% + IJ%= <7E"%DFDGA + K"% 
(3-3) 
Simply, 
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(3-4) 
Where i denotes banks and t denotes years. =; is total cost consisting of total operating cost 
plus financial costs. =) is the bank output proxied by total assets. EA is the bank’s input 
price of deposits (funds) proxied by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money 
market funding. E# is the bank’s input price of labor proxied by the ratio of personal 
expenses to total assets. EF is the bank’s input price of physical capital (fixed capital) 
proxied by the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets. Time trend 
is also included to capture the impact of technological changes that could lead to movements 
in the cost function over time (Maudos & Nagore 2005; Berger et al. 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt 
& Martínez Pería 2010; Skully & Perera 2012; Fu et al. 2014). The restriction of symmetry 
is applied to the estimation such that >DH = >HD (Berger et al. 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Martínez Pería 2010; Fu et al. 2014). In addition, total cost and input price terms are 
normalized by E# to impose linear homogeneity to make sure that there is no change in the 
cost-minimizing bundle if all of the input prices are multiplied by the same positive scalar 
(Fu et al. 2014). Thus, the allocation of inputs is only affected by the changes in the ratios 
of the input prices. Marginal cost (:;./"%) is then derived as follows: 
:;./,- = L=;"% L=)"% = =;"%=)"% @A + @# <7 =)"% + @#D <7E"%DFDGA + IJ%=  (3-5) 
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The symbols in Equation (3-5) remain as defined in Equation (3-3). The Lerner index 
can be estimated once the marginal cost is obtained from estimating Equation (3-5). 
Generally, the Lerner Index ranges from zero to one. When the Lerner Index is zero, it 
corresponds to perfect competition and the larger the values of the Lerner Index the less the 
competition (greater market power)14. 
 For the ease of interpretation, we transform it to a competition measure by 
subtracting it from one as shown below. Because of the transformation, the higher index is 
corresponding to higher competition. 
;MNO5PQPQM701"% = 1 − 456756"% = 1 − 8./"% − :;./"%8./"%  (3-6) 
 For robustness tests, we also employ two other variables which are traditionally used 
as alternative measures of the degree of competition. Those two variables are three-largest 
bank asset concentration ratio and five-largest bank asset concentration ratio. They are 
commonly used in the literature for a period time as a standard measure of market power 
until they are criticized for their inappropriateness of measuring a degree of competition in 
the banking sector. 
The three-largest bank asset concentration is computed based on the top 3 largest 
assets of a country’s banking system, whereas the five-largest bank-asset concentration ratio 
is computed differently based on the top 5 largest assets of a country’s banking system. 
Noted that the sample of banks covered by Bankscope changes over the sample period so 
measured changes in concentration may reflect changes in coverage, not changes in actual 
concentration (Beck et al. 2006a). Thus, as suggest by Beck et al. (2006a), including banks 
beyond the top three might introduce measurement bias given that our sample size changes 
over the sample period. For this reason, the Herfindahl index of concentration (HHI), which 
is the sum of the squared market shares of assets in the banking system, is not accurate as it 
tends to involve measurement bias. Therefore, we favor the three-largest bank asset 
concentration ratio and the five-largest bank asset concentration ratio. For the ease of 
                                                
14 The negative Lerner index implies that pricing is below the marginal cost and could result, for example, 
from non-optimal bank behavior. However, our sample does not contain any negative Lerner index. 
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interpretation, we convert the concentration index into a measure of competition by the 
calculation as shown below: ;MNO5PQPQM702"% = 1 − [3	4V6W5XP	YV7ZQ7W	)XX5P	;M7[57P6VPQM7]"% (3-7) ;MNO5PQPQM703"% = 1 − [5	4V6W5XP	YV7ZQ7W	)XX5P	;M7[57P6VPQM7]"% (3-8) 
3.3.1.2.3 Control Variables 
Several bank-specific and country-specific variables are controlled and explained in 
this section. Regarding bank-specific control variables, SIZE is a natural logarithm of a 
bank’s total asset, which proxy for a bank’s size.	Large banks could be less risky due to their 
greater ability to diversify risk across product lines (Berger et al. 2009; Laeven & Levine 
2009; Houston et al. 2010; Agoraki et al. 2011; Delis & Kouretas 2011; Dong et al. 2014). 
To capture the non-linear relationship between bank size and bank risk (Houston et al. 2010), 
we include SIZE_SQR, which is the square of a bank’s asset. However, large and important 
banks could be riskier due to the implicit assumption that they are “too-big-to-fail” (Brown 
& Dinç 2011; Bertay et al. 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga 2013). Thus, TBTF is included 
and it is a dummy variable that indicates too-big-too-fail and takes a value of one if the 
bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10%. LOAN is a ratio of net loans to total 
deposits. It assesses the extent to which customer loans are financed by customer deposits 
and is related to the bank's liquidity (Dong et al. 2014). EFFICIENCY is a ratio of cost-to-
income. The cost-to-income ratio, defined as the ratio of non-interest operating cost to total 
bank revenues15, reflects operations both on and off the balance sheet and the extent to which 
operating expenses absorb operating revenues. It is used to control for differences in 
technical efficiency (Agoraki et al. 2011) and it is expected to be negatively related to a 
bank's risk because less efficient banks are likely to take on greater risk to generate profits 
(Boyd 2006; Agoraki et al. 2011; Dong et al. 2014).  
Regarding country-specific control variables, we include GDPG, which is the rate of 
GDP growth as a proxy for the fluctuations in economic activities. In addition, INF is 
inflation. We also include CR, which is a creditor rights index, to control for the level of 
                                                
15 Source: http://www.bvd.co.uk/bankscope/bankscope.pdf 
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creditor rights in a country. In an environment with stronger creditor rights, lenders are more 
likely to grab collateral, force repayment, or even gain control of the debtor that is in 
financial distress (Houston et al. 2010; Acharya et al. 2011). It follows that stronger creditor 
rights would lead to higher recovery rates in the event of default, which reduces the bank’s 
risk. However, as argued further by Houston et al. (2010), with greater protection in the 
event of a default, a bank may be more willing to lend to riskier borrowers with poorer credit 
ratings. This effect will increase the average expected default rate in the bank’s portfolio. If 
the higher expected recovery rates in default fail to offset the higher expected default rates, 
stronger creditor rights would be associated with increased bank risk (Houston et al. 2010). 
Thus, the sign of the correlation between creditor rights and bank risk is ambiguous. 
Numerous research points to the same direction that the structure of national bank 
regulations crucially influences bank risk (Agoraki et al. 2011; Barth et al. 2013a; Barth et 
al. 2013b). Thus, we include bank regulatory variables to control for the potential impacts 
of bank regulation on bank risk. Those bank regulatory variables consist of DEPOSIT_INS, 
CAPITAL_STR and ASSET_DIV. First, DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if a country has explicit deposit insurance and a value of zero otherwise. As 
pointed out by Barth et al. (2006), deposit insurance intensifies the moral hazard problem in 
banking because depositors no longer face the risk of losing their savings, which diminishes 
their incentives and efforts at monitoring bank activities (Houston et al. 2010). 
Second, we construct CAPITAL_STR and ASSET_DIV by following Houston et al. 
(2010) and Agoraki et al. (2011). CAPITAL_STR is an index measuring the extent of both 
initial and overall capital stringency. It is constructed from several variables that indicate 
whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements (Houston et al. 2010). It takes 
into account whether the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement is in line with the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision guidelines; whether the minimum ratio varies as a 
function of an individual bank’s credit risk and market risk; whether the following items are 
deducted from the book value of capital: 1) The market value of loan losses not realized in 
accounting books, 2) unrealized losses in securities portfolios, and/or 3) unrealized foreign 
exchange losses; are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities? Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done 
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with assets other than cash or government securities? Can Initial disbursement of capital be 
done with borrowed funds? 
Capital requirements can influence competition and risk-taking in various ways. First, 
high initial capital stringency requirements can impose entry barriers for newcomers. This 
would restrict competition and allow existing banks to accumulate power, resulting in a more 
prudent, less-risky behavior. Second, higher overall capital requirements are associated with 
higher fixed costs of running the bank and, consequently, fewer banks will be able to afford 
these costs. Third, as Bolt and Tieman (2004) illustrate within a dynamic theoretical 
framework, more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter 
acceptance criteria for granting new loans. Fourth, Hellmann et al. (2000) suggest that in 
addition to the capital-at-risk effect, there is an opposite effect that harms franchise value 
and encourages gambling. On the same line with Hellmann et al. (2000), Matutes and Vives 
(2000) and Repullo (2004) conclude that capital requirements may not be enough and 
additional regulations such as deposit rate controls, deposit premiums or asset restrictions 
could be useful in reducing risk within a competitive environment. 
ASSET_DIV is an index measuring whether there are explicit, verifiable, and 
quantifiable guidelines for asset diversification (e.g., if banks are required to have some 
minimum diversification of loans among sectors, or if there are sectoral concentration 
limits); and whether banks can make loans aboard. Higher values of the index indicate more 
bank asset diversification. 
In the robustness tests, we include a variable gauging a percentage of total assets in 
the banking system that is owned by the government (PUBLIC_OWN). In addition, we also 
include a series of other political and institutional quality indexes from the WGI database to 
check for the robustness of the results. These indexes are control of corruption 
(CORRUPTION), government effectiveness (GOV_EFF), political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (8(4^=^;), regulatory quality ('_`_bc)), rule of law ('c4__4)E) 
and voice & accountability (d(^;__);;). All definition and data sources of all variables 
can be found in Table 3-1. 
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3.3.1.2.4 Summary Statistics 
 Table 3-1 summarizes all definitions and sources of variables as well as their symbols 
used in this chapter. Table 3-2 presents descriptive statistics of the sample. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Looking at Table 3-2, we see that the mean log z-score 
(Z_SCORE) is 3.87 and the standard deviation is 1.52. This is a fairly high standard deviation 
and the wide range in Z-scores suggest that there is considerable variation across countries 
in the level of bank risk. These statistics of Z-score are quite similar to those reported by 
Laeven and Levine (2009) and Houston et al. (2010). The sample of Laeven and Levine 
(2009) is smaller with 287 banks in 33 countries and they report 2.85 for the mean of Z-
score and 0.99 for the standard deviation. With a large (but smaller than ours) sample of 
2,400 banks in 69 countries, Houston et al. (2010) report a mean Z-score of 3.24 and a 
standard deviation of 1.09. According to the alternative measures of bank risk, the means 
value of the two modified Z-scores are slightly lower when more periods of ROA are 
incorporated into the calculation of Z-score. Specifically, the mean of Z-score with a four-
period rolling window of ROA (Z_SCORE_4WIN), which has a value of 3.64, is slightly 
higher than that of Z-score with a five-rolling period window of ROA (Z_SCORE_5WIN), 
which has a value of 3.50. We also use a ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (NPL) 
as another alternative measure of bank risk and its mean value is approximately 0.035 (or 
3.5%). 
The statistics on Table 3-2 also show that the mean value of the depth of credit 
information sharing index (DEPTH) is 5.04 and the median is 5 suggesting that banks in the 
sample enjoy a high degree of credit information sharing depth. The mean value of private 
credit bureau coverages (PRIV) and public credit registry coverages (PUB) are 0.78 (78%) 
or 0.091 (9.1%), respectively. According to the information environment proxies, the mean 
of IFRS adoption (IFRS) is 0.29, while the mean value of the Business Extent of Disclosure 
index (BDI) is 6.45. 
Regarding to our competition measures, the mean of the first competition measure 
(COMPET1), which is transformed from the Lerner index, is around 0.757, showing that 
competition during the sample period (2005-2013) is quite high. At the same time, the mean 
value of the second competitive measure (COMPET2), which is transformed from the three-
largest bank asset concentration index, is 0.185; while, the mean value of the third 
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competitive measure (COMPET3), which is transformed from the five-largest bank asset 
concentration index is 0.224. The mean values of COMPET2 and COMPET3 are not in line 
with the mean of COMPET1 implying that the competition measure derived from the 
concentration index may not be comparable to the competition measure derived from the 
Lerner index. The concentration index can be highly influenced by the differences in the 
number of banks in the banking system but does not actually reflect the overall market 
competitiveness. 
Furthermore, Table 3-2 reports the sample statistics for control variables. According 
to the bank-specific variables, the mean log of the total asset (SIZE) is 5.96. Less than 25 
percent of bank-year observations in the sample has its share of the country’s total deposits 
exceeds 10%, which is the threshold that is considered as too-big-too-fail (TBTF). The mean 
of net loans to total deposits (LOAN) is as high as 0.823. And the ratio of cost-to-income 
(EFFICIENCY) is 0.69. According to the country-specific variables, the mean of GDP 
growth rate (GDPG) is 1.2% and the mean of inflation (INF) is 3.1%. Although the range of 
creditor rights index (CR) is generally zero to four, the strength of creditor rights is around 
one to two on average for many countries in the sample. More than 75 percent of the banks’ 
deposits in the sample are insured by their government (DEPOSIT_INS). Regulation on 
capital is quite stringent (CAPITAL_STR) for most countries as its mean is 6.83 suggesting 
that banks in many countries are subjected to stringent capital requirement. Lastly, the mean 
of banks’ asset diversification (ASSET_DIV) is 0.34. 
In addition to the variables used in the main regression, we also present the summary 
statistics of other variables used in robustness tests. Regarding a series of political and 
institutional quality indexes, a control of corruption index (CORRUPTION) has a mean 
value of 1.03, a government effectiveness index (GOV_EFF) has a mean value of 1.2, a 
political stability index (POLITIC) has a mean value of 0.372, a regulatory quality index 
(REG_QUA) has a mean value of 1.14, a rule of law index (RULE_LAW) has a mean value 
of 1.17, and lastly a voice and accountability index (VOICE_ACC) has a mean value of 0.9. 
The mean value of a public ownership of bank assets (PUBLIC_OWN) is 0.106. 
 Table 3-3 reports the yearly sample distribution by year of our main variables. The 
table shows that the sample size is around 10,000 throughout our sample period 2005 to 
2013. By examining our main measure of bank risk, Z-Score, across years, the overall trend 
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shows that bank risk increases dramatically from 2008 to 2009 (lower Z-score), which is 
during the global financial crisis. The results, as confirmed by IMF (2009)16, imply that bank 
performance is most affected by the financial crisis during the year of 2009. Furthermore, 
bank risk gradually decreases in 2010 (rising Z-score), which implies that banks was hit hard 
by the global financial crisis but has gradually rebounded. Consistent with Z-Score as a 
measure of bank risk, the trend of NPL as a measure of bank risk shows that a percentage of 
nonperforming loans increases quite significantly during 2009 and 2010 when the global 
financial crisis is at its peak. 
The trend of the depth of credit information sharing index on Table 3-3 shows that 
the average is approximately at five to six. When the three measures of banking competition 
are compared by year, they reveal different trends. The trend of competition as measured by 
COMPET1 (inversely related to Lerner index) is ascending between the year 2005 and 2008 
suggesting a decreasing in pricing power (lower Lerner index) over time. In other words, the 
banking markets become more competitive during that period and peak at the year 2008. 
This trend is similar to the results of Fu et al. (2014) who also show that the downward trend 
of the Lerner index (higher competition) for 14 Asia Pacific economies during the year 2005 
to 2008. However, we additionally show that the downward trend in the Lerner index is not 
limited to only the countries in Asia Pacific but also other regions around the globe. From 
2009 onward, the trend of competition as measured by COMPET1 is descending and smooth 
in the year 2011 and 2012. 
Similar to COMPET1, Table 3-3 shows that the trend of competition as measured by 
COMPET2 and COMPET3 (inversely related to banking concentration index) is also 
ascending over the period of 2005 to 2008. However, the trend continues exhibiting in an 
ascending order, implying that the banking market is becoming less and less concentrated 
over time. As noted earlier, the concentration index is largely influenced by the number of 
banks in the banking system. Thus, the resulting of less concentrated banking market does 
not necessarily imply less market power, especially those banks who survive from the global 
financial crisis in 2008-2009. In other words, as the markets become less concentrated, it 
may have nothing to do with the markets become more competitive. Banks that do not fail 
                                                
16 International Monetary Fund, 2009. Global Financial Stability Report, April 
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during the global financial crisis are usually the more efficient bank, which effectively has 
lower costs in producing the same output (Beck et al. 2006a). 
We also check for the correlation between variables. The correlation matrix is shown 
in Table 3-4, Table 3-5 and Table 3-6. DEPTH is positively correlated with Z_SCORE and 
negatively correlated with NPL, reflecting that there exists a negative relationship between 
credit information sharing and bank risk. PRIV and PUB are also positively associated with 
Z_SCORE. DEPTH and PRIV are highly correlated. This highly positive correlation suggests 
that a country with the high depth of credit information tends to have high coverage of 
private credit bureaus or vice versa. However, each variable enters the regression 
individually, so the problem of multicollinearity should be less of a concern. Opposite to 
PRIV, DEPTH is negatively associated with PUB. Regarding the information environment 
proxies, DEPTH is negatively correlated with IFRS but negatively correlated with BDI. 
Regarding the banking competition measures, DEPTH is negatively associated with all three 
measures of competition. Moreover, the governance variables (CORRUPTION, GOV_EFF, 
POLITIC, REG_QUA, RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC) exhibit a very strong correlation with 
one another; therefore, each enters the regression one at a time. 
3.3.2 Methodology 
To test for our hypothesis H1, which we expect that credit information sharing will 
reduce bank risk, the regression analysis is expressed as followed: 
'QXZ",% = @? + @A;^f",% + @H(h",%H )jHG# + @k(l",%k)A#kGm + n% + >" + K",% (3-9) 
Where i and t indicates the ith bank in year t; Risk is measured by Z-Score index (Z_SCORE), 
which is inversely related to banking risk, so that the higher the Z-Score the lower the bank 
risk; CIS is a credit information sharing variable proxied by the depth of credit information 
sharing index (DEPTH); X contains bank-specific variables, consisting of bank’s size 
(SIZE), bank’s size squared (SIZE_SQR), too-big-to-fail dummy (TBTF), a ratio of loan to 
deposits (LOAN) and a ratio of cost-to-income (EFFICIENCY); Y contains country-specific 
variables, consisting of GDP growth (GDPG), inflation (INF), creditor rights index (CR), 
deposit insurance dummy (DEPOSIT_INS), capital stringency index (CAPITAL_STR) and 
118	
	
asset diversification index (ASSET_DIV); n% is the year fixed effects; >" is the individual 
effects or the time-invariant component of the error term; and ε is an idiosyncratic error term 
or time-varying component of the error term. The coefficient @A reflects the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank risk. Higher Z-score index implies lower bank risk; thereby, 
according to the hypothesis H1, we expect the sign of @A to be positive such that credit 
information sharing reduces bank risk. 
 To test for our hypothesis H2, which we expect that high transparent information 
environment will attenuate the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk, we 
augment Equation (3-9) with one of the two proxies of information environment and their 
interactions with the credit information sharing measure. The new regression model thus 
expresses as followed: 
'QXZ",% = @? + @A;^f",% + @#)fl:",% + @F)fl:",% ∗ ;^f",% + @H(h",%H )pHGJ+ @k(l",%k)AJkGq + n% + >" + K",% 
(3-10) 
Where i and t indicates the ith bank in year t; Risk is measured by Z-Score index (Z_SCORE), 
which is inversely related to banking risk, so that the higher the Z-Score the lower the bank 
risk; CIS is a credit information sharing variable proxied by the depth of credit information 
sharing index (DEPTH); ASYM represents one of the two proxies of information 
environment, namely IFRS adoption (^r'f) and the business extent of disclosure index 
(Ys^). X contains bank-specific variables, consisting of bank’s size (SIZE), bank’s size 
squared (SIZE_SQR), too-big-to-fail dummy (TBTF), a ratio of loan to deposits (LOAN) and 
a ratio of cost-to-income (EFFICIENCY); Y contains country-specific variables, consisting 
of GDP growth (GDPG), inflation (INF), creditor rights index (CR), deposit insurance 
dummy (DEPOSIT_INS), capital stringency index (CAPITAL_STR), asset diversification 
index (ASSET_DIV); n% is the year fixed effects; >" is the individual effects or the time-
invariant component of the error term; and ε is an idiosyncratic error term or time-varying 
component of the error term. The coefficient @F reflects the extent to which degree of 
information environment moderates the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. 
Therefore, according to the hypothesis H2, we expect the sign of @F to be negative for both 
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IFRS and BDI. Should the sign of the interaction term @F is significantly negative, the impact 
of credit information sharing on bank risk is less pronounced in a more transparent 
information environment. 
 To test for our hypothesis H3, which we expect that the impact of credit information 
sharing on bank risk is more pronounced in more competitive banking market, we augment 
Equation (3-9) with an index measuring the level of banking competition and its interaction 
with the credit information sharing measure. The new regression model is thus as followed: 'QXZ",% = @? + @A;^f",% + @#;(:8_=1",% + @F;(:8_=1",% ∗ ;^f",%+ @H(h",%H )pHGJ + @k(l",%k)AJkGq + n% + >" + K",% (3-11) 
Where i and t indicates the ith bank in year t; Risk is measured by Z-Score index (Z_SCORE), 
which is inversely related to banking risk, so that the higher the Z-Score the lower the bank 
risk; CIS is a credit information sharing variable proxied by the depth of credit information 
sharing index (DEPTH); COMPET1 is an index measuring the level of banking competition 
which is transformed from the Lerner index. The higher the index the higher the competition. 
X contains bank-specific variables, consisting of bank’s size (SIZE), bank’s size squared 
(SIZE_SQR), too-big-to-fail dummy (TBTF), a ratio of loan to deposits (LOAN) and a ratio 
of cost-to-income (EFFICIENCY); Y contains country-specific variables, consisting of GDP 
growth (GDPG), inflation (INF), creditor rights index (CR), deposit insurance dummy 
(DEPOSIT_INS), capital stringency index (CAPITAL_STR), asset diversification index 
(ASSET_DIV); n% is the year fixed effects; >" is the individual effects or the time-invariant 
component of the error term; and ε is an idiosyncratic error term or time-varying component 
of the error term. The coefficient @F reflects the extent to which degree of banking 
competition moderates the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk; thereby, 
according to H2, we expect the sign of @F to be positive such that the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank risk more pronounced with high competitive banking 
environment. 
 In the robustness test, we re-estimate Equation (3-9) to Equation (3-11) with a few 
modifications and augmentations. We replace Z-score with alternative measures of bank 
risk, which consist of two modified Z-score index (Z_SCORE_4WIN and Z_SCORE_5WIN) 
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and a ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL). Moreover, we use alternative 
variables measuring the level of credit information sharing, consisting of a private credit 
bureau coverage (PRIV) and a public credit registry coverage (PUB). Furthermore, we add 
some more country-level controls related to political and institutional quality indices 
(CORRUPTION, GOV_EFF, POLITIC, REG_QUA, RULE_LAW and VOICE_ACC) and a 
variable gauging a percentage of total assets in the banking system that is owned by the 
government (PUBLIC_OWN). We also provide an instrumental variable regression by 
employing a legal origin dummy (LEGALORIGIN), ethnic fractionalization 
(ETHNIC_FRAC) and latitude (LATITUDE) as instrumental variables for credit information 
sharing and bank risk. 
3.4 Empirical Results, Robustness Tests and Additional Test 
3.4.1 Empirical Results 
3.4.1.1 The Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Risk 
Before proceeding to the regression results, we conduct model selection and 
diagnostic tests, which are shown on Table 3-7. All tests are applied to Equation (3-9) 
without interaction terms and the chosen estimation technique are then applied to Equation 
(3-10) and (3-11)17. As shown on Table 3-7, the estimators from the pool OLS regression 
are biased and inconsistent. Also, the fixed effect regression is preferable to the random 
effect regression. Furthermore, to account for the problems of heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation, we adjust standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and cluster 
standard errors at bank-level to account for within-cluster correlation of the error term18 
The regression results of Equation (3-9) are displayed in Table 3-8 regarding the 
impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Bank risk is measured by Z_SCORE (Once again, a higher Z_SCORE implies lower risk) 
and the level of credit information sharing is measured by DEPTH. The coefficient of 
DEPTH (or @A in Equation (3-9)) is positive and significant (at 5% level), showing that 
                                                
17 Adding interaction terms would not significantly change the overall results of the tests much. 
18 More detail of model selection tests and diagnostic tests can be found in the Appendix F. 
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Z_SCORE increases with higher DEPTH. This result is consistent with our hypothesis H1, 
suggesting that bank risk is lower with higher level of credit information sharing.  
By assessing the marginal effect of credit information sharing on bank risk holding 
all other variables at their sample mean, we find that a one-unit increase of DEPTH is 
associated with a change in Z_SCORE of 0.117. Hence, switching from a regime without 
credit information sharing to a regime with fully-fledged credit information sharing 
(DEPTH=6) can increase bank Z-score by up to 0.702. This finding lends support to the 
argument that credit information sharing can decrease bank risk because information sharing 
among banks helps alleviate adverse selection problems in lending and the post-lending 
moral hazard problems (Pagano & Jappelli 1993; Padilla & Pagano 1997), increase the 
incentives for debt repayment (Klein 1992; Vercammen 1995; Padilla & Pagano 2000) and 
reduce over-borrowing (Bennardo et al. 2009, 2014).  
Our finding is in line with previous studies that attempt to examine the effect of credit 
information sharing on bank risk. Regarding to the early empirical analysis of the effects of 
information sharing on credit markets, Jappelli and Pagano (2002) support that credit risk is 
lower in countries where lenders share information about their borrowers. However, there is 
a shortcoming of the results of Jappelli and Pagano (2002) because of the weak quality of 
their proxy of a default rate (or credit risk), which is based on the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) survey of leading international bankers. The ICRG indicator is imperfectly 
correlated with the likelihood of default on bank loans and it may also reflect other financial 
risks. Recently, with smaller sample and different sample period, Houston et al. (2010) 
utilize bank-level data in 69 countries and measure bank risk with a better indicator, Z-Score, 
which is similar to the one we use in this analysis. They also find that bank risk is positively 
related to credit information sharing. Our study complements Houston et al. (2010) by using 
recent data and more banks and countries in the sample. Similarly, based on cross-country 
empirical investigation, Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2012) also support the contributed 
effect of credit information sharing to the likelihood of banking crises by showing that credit 
information sharing reduces the likelihood of banking crises.  
Investigating the coefficients of various control variables, we find a few interesting 
results. The significantly positive coefficient for bank size (SIZE) suggests that larger banks 
face less risk. Laeven and Levine (2009), Houston et al. (2010) and Fu et al. (2014) also find 
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the same result. In addition, by including a square of bank size (SIZE_SQR), we find an 
inverse U-shape relationship between bank size and bank risk. Banks that are classified as 
too-big-too-fail (TBTF) engage in more risk-taking. Less efficient banks with high cost-to-
income ratio (EFFICIENCY) tends to be relatively riskier. Regarding to macroeconomic 
variables, we find that higher inflation rate (INF) is associated with higher risk. 
By considering banking regulatory environment, the results reveal several interesting 
results. First of all, the evidence does not show that an existence of deposit insurance regime 
(DEPOSIT_INS) is significantly associated with bank risk, contrasting the moral hazard 
argument stating that bank act imprudently when a financial safety net is available. As point 
out by Barth et al. (2006), a deposit insurance regime intensifies the moral hazard problem 
in banking because depositors no longer face the risk of losing their savings, which 
diminishes their incentives and efforts to monitor bank activities (Houston et al. 2010). Our 
finding about the relationship between deposit insurance and bank risk is inconsistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)). Secondly, we find that the 
overall capital stringency (CAPITAL_STR) is significantly and positively related to lower 
bank risk. This suggests that stringent capital requirement promote more bank stability. 
Lastly, bank risk is lower with higher asset diversification (ASSET_DIV) indicating that 
banks are less risky when the regulation on asset diversification allows banks to diversify 
asset across sectors and aboard. 
3.4.1.2 The Impact of Information Asymmetry on the Relationship between Credit 
Information Sharing and Bank Risk 
 Information asymmetry can be problematic for banks since the adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems in lending are exacerbated. Nonetheless, asymmetric information can 
be less of a problem when the information environment is more transparent. When the 
information environment is more transparent, the benefit of credit information sharing can 
potentially decrease. In the previous section, we show that credit information sharing reduces 
bank risk because the sharing scheme helps to overcome the information problem and bridge 
the information gaps between banks and borrowers, such that banks can lend safely and 
borrowers behave well.  
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 In this section, we present the regression results of Equation (3-10) testing whether 
the relationship between credit information sharing and bank risk varies with different 
degree of information environment. The results are shown Table 3-9. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. Bank risk is measured by Z_SCORE (Once again, a higher Z_SCORE implies 
lower risk) and the level of credit information sharing is measured by DEPTH. IFRS and 
BDI are used as proxies for information environment transparency.  
 The results with IFRS as a proxy of information environment are presented in the 
column 2 and column 3 of Table 3-9. The coefficient of the interaction term between DEPTH 
and IFRS (or @F in Equation (3-10)) is negatively significant (at 1% level). Since the value 
one of the IFRS dummy proxies for more transparent information environment, the negative 
coefficient of the interaction indicates that IFRS attenuates the impact of credit information 
sharing on bank risk. This result supports our hypothesis H2 that the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank risk is less pronounced in a country with more transparent 
information environment as proxied by mandatory IFRS adoption. We also evaluate the 
moderating effect of IFRS on the relationship between credit information sharing and bank 
risk. When the country does not adopt IFRS, a one-unit increase of DEPTH will increase 
Z_SCORE by 0.495. However, when the country adopts IFRS, a one-unit increase of DEPTH 
will increase Z_SCORE by 0.087. That is 0.408 or approximately 82.4% less pronounced 
with IFRS adoption. 
 The results with BDI as a proxy of information environment are presented in the 
column 4 and column 5 of Table 3-9. The coefficient of the interaction term between DEPTH 
and BDI (or @F in Equation (3-10)) is negative and significant (at 5% level). As higher BDI 
indicates more transparent information environment, the negatively significance of the 
interaction term suggests that BDI mitigate the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
risk. To measure the moderating effect of BDI on the relationship between credit information 
sharing and bank risk, the interaction term is evaluated at the 25th and 75th percentiles of 
BDI. DEPTH can increase bank Z_SCORE by between 0.035 and 0.104, depending on the 
degree of BDI. Specifically, a unit-increase in DEPTH is associated with a 0.104 increase in 
Z_SCORE when BDI is at the 25th percentile. The impact reduces to 0.035 when BDI is at 
the 75th percentile. We can securely conclude that the benefit of credit information sharing 
decreases with the business extent of disclosure index. In other words, the impact of credit 
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information sharing on bank risk is less pronounced when the information environment is 
more transparent. This evidence strengthens our hypothesis H2. 
3.4.1.3 The Impact of Banking Competition on the Relationship between Credit 
Information Sharing on Bank Risk 
As explained in the literature review section, the problem of adverse selection and 
moral hazard associated with both borrowers and banks are more intense in a competitive 
banking market (Broecker 1990; Nakamura 1993; Riordan 1995; Marquez 2002). Also, 
banks in less competitive banking market are more likely to lend more efficient through 
better screening process (Cetorelli & Peretto 2000; Cetorelli & Peretto 2012) and have a 
stronger incentives to monitor the projects of borrowers and even establish a long-term 
relationships (Petersen & Rajan 1995; Von Thadden 1995; Caminal & Matutes 2006). 
Therefore, the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk may be more pronounced 
when the banking market is more competitive. 
In this section, we present the regression results of Equation (3-11) testing whether 
the relationship between credit information sharing and bank risk varies with different level 
of banking competition. To examine the potential interactive effects between credit 
information sharing and banking competition, we construct our first measure of banking 
competition, COMPET1, based on the Lerner index and it is calculated as one minus Lerner 
index. Therefore, higher index can be translated directly into higher level of banking 
competition. The results are shown in Table 3-10. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Bank risk is measured by Z_SCORE (Once again, a higher Z_SCORE implies lower risk) 
and the level of credit information sharing is measured by DEPTH. 
The column 3 of Table 3-10 reports the result of the interaction between DEPTH and 
COMPET1 (or @F in Equation (3-11)). The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
significant (at 1% level), indicating that the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
risk is higher with an increase in the degree of banking competition. This result lends support 
to our hypothesis H3 that the role of credit information sharing on bank risk is more 
pronounced in a more competitive banking market. To measure the moderating effect of 
banking competition, the interaction term is evaluated at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of 
COMPET1. When COMPET1 is at 25th percentile, a one-unit increase in DEPTH increases 
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Z_SCORE by 1.022. This effect increases to 1.109 and 1.189, when COMPET1 is at 50th and 
75th, respectively. The significant interaction between DEPTH and COMPET1 suggests that 
the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk is more pronounced when the banking 
market become more and more competitive. With this regard, we can conclude that the 
benefit of credit information sharing on bank risk increases with banking competition. 
3.4.2 Robustness Tests 
 In this section, we perform several robustness tests of our main results. First, we 
employ alternative measures of bank risk, consisting of two modified Z-Score 
(Z_SCORE_4WIN and Z_SCORE_5WIN) and a ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
(NPL). Second, we use two other measures of credit information sharing level, consisting of 
private credit bureau coverage (PRIV) and public credit registry coverage (PUB). Third, we 
replace our main competition measure by three-largest banking asset concentration index 
(COMPET2) and five-largest banking asset concentration index (COMPET3) in separate 
regressions. Fourth, we augment each of Equation (3-9), (3-10) and (3-11) with additional 
variables to control for factors that can potentially influence bank risk. Fifth, we provide a 
subsample analysis for robustness checks of results regarding to our hypothesis H2 and H3. 
The subsamples are classified by proxies of information environment (IFRS and BDI) and 
the banking competition measure (COMPET1). Sixth, we provide another subsample 
analysis by excluding banks in the USA because majorities of banks in the sample are USA’s 
banks. Lastly, an instrumental variable approach is employed to check for the robustness of 
the main results. 
3.4.2.1 Alternative Measures of Bank Risk 
Regarding to the first two alternative measure of bank risk, we re-calculate the Z-
Score and generate these two additional variables, Z_SCORE_4WIN and Z_SCORE_5WIN. 
To obtain Z_SCORE4WIN, we use data of ROA in the current year and three previous years 
(t, t-1, t-2 and t-3)  to compute the standard deviation of ROA at time t and use that to 
compute Z-Score. To obtain Z_SCORE_5WIN, we use data of ROA in the current year and 
four previous years (t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4) to compute the standard deviation of ROA at time 
t and use that to compute Z-Score. 
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The results with Z_SCORE_4WIN as a dependent variable is displayed in Table 3-11, 
while the results with Z_SCORE_5WIN as a dependent variable is shown in Table 3-12. 
Overall, the main findings are still unchanged. Specifically, the results in the column 1 of 
each table support our hypothesis H1 because the coefficients of DEPTH are still positive 
and significant, although both coefficients are less in magnitude and less significant in the 
regression with Z_SCORE_5WIN. The results in the column 2 to the column 5 of each table 
also support our hypothesis H2 because the coefficients of the interaction term between 
DEPTH and proxies of information environment (IFRS & BDI) are negative and significant. 
According to the hypothesis H3, the significantly positive coefficients of the interaction term 
between DEPTH and COMPET1 in the column 6 and the column 7 of each table also support 
that bank risk is lower with credit information sharing level when the banking market 
become more and more competitive.  
Next, we replace Z-Score with a ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL), 
which is another variable that is widely in gauging bank risk (Berger et al. 2009; Jeon & 
Lim 2013). The regression results are presented in Table 3-13. The result in the column 1 
shows that the coefficient of DEPTH is negative and significant (at 5% level). This result 
supports our hypothesis H1 that bank risk is lower with higher level of credit information 
sharing. A one-unit increase of DEPTH is associated with a 1% reduction in NPL. According 
to the hypothesis H2, the results in the column 3 support that the impact of credit information 
sharing on bank risk is less pronounced with more transparent information environment as 
proxied by IFRS adoption. Specifically, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
DEPTH and IFRS is negative and significant (at 10% level) meaning that the impact of 
DEPTH on NPL is lower when IFRS dummy is equal to one. Similarly, the negatively 
significance of the interaction term between DEPTH and BDI in the column 5 shows that 
the impact of DEPTH on NPL is lower with higher BDI. This result also supports the 
hypothesis H2 that the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk is less pronounced 
with more transparent information environment as proxied by BDI.  
The regression with NPL as a dependent variable also support the hypothesis H3 that 
the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk is less pronounced with higher banking 
competition. The regression results are reported in the column 7 of Table 3-13. The 
coefficient of the interaction term between DEPTH and COMPET1 is negative and 
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significant (at 5% level). The coefficient of DEPTH itself is not significant, but it is only 
significant through its interaction with COMPET1. Thus, the effect of credit information 
sharing on bank risk is insignificant when there is no banking competition (when COMPET1 
= 0), which is quite impossible practically and intuitively, but such impact is significant with 
at least some level of banking competition (when COMPET1 > 0). The significantly negative 
coefficient of the interaction term between DEPTH and COMPET1 suggests that credit 
information sharing reduces bank risk more with higher level of banking competition. 
However, if the level of banking competition goes below 0.511 (COMPET < 0.511), credit 
information sharing in turn increase bank risk (higher NPL). Impliedly, credit information 
sharing may decrease the informational advantage of banks in a low competitive banking 
market. As suggested by Petersen and Rajan (1995), banks in a low competitive banking 
market tend to enjoy long-term lending relationship with borrowers due to potential 
intertemporal surplus sharing. These lending relationships help banks acquire privately 
important credit information about their borrowers that is not known to other banks. With 
more disclosure through credit information sharing, the lending relationships may no longer 
exist as private information is known to other banks, so the banking market become more 
fiercely competitive (Petersen & Rajan 1995). 
3.4.2.2 Alternative Measures of Credit Information Sharing 
 Instead of using depth of credit information sharing index (DEPTH) as the proxy for 
the level of credit information sharing, we employ private credit bureau coverage (PRIV) 
and public credit bureau coverage (PUB). The regression results with PRIV is shown in Table 
3-14. Noted that higher PRIV indicates higher level of credit information sharing. According 
to the hypothesis H1, the result in the column 1 still supports that bank risk is lower with 
higher level of credit information sharing. Economically, a one-percentage increase in PRIV 
is corresponding to a 0.00309 increase in Z_SCORE. Consistent with the hypothesis H2, the 
coefficient of the interaction term between PRIV and IFRS as well as the interaction term 
between PRIV and BDI are negative and significant. Consistent with the hypothesis H3, the 
coefficient of the interaction term between PUB and COMPET1 is positive and significant 
(at 1% level). 
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 The regression results with PUB is shown in Table 3-15. Noted that higher PUB 
indicates higher level of credit information sharing. Notably, we find no significant impact 
of compulsory information sharing via public credit registry on bank risk throughout the 
model specification. One possible reason is that sharing information has pros and cons. The 
cost for a bank is that its competitor may learn something about that bank’s portfolio and 
customers, whereas the benefit is that the bank is able to access to wide profile of borrowers 
cheaply and may be able to make more informed lend decision19. Moreover, banks generally 
invest and acquire costly information about customers to establish a profitable lending 
relationship. Given that relationships tie borrowers in to a lender, that lender may exert a 
type of monopoly power (Majnoni et al. 2004). When public credit registries force banks to 
share this information, it reduces the monopoly rents available that banks can extract from 
their lending relationship (Petersen & Rajan 1995; Majnoni et al. 2004). As a result, banks’ 
profits could shrink and they have an incentive to pursue riskier projects to compensate for 
the losses and to accumulate capital cushions (Keeley 1990; Allen & Gale 2004). According 
to our results with PUB, the benefits may offset the costs with compulsory sharing via public 
credit registries, so that they have no impact on bank risk.  
 Also, there is some distinction between a private credit bureau and a public credit 
registry that may lead to the significance of PRIV and the insignificance of PUB. Generally, 
a public credit registry has limitations when compared to a private credit bureau. It is quite 
common for public credit registries to set a minimum loan size and therefore to collect 
information only on loans in excess of this amount (Miller, 2003). Furthermore, the 
information from public credit registries consists mainly of credit data and is disseminated 
in consolidated form (so that details about individual loans are not available). In addition, 
public registries only collect data from supervised institutions like banks. In contrast, private 
credit bureaus offer details on individual loans and merge credit data with data from other 
sources (e.g., ﬁrms, leasing and ﬁnance companies, retail establishments, courts, tax 
authorities, and ﬁnancial statements), though they are less comprehensive in coverage 
(Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). More importantly, in most cases, historical data are not made 
available to ﬁnancial institutions via the public credit registries (Miller, 2003). 
                                                
19 One may argue that the benefits of sharing negative information absolutely exceed the costs. However, the 
benefits of sharing positive information may not always exceed the costs. 
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3.4.2.3 Alternative Measures of Banking Competition 
In this section, we provide additional robustness checks for the hypothesis H3 by 
employing two alternative measures of banking competition, which are previously used to 
measure the degree of banking competition. These two variables are the three-largest bank 
asset concentration index and the five-largest bank asset concentration index. The three-
largest bank asset concentration index is converted into a competition measure by 
subtracting it from one to obtain COMPET2. Similarly, the five-largest bank asset 
concentration index is converted into a competition measure by subtracting it from one to 
obtain COMPET3. 
The regression results using each of COMPET2 and COMPET 3 as a measure of 
banking competition are reported in Table 3-16. We do not see the interaction term between 
DEPTH and COMPET2 as well as the interaction term between DEPTH and COMPET3 to 
be significant. Although the results with COMPET2 and COMPET3 may not produce desire 
results, they pose no problem to the main results. This is because there is a growing 
consensus that concentration measures are not good proxies for measuring bank competition 
(Berger et al. 2004; Claessens & Laeven 2004; Beck et al. 2006a). The banking 
concentration measures, like Herfindhal Hirschman Index (HHI) and N-bank concentration 
ratios20, have also been viewed as ambiguous indicators of market power/competition 
because they ignore the relationship between revenue and market contestability at the bank-
level (Beck et al. 2006a; Berger et al. 2009; Skully & Perera 2012). Specifically, these 
measures of concentration do not take into account the competitive behavior of banks in a 
way that banks with different ownership behave differently and that banks might not 
compete directly with each other in the same line of business (Beck 2008). Furthermore, the 
concentration measures are computed at nationwide level which may not always coincide 
with the market power exercised at the local level (Berger et al. 2009). 
                                                
20 N-bank is the number of banks. 
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3.4.2.4 Additional Control Variables 
 Moreover, we provide additional robustness tests by controlling more factors that 
could potentially affect bank risk. First, we add a series of macro institutional indexes in our 
model to test the robustness of the results. These variables are six components of the World 
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2011), which capture different aspects of the 
institutional environment. The detailed definition of the indexes can be found in the data 
section. These governance indicators enter the regression individually (one at a time) 
because they are highly correlated with one another. In addition, we also include a 
percentage of public ownership of bank assets in the country’ banking system. 
 Table 3-17 presents the regression results for Equation (3-9) with additional control 
variables. Consistent with the hypothesis H1, the coefficient of DEPTH is still positive and 
significant (at 5% and 10% level) with some variation in the impact magnitude. Table 3-18 
and Table 3-19 present the regression for Equation (3-10) with additional control variables. 
Consistent with the hypothesis H2, the coefficient of the interaction term between DEPTH 
and IFRS as well as the interaction term between DEPTH and BDI are still negative and 
significant (at 1% and 5% level) with some variation in the impact magnitude. Table 3-20 
presents the regression for Equation (3-11) with additional control variables. The 
coefficients of the interaction term between DEPTH and COMPET1 are still positive and 
significant (at 1% level) in all cases. Although the magnitude of DEPTH may be lower with 
additional control variables, all our main results are still upheld.  
 Interestingly, we find that better control of corruption (CORRPUTION), effective 
government (GOV_EFF) and good regulatory quality (REG_QUA) are associated with lower 
bank risk. The finding also reveals that bank risk increases with a higher percentage of public 
ownership of bank assets (PUBLIC_OWN). This suggests that state-owned banks might be 
seen as vehicles for raising capital to ﬁnance projects with high social returns, but possibly 
high-risk and low-proﬁt returns (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Shleifer & Vishny 1998). 
3.4.2.5 Subsample Analysis 
Beside interacting results, we also provide a subsample analysis. We classify the 
sample based on each proxy of information environment. Based on IFRS dummy, one 
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subsample consists of observations with IFRS proxied for more transparent information 
environment, while another subsample consists of observations with NON-IFRS proxied for 
low transparent information environment. Based on BDI, one subsample consists of 
observations with the value of BDI above the sample median to proxy for high transparent 
information environment, while another subsample consists of observations with the value 
of BDI below the sample median to proxy for low transparent information environment.   
Table 3-21 reports the subsample analysis based on IFRS and BDI. The subsample 
with NON-IFRS in the column1 shows that the coefficient of DEPTH is positive and 
significant at 5% level, whereas the subsample with IFRS in the column 2 shows that the 
coefficient of DEPTH is positive but significant at 10% level. In comparison to the 
subsample with NON-IFRS, the coefficient of DEPTH in the subsample with IFRS is less 
significant. This suggests that the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk is more 
pronounced with NON-IFRS adoption. The magnitude of DEPTH in the NON-IFRS sample 
is also larger than the one in the IFRS sample. 
On the same table, the subsample with LOW BDI in the column 3 shows that the 
coefficient of DEPTH is positive and significant at 1% level, but the coefficient of DEPTH 
in the subsample with HIGH BDI shown in the column 4 is not significant. This suggests 
that not only the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk is more pronounced with 
LOW BDI, but such impact is not even significant with HIGH BDI. Overall, our main results 
related to the hypothesis H2 are still supported with the subsample analysis based on IFRS 
and BDI as proxies of information asymmetry. 
Table 3-22 presents the subsample analysis based on the banking competition 
measure. The sample is divided into top 25th and bottom 25th percentile of COMPET1 shown 
in the column 1 and the column 2, respectively. We find that the coefficient of DEPTH is 
only significant in the subsample with top 25th percentile of COMPET1, while it is not 
significant in the subsample with bottom 25th percentile of COMPET1. This suggests that 
the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk is only significant and pronounced 
when the degree of banking market competition is high. We confirm the results with 
additional subsamples classified by top and bottom 30th percentile and top and bottom 40th 
percentile of COMPET1. They are displayed in the column 3 to 6. The findings all show that 
the coefficients of DEPTH are only significant in the subsample with top 30th and top 40th 
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percentile of COMPET1. These results corroborate that the impact of credit information 
sharing on bank risk is only significant and pronounced when the degree of banking market 
competition is high. Thus, the subsample analysis based on the banking competition measure 
COMPET1 still support our main results related to the hypothesis H3. 
3.4.2.6 Non-USA Sample 
 Since the sample comprises of numerous banks in the USA, the main results may be 
driven by banks in the USA. Thus, we subsample by excluding banks in the USA and re-
estimate each of Equation (3-9), (3-10) and (3-11). The results are shown on Table 3-23. The 
number of the observation shrinks by almost half. Overall, the results show that exclusion 
of banks in the USA does not change our main results. On the column 1, the magnitude of 
DEPTH coefficient in the sample without banks in the USA is even slightly higher than the 
one in the main sample.  
 Economically, a one-unit increase in DEPTH is associated with a 0.124 increase in 
Z_SCORE. When the country does not adopt IFRS, a one-unit increase of DEPTH will 
increase Z_SCORE by 0.48. However, when the country adopts IFRS, a one-unit increase of 
DEPTH will increase Z_SCORE by 0.169. That is 0.311 or approximately 64.7% less 
pronounced with IFRS adoption. By evaluating the interaction term between DEPTH and 
BDI at the 25th percentile and 75th percentile of BDI, we find that a one-unit increase in 
DEPTH is associated with a 0.151 increase in Z_SCORE when BDI is at the 25th percentile. 
The impact reduces to 0.09 when BDI is at the 75th percentile. In addition, by assessing the 
interaction term between DEPTH and COMPET1 at the 25th percentile and 75th percentile 
of COMPET1, the results show that a one-unit increase in DEPTH is associated with a 1.128 
increase in Z_SCORE when COMPET1 is at the 25th percentile. The impact increases to 
1.314 when COMPET1 is at the 75th percentile. 
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3.4.2.7 Instrumental Variable Approach 
There could be a reverse causality between credit information sharing and bank risk. 
This creates a problem of endogeneity21. Based on the existing literature on law and finance 
(Easterly & Levine 1997; LaPorta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 1999; Beck et al. 2003; 
Acemoglu & Johnson 2005), we employ legal origins, ethnic fractionalization and latitude 
as instrumental variables for DEPTH22. Rather than using fixed effects estimations, we use 
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) with pooled OLS estimations because our instruments are 
time-invariant. 
 Initially, we test whether DEPTH is endogenous by performing the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test of endogeneity. The test shows that the p-value is 0.5695 so the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. Thus, we can treat depth of credit information sharing as exogenous. 
Nonetheless, we perform robustness tests for Equation (3-9) to (3-11) by employing an 
instrumental variable approach. The results are presented in Table 3-24, Table 3-25 and 
Table 3-26. Each table also presents the relevance and validity tests of our instruments. 
 We perform the F-tests of the excluded instruments in the corresponding first-stage 
regression to see whether they are relevant. In each table of results, the F-tests show that the 
null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level in all regressions. Moreover, we test for the 
validity of the instruments by performing the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions. 
We can see that the J-test in all tables cannot be rejected suggesting that the instruments are 
valid instruments, uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated 
equation. 
 Once we verify that our instruments are relevant and valid, we proceed to the IV 
regression results of each table. First, we analyze the IV regression results for Equation (3-9). 
On Table 3-24, the first column reports the second stage regression, while the second column 
reports the first stage regression. The main result is still robust and consistent with our first 
hypothesis H1. The coefficient of DEPTH remains positive and significant. The result with 
                                                
21 However, the reverse causality between credit information sharing and bank risk is less likely because we 
explore the impact of credit information sharing agencies on bank risk of individual bank firms. Thus, the 
endogeneity problem is less of a concern.  
22 Refer to Appendix G for the rationales behind selecting instruments 
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IV approach confirms our main finding that bank risk decreases with credit information 
sharing. Moreover, the IV coefficient are much larger than the coefficient of the fixed effect 
regression, indicating the presence of potential measurement error, which inflates the IV 
coefficient. Nonetheless, our conclusion does not depend on the instrumentation approach 
because DEPTH is not endogenous and poses no concern of endogeneity. 
 For Equation (3-10) and (3-11), we split the sample into two subsamples based on 
each of information environment proxies and the banking competition measure. Table 3-25 
display the regression results for Equation (3-10). The first four columns of Table 3-25 
present the IV regressions of two subsamples that are split based on IFRS as a proxy of 
information environment transparency. The results are robust and consistent with our second 
hypothesis H2. The coefficient of DEPTH is only significant in the subsample without the 
mandatory IFRS adoption suggesting that the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
risk is more pronounced when the information environment is less transparent. Similar 
results are applied to the subsample based on BDI. In the column 5 to 8 of Table 3-25, the 
coefficient of DEPTH is only significant in the subsample with LOW BDI suggesting that 
the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk is more pronounced when the 
information environment is less transparent. 
 The regression results of Equation (3-11) are shown in Table 3-26. The table presents 
the IV regressions of two subsamples which are split based on top and bottom 30th percentile 
of COMPET1. Top 30th percentile of COMPET1 is corresponding to high degree of banking 
competition (HIGH COMPET1), whereas bottom 30th percentile of COMPET1 is 
corresponding to low degree of banking competition (LOW COMPET1). Consistent with the 
hypothesis H3, the coefficient of DEPTH is positive and significant in the subsample with 
HIGH COMPET1. This result suggests that the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
risk is more pronounced in the subsample with high degree of banking market competition. 
3.4.3 Additional Test 
 In this section, we provide one additional result regarding the potential interaction 
effect between credit information sharing and creditor rights (CR) on bank risk. Houston et 
al. (2010) find that stronger creditor rights through the legal system promotes bank risk. 
They argue that stronger creditor rights may induce banks to extend loans to a wider and 
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riskier set of borrowers. When creditors are greatly protected in the event of default, they 
are more willing to lend to riskier borrowers with poorer credit ratings. This effect may raise 
the average expected default rate. If the increased average expected recovery does not offset 
the increased average expected default, stronger creditor rights will lead to an increase in 
bank risk. Stronger creditor protection also decreases the level of banks’ incentive to monitor 
their borrowers because marginal benefit of monitoring is lower and the losses in the state 
of default decreases. 
 To support his argument, Houston et al. (2010) show that there is an interaction effect 
between credit information sharing and creditor rights on bank risk. They show that the 
impact of credit rights on bank risk is attenuated by credit information sharing. More 
specifically, information sharing helps reduce adverse selection and post-lending moral 
hazard problems; therefore, the potential risk of any given loan is lower with greater level 
of credit information sharing. Also, information sharing itself works as a post-lending 
disciplining/monitoring device for borrowers. Thus, this reduces the impact of weaker post-
lending monitoring caused by stronger creditor protection. 
 Following the same line of argument, we argue that the impact of credit information 
sharing on bank risk is more pronounced with stronger creditor rights. Since stronger creditor 
rights reduces banks’ incentive to monitor and increases the willingness to extend to a wider 
and riskier set of borrowers, the benefits of credit information sharing on bank risk should 
be more pronounced with stronger creditor rights. Consistent to our argument, in a 
subsample analysis shown in Table 3-27, we find that the impact of credit information 
sharing on bank risk is more pronounced with stronger creditor protection. By classifying 
the sample into two groups, we show that the coefficient of DEPTH is positive and only 
significant (at 1% level) in a sample with high creditor rights index. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The study in this chapter explores the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
risk. The theory argues that credit information sharing alleviates adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Banks can lend safely with better judgment on their lending decision. Borrowers also 
become more disciplined and put more effort to service debts, such that the likelihood of 
borrower defaults reduces. At the same times, credit information sharing might lead to lower 
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lending standards and the entry of riskier borrowers in the credit markets. Thus, credit 
information sharing might increase or decrease bank risk. 
As suggested by the results in chapter 2, credit information sharing facilitates lending 
decision and encourages banks to extend more credits. Providing more credits may result in 
higher access to credit for riskier borrowers, and thereby increase bank risk. However, the 
results presented in this chapter suggests that credit information sharing among banks does 
not necessarily increase bank risk. By employing a sample of 15,558 banks in 105 countries, 
we find that credit information sharing has a negative impact on bank risk. This finding 
suggests that bank risk is lower in countries with more credit information sharing. Our results 
rule out the prediction of increasing bank risk, which may result from looser screening 
requirements and lower post-lending effort in monitoring. Therefore, credit information 
sharing does not only encourage banks to provide more credits but also induce them to lend 
safely, promoting bank stability. 
In addition, we find that the negative relationship between credit information sharing 
and bank risk is less pronounced in more transparent information environment. We show 
that mandatory IFRS adoption mitigates the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
risk. In addition, the greater extent of business disclosure also moderates the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank risk. These results suggest that enhancing the transparency of 
information environment downplays the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. 
Thus, credit information sharing has a less beneficial effect on bank risk when the 
information environment is more transparent.  
Moreover, we provide evidence that the negative association between credit 
information sharing and bank risk is more pronounced in more competitive banking markets. 
This finding lends support to the argument that banks in competitive banking markets may 
have less incentive to screen and monitor their borrowers, so adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems would be more severe than less competitive banking markets. Our findings 
are robust to various robustness tests, including alternative measures of bank risk, alternative 
measures of credit information sharing, alternative measures of banking competition, 
subsample analysis and a potential endogeneity problem.  
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Figure 3-1: Diagram for Research Question 1 
Figure 3-2: Diagram for Research Question 2 
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Table 3-1: Summary of Variables, Symbols and Sources 
Variables Definition Data Sources 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Z_SCORE Bank  Z-Score 
It is inversely related to the probability of a bank’s insolvency. 
The Z-score combines profitability, leverage and the volatility 
of return into a single ratio showing the number of standard 
deviations below the mean by which profits would have to fall 
so as to just deplete equity capital. 
Higher (lower) Z_SCORE indicates lower (higher) bank risk 
Bankscope 
Z_SCORE_4WIN 
Modified Bank 
Z-Score 
This variable is the modified version of original Z_SCORE. 
In this version, return on assets (ROAs) from four-period 
rolling window (t, t-1, t-2 and t-3) are used to calculate Z-
Score. 
Higher (lower) Z_SCORE_4WIN indicates lower (higher) 
bank risk 
Bankscope 
Z_SCORE_5WIN 
Modified Bank 
Z-Score 
This variable is the modified version of original Z_SCORE. 
In this version, return on assets (ROAs) from five-period 
rolling window (t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4) are used to calculate Z-
Score. 
Higher (lower) Z_SCORE_5WIN indicates lower (higher) 
bank risk 
Bankscope 
NPL 
Nonperforming 
loans to gross 
loan (%) 
A ratio of nonperforming/defaulting loans (payment of 
interest and principal past due by 90 days or more) to total 
gross loans. The loan amount recorded as nonperforming 
includes the gross value of the loan recorded on the balance 
sheet, not just the amount that is overdue. 
Higher (lower) NPL indicates higher (lower) bank risk 
Bankscope 
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
DEPTH 
Depth of credit 
information 
sharing index 
An index that measures the scope and contents of credit 
information that being shared. It ranges from zero to six. The 
value of zero indicates that there is no public credit registry or 
private credit bureau operating in a country. The value of one 
is added to the index with each of the following 
characteristics: 
• Both positive and negative information are 
distributed. 
• Data on households and firms are distributed. 
• Data from retailers, trade creditors, and/or utility 
companies as well as financial institutions are 
distributed. 
• More than 2 years of data are available. 
World Bank’s 
Doing Business 
database; Djankov 
et al. (2007) 
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• Data are collected and distributed on loans with value 
below 1% of income per capita. 
• Laws give right to borrowers to inspect their own 
data. 
Higher (lower) DEPTH indicates more (lower) credit 
information sharing level 
PRIV 
Private Credit 
Bureau 
Coverage (%) 
The number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit 
bureau with information on repayment history, unpaid debts, 
or credit outstanding from the past five years scaled by the 
adult population 
Higher (lower) PRIV indicates more (lower) credit 
information sharing level (through private credit bureaus) 
World Bank’s 
Doing Business 
database; Djankov 
et al. (2007) 
PUB 
Public Credit 
Registry 
Coverage (%) 
The number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit 
registry with information on repayment history, unpaid 
debts, or credit outstanding from the past five years scaled by 
adult population 
Higher (lower) PUB indicates more (lower) credit 
information sharing level (through public credit registries) 
World Bank’s 
Doing Business 
database; Djankov 
et al. (2007) 
IFRS 
International 
Financial 
Reporting 
Standard 
(IFRS) adoption 
A dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 for a country 
(and year) that adopts IFRS and 0 otherwise. 
A value of one (zero) indicates more (less) transparent 
information environment 
IFRS foundation 
website, Deloitte 
and Simon Fraser 
University in 
Canada 
BDI 
Business Extent 
of Disclosure 
Index (BDI) 
This index measures the extent to which investors are 
protected through disclosure of ownership and financial 
information (World Bank’s Doing Business 2016). It ranges 
from 0 to 10 with higher value indicating more disclosure of 
ownership and financial information to investors.  
Higher (lower) index indicates more (less) transparent 
information environment 
World Bank’s 
Doing Business 
COMPET1 
The conversion 
of “Lerner 
Index” 
It is calculated as one minus the Lerner index. Lerner index 
is a measure of market power in the banking market. It is 
defined as the difference between output prices and marginal 
costs (relative to prices). An increase in Lerner index 
indicates a deterioration of the competitive conduct of 
financial intermediaries. Thus, an increase in one minus the 
Lerner index indicates more competition. 
Higher (lower) value of COMPET1 indicates higher (more) 
bank competition. 
World Bank’s 
Global Financial 
Development 
database; 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Martínez Pería 
(2010): Cihak et al. 
(2012); Bankscope 
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COMPET2 
The conversion 
of “Three 
largest bank 
asset 
concentration 
(%)” 
It is calculated as one minus the three largest bank asset 
concentration. The three largest bank asset concentration 
index is calculated from three largest banks’ asset as a share 
of total commercial banking assets. Total assets include total 
earning assets, cash and due from banks, foreclosed real 
estate, fixed assets, goodwill, other intangibles, current tax 
assets, deferred tax, discontinued operations and other assets. 
An increase in concentration index indicates less competitive 
degree in banking market. Thus, an increase in one minus 
concentration index indicates more competition. 
Higher (lower) value of COMPET2 indicates higher (lower) 
bank competition. 
World Bank’s 
Global Financial 
Development 
database; 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Martínez Pería 
(2010): Cihak et al. 
(2012); Bankscope 
COMPET3 
The conversion 
of “Five largest 
bank asset 
concentration 
(%)” 
It is calculated as one minus the five largest bank asset 
concentration. The five largest bank asset concentration 
index is calculated from five largest banks’ asset as a share 
of total commercial banking assets. Total assets include total 
earning assets, cash and due from banks, foreclosed real 
estate, fixed assets, goodwill, other intangibles, current tax 
assets, deferred tax, discontinued operations and other assets. 
An increase in concentration index indicates less competitive 
degree in banking market. Thus, an increase in one minus 
concentration index indicates more competition. 
Higher (lower) value of COMPET3 indicates higher (lower) 
bank competition. 
World Bank’s 
Global Financial 
Development 
database; 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Martínez Pería 
(2010): Cihak et al. 
(2012); Bankscope 
B
an
k-
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
C
on
tro
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SIZE Bank Size A natural logarithm of a bank’s assets (billion US dollars) Bankscope 
SIZE_SQR 
Bank Size 
Square 
A square of a natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets 
(billion US dollars) 
Bankscope 
TBTF 
Too-Big-Too-
Fail 
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bank’s 
share in the country’s total deposits exceeds 10% (Houston 
et al. 2010). 
Bankscope 
LOAN 
Loans to 
Deposits (%) 
A ratio of total amount of gross loans to total deposit. Bankscope 
EFFICIENCY 
Cost-to-Income 
Ratio 
This is a ratio of the overhead (or cost of running the bank) 
to operating income (interest and non-interest income), 
which reflects operations on both on and off balance sheet. 
This measures the bank’s efficiency. Overheads is data2090; 
Interest income is data2080; Non-interest income is 
data2085. This is similar to data4029 in BankScope. 
Bankscope 
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C
ou
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ry
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ci
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 C
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ia
bl
es
 
GDPG 
A growth rate 
of gross 
domestic 
products (GDP) 
It captures macroeconomic developments and a proxy for 
fluctuation in economic activities. 
World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
INF Inflation 
This is proxied by the consumer price index (CPI). It links to 
the fluctuation of price movement and higher inflation is 
associated with high nominal interest, reflecting poor 
macroeconomic management. 
World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
CR 
Creditor rights 
index 
An aggregate measure of creditor legal protection created 
based on the methodology proposed by LaPorta et al. (1998). 
The index is ranging from zero to four. The index consists of 
4 components: 
• Restrictions on reorganization: whether there are 
restrictions imposed, such as creditors’ consent or 
minimum divided, when a debtor files for 
reorganization. 
• No automatic stay: whether secured creditors are 
able to gain possession of assets after the petition for 
reorganization is approved, that is, whether there is 
no automatic stay or asset freeze imposed by the 
court on a creditor’s ability to seize collateral. 
• Secured creditor paid first: whether secured creditors 
are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds of 
liquidating a bankrupt firm as opposed to other 
creditors such as government or workers 
• No management stay: whether the incumbent 
management does not stay in control of the firm 
during the reorganization, in other words, whether an 
administrator, not the management, is responsible for 
running the business during the reorganization 
A value of one is added to the index when a country’s laws 
and regulations provide each of these powers to secured 
lenders. Higher index indicates that secured lenders are better 
protected in case a borrower defaults. 
LaPorta et al. 
(1998); Djankov et 
al. (2007) 
DEPOSIT_INS 
Deposit 
insurance 
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the country 
has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise. 
Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al. (2008) 
CAPITAL_STR 
Capital 
Stringency 
index 
This is an index measuring the extent of both initial and 
overall capital stringency. The index ranges from 0 to 10. This 
index is constructed from following questions: 
1. Whether the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement 
is in line with the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision guidelines 
World Bank’s 
Bank Regulation 
and Supervision 
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2. Does the minimum ratio varies as a function of an 
individual bank’s credit risk? 
3. Does the minimum ratio varies as a function of an 
individual bank’s market risk? 
4. Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, 
which of the following are deducted from the book 
value of capital: 
a. Market value of loan losses not realized in 
accounting books? 
b. Unrealized losses in securities portfolios?  
c. Unrealized foreign exchange losses? 
5. What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part 
of capital? (1 if the fraction is less than 0.75 and 0 
otherwise) 
6. Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified 
by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? 
7. Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections 
of capital be done with assets other than cash or 
government securities? 
8. Can initial capital contributions by prospective 
shareholders be in the form of borrowed funds? 
ASSET_DIV 
Diversification 
index 
The index measures whether there are explicit, verifiable, 
and quantifiable guideline for asset diversification (e.g. if 
banks are required to have some minimum diversification of 
loans among sectors, or if there are sectoral concentration 
limits) and whether banks are allowed to make loans aboard. 
Higher index indicates higher asset diversification. 
World Bank’s 
Bank Regulation 
and Supervision 
CORRUPTION 
Control of 
Corruption 
index 
This index captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests. 
World Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
GOV_EFF 
Government 
Effectiveness 
index 
This index captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
World Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
POLITIC 
Political 
Stability index 
This index measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including 
terrorism. 
World Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
REG_QUA 
Regulatory 
Quality index 
This index captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
World Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
143	
	
RULE_LAW 
Rule of Law 
index 
This index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
World Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
VOICE_ACC 
Voice and 
Accountability 
index 
This index captures perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens can participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. 
World Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
PUBLIC_OWN 
Public 
Ownership ratio 
This ratio is a percentage of banking system’s assets in banks 
that are 50% or more owned by the government. 
World Bank’s 
Bank Regulation 
and Supervision 
In
st
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LEGALORIGIN Legal Origin 
A dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country 
has English legal origin and otherwise zero. 
Djankov et al. 
(2007) 
ETHNIC_FRAC 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
This variable captures the ethnic diversity in a country. It 
measures probability that two randomly selected people from 
a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic 
group. 
Easterly (2001) 
LATITUDE Latitude 
This variable measures the geographical latitude of a 
country. It is calculated as an absolute value of the latitude of 
the country scaled to take a value between zero and one 
La Porta et al. 
(1999); Central 
Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) 
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Table 3-2: Descriptive Statistics 
    Variable Obs. Mean Stdev. Min Max P25 P50 P75 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
va
ri
ab
le
   Z_SCORE  96,422  3.870 1.520 -6.150 11.700 2.890 3.740 4.760 
  Z_SCORE_4WIN  91,572  3.640 1.370 -6.230 10.400 2.790 3.570 4.410 
  Z_SCORE_5WIN  86,877  3.500 1.270 -6.150 9.780 2.730 3.460 4.210 
  NPL  75,137  0.035 0.061 0.000 1.000 0.004 0.016 0.042 
E
xp
la
na
to
ry
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 C
IS
 DEPTH  96,422  5.040 0.949 0.000 6.000 4.000 5.000 6.000 
PRIV  96,422  0.783 0.353 0.000 1.000 0.612 1.000 1.000 
PUB  96,422  0.091 0.113 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.026 0.237 
A
SY
M
 
IFRS  96,422  0.290 0.454 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BDI  96,422  6.450 1.780 0.000 10.000 6.000 7.000 7.000 
C
O
M
PE
T
 COMPET1  96,422  0.757 0.090 0.238 0.993 0.680 0.744 0.802 
COMPET2  96,422  0.185 0.137 0.000 0.500 0.058 0.178 0.275 
COMPET3  96,422  0.224 0.143 0.000 0.500 0.051 0.235 0.333 
B
an
k-
sp
ec
ifi
c 
C
on
tr
ol
 
  SIZE  96,422  5.960 2.030 -5.150 20.400 4.770 5.700 6.920 
  SIZE_SQR  96,422  39.700 27.700 0.000 418.000 22.800 32.500 47.800 
  TBTF  96,422  0.017 0.128 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  LOAN  96,422  0.823 0.574 -0.300 9.990 0.608 0.763 0.914 
  EFFICIENCY  96,422  0.690 0.293 0.000 9.880 0.568 0.667 0.771 
C
ou
nt
ry
-s
pe
ci
fic
 C
on
tr
ol
s 
  GDPG  96,422  0.012 0.028 -0.151 0.185 0.007 0.015 0.024 
  INF  96,422  0.031 0.043 -0.251 1.040 0.012 0.020 0.031 
  CR  96,422  1.550 0.881 0.000 4.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 
  DEPOSIT_INS  96,422  0.965 0.185 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  CAPITAL_STR  96,422  6.830 1.320 0.000 8.000 6.000 7.000 8.000 
  ASSET_DIV  96,422  0.340 0.501 0.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
  CORRUPTION  96,422  1.030 0.867 -1.440 2.550 1.260 1.320 1.510 
  GOV_EFF  96,422  1.200 0.746 -1.570 2.370 1.450 1.510 1.600 
  POLITIC  96,422  0.372 0.607 -2.810 1.590 0.374 0.488 0.635 
  REG_QUA  96,422  1.140 0.679 -1.640 1.990 1.210 1.440 1.540 
  RULE_LAW  96,422  1.170 0.848 -1.790 2.000 1.350 1.580 1.610 
  VOICE_ACCT  96,422  0.900 0.688 -1.770 1.770 1.080 1.110 1.280 
  PUBLIC_OWN  93,059  0.106 0.170 0.000 0.900 0.000 0.000 0.203 
In
st
ru
m
e
nt
al
 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
  LEGALORIGIN  96,422  0.576 0.494 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
  ETHNIC_FRAC  87,300  0.378 0.219 0.000 0.930 0.130 0.500 0.500 
  LATITUDE  95,558  0.703 0.082 0.295 0.835 0.691 0.691 0.768 
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis. Each of Z_SCORE, Z_SCORE_3SD and Z_SCORE_4SD 
is an indicator of bank stability. For Z_SCORE_4WIN, ROA from four-period rolling window (t, t-1, t-2 and t-3) are used to calculate 
the standard deviation of ROA in the Z-Score formula, while, for Z_SCORE_5WIN, ROA from five-period rolling window (t, t-1, 
t-2, t-3 and t-4) are used to calculate the standard deviation of ROA in the Z-Score formula. NPL is the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total gross loans; CIS represents credit information sharing measures; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; 
PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); 
ASYM represents information environment proxies; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; 
BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; COMPET represents competition measures; COMPET1 is the 1st competition measure 
converted from one minus Lerner Index; COMPET2 is the 2nd competition measure converted from concentration index calculated 
from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in each country; COMPET3 is the 3rd competition measure converted from 
concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 5 largest banks in each country; SIZE is bank size calculated 
by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is a square of a natural logarithm of total asset; TBTF is too-big-too-fail 
dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a 
ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is 
inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has 
adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both 
initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification; 
CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability 
index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountatbility 
index; PUBLIC_OWN is a percentage of total assets in the banking system owned by the government; LEGALORIGIN is dummy 
variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic 
fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude 
of a country. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter. Obs is observation. Stdev is for standard 
145	
	
deviation. Min is minimum. Max is maximum. P25 is 25th percentile of the sample. P50 is 50th percentile (or median) of the sample. 
P75 is 75th percentile of the sample 
Table 3-3: Mean Value of Bank Risk, Depth of Credit Information Sharing and 
Competition Measures – By Year 
Year Obs. Z_SCORE NPL DEPTH COMPET1 COMPET2 COMPET3 
2005 9,654 4.0767 0.0189 5.0367 0.7414 0.1240 0.1474 
2006 9,490 4.1049 0.0180 5.0392 0.7605 0.1194 0.1421 
2007 11,022 4.0157 0.0227 5.0013 0.7886 0.1410 0.1729 
2008 10,819 3.6853 0.0275 4.9804 0.8091 0.1460 0.1766 
2009 11,086 3.5108 0.0402 5.0391 0.7650 0.1740 0.2159 
2010 11,442 3.6010 0.0466 5.0274 0.7375 0.2322 0.2673 
2011 11,286 3.8057 0.0471 5.0596 0.7426 0.2372 0.2806 
2012 11,248 3.9929 0.0442 5.0902 0.7430 0.2374 0.2897 
2013 10,375 4.1304 0.0392 5.1229 0.7223 0.2514 0.2993 
2005-2013 96,422 3.8700 0.0348 5.0400 0.7570 0.1850 0.2240 
The table shows the mean of our main variables by year. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank risk. NPL is the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total gross loans. DEPTH is a depth of credit information sharing index. COMPET1, COMPET2 and COMPET3 are indicators 
of bank competition and they are converted by subtracting one from each of LERNER, CCT3 and CCT5, respectively. LERNER is 
Lerner index (higher index indicates lower competition). CCT3 is the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in each country 
(higher index indicates lower competition). CCT5 is the fraction of assets held by the 5 largest banks in each country (higher index 
indicates lower competition). 
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Table 3-4: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variable Z_SCORE 
Z_SCOR
E 
_4WIN 
Z_SCOR
E 
_5WIN 
NPL DEPTH PRIV PUB IFRS BDI 
COMPE
T1 
Z_SCORE  1.000                    
Z_SCORE_4WIN  0.897   1.000                  
Z_SCORE_5WIN  0.823   0.929   1.000                
NPL -0.212  -0.232  -0.242   1.000              
DEPTH  0.093   0.092   0.095  -0.267   1.000            
PRIV  0.045   0.038   0.033  -0.269   0.758   1.000          
PUB  0.008   0.008   0.005   0.304  -0.311  -0.486   1.000        
IFRS  0.100   0.113   0.125   0.299  -0.259  -0.357   0.662   1.000      
BDI -0.095  -0.104  -0.114  -0.087   0.136   0.330  -0.195  -0.285   1.000    
COMPET1  0.107   0.138   0.166  -0.125  -0.191  -0.325   0.285   0.379  -0.458   1.000  
COMPET2  0.002  -0.006  -0.008   0.347  -0.587  -0.595   0.415   0.493  -0.383   0.199  
COMPET3  0.021   0.014   0.012   0.339  -0.498  -0.516   0.400   0.509  -0.308   0.203  
SIZE  0.147   0.163   0.177   0.186  -0.152  -0.206   0.371   0.436  -0.119   0.159  
SIZE_SQR  0.147   0.163   0.177   0.186  -0.152  -0.206   0.371   0.436  -0.119   0.159  
TBTF -0.058  -0.061  -0.063   0.052  -0.130  -0.146   0.076   0.029   0.003  -0.056  
LOAN  0.008   0.015   0.018   0.028  -0.141  -0.018  -0.039  -0.030   0.034   0.076  
EFFICIENCY -0.226  -0.232  -0.231   0.149   0.095   0.063  -0.107  -0.063  -0.091   0.090  
GDPG  0.042   0.030   0.021  -0.073  -0.164  -0.261   0.095  -0.002  -0.172  -0.001  
INF -0.079  -0.076  -0.081  -0.191  -0.282  -0.167  -0.096  -0.188   0.061   0.164  
CR  0.071   0.078   0.084   0.243  -0.184  -0.401   0.404   0.602  -0.480   0.398  
DEPOSIT_INS  0.059   0.063   0.066  -0.073   0.265   0.281  -0.169   0.020   0.026   0.054  
CAPITAL_STR -0.038  -0.049  -0.056   0.015   0.466   0.700  -0.391  -0.355   0.350  -0.441  
ASSET_DIV  0.036   0.038   0.044   0.216  -0.415  -0.605   0.374   0.380  -0.380   0.406  
CORRUPTION  0.226   0.245   0.259  -0.312   0.372   0.257  -0.027   0.288  -0.122   0.280  
GOV_EFF  0.156   0.178   0.197  -0.389   0.429   0.380  -0.239   0.014   0.007   0.230  
POLITIC  0.163   0.158   0.155   0.081   0.274   0.133   0.087   0.359  -0.235   0.015  
REG_QUA  0.176   0.201   0.221  -0.401   0.515   0.449  -0.244   0.048  -0.017   0.217  
RULE_LAW  0.132   0.144   0.166  -0.115   0.482   0.373  -0.149   0.174  -0.157   0.115  
VOICE_ACCT  0.183   0.196   0.214  -0.177   0.334   0.234   0.017   0.333  -0.138   0.203  
PUBLIC_OWN  0.052   0.061   0.071   0.297  -0.510  -0.722   0.540   0.534  -0.588   0.589  
LEGALORIGIN -0.062  -0.069  -0.074  -0.311   0.555   0.726  -0.670  -0.617   0.523  -0.467  
ETHNIC_FRAC -0.125  -0.132  -0.138  -0.253   0.072   0.318  -0.587  -0.738   0.370  -0.379  
LATITUDE  0.104   0.121   0.139   0.130  -0.245  -0.335   0.223   0.553  -0.327   0.504  
This table shows Pearson correlations between variables. Each of Z_SCORE, Z_SCORE_3SD and Z_SCORE_4SD is an indicator of bank 
stability. For Z_SCORE_4WIN, ROA from four-period rolling window (t, t-1, t-2 and t-3) are used to calculate the standard deviation of ROA 
in the Z-Score formula, while, for Z_SCORE_5WIN, ROA from five-period rolling window (t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4) are used to calculate the 
standard deviation of ROA in the Z-Score formula. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans. DEPTH is depth of credit 
information sharing index; PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult 
population); IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; 
COMPET1 is the 1st competition measure converted from one minus Lerner Index; COMPET2 is the 2nd competition measure converted 
from concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in each country; COMPET3 is the 3rd competition 
measure converted from concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 5 largest banks in each country; SIZE is bank 
size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is a square of a natural logarithm of total asset; TBTF is too-big-too-fail 
dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total 
gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor 
rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, 
and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV 
is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification; CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is 
a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of 
law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability index; PUBLIC_OWN is a percentage of total assets in the banking system owned by 
the government;  LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise zero; 
ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the 
geographical latitude of a country. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter. 
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Table 3-5: Pearson Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
Variable COMPET2 COMPET3 SIZE SIZE _SQR TBTF LOAN EFFICIENCY GDPG INF CR 
COMPET2  1.000                    
COMPET3  0.939   1.000                  
SIZE  0.304   0.321   1.000                
SIZE_SQR  0.304   0.321   1.000   1.000              
TBTF  0.049  -0.003   0.066   0.066   1.000            
LOAN  0.002  -0.005   0.017   0.017   0.023   1.000          
EFFICIENCY  0.016   0.037  -0.203  -0.203  -0.072  -0.039   1.000        
GDPG  0.183   0.132  -0.005  -0.004   0.049  -0.071  -0.101   1.000      
INF -0.028  -0.083  -0.138  -0.137   0.064   0.102  -0.076   0.353   1.000    
CR  0.445   0.466   0.234   0.234   0.061  -0.071   0.010   0.189  -0.012   1.000  
DEPOSIT_INS -0.140  -0.055  -0.079  -0.079  -0.174   0.084   0.120  -0.173  -0.208  -0.090  
CAPITAL_STR -0.370  -0.303  -0.171  -0.171  -0.143   0.010   0.095  -0.411  -0.330  -0.486  
ASSET_DIV  0.521   0.482   0.210   0.210   0.098  -0.045  -0.009   0.192   0.053   0.427  
CORRUPTION -0.111  -0.075   0.187   0.187  -0.100  -0.079  -0.034  -0.084  -0.290   0.052  
GOV_EFF -0.363  -0.328   0.029   0.029  -0.112  -0.003  -0.034  -0.112  -0.142  -0.131  
POLITIC  0.186   0.219   0.199   0.199  -0.069  -0.121   0.025  -0.130  -0.557   0.162  
REG_QUA -0.399  -0.359   0.034   0.034  -0.114  -0.034  -0.030  -0.058  -0.127  -0.058  
RULE_LAW -0.102  -0.052   0.134   0.134  -0.112  -0.096   0.036  -0.216  -0.483   0.058  
VOICE_ACCT -0.033   0.010   0.211   0.211  -0.112  -0.087  -0.017  -0.083  -0.384   0.046  
PUBLIC_OWN  0.645   0.610   0.270   0.270   0.087   0.004   0.031   0.285   0.107   0.664  
LEGALORIGIN -0.655  -0.617  -0.292  -0.292  -0.080  -0.029  -0.002  -0.189   0.050  -0.584  
ETHNIC_FRAC -0.419  -0.476  -0.301  -0.301   0.016   0.039  -0.028  -0.023   0.316  -0.611  
LATITUDE  0.500   0.566   0.215   0.215  -0.067   0.072   0.128  -0.034  -0.215   0.475  
This table shows Pearson correlations between variables. Each of Z_SCORE, Z_SCORE_3SD and Z_SCORE_4SD is an indicator of bank 
stability. For Z_SCORE_4WIN, ROA from four-period rolling window (t, t-1, t-2 and t-3) are used to calculate the standard deviation of 
ROA in the Z-Score formula, while, for Z_SCORE_5WIN, ROA from five-period rolling window (t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4) are used to 
calculate the standard deviation of ROA in the Z-Score formula. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans. DEPTH 
is depth of credit information sharing index; PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry 
coverage (% of adult population); IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent 
of disclosure index; COMPET1 is the 1st competition measure converted from one minus Lerner Index; COMPET2 is the 2nd competition 
measure converted from concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in each country; COMPET3 
is the 3rd competition measure converted from concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 5 largest banks in 
each country; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is a square of a natural logarithm of 
total asset; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% 
and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real 
GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the 
country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of 
both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification; 
CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability index; 
REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability index; 
PUBLIC_OWN is a percentage of total assets in the banking system owned by the government;  LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable 
whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which 
captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude of a country. Further detail 
of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter. 
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Table 3-6: Pearson Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
Variable DEPOSIT_INS 
CAPITAL_S
TR 
ASSET_D
IV 
CORRUPTI
ON 
GOV_E
FF 
POLIT
IC 
REG_Q
UA 
RULE_L
AW 
VOICE_AC
CT 
PUBLIC_O
WN 
LEGALORI
GIN 
ETHNIC_FR
AC 
LATITU
DE 
DEPOSIT_I
NS  1.000                          
CAPITAL_S
TR  0.250   1.000                        
ASSET_DIV -0.081  -0.557   1.000                      
CORRUPTI
ON  0.237   0.015   0.003   1.000                    
GOV_EFF  0.248   0.067  -0.208   0.777   1.000                  
POLITIC  0.197   0.124   0.055   0.649   0.430   1.000                
REG_QUA  0.253   0.101  -0.215   0.794   0.881   0.397   1.000              
RULE_LAW  0.241   0.255  -0.117   0.733   0.732   0.675   0.688   1.000            
VOICE_ACC
T  0.262   0.086   0.017   0.886   0.696   0.603   0.697   0.819   1.000          
PUBLIC_O
WN -0.167  -0.671   0.679  -0.078  -0.329   0.005  -0.285  -0.151  -0.060   1.000        
LEGALORI
GIN  0.092   0.640  -0.632   0.022   0.246  -0.173   0.279   0.141  -0.006  -0.827   1.000      
ETHNIC_FR
AC -0.113   0.369  -0.377  -0.312  -0.015  -0.452  -0.065  -0.203  -0.308  -0.649   0.756   1.000    
LATITUDE  0.301  -0.278   0.391   0.316   0.127   0.357   0.117   0.229   0.354   0.502  -0.615  -0.688   1.000  
This table shows Pearson correlations between variables. Each of Z_SCORE, Z_SCORE_3SD and Z_SCORE_4SD is an indicator of bank stability. For Z_SCORE_4WIN, ROA from four-period rolling window 
(t, t-1, t-2 and t-3) are used to calculate the standard deviation of ROA in the Z-Score formula, while, for Z_SCORE_5WIN, ROA from five-period rolling window (t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4) are used to calculate the 
standard deviation of ROA in the Z-Score formula. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans. DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of 
adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; COMPET1 
is the 1st competition measure converted from one minus Lerner Index; COMPET2 is the 2nd competition measure converted from concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest 
banks in each country; COMPET3 is the 3rd competition measure converted from concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 5 largest banks in each country; SIZE is bank size calculated 
by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is a square of a natural logarithm of total asset; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits 
exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; 
DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent 
of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification; CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government 
effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability index; PUBLIC_OWN is a 
percentage of total assets in the banking system owned by the government;  LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC 
is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude of a country. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 
3-1 in this chapter. 
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Table 3-7: Model Selection and Diagnostic Tests 
Panel A: Poolability Test 
F(15557, 80852) 6.55 
F(15557, 80852) P-value 0.00 
The test of poolability is performed to determine the presence of individual effects, αi in the regression model. H0: αi=0 for i = 1, 2, 
3…., N. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the individual effects exist and the OLS estimates suffer from the problem 
of omitted variables. 
  
Panel B: Hausman Test 
Chi-sq(12) 1191.52 
Chi-sq(12) P-value 0.00 
The Hausman test is performed to choose between the fixed effect model and the random effect model. H0: difference in coefficients 
not systemic. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the fix effect regression model is preferable to the random effect. 
  
Panel C: Modified Wald Test for Groupwise Heteroskedasticity in Fixed Effect Regression Model 
Chi-sq(15558) 383.38 
Chi-sq(15558) P-value 0.00 
The modified Wald test is performed to test for the presence of groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals. H0: σ"# = σ# for i = 1, 2, 
3…., Ng, where Ng is the number of cross-sectional units. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that there exist the 
groupwise geteroskedasticity. 
  
Panel D: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 
F(1, 13149) 11066.864 
F(1, 13149) P-value 0.00 
The Wooldridge test is performed to test for the presence of serial correlation. H0: no first-order autocorrelation. The rejection of the 
null hypothesis indicates that data does not have first-order autocorrelation. 
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Table 3-8: The Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Risk 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) 
DEPTH 0.117** 
  (2.42) 
SIZE 0.196** 
  (2.37) 
SIZE_SQR -0.013** 
  (-2.48) 
TBTF -0.579*** 
  (-3.62) 
LOAN 0.029 
  (0.59) 
EFFICIENCY -1.204*** 
  (-5.35) 
GDPG 0.831 
  (0.64) 
INF -2.246** 
  (-2.19) 
CR 0.161 
  (1.35) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.115 
  (0.88) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.094** 
  (2.24) 
ASSET_DIV 0.338*** 
  (2.69) 
Constant 1.828* 
  (1.77) 
R-squared 0.235 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes 
Time Dummies Yes 
Observations 96,422 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. The dependent 
variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit 
information sharing index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is 
bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's 
total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a 
ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; 
DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance 
regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall 
capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. 
Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter. Time dummy variables are included in all 
regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-9: The Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Risk - The Role of 
Information Asymmetry 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DEPTH 0.117** 0.126** 0.495** 0.123** 0.518*** 
  (2.42) (2.18) (2.16) (2.58) (3.45) 
IFRS   0.079** 0.552***     
    (2.50) (3.03)     
IFRS * DEPTH     -0.408***     
      (-2.98)     
BDI       0.088*** 0.250** 
        (3.32) (2.51) 
BDI * DEPTH         -0.069** 
          (-2.46) 
SIZE 0.196** 0.191** 0.192** 0.169** 0.174** 
  (2.37) (2.39) (2.51) (2.15) (2.34) 
SIZE_SQR -0.013** -0.013** -0.013*** -0.011** -0.012** 
  (-2.48) (-2.51) (-2.65) (-2.18) (-2.48) 
TBTF -0.579*** -0.565*** -0.596*** -0.549*** -0.458*** 
  (-3.62) (-3.61) (-4.17) (-3.85) (-3.65) 
LOAN 0.029 0.027 0.023 0.033 0.021 
  (0.59) (0.54) (0.46) (0.69) (0.42) 
EFFICIENCY -1.204*** -1.204*** -1.213*** -1.222*** -1.228*** 
  (-5.35) (-5.34) (-5.47) (-5.63) (-5.71) 
GDPG 0.831 1.094 0.647 0.951 0.642 
  (0.64) (0.74) (0.45) (0.72) (0.50) 
INF -2.246** -2.207** -2.313** -1.943** -1.652** 
  (-2.19) (-2.08) (-2.34) (-2.17) (-2.18) 
CR 0.161 0.142 0.064 0.124 0.137* 
  (1.35) (1.36) (0.73) (1.26) (1.67) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.115 0.097 0.224* 0.079 0.164 
  (0.88) (0.71) (1.74) (0.56) (1.31) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.094** 0.097** 0.101** 0.106** 0.122*** 
  (2.24) (2.22) (2.26) (2.54) (2.74) 
ASSET_DIV 0.338*** 0.330*** 0.294*** 0.284** 0.220** 
  (2.69) (2.63) (2.78) (2.49) (2.43) 
Constant 1.828* 1.881* 2.769*** 2.302*** 0.333 
  (1.77) (1.92) (3.83) (2.67) (0.28) 
R-squared 0.235 0.235 0.242 0.244 0.250 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of information asymmetry on the relationship between credit information sharing 
and bank risk. The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth 
of credit information sharing index; IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether 
a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of 
total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the 
country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of 
total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for 
deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is 
capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index 
measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy 
variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all 
estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-10: The Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Risk - The Role of 
Banking Competition 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) (3) 
DEPTH 0.117** 0.097*** 0.0904*** 
  (2.42) (2.74) (3.36) 
COMPET1   -2.389*** -4.675*** 
    (-4.12) (-2.79) 
COMPET1 * DEPTH   1.370*** 
      (3.57) 
SIZE 0.196** 0.171** 0.150** 
  (2.37) (2.36) (2.10) 
SIZE_SQR -0.013** -0.012** -0.011** 
  (-2.48) (-2.45) (-2.21) 
TBTF -0.579*** -0.410*** -0.399*** 
  (-3.62) (-3.37) (-3.49) 
LOAN 0.029 0.005 0.016 
  (0.59) (0.11) (0.33) 
EFFICIENCY -1.204*** -1.269*** -1.262*** 
  (-5.35) (-6.47) (-6.29) 
GDPG 0.831 2.144** 2.445** 
  (0.64) (1.99) (2.45) 
INF -2.246** -2.778*** -2.754*** 
  (-2.19) (-3.12) (-3.21) 
CR 0.161 0.085 0.031 
  (1.35) (1.00) (0.43) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.115 0.049 0.102 
  (0.88) (0.42) (0.98) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.094** 0.097** 0.095** 
  (2.24) (2.28) (2.34) 
ASSET_DIV 0.338*** 0.203** 0.208** 
  (2.69) (2.09) (2.23) 
Constant 1.828* 0.411 5.690*** 
  (1.77) (0.40) (5.09) 
R-squared 0.235 0.247 0.253 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,422 96,422 96,422 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of banking competition on the relationship between credit information 
sharing and bank risk. The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. 
DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; COMPET1 is a measure of banking competition converted from Lerner 
Index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-
too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; 
LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP 
growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the 
country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the 
extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset 
diversification. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all 
regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
153	
	
Table 3-11: Estimation Results with Alternative Measure of Bank Risk - Z_SCORE_4WIN 
Variable 
Z_SCORE_4WIN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH 0.109** 0.121** 0.39** 0.114** 0.518*** 0.090** 0.099*** 
  (2.11) (2.06) (2.02) (2.25) (3.53) (2.43) (4.37) 
IFRS   0.099** 0.599***         
    (2.61) (3.30)         
IFRS * DEPTH     -0.337***         
      (-3.28)         
BDI       0.084*** 0.263**     
        (3.36) (2.61)     
BDI * DEPTH         -0.071**     
          (-2.47)     
COMPET1           -2.510*** -5.213*** 
            (-4.89) (-3.50) 
COMPET1 * DEPTH           1.489*** 
              (4.57) 
SIZE 0.205** 0.198** 0.197** 0.176** 0.181** 0.175** 0.151** 
  (2.37) (2.38) (2.49) (2.16) (2.36) (2.34) (2.02) 
SIZE_SQR -0.014** -0.013** -0.013** -0.011** -0.012** -0.012** -0.011** 
  (-2.43) (-2.46) (-2.58) (-2.13) (-2.44) (-2.39) (-2.11) 
TBTF -0.591*** -0.573*** -0.616*** -0.559*** -0.465*** -0.403*** -0.390*** 
  (-3.74) (-3.72) (-4.50) (-3.92) (-3.69) (-3.44) (-3.57) 
LOAN 0.044 0.042 0.038 0.047 0.034 0.016 0.026 
  (0.90) (0.83) (0.75) (0.97) (0.69) (0.33) (0.55) 
EFFICIENCY -1.170*** -1.171*** -1.180*** -1.189*** -1.196*** -1.240*** -1.229*** 
  (-5.59) (-5.58) (-5.76) (-5.92) (-6.04) (-7.01) (-6.74) 
GDPG 0.046 0.387 0.150 0.142 -0.000 1.477 1.672* 
  (0.03) (0.24) (0.10) (0.10) (-0.00) (1.35) (1.70) 
INF -1.827 -1.776 -1.892* -1.513 -1.215 -2.416** -2.435*** 
  (-1.63) (-1.52) (-1.77) (-1.52) (-1.44) (-2.55) (-2.65) 
CR 0.151 0.127 0.049 0.115 0.131* 0.070 0.009 
  (1.35) (1.31) (0.59) (1.24) (1.70) (0.90) (0.14) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.087 0.065 0.220 0.059 0.150 0.018 0.075 
  (0.61) (0.45) (1.59) (0.39) (1.15) (0.14) (0.68) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.088** 0.091** 0.100** 0.101** 0.119*** 0.094** 0.090** 
  (2.08) (2.05) (2.20) (2.43) (2.64) (2.27) (2.30) 
ASSET_DIV 0.317** 0.306** 0.264** 0.266** 0.196** 0.180* 0.189** 
  (2.59) (2.47) (2.55) (2.33) (2.17) (1.93) (2.16) 
Constant 1.589 1.657* 2.619*** 2.043** 0.033 0.120 5.901*** 
  (1.55) (1.72) (3.61) (2.36) (0.03) (0.12) (5.77) 
R-squared 0.242 0.243 0.251 0.252 0.260 0.259 0.266 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 91,572 91,572 91,572 91,572 91,572 91,572 91,572 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. The dependent variable is 
bank risk measured by Z_SCORE_4WIN. For all these regressions, ROA from four-period rolling window (t, t-1, t-2 and t-3) are 
used to calculate the standard deviation of ROA in the Z-Score formula. Z_SCORE_4WIN is an indicator of bank stability. 
DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS is a dummy 
variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; COMPET1 is a measure 
of banking competition converted from Lerner Index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; 
SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's 
total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of 
total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy 
for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; 
CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is 
asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. Further detail of all variables are presented in 
Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-12: Estimation Results with Alternative Measure of Bank Risk - Z_SCORE_5WIN 
Variable 
Z_SCORE_5WIN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH 0.103* 0.117* 0.405* 0.107* 0.507*** 0.08** 0.086*** 
  (1.87) (1.91) (1.97) (1.97) (3.57) (2.14) (-4.83) 
IFRS   0.121** 0.689***         
    (2.72) (3.55)         
IFRS * DEPTH     -0.357***         
      (-3.56)         
BDI       0.079*** 0.266**     
        (3.38) (2.60)     
BDI * DEPTH         -0.071***     
          (-2.53)     
COMPET1           -2.584*** -5.779*** 
            (-5.50) (-3.75) 
COMPET1 * DEPTH           1.599*** 
              (5.05) 
SIZE 0.216** 0.208** 0.206** 0.187** 0.192** 0.181** 0.156* 
  (2.39) (2.39) (2.50) (2.17) (2.38) (2.31) (1.97) 
SIZE_SQR -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.012** -0.013** -0.012** -0.011** 
  (-2.40) (-2.43) (-2.55) (-2.10) (-2.42) (-2.35) (-2.04) 
TBTF -0.562*** -0.540*** -0.605*** -0.535*** -0.444*** -0.373*** -0.358*** 
  (-3.60) (-3.54) (-4.52) (-3.76) (-3.54) (-3.28) (-3.41) 
LOAN 0.058 0.056 0.050 0.060 0.048 0.026 0.035 
  (1.11) (1.04) (0.96) (1.18) (0.93) (0.52) (0.71) 
EFFICIENCY -1.132*** -1.133*** -1.143*** -1.149*** -1.158*** -1.202*** -1.187*** 
  (-5.62) (-5.61) (-5.83) (-5.94) (-6.12) (-7.21) (-6.79) 
GDPG -0.270 0.143 0.034 -0.190 -0.254 1.291 1.306 
  (-0.19) (0.09) (0.02) (-0.13) (-0.19) (1.14) (1.30) 
INF -1.884 -1.825 -1.926 -1.587 -1.277 -2.422** -2.573** 
  (-1.51) (-1.42) (-1.64) (-1.42) (-1.35) (-2.32) (-2.53) 
CR 0.147 0.119 0.039 0.113 0.130* 0.061 -0.007 
  (1.37) (1.29) (0.49) (1.24) (1.71) (0.83) (-0.11) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.042 0.015 0.196 0.020 0.113 -0.018 0.037 
  (0.28) (0.10) (1.39) (0.13) (0.86) (-0.13) (0.33) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.089** 0.093** 0.106** 0.103** 0.121** 0.093** 0.085** 
  (2.05) (2.02) (2.28) (2.42) (2.61) (2.22) (2.17) 
ASSET_DIV 0.299** 0.285** 0.239** 0.252** 0.179* 0.163* 0.177* 
  (2.36) (2.22) (2.24) (2.09) (1.83) (1.68) (1.98) 
Constant 1.438 1.521 2.554*** 1.869** -0.122 -0.047 6.225*** 
  (1.45) (1.64) (3.62) (2.20) (-0.11) (-0.05) (5.79) 
R-squared 0.245 0.245 0.256 0.255 0.263 0.264 0.272 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 86,877 86,877 86,877 86,877 86,877 86,877 86,877 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. The dependent variable is bank risk 
measured by Z_SCORE_5WIN. For all these regressions, ROA from five-period rolling window (t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4) are used to 
calculate the standard deviation of ROA in the Z-Score formula. Z_SCORE_5WIN is an indicator of bank stability: DEPTH is depth 
of credit information sharing index; IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; COMPET1 is a measure of banking competition 
converted from Lerner Index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size 
squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% 
and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is 
real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one 
if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the 
extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset 
diversification. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all 
regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-13: Estimation Results with Alternative Measure of Bank Risk - NPL 
Variable 
NPL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH -0.010** -0.007** -0.008* -0.010*** -0.005** -0.010** 0.024 
  (-2.61) (-2.03) (-1.96) (-2.65) (-2.01) (-2.60) (1.46) 
IFRS   -0.023*** -0.013         
    (-2.75) (-0.50)         
IFRS * DEPTH     0.002*         
      (1.89)         
BDI       0.001 0.005     
        (0.52) (0.80)     
BDI * DEPTH         0.001*     
          (1.72)     
COMPET1           0.062 0.176* 
            (1.58) (1.69) 
COMPET1 * DEPTH           -0.047** 
              (-2.09) 
SIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.44) (-0.70) (-0.66) (-0.39) (-0.33) (-0.35) (-0.16) 
SIZE_SQR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.44) (0.36) (0.31) (0.35) (0.22) (0.37) (0.18) 
TBTF 0.016* 0.018** 0.018** 0.016* 0.017** 0.012 0.013 
  (1.85) (2.41) (2.38) (1.85) (2.01) (1.41) (1.53) 
LOAN -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.29) (-0.78) (-0.88) (-0.29) (-0.46) (0.16) (0.10) 
EFFICIENCY 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
  (6.31) (6.77) (6.75) (6.32) (6.27) (7.84) (7.80) 
GDPG -0.324** -0.233* -0.235* -0.328** -0.329** -0.373*** -0.390*** 
  (-2.18) (-1.87) (-1.91) (-2.18) (-2.21) (-2.66) (-2.89) 
INF 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.043 0.059 0.060 
  (0.66) (0.64) (0.62) (0.64) (0.68) (1.05) (1.09) 
CR 0.010** 0.006 0.006 0.010** 0.011** 0.011** 0.012*** 
  (2.20) (1.50) (1.36) (2.25) (2.25) (2.42) (2.71) 
DEPOSIT_INS -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 
  (-0.22) (-0.44) (-0.38) (-0.21) (-0.08) (-0.23) (-0.39) 
CAPITAL_STR -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
  (-1.60) (-1.57) (-1.55) (-1.61) (-1.57) (-1.57) (-1.55) 
ASSET_DIV -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.001 
  (-0.40) (-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.33) (-0.41) (0.13) (0.08) 
Constant 0.055 0.063* 0.068** 0.052 0.025 0.103** -0.071 
  (1.53) (1.83) (2.01) (1.46) (0.46) (2.35) (-0.91) 
R-squared 0.222 0.231 0.231 0.222 0.223 0.226 0.229 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 75,137 75,137 75,137 75,137 75,137 75,137 75,137 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. The dependent variable is bank 
risk measured by NPL. NPL is a ratio of total non-performing loans to total gross loans. DEPTH is depth of credit information 
sharing index; IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts 
IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; COMPET1 is a measure of banking competition converted from Lerner 
Index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-
fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a 
ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is 
inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has 
adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both 
initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. 
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Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Table 3-14: Estimation Results with Alternative Proxy of Credit Information Sharing - 
Private Credit Bureau Coverages 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PRIV 0.309** 0.313** 0.268** 0.335** 2.007*** 0.338* 0.199** 
  (2.32) (2.40) (2.36) (2.52) (3.06) (1.75) (2.58) 
IFRS   0.022** 0.664*         
    (2.14) (1.90)         
IFRS * PRIV     -0.256*         
      (-1.84)         
BDI       0.088* 0.006     
        (1.80) (0.15)     
BDI * PRIV         -0.257**     
          (-2.41)     
COMPET1           -2.513*** -0.040 
            (4.40) (-0.06) 
COMPET1 * PRIV             1.550*** 
              (3.00) 
SIZE 0.190** 0.189** 0.192** 0.163** 0.165** 0.163** 0.148** 
  (2.34) (2.36) (2.57) (2.13) (2.29) (2.27) (2.08) 
SIZE_SQR -0.013** -0.013** -0.013*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** 
  (-2.43) (-2.44) (-2.67) (-2.14) (-2.36) (-2.30) (-2.21) 
TBTF -0.646*** -0.643*** -0.624*** -0.618*** -0.503*** -0.454*** -0.455*** 
  (-4.32) (-4.40) (-5.03) (-4.71) (-4.13) (-3.94) (-4.36) 
LOAN 0.031 0.031 0.003 0.036 0.031 0.007 0.013 
  (0.66) (0.62) (0.05) (0.75) (0.65) (0.16) (0.28) 
EFFICIENCY -1.196*** -1.196*** -1.199*** -1.214*** -1.225*** -1.267*** -1.252*** 
  (-5.22) (-5.22) (-5.29) (-5.50) (-5.66) (-6.43) (-6.07) 
GDPG 1.023 1.097 0.598 1.161 -0.011 2.436** 2.189** 
  (0.72) (0.69) (0.34) (0.80) (-0.01) (2.18) (2.28) 
INF -2.590** -2.590** -3.019*** -2.291** -1.877** -2.983*** -2.738*** 
  (-2.33) (-2.32) (-3.26) (-2.42) (-2.12) (-2.99) (-3.11) 
CR 0.155 0.150 0.005 0.117 0.101 0.069 0.009 
  (1.37) (1.44) (0.06) (1.24) (1.56) (0.90) (0.13) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.148 0.144 0.290** 0.112 0.136 0.062 0.216** 
  (1.12) (1.02) (2.35) (0.79) (1.16) (0.52) (2.16) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.082** 0.082** 0.098** 0.091** 0.105*** 0.076** 0.081** 
  (2.12) (2.13) (2.40) (2.29) (2.67) (2.08) (2.61) 
ASSET_DIV 0.367*** 0.366*** 0.288** 0.317** 0.272*** 0.238** 0.190** 
  (2.65) (2.64) (2.56) (2.51) (2.99) (2.23) (2.20) 
Constant 2.368*** 2.393*** 3.137*** 2.875*** 2.466*** 0.818 2.917*** 
  (2.80) (2.97) (5.08) (4.05) (3.98) (0.92) (4.24) 
R-squared 0.234 0.234 0.245 0.243 0.252 0.248 0.254 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 
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The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. Credit information sharing is 
proxied by private credit bureau coverages PRIV. The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an 
indicator of bank stability. PRIV is a private credit bureau coverage; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS and 
BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a 
business extent of disclosure index; COMPET1 is a measure of banking competition converted from Lerner Index; SIZE is bank size 
calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value 
is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans 
to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights 
index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, 
and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; 
ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. Further detail of all variables are 
presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-15: Estimation Results with Alternative Proxy of Credit Information Sharing - 
Public Credit Registry Coverages 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PUB 0.961 1.052 0.659 0.684 -0.793 0.832 0.435* 
  (0.87) (0.81) (1.45) (0.90) (-0.61) (0.37) (1.66) 
IFRS   0.102* 0.168*         
    (1.74) (1.96)         
IFRS * PUB     -0.667         
      (-1.06)         
BDI       0.076*** 0.098     
        (3.00) (0.73)     
BDI * PUB         0.302     
          (1.49)     
COMPET1           -2.380*** -2.692*** 
            (-3.95) (-4.12) 
COMPET1 * PUB             1.860 
              (0.79) 
SIZE 0.188** 0.181** 0.180** 0.167** 0.162** 0.164** 0.164** 
  (2.27) (2.28) (2.28) (2.11) (2.06) (2.28) (2.28) 
SIZE_SQR -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** 
  (-2.27) (-2.30) (-2.29) (-2.08) (-2.08) (-2.27) (-2.28) 
TBTF -0.657*** -0.647*** -0.649*** -0.633*** -0.619*** -0.476*** -0.482*** 
  (-4.53) (-4.67) (-4.73) (-4.98) (-5.15) (-4.28) (-4.43) 
LOAN 0.032 0.030 0.031 0.034 0.035 0.008 0.002 
  (0.66) (0.61) (0.62) (0.70) (0.73) (0.17) (0.05) 
EFFICIENCY -1.209*** -1.210*** -1.206*** -1.220*** -1.217*** -1.274*** -1.277*** 
  (-5.50) (-5.49) (-5.44) (-5.65) (-5.59) (-6.59) (-6.67) 
GDPG 0.435 0.736 0.462 0.638 0.322 1.798* 1.719 
  (0.35) (0.52) (0.36) (0.47) (0.25) (1.71) (1.64) 
INF -2.842*** -2.854*** -2.893*** -2.653*** -2.604*** -3.269*** -3.333*** 
  (-3.48) (-3.49) (-3.45) (-3.57) (-3.64) (-4.20) (-4.11) 
CR 0.157 0.133 0.115 0.134 0.150 0.081 0.064 
  (1.34) (1.30) (1.19) (1.33) (1.55) (0.97) (0.78) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.211 0.197 0.191 0.177 0.163 0.130 0.121 
  (1.48) (1.39) (1.36) (1.28) (1.19) (1.06) (1.00) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.102** 0.106** 0.110** 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.103** 0.104** 
  (2.34) (2.33) (2.39) (2.76) (2.78) (2.39) (2.43) 
ASSET_DIV 0.339*** 0.329*** 0.327*** 0.280*** 0.241** 0.206** 0.205** 
  (2.92) (2.92) (2.95) (2.65) (2.36) (2.27) (2.28) 
Constant 2.334** 2.454*** 2.510*** 2.736*** 2.956*** 0.841 0.653 
  (2.55) (2.93) (3.10) (3.43) (3.79) (0.86) (0.67) 
R-squared 0.236 0.236 0.236 0.242 0.244 0.248 0.250 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. Credit information sharing is 
proxied by public credit registry coverage PUB. The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an 
indicator of bank stability. PUB is a public credit registry coverage; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS is a 
dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; COMPET1 is a 
measure of banking competition converted from Lerner Index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total 
asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the 
country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio 
of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for 
deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is 
capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index 
measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time 
dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in 
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all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Table 3-16: Estimation Results with Alternative Measures of Banking Competition - 
Banking Concentration Ratios 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DEPTH 0.117** 0.106** 0.126* 0.106** 0.055 
  (2.42) (2.42) (1.75) (2.45) (0.96) 
COMPET2   -0.220 0.147     
    (-0.45) (0.18)     
COMPET2 * DEPTH   -0.071     
      (-0.38)     
COMPET2       -0.245 -1.177 
        (-0.66) (-1.30) 
COMPET2 * DEPTH         0.186 
          (1.07) 
SIZE 0.196** 0.201** 0.200** 0.203** 0.204** 
  (2.37) (2.33) (2.34) (2.32) (2.34) 
SIZE_SQR -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** 
  (-2.48) (-2.46) (-2.46) (-2.45) (-2.46) 
TBTF -0.579*** -0.594*** -0.594*** -0.607*** -0.630*** 
  (-3.62) (-3.79) (-3.79) (-3.81) (-4.01) 
LOAN 0.029 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.034 
  (0.59) (0.72) (0.74) (0.74) (0.76) 
EFFICIENCY -1.204*** -1.200*** -1.200*** -1.199*** -1.200*** 
  (-5.35) (-5.30) (-5.30) (-5.28) (-5.31) 
GDPG 0.831 0.897 0.892 0.906 1.005 
  (0.64) (0.69) (0.69) (0.70) (0.77) 
INF -2.246** -2.242** -2.220** -2.240** -2.276** 
  (-2.19) (-2.13) (-2.09) (-2.14) (-2.18) 
CR 0.161 0.166 0.168 0.170 0.163 
  (1.35) (1.34) (1.33) (1.36) (1.31) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.115 0.126 0.125 0.137 0.147 
  (0.88) (0.95) (0.95) (1.02) (1.08) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.094** 0.090** 0.088** 0.089** 0.095** 
  (2.24) (2.32) (2.30) (2.29) (2.39) 
ASSET_DIV 0.338*** 0.347*** 0.348*** 0.345*** 0.341*** 
  (2.69) (2.68) (2.67) (2.68) (2.67) 
Constant 1.828* 1.894* 1.783 1.863* 2.132** 
  (1.77) (1.96) (1.60) (1.86) (2.15) 
R-squared 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.235 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 
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The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. Alternative measures of 
banking competition are employed, which are COMPET2 and COMPET3. The dependent variable is bank risk measured by 
Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS and BDI are 
proxies of information environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a 
business extent of disclosure index; COMPET2 is a measure of banking competition converted from concentration index 
calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 3 largest banks in each country; COMPET3 is a measure of banking competition 
converted from concentration index calculated from the fraction of assets held by the 5 largest banks in each country; SIZE is 
bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy 
whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of 
total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; 
CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a 
deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and 
overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. Further 
detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-17: Estimation Results with Additional Control Variables for the Impact of Credit 
Information Sharing on Bank Risk 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH 0.081* 0.086* 0.108** 0.074* 0.085* 0.103** 0.107** 
  (1.71) (1.70) (2.28) (1.68) (1.77) (2.15) (2.56) 
SIZE 0.175** 0.184** 0.187** 0.180** 0.181** 0.186** 0.200** 
  (2.22) (2.25) (2.28) (2.24) (2.23) (2.34) (2.40) 
SIZE_SQR -0.012** -0.012** -0.013** -0.012** -0.012** -0.013** -0.014** 
  (-2.39) (-2.40) (-2.40) (-2.41) (-2.37) (-2.47) (-2.60) 
TBTF -0.570*** -0.562*** -0.576*** -0.556*** -0.574*** -0.578*** -0.392*** 
  (-3.59) (-3.51) (-3.63) (-3.48) (-3.58) (-3.62) (-2.70) 
LOAN 0.050 0.043 0.033 0.046 0.046 0.038 0.012 
  (0.95) (0.81) (0.65) (0.88) (0.87) (0.73) (0.23) 
EFFICIENCY -1.196*** -1.197*** -1.204*** -1.197*** -1.197*** -1.199*** -1.222*** 
  (-5.17) (-5.20) (-5.32) (-5.20) (-5.19) (-5.22) (-5.57) 
GDPG 1.284 1.139 1.095 1.722 1.261 1.390 -2.130* 
  (0.97) (0.92) (0.78) (1.32) (0.99) (0.94) (-1.68) 
INF -1.129 -1.382* -1.859** -0.903 -1.317* -1.704* -3.127*** 
  (-1.43) (-1.79) (-2.05) (-1.35) (-1.76) (-1.86) (-2.66) 
CR 0.162 0.169 0.158 0.154 0.166 0.162 0.109 
  (1.44) (1.44) (1.34) (1.35) (1.43) (1.38) (1.22) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.077 0.075 0.092 0.057 0.084 0.049 0.090 
  (0.59) (0.58) (0.73) (0.42) (0.64) (0.34) (0.69) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.067 0.070 0.094** 0.056 0.069 0.078 0.134*** 
  (1.44) (1.45) (2.19) (1.15) (1.41) (1.60) (2.84) 
ASSET_DIV 0.312*** 0.326*** 0.338*** 0.346*** 0.337*** 0.328*** 0.302*** 
  (2.87) (2.82) (2.77) (3.19) (2.89) (2.81) (2.80) 
CORRUPTION 0.174**             
  (2.01)             
GOV_EFF   0.155*           
    (1.66)           
POLITIC     0.083         
      (0.82)         
REG_QUA       0.254**       
        (2.04)       
RULE_LAW         0.146     
          (1.65)     
VOICE_ACCT           0.126   
            (1.15)   
PUBLIC_OWN             -1.150*** 
              (-2.85) 
Constant 2.240** 2.100** 1.979* 2.193** 2.155** 2.085** 1.863** 
  (2.41) (2.08) (1.93) (2.26) (2.20) (2.08) (2.32) 
R-squared 0.239 0.237 0.235 0.238 0.237 0.236 0.250 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 93,059 
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The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk with additional control 
variables. The additional control variables are CORRUPTION, GOV_EFF, POLITIC, REG_QUA, RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC and 
PUBLIC_OWN. The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH 
is depth of credit information sharing index; COMPET1 is the 1st competition measure converted from Lerner Index; SIZE is 
bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy 
whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of 
total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; 
CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a 
deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and 
overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. 
CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability 
index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountatbility 
index; PUBLIC_OWN is a percentage of total assets in the banking system owned by the government. Further detail of all 
variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
  
163	
	
Table 3-18: Estimation Results with Additional Control Variables for the Interaction Effect 
of Credit Information Sharing and IFRS Adoption on Bank Risk 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH 0.462** 0.472** 0.490*** 0.437** 0.451** 0.486** 0.415*** 
  (2.25) (2.29) (2.94) (2.12) (2.24) (2.53) (3.38) 
IFRS 0.611*** 0.633*** 0.575*** 0.638*** 0.623*** 0.631*** 0.552** 
  (3.39) (-3.24) (3.10) (3.33) (3.26) (3.13) (2.46) 
IFRS * DEPTH -0.325*** -0.339*** -0.322*** -0.328*** -0.332*** -0.325*** -0.218*** 
  (-3.19) (-3.10) (-3.01) (-3.13) (-3.12) (-3.04) (-2.74) 
SIZE 0.174** 0.178** 0.184** 0.179** 0.177** 0.185** 0.202** 
  (2.39) (2.39) (2.44) (2.41) (2.37) (2.50) (2.45) 
SIZE_SQR -0.012** -0.012** -0.013** -0.012** -0.012** -0.013** -0.014*** 
  (-2.54) (-2.56) (-2.54) (-2.55) (-2.52) (-2.61) (-2.69) 
TBTF -0.596*** -0.579*** -0.599*** -0.584*** -0.597*** -0.608*** -0.403*** 
  (-4.30) (-4.17) (-4.22) (-4.18) (-4.25) (-4.24) (-2.83) 
LOAN 0.046 0.040 0.028 0.042 0.043 0.035 0.012 
  (0.85) (0.75) (0.53) (0.79) (0.78) (0.63) (0.23) 
EFFICIENCY -1.205*** -1.206*** -1.213*** -1.205*** -1.206*** -1.207*** -1.221*** 
  (-5.29) (-5.31) (-5.45) (-5.32) (-5.31) (-5.34) (-5.54) 
GDPG 0.918 0.953 0.804 1.348 0.999 1.005 -1.721 
  (0.62) (0.67) (0.54) (0.91) (0.70) (0.65) (-1.36) 
INF -1.198* -1.302* -1.925** -0.938 -1.307* -1.753** -2.941** 
  (-1.71) (-1.88) (-2.28) (-1.61) (-1.95) (-2.11) (-2.62) 
CR 0.076 0.071 0.068 0.069 0.074 0.080 0.055 
  (0.88) (0.82) (0.80) (0.80) (0.85) (0.93) (0.69) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.201* 0.187 0.209* 0.182 0.202* 0.172 0.170 
  (1.70) (1.60) (1.79) (1.51) (1.68) (1.37) (1.35) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.071 0.072 0.100** 0.058 0.072 0.080 0.138*** 
  (1.44) (1.38) (2.15) (1.13) (1.36) (1.51) (2.83) 
ASSET_DIV 0.272*** 0.279*** 0.297*** 0.307*** 0.294*** 0.290*** 0.285*** 
  (3.01) (3.01) (2.87) (3.48) (3.11) (2.94) (2.72) 
CORRUPTION 0.178**             
  (2.25)             
GOV_EFF   0.183*           
    (1.88)           
POLITIC     0.087         
      (0.82)         
REG_QUA       0.266**       
        (2.17)       
RULE_LAW         0.161*     
          (1.78)     
VOICE_ACCT           0.139   
            (1.18)   
PUBLIC_OWN             -0.901** 
              (-2.33) 
Constant 3.173*** 3.141*** 2.914*** 3.135*** 3.148*** 3.020*** 2.461*** 
  (4.47) (4.20) (3.85) (4.32) (4.19) (3.97) (3.54) 
R-squared 0.246 0.244 0.242 0.245 0.244 0.243 0.253 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 93,059 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of information asymmetry (proxied by IFRS) on the relationship between 
credit information sharing and bank risk with additional control variables. The additional control variables are CORRUPTION, 
GOV_EFF, POLITIC, REG_QUA, RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC and PUBLIC_OWN. The dependent variable is bank risk measured by 
Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS is a dummy 
variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; 
SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total 
deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to 
total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit 
insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital 
stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index 
measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government 
effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law 
index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability index; PUBLIC_OWN is a percentage of total assets in the banking system owned 
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by the government. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in 
all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Table 3-19: Estimation Results with Additional Control Variables for the Interaction Effect 
of Credit Information Sharing and the Business Extent of Disclosure Index on Bank Risk 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH 0.479*** 0.490*** 0.535*** 0.474*** 0.490*** 0.514*** 0.376*** 
  (3.30) (3.31) (3.45) (3.23) (3.35) (3.43) (3.29) 
BDI 0.244** 0.250** 0.254** 0.247** 0.251** 0.249** 0.144* 
  (2.53) (2.57) (2.49) (2.56) (2.59) (2.51) (1.66) 
BDI * DEPTH -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.045** 
  (-3.06) (-3.11) (-3.09) (-3.09) (-3.14) (-3.08) (-2.48) 
SIZE 0.162** 0.165** 0.179** 0.161** 0.163** 0.172** 0.186** 
  (2.21) (2.21) (2.40) (2.20) (2.19) (2.34) (2.25) 
SIZE_SQR -0.011** -0.012** -0.012** -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** -0.013** 
  (-2.40) (-2.39) (-2.52) (-2.39) (-2.36) (-2.48) (-2.48) 
TBTF -0.457*** -0.446*** -0.456*** -0.442*** -0.455*** -0.458*** -0.314** 
  (-3.62) (-3.53) (-3.66) (-3.51) (-3.60) (-3.64) (-2.50) 
LOAN 0.035 0.032 0.017 0.035 0.034 0.022 0.015 
  (0.68) (0.63) (0.35) (0.69) (0.66) (0.44) (0.30) 
EFFICIENCY -1.221*** -1.222*** -1.229*** -1.221*** -1.222*** -1.226*** -1.234*** 
  (-5.55) (-5.57) (-5.73) (-5.56) (-5.56) (-5.66) (-5.75) 
GDPG 0.938 0.885 0.450 1.386 0.972 0.729 -1.739 
  (0.72) (0.71) (0.34) (1.03) (0.76) (0.53) (-1.56) 
INF -0.965 -0.979 -1.907*** -0.553 -0.949 -1.573** -2.277*** 
  (-1.49) (-1.62) (-2.65) (-1.04) (-1.60) (-2.17) (-2.65) 
CR 0.140* 0.145* 0.138* 0.133* 0.143* 0.138* 0.100 
  (1.73) (1.75) (1.67) (1.68) (1.75) (1.67) (1.38) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.139 0.133 0.181 0.115 0.141 0.154 0.150 
  (1.10) (1.08) (1.43) (0.90) (1.11) (1.22) (1.24) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.102** 0.102** 0.123*** 0.088* 0.101** 0.119** 0.149*** 
  (2.21) (2.10) (2.77) (1.85) (2.06) (2.45) (3.07) 
ASSET_DIV 0.210** 0.213** 0.215** 0.230*** 0.222** 0.219** 0.240*** 
  (2.43) (2.43) (2.38) (2.89) (2.57) (2.44) (2.66) 
CORRUPTION 0.113*             
  (1.79)             
GOV_EFF   0.122*           
    (1.67)           
POLITIC     -0.060         
      (-0.88)         
REG_QUA       0.211**       
        (2.19)       
RULE_LAW         0.113     
          (1.58)     
VOICE_ACCT           0.020   
            (0.27)   
PUBLIC_OWN             -0.801** 
              (-2.43) 
Constant 0.635 0.547 0.197 0.657 0.579 0.375 0.898 
  (0.57) (0.47) (0.16) (0.58) (0.50) (0.31) (0.93) 
R-squared 0.251 0.251 0.250 0.252 0.251 0.250 0.259 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 93,059 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of information asymmetry (proxied by BDI) on the relationship between credit 
information sharing and bank risk with additional control variables. The additional control variables are CORRUPTION, GOV_EFF, 
POLITIC, REG_QUA, RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC and PUBLIC_OWN. The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. 
Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; BDI is a business extent of 
disclosure index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is 
too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero 
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otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP 
growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the 
country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent 
of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset 
diversification. CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a 
political stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and 
accountability index; PUBLIC_OWN is a percentage of total assets in the banking system owned by the government. Further detail of 
all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-20: Estimation Results with Additional Control Variables for the Interaction Effect 
of Credit Information Sharing and Banking Competition on Bank Risk 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH -0.799*** -0.861*** -0.888*** -0.834*** -0.832*** -0.868*** -0.838*** 
  (-3.24) (-3.32) (-3.51) (-3.23) (-3.28) (-3.34) (-3.04) 
COMPET1 -3.602** -4.044** -4.413*** -3.802** -3.847** -4.204** -4.366*** 
  (-2.30) (-2.52) (-2.80) (-2.39) (-2.43) (-2.58) (-2.68) 
COMPET1 * DEPTH 1.178*** 1.265*** 1.332*** 1.217*** 1.227*** 1.297*** 1.264*** 
  (3.33) (3.42) (3.69) (3.31) (3.38) (3.51) (3.32) 
SIZE 0.132* 0.138* 0.138* 0.136* 0.136* 0.138* 0.186** 
  (1.84) (1.91) (1.92) (1.90) (1.88) (1.95) (2.24) 
SIZE_SQR -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.013** 
  (-2.05) (-2.09) (-2.05) (-2.09) (-2.05) (-2.12) (-2.35) 
TBTF -0.385*** -0.375*** -0.391*** -0.372*** -0.389*** -0.391*** -0.322*** 
  (-3.31) (-3.23) (-3.53) (-3.19) (-3.35) (-3.42) (-2.84) 
LOAN 0.034 0.030 0.021 0.031 0.031 0.025 0.017 
  (0.65) (0.57) (0.41) (0.59) (0.60) (0.50) (0.33) 
EFFICIENCY -1.258*** -1.258*** -1.263*** -1.258*** -1.258*** -1.258*** -1.259*** 
  (-6.17) (-6.19) (-6.32) (-6.20) (-6.19) (-6.20) (-6.13) 
GDPG 2.883*** 2.799*** 2.820*** 3.334*** 2.893*** 3.144*** 1.258 
  (2.94) (3.00) (2.83) (3.68) (3.12) (3.07) (1.06) 
INF -1.708*** -1.861*** -2.263*** -1.456*** -1.849*** -2.134*** -2.762*** 
  (-2.81) (-2.92) (-3.07) (-2.64) (-3.01) (-2.87) (-2.97) 
CR 0.037 0.041 0.026 0.027 0.039 0.032 0.029 
  (0.53) (0.58) (0.38) (0.39) (0.56) (0.46) (0.42) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.056 0.054 0.069 0.037 0.063 0.019 0.090 
  (0.54) (0.52) (0.66) (0.36) (0.61) (0.17) (0.73) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.069 0.070 0.095** 0.058 0.071 0.076 0.126*** 
  (1.53) (1.48) (2.28) (1.20) (1.45) (1.59) (2.80) 
ASSET_DIV 0.178** 0.190** 0.204** 0.210*** 0.201** 0.191** 0.183* 
  (2.28) (2.32) (2.40) (2.63) (2.37) (2.28) (1.85) 
CORRUPTION 0.166**             
  (2.31)             
GOV_EFF   0.164*           
    (1.75)           
POLITIC     0.108         
      (1.21)         
REG_QUA       0.249**       
        (2.33)       
RULE_LAW         0.146*     
          (1.78)     
VOICE_ACCT           0.149   
            (1.61)   
PUBLIC_OWN             -0.467 
              (-1.26) 
Constant 5.296*** 5.521*** 5.702*** 5.410*** 5.412*** 5.657*** 5.258*** 
  (4.75) (4.95) (5.18) (4.82) (4.89) (4.94) (4.72) 
R-squared 0.256 0.255 0.254 0.256 0.255 0.254 0.258 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 96,422 93,059 
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The table presents the regression results for the impact of banking competition on the relationship between credit information 
sharing and bank risk with additional control variables. The additional control variables are CORRUPTION, GOV_EFF, POLITIC, 
REG_QUA, RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC and PUBLIC_OWN.  The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. 
Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; COMPET1 is the 1st competition 
measure converted from Lerner Index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank 
size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 
10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; 
GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a 
value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index 
measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent 
of bank asset diversification. CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; 
POLITIC is a political stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is 
a voice and accountability index; PUBLIC_OWN is a percentage of total assets in the banking system owned by the government. 
Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-21: Sub Sample Analysis by Information Asymmetry 
Variable 
Z_SCORE Z_SCORE 
NON-IFRS 
Adoption 
IFRS 
Adoption LOW BDI HIGH BDI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
DEPTH 0.139** 0.013* 0.140*** 0.001 
  (2.46) (1.69) (3.48) (0.02) 
SIZE 0.321 0.127 0.218 0.116 
  (1.66) (1.28) (1.65) (1.24) 
SIZE_SQR -0.019* -0.009 -0.015** -0.008 
  (-1.69) (-1.25) (-2.13) (-1.23) 
TBTF -0.595*** -0.485*** -0.029 -0.556*** 
  (-3.69) (-2.75) (-0.15) (-3.86) 
LOAN 0.032 0.029 0.073 0.008 
  (0.80) (0.41) (1.36) (0.12) 
EFFICIENCY -0.904*** -1.415*** -0.878*** -1.396*** 
  (-13.04) (-8.00) (-11.70) (-7.29) 
GDPG 4.884** -0.938 0.480 0.992 
  (2.11) (-0.80) (0.33) (0.90) 
INF -2.324** -2.384** -2.363** -2.261*** 
  (-2.62) (-2.05) (-2.30) (-3.39) 
CR 0.097 -0.115 0.154 -0.061** 
  (1.11) (-1.29) (1.33) (-2.56) 
DEPOSIT_INS -0.118 0.194 0.043 0.181 
  (-0.32) (1.09) (0.22) (1.30) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.114 0.023 0.186*** 0.038 
  (1.49) (0.58) (3.51) (1.49) 
ASSET_DIV 0.188* 0.158 0.210* -0.064 
  (1.77) (1.15) (1.88) (-1.02) 
Constant -1.363 3.372*** 0.302 3.765*** 
  (-0.92) (7.12) (0.36) (9.26) 
R-squared 0.276 0.227 0.303 0.226 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,990 68,432 28,949 67,473 
The table presents the regression results of subsample analysis for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. The 
subsamples are classified based on proxies of information environment. "NON-IFRS" is the group of observations with NON-
IFRS adoption proxied for low transparent information environment, while "IFRS" is the group of observations with IFRS 
adoption proxied for high transparent information environment. "LOW BDI" is the group of observations with BDI below the 
median value of the sample, while "HIGH BDI" is the group of observations with BDI above the median value of the sample. 
The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of 
credit information sharing index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank 
size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits 
exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total 
income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit 
insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is 
capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification 
index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter. 
Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are 
applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-22: Sub Sample Analysis by Banking Competition 
Variable 
Z_SCORE Z_SCORE Z_SCORE 
COMPET1 
(TOP 25) 
COMPET1 
(BOTTOM 
25) 
COMPET1 
(TOP 30) 
COMPET1 
(BOTTOM 
30) 
COMPET1 
(TOP 40) 
COMPET1 
(BOTTOM 
40) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPTH 0.267*** 0.052 0.262*** 0.048 0.172*** 0.051 
  (3.39) (1.64) (3.38) (1.64) (3.01) (1.58) 
SIZE 0.165 0.087 0.177 0.093 0.167 0.104 
  (1.01) (0.93) (1.28) (1.23) (1.60) (1.30) 
SIZE_SQR -0.013 -0.006 -0.013* -0.006 -0.013** -0.008 
  (-1.45) (-0.93) (-1.78) (-1.24) (-2.13) (-1.34) 
TBTF -0.466* -0.430** -0.466** -0.461*** -0.400** -0.409** 
  (-1.86) (-2.30) (-2.15) (-2.89) (-2.24) (-2.43) 
LOAN 0.019 -0.060 0.040 -0.045 0.038 -0.042 
  (0.54) (-1.32) (0.88) (-0.99) (0.81) (-0.90) 
EFFICIENCY -0.728*** -1.711*** -0.858*** -1.673*** -0.978*** -1.620*** 
  (-6.47) (-9.19) (-7.08) (-8.07) (-6.15) (-10.14) 
GDPG 3.039 -1.840 3.511 -2.713* 3.727** -1.332 
  (1.16) (-1.27) (1.40) (-1.86) (2.05) (-1.06) 
INF -1.861 -1.320* -2.080 -1.519** -2.658** -1.552** 
  (-1.36) (-1.91) (-1.45) (-2.25) (-2.21) (-2.35) 
CR 0.108 0.010 0.063 -0.011 0.150* -0.023 
  (1.17) (0.27) (0.66) (-0.30) (1.68) (-0.62) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.355 0.037 0.388* 0.094 0.333* 0.118 
  (1.37) (0.23) (1.67) (0.67) (1.76) (0.84) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.299** 0.057** 0.189** 0.007 0.175** 0.003 
  (2.34) (2.06) (2.37) (0.21) (2.42) (0.09) 
ASSET_DIV 0.241* -0.007 0.279** -0.093 0.374*** -0.078 
  (1.74) (-0.09) (2.05) (-1.32) (3.92) (-1.08) 
Constant -0.513 3.651*** -0.356 4.124*** 0.419 4.074*** 
  (-0.75) (12.16) (-0.53) (16.91) (0.58) (15.58) 
R-squared 0.300 0.232 0.277 0.228 0.282 0.240 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,608 28,599 29,913 30,172 39,783 36,814 
The table presents the regression results of subsample analysis for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. The 
subsamples are classified based on the banking competition measure COMPET1. "TOP" and "BOTTOM" on each column are 
observations "above" and "below" the percentile of COMPET1, respectively.  
The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit 
information sharing index; COMPET1 is the 1st competition measure converted from Lerner Index; SIZE is bank size calculated by 
taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to 
one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total 
assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; 
DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and 
zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; 
ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. Further detail of all variables are 
presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustering at the country-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-23: Non-US Sample Analysis 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DEPTH 0.124** 0.123** 0.480** 0.111** 0.517*** 0.092** 0.091*** 
  (2.38) (2.25) (2.39) (2.36) (3.48) (2.49) (4.19) 
IFRS   0.022* 0.518***         
    (1.88) (3.16)         
IFRS * DEPTH     -0.311***         
      (-2.95)         
BDI       0.091*** 0.279***     
        (3.39) (2.63)     
BDI * DEPTH         -0.061***     
          (-3.19)     
COMPET1           -2.058*** -5.686*** 
            (-3.46) (-3.81) 
COMPET1 * DEPTH           1.525*** 
              (4.38) 
SIZE 0.152* 0.153* 0.146** 0.120 0.118* 0.126* 0.098 
  (1.92) (1.95) (1.98) (1.65) (1.82) (1.88) (1.58) 
SIZE_SQR -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.008* -0.008** -0.009** -0.007* 
  (-2.16) (-2.17) (-2.22) (-1.79) (-2.06) (-2.05) (-1.78) 
TBTF -0.558*** -0.560*** -0.604*** -0.540*** -0.462*** -0.437*** -0.416*** 
  (-3.70) (-3.71) (-4.37) (-4.07) (-3.93) (-3.64) (-3.71) 
LOAN 0.051 0.051 0.058 0.063 0.065 0.042 0.053 
  (1.29) (1.33) (1.65) (1.57) (1.65) (1.04) (1.39) 
EFFICIENCY -0.771*** -0.771*** -0.779*** -0.800*** -0.802*** -0.875*** -0.862*** 
  (-13.69) (-13.68) (-13.30) (-12.01) (-11.97) (-13.78) (-14.16) 
GDPG 2.176 2.106 1.665 2.407* 1.918 2.378* 2.145* 
  (1.42) (1.18) (1.08) (1.68) (1.65) (1.81) (1.78) 
INF -2.676*** -2.690*** -2.716*** -2.356*** -1.966*** -3.020*** -3.002*** 
  (-2.83) (-2.70) (-2.82) (-2.97) (-2.97) (-3.40) (-3.55) 
CR 0.117 0.119 0.066 0.103 0.163* 0.086 0.016 
  (1.03) (1.15) (0.73) (1.10) (1.92) (0.90) (0.19) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.112 0.117 0.240** 0.097 0.211* 0.042 0.067 
  (1.02) (1.01) (2.03) (0.81) (1.82) (0.38) (0.66) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.099** 0.099** 0.080* 0.092** 0.078* 0.088* 0.095** 
  (2.16) (2.16) (1.87) (2.06) (1.85) (1.98) (2.15) 
ASSET_DIV 0.196* 0.194* 0.226** 0.178* 0.193** 0.166* 0.169** 
  (1.70) (1.71) (2.11) (1.85) (2.39) (1.81) (1.99) 
Constant 1.439 1.423 2.323*** 1.900** -0.278 0.338 6.218*** 
  (1.44) (1.47) (3.47) (2.30) (-0.23) (0.32) (5.46) 
R-squared 0.239 0.239 0.250 0.257 0.269 0.254 0.266 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,773 45,773 45,773 45,773 45,773 45,773 45,773 
The table presents the regression results of subsample analysis for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. All 
regressions exclude banks in the USA. The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of 
bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS 
is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; COMPET1 is 
a measure of banking competition converted from Lerner Index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of 
total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the 
country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a 
ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a 
dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; 
CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset 
diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 
in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the 
bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
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*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Table 3-24: IV Approach for the Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Risk 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
(1) (2) 
DEPTH 0.312*   
  (1.78)   
SIZE 0.246*** -0.014 
  (2.71) (-0.25) 
SIZE_SQR -0.016*** 0.001 
  (-2.67) (0.20) 
TBTF -0.400* -0.576*** 
  (-1.70) (-2.74) 
LOAN 0.006 0.025 
  (0.10) (1.14) 
EFFICIENCY -1.269*** 0.020 
  (-6.16) (0.77) 
GDPG 0.488 3.849 
  (0.26) (1.64) 
INF -1.486 -4.971*** 
  (-0.71) (-3.14) 
CR 0.078 0.132 
  (0.75) (1.05) 
DEPOSIT_INS -0.075 0.928* 
  (-0.26) (1.93) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.048 0.129 
  (0.74) (1.46) 
ASSET_DIV 0.423** -0.223 
  (2.36) (-1.44) 
LEGALORIGIN   1.954*** 
    (4.55) 
ETHNIC_FRAC   -1.330*** 
    (-2.86) 
LATITUDE   -1.480* 
    (-1.80) 
Constant 0.394 4.717*** 
  (0.25) (4.66) 
R-squared 0.233 0.514 
First Stage F-test 8.402  
Second Stage F-test 80.98   
Hansen J 3.24   
Hansen J P-Value 0.196   
Observations 87,300 87,300 
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The table presents the results of instrumental variable regressions for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. The 
instruments are legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and latitude. The 2nd-stage regressions are reported in the odd columns, while 
the 1st-stage regressions are reported in the even columns.  
The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit 
information sharing index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; 
TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero 
otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP 
growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the 
country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent 
of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset 
diversification; LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise 
zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which 
measures the geographical latitude of a country. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time 
dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in 
all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-25: IV Approach for the Effect of Information Asymmetry on the Linkage 
between Credit Information Sharing and Bank Risk 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
IFRS Adoption NON IFRS Adoption HIGH BDI LOW BDI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DEPTH 0.201*   0.781**   -0.074   0.122*   
  (1.86)   (2.28)   (-1.63)   (1.74)   
SIZE 0.395** -0.056 0.234** 0.136** 0.149 0.049 0.368** 0.064 
  (2.75) (-0.79) (2.24) (2.56) (1.54) (0.70) (1.99) (0.81) 
SIZE_SQR -0.024* 0.005 -0.016** -0.008** -0.011 -0.003 -0.024** -0.003 
  (-1.89) (1.27) (-1.99) (-2.52) (-1.55) (-0.79) (-2.29) (-0.63) 
TBTF -0.456* -0.104 -0.661*** -0.655*** -0.538*** 0.110 0.000 -1.170*** 
  (-1.71) (-0.41) (-2.71) (-3.32) (-3.42) (0.87) (0.00) (-5.49) 
LOAN -0.021 0.017 0.036 0.047 0.005 0.003 0.052 0.037 
  (-0.52) (0.67) (0.29) (1.64) (0.07) (0.24) (0.47) (1.26) 
EFFICIENCY -0.872*** 0.058 -1.436*** 0.006 -1.398*** 0.017 -0.874*** 0.134** 
  (-10.88) (1.35) (-8.41) (0.39) (-7.30) (0.93) (-10.32) (2.27) 
GDPG 9.064** -1.121 -5.325** 1.628 1.625 0.606 -2.501 1.140 
  (2.23) (-0.25) (-2.04) (0.60) (1.15) (0.22) (-0.76) (0.42) 
INF 2.007 -9.250*** -2.241** -1.333 -2.158** -3.909* -3.380 -4.526* 
  (0.44) (-4.80) (-1.96) (-1.01) (-2.56) (-1.78) (-1.59) (-1.93) 
CR -0.211 0.394*** -0.001 0.261* -0.053** 0.175* 0.214 0.161 
  (-0.80) (3.84) (-0.01) (1.83) (-2.30) (1.73) (1.63) (1.13) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.201 -0.420 0.874*** 1.227*** 0.421** 2.114*** 0.029 0.214 
  (0.46) (-0.74) (2.92) (3.67) (2.08) (3.83) (0.11) (0.62) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.206 -0.012 0.089 0.336*** 0.065* -0.017 0.282*** 0.130 
  (1.44) (-0.15) (1.36) (3.33) (1.84) (-0.21) (3.07) (1.43) 
ASSET_DIV 0.178 0.231 0.188* -0.290 -0.049 -0.249 -0.104 -0.128 
  (0.91) (1.45) (1.75) (-1.43) (-0.76) (-1.12) (-0.51) (-0.51) 
LEGALORIGIN   0.855   0.050   2.415***   -0.472 
    (1.13)   (0.07)   (6.39)   (-0.65) 
ETHNIC_FRAC   -2.414***   -2.080***   -0.745   -2.453*** 
    (-3.69)   (-4.77)   (-1.55)   (-5.94) 
LATITUDE   -1.487   -0.380   -3.903***   1.006 
    (-1.44)   (-0.29)   (-3.07)   (0.99) 
Constant -2.113 6.105*** 4.646*** 2.553*** 4.130*** 4.797*** 1.264 3.973*** 
  (-1.05) (6.22) (9.10) (2.76) (11.07) (5.62) (1.33) (4.47) 
R-squared 0.288 0.589 0.230 0.653 0.226 0.713 0.281 0.640 
First Stage F-test 5.552   7.798   31.49   11.89   
Second Stage F-test 29.54   658.1   267.3   274.4   
Hansen J 1.863   0.02   0.40   4.233   
Hansen J P-Value 0.30   0.98   0.523   0.121   
Observations 25,850 25,850 61,450 61,450 65,680 65,680 21,620 21,620 
The table presents the results of instrumental variable regressions for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. The 
instruments are legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and latitude. The subsamples are classified based on proxies of information 
environment. "NON-IFRS" is the group of observations with NON-IFRS adoption proxied for low transparent information environment, 
while "IFRS" is the group of observations with IFRS adoption proxied for high transparent information environment. "LOW BDI" is the 
group of observations with BDI below the median value of the sample, while "HIGH BDI" is the group of observations with BDI above 
the median value of the sample. The 2nd-stage regressions are reported in the odd columns, while the 1st-stage regressions are reported in 
the even columns. 
The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit 
information sharing index; IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country 
adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural logarithm of total asset; 
SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the bank's share in the country's total 
deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total 
income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking 
a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index 
measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank 
asset diversification; LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise 
zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which 
measures the geographical latitude of a country. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy 
variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all 
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estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Table 3-26: IV Approach for the Effect of Banking Competition on the Linkage between 
Credit Information Sharing and Bank Risk 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
HIGH COMPET1 LOW COMPET1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
DEPTH 0.316**   0.033   
  (2.35)   (0.57)   
SIZE 0.247 -0.006 0.120 0.016 
  (1.62) (-0.06) (1.42) (0.33) 
SIZE_SQR -0.017* -0.001 -0.009 0.001 
  (-1.88) (-0.17) (-1.49) (0.36) 
TBTF -0.250 -0.853*** -0.368* -0.550** 
  (-0.99) (-3.55) (-1.90) (-2.20) 
LOAN 0.017 -0.007 -0.043 0.073** 
  (0.21) (-0.26) (-0.85) (2.48) 
EFFICIENCY -1.027*** 0.006 -1.633*** 0.037 
  (-6.38) (0.24) (-10.77) (1.16) 
GDPG 3.471 -0.983 -2.546 12.565*** 
  (0.96) (-0.28) (-1.55) (2.98) 
INF -2.635 -3.380 -1.568** -4.284** 
  (-1.31) (-1.12) (-1.98) (-2.55) 
CR 0.038 0.343*** -0.030 -0.085 
  (0.25) (3.66) (-0.81) (-0.64) 
DEPOSIT_INS 0.188 0.405 0.296 1.381** 
  (0.68) (1.11) (1.58) (2.27) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.116 0.069 0.017 0.177 
  (1.10) (0.80) (0.46) (1.51) 
ASSET_DIV 0.295** -0.206 -0.035 -0.247 
  (2.41) (-1.18) (-0.41) (-1.06) 
LEGALORIGIN   1.976***   1.857*** 
    (3.11)   (3.15) 
ETHNIC_FRAC   -0.588   -3.229*** 
    (-1.56)   (-3.87) 
LATITUDE   -0.570   -2.523* 
    (-0.56)   (-1.95) 
Constant -0.524 4.565*** 4.491*** 4.904*** 
  (-0.47) (4.09) (11.10) (3.31) 
R-squared 0.281 0.606 0.242 0.602 
First Stage F-test 3.637  6.224  
Second Stage F-test 150   201.7   
Hansen J 1.68   1.51   
Hansen J P-Value 0.512   0.45   
Observations  33,039   33,039   35,552   35,552  
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The table presents the results of instrumental variable regressions for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk. The 
instruments are legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and latitude. The subsamples are classified based on the measure of banking 
competition COMPET1. "TOP" and "BOTTOM" are observations "above" and "below" the 30 percentile of COMPET1 in each 
year respectively. The 2nd-stage regressions are reported in the odd columns, while the 1st-stage regressions are reported in the 
even columns. 
The dependent variable is bank risk measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit 
information sharing index; COMPET1 is the 1st competition measure converted from Lerner Index; SIZE is bank size calculated by 
taking a natural logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to 
one if the bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total 
assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights index; 
DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance regime, and 
zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency; 
ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification; LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable 
whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization 
which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude of a country. 
Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3-27: Additional Test for the Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Bank Risk – 
The Role of Creditor Rights 
Variable 
Z_SCORE 
LOW CR HIGH CR 
(1) (2) 
DEPTH 0.097 0.134*** 
  (1.36) (3.50) 
COMPET1 1.340 2.220*** 
  (1.40) (3.97) 
SIZE 0.266** 0.109 
  (2.11) (1.18) 
SIZE_SQR -0.020** -0.007 
  (-2.17) (-1.27) 
TBTF -0.340* -0.503*** 
  (-1.85) (-4.51) 
LOAN 0.000 0.004 
  (0.00) (0.10) 
EFFICIENCY -1.410*** -0.935*** 
  (-7.32) (-11.55) 
GDPG -1.190 3.478** 
  (-0.44) (2.57) 
INF -5.684** -1.981*** 
  (-2.10) (-2.92) 
DEPOSIT_INS -0.316 0.080 
  (-0.83) (0.52) 
CAPITAL_STR 0.067 0.085 
  (1.39) (1.45) 
ASSET_DIV 0.315* 0.191 
  (1.76) (1.60) 
Constant 2.735*** -0.001 
  (4.32) (-0.00) 
R-squared 0.241 0.264 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 60,393 36,896 
The table presents the regression results for the impact of credit information sharing on bank risk grouped by the level of 
creditor rights index. "LOW CR" is the group of observations with CR values below the sample median value, while "HIGH 
CR" is the group of observations with CR values above the sample median value. The dependent variable is bank risk 
measured by Z_SCORE. Z_SCORE is an indicator of bank stability. DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; 
COMPET1 is the 1st competition measure converted from Lerner Index; SIZE is bank size calculated by taking a natural 
logarithm of total asset; SIZE_SQR is bank size squared; TBTF is too-big-too-fail dummy whose value is equal to one if the 
bank's share in the country's total deposits exceeds 10% and zero otherwise; LOAN is a ratio of total gross loans to total 
assets; EFFICIENCY is a ratio of total cost to total income; GDPG is real GDP growth; INF is inflation; CR is creditor rights 
index; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy for deposit insurance taking a value of one if the country has adopted a deposit insurance 
regime, and zero otherwise; CAPITAL_STR is capital stringency index measuring the extent of both initial and overall 
capital stringency; ASSET_DIV is asset diversification index measuring the extent of bank asset diversification. Further 
detail of all variables are presented in Table 3-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Chapter 4: Credit Information Sharing and Bank Stock 
Price Crash Risk: The Role of Information Asymmetry and 
Bank Regulations 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we examine the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
risk based on the asymmetric information between banks and borrowers. However, risk, 
especially downside risk or the risk of extreme losses, may arise from the asymmetric 
information between banks and outside investors. It is the ability to make loans that generate 
such asymmetric information between banks and outside investors. When banks make loans, 
they possess private information about borrowers, and the credit quality of borrowers is not 
readily observable and accessible by outside investors. This bank opacity enables corruption 
in lending and gives lending officers incentives to conceal any bad projects or adverse 
operating outcomes for an extended period. Eventually, the unanticipated release of hoarding 
negative information may lead to the risk of extreme losses, namely crash risk. 
Interest in crash risk has been increasing, particularly since the 2008 financial crisis. 
In the onset of the crisis, investors’ lack of confidence and fear of further decreases in prices 
have been identified among the various culprits behind the sharp price declines (Kim et al. 
2013). Crash risk is an essential characteristic of return distribution and captures asymmetry 
in risk, especially downside risk or extreme negative return. Thus, it is important for 
portfolio theories, asset-pricing and option-pricing models (Kim et al. 2014; Kim & Zhang 
2015). Unlike the risks from symmetric volatilities, the risk of extreme losses, or crash risk, 
cannot be reduced through portfolio diversification (Mitton & Vorkink 2007; Barberis & 
Huang 2008; Sunder 2010; Kim et al. 2011b; Conrad et al. 2013). 
Several mechanisms have been identified in the literature as the source of crash risk. 
These mechanisms are referred to leverage effects (Black 1976; Christie 1982), investor 
heterogeneity (Romer 1993; Hong & Stein 2003) and volatility feedback effects (French et 
al. 1987; Campbell & Hentschel 1992). Another factor that increasingly captures much of 
attention in the crash risk literature is the information opacity that provides corporate 
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managers incentives to conceal bad news (negative information) from outside investors (Jin 
& Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009). This information theory requires neither disagreement 
among investors nor time variation in risk premia (Hutton et al. 2009). 
A wide range of incentives, such as compensation contracts, career concerns, and 
empire building, motivate corporate insiders to hide unfavorable outcome from their poor 
performance (Ball 2009; Kothari et al. 2009). If an insider conceals or hoards bad news 
(negative information) for an extended period, the firm’s share price may be overvalued, 
creating a bubble. When the bad news accumulates and reaches its upper limit that can no 
longer be absorbed, that bad news will be suddenly released to the stock market all at once; 
as a consequence, the bubble bursts and a stock market crash (Jin & Myers 2006; Hutton et 
al. 2009). More importantly, hiding bad news about a firm prevents investors and board of 
directors to take an early action to correct or liquidate bad projects. As a consequence, 
unprofitable projects are kept alive and their poor performances are piled up over time until 
a collapse of asset price occurs (Bleck & Liu 2007).  
As suggested by Hertzberg et al. (2010), the incentive of bad news hoarding inside 
banks is due to a loan officer’s career concern. This poses a principle-agent problem inside 
banks that may lead to mistakenly unintentional communication toward outside investors. 
Specifically, due to career concern, a loan officer (agent) tends to hide information about 
their assigned borrower’s repayment prospect that reflects poorly on their own performance. 
This hidden negative information eventually prevents investors and the board of directors 
from taking timely abandonment actions or discerning negative net present value (NPV) 
projects at an early stage (Bleck & Liu 2007). 
Due to potentially bad news hoarding behaviors, we argue that credit information 
sharing among banks about their borrowers’ creditworthiness will discourage bank loan 
officers to engage in bad news hoarding behaviors and subsequently lead to a reduction in 
stock price crash risk. We base on our prediction on these following reasons. First, credit 
information sharing helps to monitor loan officers and to prevent corruption in lending. 
Second, sharing of borrowers from one bank will be beneficial to another bank’s manager 
validating internal risk ratings and will prevent loan officers from being bias in their reports 
about borrowers. Third, credit information sharing improves comparability that discourages 
bad news hoarding within banks. Thus, more credit information sharing can improve bank 
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transparency and help to curb bad news hoarding activities of loan officers. Consequently, 
the perception of investors about banks’ true underlying performance is improved and the 
risk of stock price crash is suppressed. How, and to what extent, credit information sharing 
among banks helps reducing crash risk is an empirical question. 
The impact of credit information sharing may also depend on the transparency of the 
information environment. In an environment with a greater level of information 
transparency, bank loan officers have less ability to conceal negative information about 
borrowers as more information is assessable to both investors and loan managers. When the 
information environment is more transparent, the impact of credit information sharing on 
crash risk should then be less pronounced. Thus, like the previous two chapters, we also 
examine the impact of information asymmetry on the relationship between credit 
information sharing and crash risk (see figure 4-1). 
 Furthermore, a banking industry is known to be heavily regulated by regulators and 
authorities because they play an essential role in channeling savings to the most productive 
investment projects and thereby enhance the performance of economies (Barth et al. 2004; 
Levine 2004, 2005). Regulation and supervision are considered as an additional external 
governance force that acts macro-economically at the banking industry level and micro-
economically at the individual bank level (Barth et al. 2006; Beck et al. 2006b; De Andres 
& Vallelado 2008). When the banking regulatory environments are strict, banks are less 
likely to have enormous discretion to act in their own interests rather than in the interests of 
shareholders and debt holders. Thus, the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk 
may depend on the strictness of banking regulatory environments (see figure 4-2). 
For our empirical investigation, we use a cross-country sample of international bank-
level data during 2005 to 2013. Following prior literature on stock price crash risk (Chen et 
al. 2001; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011b, a; An et al. 2015), we measure the crash risk 
of individual banks by the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns and the 
asymmetric volatility of negative and positive stock returns. Crash risk captures return 
skewness (the third moment of stock return), which is distinct from measures studied in prior 
research, such as the average return (the first moment) and the variance of returns (the second 
moment). 
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The results indicate that credit information sharing through public credit registries 
reduces bank-specific stock price crash risk, whereas the depth of credit information sharing 
and information sharing through private credit bureaus have no significant effect on crash 
risk. These findings show that banks in a country with more credit information sharing 
through public credit registries are less likely to experience crash risk. These findings are 
consistent with our conjecture that borrower information sharing may prevent banks’ loan 
officers from hiding bad news that could lead to a future stock price crash. The insignificance 
of information sharing through private credit bureaus on crash risk suggests that the 
voluntary exchange of credit information among banks may not be sufficient to prevent bad 
news hoarding. Banks may self-select themselves into sharing credit information and may 
share only information that makes them better off. Moreover, private credit bureaus are not 
compulsory and less regulated than the public credit registries (Majnoni et al. 2004). 
Therefore, opaque banks may not join the credit bureaus to share borrower information in 
the first place. 
Furthermore, we proxy the level of information transparency environment by the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS and find that the impact of credit information sharing on crash 
risk is less pronounced with more transparent information environment. With regards to 
banking regulatory environments, we analyze three aspects of bank regulations related to the 
three pillars of the Basel Accords, namely capital adequacy, official supervisory power and 
market discipline. We find that the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk is more 
pronounced with less stringent capital requirements, low supervisory power and low degree 
of private monitoring. These findings suggest that credit information sharing is more useful 
in reducing crash risk when the banking regulatory environments are weak. Overall, our 
results are robust to an alternative measure of crash risk, additional controls, subsample 
analysis and potential endogeneity. 
Our research in this chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, our study 
adds to the growing literature on banks’ credit information sharing and its economic 
consequences. As discussed earlier, prior works in this area has studied the impact of credit 
information sharing on enhanced credit availability (Pagano & Jappelli 1993; Padilla & 
Pagano 1997; Djankov et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2009), in lowering cost of credit (Brown et 
al. 2009), in reducing borrower-default rate (Jappelli & Pagano 2002), in reducing bank-
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lending corruption (Barth et al. 2009), in reducing bank risk (Houston et al. 2010) & banking 
crisis (Büyükkarabacak & Valev 2012), in increasing industrial growth (Houston et al. 2010) 
and  in enhancing job growth (Ayyagari et al. 2016). We add to the literature by investigating 
the role of credit information sharing in reducing bank-specific stock price crash risk, which 
captures asymmetry in risk or the third moment of the stock return distribution. This role is 
distinct from the effect of credit information sharing on stock return performance (first 
moment) or firm risk (second moment) documented in prior studies. Thus, our findings 
broaden the understanding of the economic consequences of credit information sharing on 
banks and investors. 
Second, our research contributes to the emerging literature that attempts to forecast 
future stock price crash risk (Chen et al. 2001; Hong & Stein 2003; Jin & Myers 2006; 
Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011b, a; Kim et al. 2014; Kim & Zhang 2015). The literature 
on crash risk has captured much attention from both the investment community and 
academic researchers since the stock market collapse of 2001-2002 and 2008-2009. We 
complement prior studies on crash risk by examining a new factor that mitigates future stock 
price crash risk. By examining crash risk, our study will be beneficial to firms, shareholders 
and investors who might want to manage tail risk in the stock market and incorporate crash 
risk in their portfolio and risk management decisions (Harvey & Siddique 2000; Chen et al. 
2001). 
In summary, this chapter attempts to answer these following questions, which are 
graphically displayed in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2: 
1. How, and to what extent, credit information sharing affects bank-
specific stock price crash risk? 
2. How, and to what extent, information asymmetry (as measured by 
IFRS adoption and BDI) and bank regulations & supervision affect 
the relationship between credit information sharing and bank-
specific stock price crash risk? 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature and outlines hypotheses development. Section 3 describes data and methodology. 
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Section 4 discusses the empirical results, the robustness tests, and the additional tests. 
Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
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4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Stock Price Crash Risk 
It has been well documented that the distribution of stock returns exhibits negative 
skewness; that is, large negative stock returns (or stock price crashes) are more common 
than large positive stock price movements (French et al. 1987; Campbell & Hentschel 1992; 
Bekaert & Wu 2000; Chen et al. 2001; Hong & Stein 2003). Following Chen et al. (2001) 
and Hutton et al. (2009), we define crash risk as a negative skewness of firm-specific weekly 
return distribution.  
Several mechanisms could initiate crash risk or, more generally, negative skewness 
in returns. Perhaps the most venerable theory is based on leverage effects (Black 1976; 
Christie 1982), whereby a drop in prices raises operating and financial leverage, and hence 
the volatility of subsequent returns. However, it appears that leverage effects are not of 
sufficient quantitative importance to explain the data (Schwert 1989; Bekaert & Wu 2000). 
This is especially true if one is interested in asymmetries at a relatively high frequency, e.g., 
in daily data. To explain these, one has to argue that intraday changes in leverage have a 
large impact on volatility – that a drop in prices on Monday morning leads to a large increase 
in leverage and hence in volatility by Monday afternoon so that overall, the return for the 
full day Monday is negatively skewed. Another explanation for asymmetries in stock market 
returns comes from stochastic bubble models of the sort pioneered by Blanchard and Watson 
(1982). The asymmetry here is due to the popping of the bubble – a low-probability event 
that produces large negative returns. 
Investor heterogeneity is another source of existence of negative asymmetries in 
market returns. For instance, as in the paper by Romer (1993), in the absence of new 
fundamental information and irrationality, the trading among investors who have different 
opinions could reveal the private signals of others and move prices. This process, combined 
with short sale constraints, discloses an asymmetry in which market declines differentially 
reveal the private signals of relatively pessimistic investors (Hong & Stein 2003). Such 
revelation could lead other investors to downgrade their assessments of a firm’s prospects, 
thereby reinforcing the decline. Motivated by difference-of-opinion, Chen et al. (2001) 
examine what factors determine the negative skewness in the daily returns of individual 
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stocks and conclude that past returns and recent deviation of turnover are the most 
significant. 
Volatility feedback effects could also be the cause of negative skewness (French et 
al. 1987; Campbell & Hentschel 1992). For example, big price movements could cause 
investors to reassess market volatility and increase required risk premia. When a large piece 
of good news arrives, this signals that market volatility has increased, so the direct positive 
effects of the good news is partially offset by an increase in the risk premium. In contrast, 
when the bad news arrives, the direct effects and the effect of the risk-premium now go in 
the same direction. Thus, the impact of the news is amplified with the bad news. 
Another factor, which is the focus of this chapter, that appear in the literature as an 
important predictor of stock price crash risk is the managerial incentives to conceal bad 
corporate news from outside investors (Jin & Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Kothari et al. 
2009). This growing body of research focuses on the significant positive relationship 
between crash risk and the consequence of managerial concealing bad news as long as 
possible (i.e. bad news hoarding behaviors). In a nutshell, managers have an incentive to 
conceal and accumulate bad news due to career and compensation concerns; however, when 
the accumulation of bad news eventually reaches its upper limit, all accumulated bad news 
suddenly becomes publicly available resulting in a large decline in a stock price, namely a 
stock price crash (Jin & Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009). 
The linkage between managerial tendency to hoard bad news and stock price crash 
risk starts with the theoretical analysis by Jin and Myers (2006). This model does not rely 
on the disagreement among investors or time variation in risk-premia. Instead, the model is 
based on the firm’s extreme information asymmetry. Particularly, firms’ managers have 
control at least a portion of the public access to the firm’s fundamental information through 
disclosure about their firms’ operations as well as their firms’ asset values (Basu 1997; 
Kothari et al. 2009). Managers, in such firms, due to career concerns and incentives arising 
from compensation contracts, may exploit information asymmetries by concealing negative 
information and engaging in short-sighted price maximization to better serve their own 
interests (Stein 1989; Kothari et al. 2009; Andreou et al. 2015). 
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Career concern may motivate managers to work hard and generate good performance 
(Holmstrom 1982; Holmström 1999); however, career concerns may also motivate managers 
to conceal bad news and gamble that subsequent events will turn in their favor, enabling 
them to bury the bad news (Kothari et al. 2009). As defined broadly by Kothari et al. (2009), 
managers’ career concerns include the impact of disclosure on current monetary incentives 
such as stock/option-based incentives and bonus plans, as well as the long-horizon effects 
of disclosures on promotion, employment opportunities, and potential termination. 
Therefore, if their compensation links to their earnings performance, they tend to hide any 
information that could negatively affect their earnings and, hence, compensation (Basu 
1997; Kothari et al. 2009). Consistent with the view that managers tend to conceal bad news, 
the survey from Graham et al. (2005) suggests that managers with bad news tend to delay 
disclosure more than do those with good news. Kothari et al. (2009) also contend that 
managers will announce good news immediately to investors; however, they will act 
strategically towards bad news by weighing the cost and benefits before disclosing such bad 
news. 
There are various ways that managers can engage in bad news hoarding behaviors. 
Kothari et al. (2009) argue that managers have an incentive to stockpile bad news by 
overstating financial statement. Focusing on dividend changes and management earnings 
forecasts, they provide evidence that managers delay the release of bad news to investors. 
Furthermore, managers’ short-termist behavior may involve the manipulation of 
nonfinancial information. Managers can pursue suboptimal investment decision that caters 
to prevailing market sentiment and to support the pretense of strong investment opportunities 
(Bebchuk & Stole 1993; McNichols & Stubben 2008; Kedia & Philippon 2009; Benmelech 
et al. 2010). For instance, in the period of overstated earnings, managers overinvest in 
property, plant, and equipment (McNichols & Stubben 2008). In addition, firms may involve 
in too excessive hiring and investing during periods of inflated performance (Kedia & 
Philippon 2009). In the theoretical model of Benmelech et al. (2010), after the slowdown of 
the growth rate, suboptimal investment decision leads to undercapitalization and finally 
results in stock price crash. In addition, Ball (2001) and Ball (2009) argues that nonfinancial 
motives, such as empire building and maintaining the esteem of one’s peers, also motivate 
managers to hide bad performance. Managers can build up their empire by pretending to 
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have valuable investment opportunities, which is, in turn, masked by presenting the firm’s 
good performance (Xu et al. 2014). 
Anecdotal evidence during the past 2 decades also highlights the issue of concealing 
and hoarding bad news. According to Powers et al. (2002), Enron set up off-balance-sheet 
Special Purpose Vehicles to hide assets that were losing money until accumulated losses 
were no longer sustainable. Arthur Anderson was also accused of destroying documentation 
related to its audit of Enron (Abdel-Khalik 2016). According to Beresford et al. (2003), 
WorldCom used fraudulent accounting methods to mask a declining earnings trend until the 
accounting data were no longer deemed realistic. According to Schapiro (2010), New 
Century failed to disclosure dramatic increases in early default rates, loan repurchases, and 
pending loan repurchase requests until this was no longer sustainable with the collapse of 
the subprime mortgage business. Lakonishok et al. (1991) show that pension fund managers, 
by “window dress” their portfolio, tend to oversell losing stocks (stocks that have performed 
poorly) before annual evaluation. Similarly, Musto (1999) show that retail money market 
fund managers switch to safer investment around disclosure. The tendency to hide bad news 
may involve issue outside finance. For instance, police downgrade offense classifications to 
understate crime incidence (Seidman & Couzens 1974), school teachers cheat on 
standardized tests to improve student scores (Jacob & Levitt 2003; Levitt & Dubner 2005), 
etc. 
As a consequence, the accumulation of bad news within firms is the culprit behind 
the occurrence of the stock price crash risk. The managerial tendency to conceal, delay or 
accumulate the announcement of bad news leads to bad news being withheld within the firm. 
Eventually, the accumulation of bad news reaches a certain threshold at which it becomes 
too costly or impossible for managers to continue withholding the bad news and the resulting 
negative cash flows eventually materialize (Jin & Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Kothari 
et al. 2009). The consequence of the sudden release of all accumulated hidden bad news to 
the public results in a large negative price decline (share-price collapse), that is, a significant 
stock price crash (Jin & Myers 2006; Bleck & Liu 2007; Hutton et al. 2009; Benmelech et 
al. 2010; Callen & Fang 2013). This crash refers to a large negative outlier in the distribution 
of returns generating long left tails in the distribution of stock return (Chen et al. 2001; Hong 
& Stein 2003). 
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Bleck and Liu (2007) argue that the withholding of bad news prevents investors and 
the board of directors from discriminating bad projects (with negative net present value) 
from good ones and, therefore, prevent them from liquidating bad projects promptly or 
forcing managers to take timely actions at the early stage. The hiding of bad news also allows 
firms with aggressive accounting to keep bad projects for a longer period, compared to firms 
with conservative accounting (Francis & Martin 2010; Ahmed & Duellman 2011). As a 
result, unprofitable projects are kept alive and poor performance accumulates over time until 
an asset price crash (Bleck & Liu 2007; Kim et al. 2011b). 
There are several prior studies supporting the consequence of managerial tendency 
to withhold bad news on stock price crash risk. Those studies are quite recent. The first set 
of evidence shows that stock price crash risk increases with financial accounting opacity, 
corporate tax avoidance, executive-equity incentive and excess perks. Using international 
data, Jin and Myers (2006) find that country-level crash risk is positively associated with 
country-level financial reporting opacity. Corroborating Jin and Myers (2006), Hutton et al. 
(2009) employ US firm-level data and find that crash risk is positively related to financial 
reporting opacity, as measured by discretional accruals (earnings management measure). In 
line with Hutton et al. (2009), Kim and Zhang (2014) and DeFond et al. (2014) further 
document that the opaqueness of financial reports is associated with future stock price crash 
risk. Particularly, Kim and Zhang (2014) show that, besides discretional accruals, the 
occurrence of financial statement restatements and the presence of auditor-attested material 
internal control weakness increase crash risk. On the other hand, DeFond et al. (2014) use a 
more comprehensive measure of financial reporting transparency than discretionary accruals 
and find that increased financial transparency after the adoption of IFRS decreases crash risk 
among non-financial firms. 
In addition, Kim et al. (2011b) show the positive association between crash risk and 
tax avoidance. They argue that managers hide news through complex tax shelters to extract 
private benefits at the expense of shareholders, which then leads to an unexpected stock 
crash once all the bad news is unveiled. Moreover, Kim et al. (2011a) find that the chief 
financial officer’s (CFO) option incentive, as measured by the sensitivity of the option 
portfolio value to stock price, is positively related to the firm’s future stock price crash risk. 
They argue that stock options-based compensation induces managers to behave short-termist 
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so they have an incentive to board bad news to inflate current share price at the expense of 
long-term firm-value. In a context of China, Xu et al. (2014) find that excess perks provide 
executives an incentive to hide bad news for extended periods so that they can continue to 
collect their perks and thus their firms are prone to crash risk. 
In contrary, the second set of evidence finds that crash risk decreases with dedicated 
institutional investors’ ownership, corporate social responsibility performance, accounting 
conservatism, high levels of religiosity and increased financial statement comparability. By 
testing the two competing view of the roles of institutional investors’ ownership monitoring 
versus short-termism on managerial bad news hoarding activities, An and Zhang (2013) and 
Callen and Fang (2013) find that US firms’ crash risk decreases with dedicated & stable 
institutional investors’ ownership, which has a strong monitoring incentive, a large 
stakeholding and a long investment horizon. However, crash risk increases with transient 
institutional investors’ ownership due to weaker monitoring, smaller holdings, and short-
termism. Consistent with An and Zhang (2013) and Callen and Fang (2013), Chauhan et al. 
(2015) provide similar results for Indian firms. A few studies have explored the role of 
corporate social responsibility on crash risk but have found contradicting results. Corporate 
social responsibility has reduced the crash risk for firms in the US (Kim et al. 2014) and 
Taiwan (Lee & Lee 2016). However, it has no effect on reducing crash risk of Japanese firms 
(Jie & Nakajima 2014). 
Moreover, Kim and Zhang (2015) find that the timelier recognition of bad news as 
losses than of good news as gains (or conditional conservatism) reduces crash risk. In 
addition to Kim and Zhang (2015), Kousenidis et al. (2014) provide evidence that not only 
conditional conservatism that reduces crash risk but also unconditional conservatism, which 
is news-independent. By examining the view that short sellers are sophisticated investors 
who are able to identify bad news hoarding by managers (i.e. firms) whose stock they short 
in anticipation of price crashes, Callen and Fang (2015b) find robust evidence that short 
selling is significantly related to crash risk. In another paper by Callen and Fang (2015a), 
they suggest the view that religion, as a set of social norms, could help limiting managerial 
bad news hoarding activities. To be specific, they find that firms located in the US countries 
who headquartered in countries with high levels of religiosity experience low levels of crash 
risk. 
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Kim et al. (2016) focus on the benefit of financial statement comparability based on 
the study of De Franco et al. (2011) and argue that financial statement comparability reduces 
managers’ incentives and ability to hoard bad news because investors can obtain some of the 
undisclosed bad news of a firm from analyzing or inferring from its comparable peer firms. 
Empirically, they find evidence that crash risk decreases with improved comparable 
financial statements. 
In contrast to prior crash risk literature that focus upon a single governance 
mechanism (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a; An & Zhang 2013; Callen & Fang 2013; 
Kim & Zhang 2015), Andreou et al. (2015) undertake a comprehensive investigation using 
a board set of governance attributes in order to measure the overall quality of a firm’s 
governance mechanisms in association with a firm’s propensity to stock price crash. Of all 
4 central governance mechanisms, they find that ownership structure and accounting opacity 
are the first and second most significant factor, respectively, in affecting the crash risk. In 
contrast, board structure & processes and managerial incentives explain very little a firm’s 
tendency to stock price crash. By further analyzing each individual 21 attributes, they show 
that crash risk increases with transient institutional ownership (similar to An and Zhang 
(2013), Callen and Fang (2013) and Chauhan et al. (2015)), CEO stock-option incentive 
(similar to Kim et al. (2011a)) and the proportion of outside director that hold equity in the 
company; whereas, crash risk decreases with insiders’ ownership, the level of accounting 
conservatism in financial reports (similar to Kim and Zhang (2015)), the size of the board 
and the presence of corporate governance policy in the company’s mandate. 
4.2.2 Credit Information Sharing and Stock Price Crash Risk 
Like nonfinancial firms, a bank’s corporate governance is no different. Banks are 
firms with debt holders, shareholders board of directors, etc. One can view the governance 
of banks in a similar way as the governance of the automobile companies, pharmaceutical 
companies, etc. Due to banks’ similarity toward nonfinancial firms, when a bank is less 
transparent, its manager (like any other managers) has an incentive to stockpile bad news 
due to career concerns. There is a limit to which bad news can be hidden and accumulated 
within the firm. When the hidden bad news accumulated over time reaches its threshold, it 
is released all at once, resulting in a stock price crash (Jin & Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009). 
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 However, banks are generally less transparent than nonfinancial firms (Ross 1989; 
Levine 2004). Evidence from Furfine (2001) suggests that the problem of information 
asymmetry is common in all sectors but it is larger in a banking sector. It is the ability of 
banks to make loans and their trading assets that make them more opaque than nonfinancial 
firms (Morgan 2002; Flannery et al. 2004). The quality of loan is not readily observable and 
can even be hidden for a long period of time because banks possess information relating to 
the credit quality of the borrowers (a borrower’s creditworthiness) as well as the 
characteristics of the loan contracts that is not accessible by outside investors (Levine 2004). 
Moreover, in the banking sector, their assets are inherently opaque and difficult to value by 
outside investors (Ross 1989; Morgan 2002; Cheng et al. 2011; Gorton 2013; Andreou et al. 
2015). Banks can also modify the risk composition of their assets more quickly compared to 
nonfinancial firms and they can hide problems by extending loans to clients that cannot 
service previous debt obligations (Levine 2004). 
 Thus, the source of bank’s opacity can be found in the loan quality and its allocation 
(Morgan 2002; Levine 2003; Flannery et al. 2004). In this sense, banks’ transparency may 
improve with more credit information sharing among banks about their borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. Enhanced transparency then discourages bad news hoardings within 
banks. However, whether or not sharing information among banks about borrowers enhances 
banks’ transparency and helps to curb bad news hoarding behaviors within banks and 
subsequently reduces stock price crash risk is an empirical question. 
 Previous studies link loan officers’ bad news hoarding behaviors to their career 
concern. Hertzberg et al. (2010) show that the incentive of bad news hoarding inside banks 
is due to a loan officer’s career concern. This poses a principle-agent problem inside banks 
that may lead to mistakenly unintentional communication toward outside investors. Due to 
career concern, a loan officer (agent) tends to hide information that reflects poorly on their 
own performance. That is a loan officer has an incentive to hide bad news about their 
assigned borrower’s repayment prospect (Hertzberg et al. 2010). This hidden incentive is no 
different from the incentive taken by an employee in nonfinancial firms. 
 In a lending process, a loan officer performs a dual role, active monitoring, and 
passive monitoring. The active monitoring states that the role of a loan officer is to manage 
the relationship with a firm so as to maintain high repayment prospects. Besides, the active 
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monitoring, the passive monitoring states that a loan officer is also responsible for obtaining 
and reporting information about the firm’s repayment prospects. Loan officers make lending 
recommendations based on their assessment of each firm’s creditworthiness and 
communicate their assessment by internally assigning risk ratings. This role of passive 
monitoring allows a loan officer to hide bad news and suppress unfavorable information 
about repayment prospects because it will reflect poorly on how she has performed as an 
active monitor (Hertzberg et al. 2010). For instance, loan officers can assign lower-than-
reality default probability for their assigned borrowers when they are actually more likely to 
default. 
 Hertzberg et al. (2010) suggest that there is a mechanism in which it can prevent loan 
officers from withholding bad news due to career concerns. They show evidence that a 
rotation policy can mitigate the agency problem in communication between loan officers 
and their managers by temporarily separating the active and passive monitoring. A firm will 
be reassigned to a different loan officer at the end of the rotation period23 of firm-loan officer 
relationship. Their results show that a loan officer (agent) has reduced incentives to suppress 
bad news about his or her assigned borrowers when his or her relationship manager 
(principle) can compare the officer’s report with that issued by the successor. Also, when 
the time of rotation comes, reports issued by loan officers are more accurate, more 
informative internal risk ratings (more predictive power of a borrower’s creditworthiness) 
and contains more bad news about borrowers’ repayment prospects. 
 The rotation policy is effective because the new loan officer will have an incentive 
to report bad news immediately to demonstrate their early-bad-news-detecting ability and to 
avoid bad news that can reflect poorly upon his or her future performance record (Hertzberg 
et al. 2010). Moreover, loan officers who fail to report bad news and are exposed by their 
successor may go on to manage the smaller lending portfolio as one of punishment schemes. 
Thus, the ex-ante threat of being uncovered by a newly loan officer will reduce the incentive 
of incumbent loan officers to withhold bad news and induce incumbent loan officers to 
perform self-reporting bad news, which has the smaller negative impact on their career 
                                                
23 They base on the 3-year loan officer rotation rule from the Argentina branch of a large multinational U.S 
bank to identify the effect of rotation on the reporting behavior of loan officers. 
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prospects. 
 In addition to the rotation policy, we argue that the role of credit information sharing 
can play an important role in constraining loan officers’ discretion and incentives to hoard 
bad news. Due to imperfect information in the lending process, the loan officer has a 
significant amount of discretion in terms of the lending decision, such as loan rates, 
maturities, or type of collateral required, if any. Such amount of discretion creates a room 
for bribery and leads to corruption in lending (Barth et al. 2009). The loan officers could 
have an incentive to request for a bribe to improve his or her income. At the same time, 
borrowers could also have an incentive to bribe the loan officer to seek loans that provide 
better terms, such as longer maturities, lower loan rates, or loans without collateral. 
Supporting the role of credit information sharing on monitoring loan officers, Barth et al. 
(2009) argue that credit information sharing can reduce lending corruption by lowering the 
degree of discretion of loan officers that can be exercised in evaluating loan applicants and 
improving the monitoring of loan officers.  Thus, information sharing may also curb loan 
officers’ tendency to conceal bad news to their superiors. 
 Moreover, relationship managers can gain access to information shared on a credit 
bureau/registry to partly validate the internal risk ratings assigned by loan officers and ensure 
that the information content from reports issued by loan officers is less bias. Thus, higher 
extensiveness of credit information sharing system improves the validation of internal risk 
ratings by allowing managers to compare them with external risk ratings assigned to the 
same borrowers by other banks. 
 In addition, information sharing among banks about their borrowers may enhance 
comparability, which helps discourage loan officers from being bias in his or her report. 
Recent literature shows that financial statement comparability reduces the cost of acquiring 
and processing information and raises the quality of financial information (De Franco et al. 
2011; Barth et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2013)24. Supporting the effect of financial statement 
                                                
24 For instance, Comparability facilities transfer of information across comparable firms such that their 
economic similarity and differences can be inferred smartly (De Franco et al. 2011). Another example, the 
improvement of financial statement comparability helps investors in understanding and evaluating firm 
performance because less judgmental calculations with accounting numbers and fewer adjustment are 
required when comparing a firm’s performance with that of its peers (Kim et al. 2013). 
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comparability on firms’ bad news hoardings, Kim et al. (2016) argue that investors gain a 
better understanding of a performance of a firm and also obtain some of the bad news by 
inferring the performance and/or disclosure of the firm’s comparable peers. Specifically, 
they examine whether financial statement comparability predicts crash risk and find that 
comparability reduces firms’ future crash risk. 
 From the comparability literature, we can form two arguments. First, we argue that 
credit information sharing can reduce the tendency of loan officers to hide bad news by 
allowing their superiors to gain more borrowers’ information and able to compare with their 
peers. Second, if we consider banks as investors, credit information sharing can also improve 
comparability and allow each of them to gain more knowledge about the repayment prospect 
of other banks’ borrowers (or default risk). Therefore, credit information sharing does not 
only limit loan officers’ bad news hoarding behaviors but also all banks’ managers.   
 Taken together, we argue that the extensive availability and better scope of credit 
information sharing among banks will prevent banks, especially banks’ loan officer, from 
withholding bad news due to the following rationales. First, credit information sharing help 
monitoring loan officers and preventing corruption in lending. Second, the sharing of 
borrowers from one bank will be beneficial to another bank’s manager validating internal 
risk ratings and preventing loan officers from being bias in their reports about borrowers. 
Third, credit information sharing improves comparability that discourages bad news 
hoarding within banks. Thus, more credit information sharing reduces bad news hoarding 
activities within banks and therefore improve investors’ perception about banks’ true 
underlying performance. In other words, banks in a country with more credit information 
sharing through either private credit bureau or public credit registry is less likely to 
experience crash risk. 
 Based on the arguments that bad news withholding creates stock price crash risk and 
that the extensiveness of credit information sharing exerts prevention of bad news hoarding 
behaviors within banks, we hypothesize that more credit information sharing is expected to 
reduce bank-specific stock price crash risk. 
Hypothesis 1: Credit information sharing is expected to reduce bank-specific stock price 
crash risk. 
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4.2.3 Credit Information Sharing, Information Asymmetry and Stock Price Crash 
Risk 
 As documented in the previous section, the lack of bank’s transparency motivates 
managerial incentive to hoard bad news leading to stock price crash risk. Nevertheless, in 
countries with a more transparent information environment, both financial and non-financial 
firm-level information tends to be released in a more accurate and timely manner. In an 
environment with less transparent information environment, credit information sharing 
among banks should be particularly more useful for banks, since bank relationship managers 
as well as investors may not be able to obtain much information directly from their 
borrowers/firms of interest. In such an environment, bank loan officers have more ability to 
hoard bad news resulting in the misperception of investors toward the true underlying 
performance of banks. Thus, we expect that the benefits of credit information sharing on 
stock price crash risk are likely to be more (less) pronounced in less (more) transparent 
information environment. To test our prediction, we employ two variables to proxy for the 
overall country-level information environment, which have been used earlier in this thesis. 
These proxies are International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption and the 
Business Extent of Disclosure index (BDI). 
 According to our first variable, we use a country-level mandatory adoption of IFRS 
to proxy for a transparency of information environment. Previous research find that IFRS 
adoption has favorable consequences on capital market, including increasing liquidity, 
reducing the cost of capital, increasing firm’s information environments, and improve 
financial reporting comparability across firms (Daske et al. 2008; Li 2010; Byard et al. 2011; 
DeFond et al. 2011; Tan et al. 2011). Proponents of IFRS adoption argue that increased 
reporting transparency enables investors to more easily compare financial performance 
across different jurisdictions (Daske et al. 2008; DeFond et al. 2014). Thus, IFRS adoption 
is expected to enhance the transparency of information environment primarily through 
additional disclosure and improved comparability, which in turn expected to increase overall 
transparency. 
 Since firms (borrowers) are more transparent and easily comparable to their peers 
when IFRS adoption is mandatory in a country, much more information about the firms can 
be discovered directly. The credit bureaus that shared among banks are thus less useful to 
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the relationship managers and the bank loan officers have less ability to hide bad news about 
firms’ prospect. In this regard, we expect that IFRS adoption would improve firms’ 
transparency and comparability which could in turn affect the relationship between credit 
information sharing and stock price crash risk. Specifically, we hypothesize that the impact 
of credit information sharing on bank-specific stock price crash risk is less pronounced in 
countries with mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 Second, we use another country-level index to proxy for the information 
environment. That measurement is BDI taken from the World Bank’s Doing Business. This 
index measures the extent to which investors are protected through disclosure of ownership 
and financial information (World Bank’s Doing Business 2016). Particularly, BDI measures 
how well are minority shareholders protected from disclosure of transactions that involve 
conflicts of interests by controlling shareholders. The index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher 
value indicating more disclosure of ownership and financial information. When the level of 
BDI is low, the information environment is likely to be less transparent and the controlling 
shareholders is likely to expropriate minority shareholders and creditors. 
 In general, expropriation is related to the agency problem described by Jensen and 
Meckling (1979), who focus on the consumption of “Perk” by managers and other types of 
empire building. When the transaction involving conflict of interest is not transparent, the 
insiders have an incentive and ability to expropriate the profits of the firm to benefit 
themselves rather than return the money to the outside investors (La Porta et al. 2000). 
Expropriation can take various forms. For example, the profits are simply stolen by the 
insiders. In some circumstance, the insiders may sell the assets, the output, or the additional 
securities in the firm they control (Seller) to another firm they own (Buyer) at below market 
prices. Though often legal, such asset stripping25, investor dilution26, and transfer pricing27 
have largely the same effect as theft (La Porta et al. 2000). In addition, there are some other 
forms of expropriation; for instance, placing possibly unqualified family members in 
                                                
25 The practice of taking over a company in financial difficulties and selling each of its assets separately at a 
profit without regard for the company’s future. 
26 It is when a company issues additional shares, this reduces an existing investor’s proportional ownership in 
that company. 
27 The setting of the price of goods and services sold between controlled (or related) legal entities within the 
enterprise. For example, if a subsidiary company sells goods to a parent company, the cost of those goods 
paid by the parent to the subsidiary is the transfer price. 
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managerial positions, deviating corporate opportunities from the firm, or paying executives 
too much. 
 Thus, with less disclosure of ownership and financial information, banks become less 
transparent and control shareholders are likely to expropriate. Moreover, when banks are 
less transparent, loan officers can report to their boss in a favor of their careers about their 
assigned borrowers’ prospect. Furthermore, the boss of loan officers and investors cannot 
directly obtain much information from borrowers of interest when the overall information 
environment is less transparent; therefore, their knowledge about borrowers relies on the 
reports of loan officers as well as credit bureaus. Taken together, we expect the relationship 
between credit information sharing and stock price crash risk to vary with both the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS and the extent of BDI. Specifically, we hypothesize that the 
relationship between credit information sharing and stock price crash risk is less pronounced 
with mandatory IFRS adoption and high business extent of disclosure index. 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of credit information sharing on bank-specific stock price crash 
risk is expected to be less pronounced when the information environment is more transparent 
(as proxied by IFRS adoption and BDI). 
4.2.4 Credit Information Sharing, Bank Regulations and Stock Price Crash Risk 
 Banks play a major role in the functioning of economic systems (Beck et al. 2000; 
Levine 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2012). Specifically, banks are responsible for 
safeguarding deposits’ rights, guaranteeing the stability of the payment system and reducing 
systemic risk (De Andres & Vallelado 2008). Moreover, they are highly leveraged as they 
take deposits from customers. Due to the nature of the banking business, banks are more 
opaque and complex than other firms (Furfine 2001; Morgan 2002; Flannery et al. 2004; 
Levine 2004). As a result, the poor governance of banks can lead to banking crises crippling 
economies, destabilizing governments and intensifying poverty (Barth et al. 2013b; 
Fernández et al. 2013; Fernández et al. 2016). That is why well-functioning banking systems 
are crucial for economic growth and development (Levine 1997, 2005). Therefore, banks 
are heavily regulated (Levine 2004). 
 Regulation and supervision are considered as an additional external governance force 
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that acts macro-economically at the banking industry level as a whole and micro-
economically at the individual bank level (Ciancanelli & Reyes-Gonzalez 2000; Macey & 
O'hara 2003; Arun & Turner 2004; Barth et al. 2006; Beck et al. 2006b; De Andres & 
Vallelado 2008). If bank managers face sound governance mechanisms, they will be more 
likely to allocate capital efficiently. In contrast, if bank managers enjoy enormous discretion 
to act in their own interests rather than in the interests of shareholders and debt holders, then 
banks will be correspondingly less likely to allocate society’s savings efficiently and may 
have more ability to conceal their bad behaviors. Inefficiency of capital allocation can lead 
to the likelihood of bank failures and thereby curtail corporate finance and economic 
development (Levine 2004). 
 In general, there are two contradicting theoretical views about the effects of bank 
regulation and supervision on corporate governance of banks. Two opposing views point to 
the public interest and private interest. On one hand, according to the “public interest view”, 
the regulators/supervisors act in the interests of the public and regulate banks to enhance 
banking efficiency and eliminate market failures due to market imperfection. Particularly, 
this view suggests that regulators/supervisors have the capabilities to eliminate market 
failures by directly monitoring and regulating banks. By doing so, intense regulation and 
strong supervision can enhance corporate governance of banks, reduce corruption in lending, 
improve the efficiency of capital allocation, encourage competition and hence boost the 
efficiency of banking sectors (Stigler 1971; Beck et al. 2006b). Thus, according to this view, 
banks in a stringent regulatory environment will carefully channel credits to profitable 
investments and there is less opportunity for their loan officers to hide their poor 
performance or any bad news that could lead to crash risk. 
 On the other hand, the “private interest view” argues that regulators/supervisors do 
not maximize social welfare, but they maximize their own welfare and may not have 
incentives to fix market failures (Rossiter et al. 1961; Buchanan & Tullock 1962; Becker 
1983; Shleifer & Vishny 1998; Djankov et al. 2002; Quintyn & Taylor 2003). Their 
regulation and supervision are often used to promote the special interests of the few, not the 
broader public. Therefore, if they have the power to discipline non-compliant banks, then 
they will rather use the regulation and their privileged positions to channel credit to special 
interest groups, such as politically connected firms (Stigler 1971; Becker & Stigler 1974). 
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Under this condition, banks do not allocate based on risk-return criteria but their distribution 
of bank credit is influenced by corruption and political ties. This view suggests that powerful 
supervision and regulation tend to reduce the integrity of lending which leads to more 
lending corruption and increased likelihood of bad news hoarding activities. 
 With these two opposing views, the effectiveness of regulation and supervision 
therefore depends crucially on whether which force dominates the other. The regulations 
will serve as an additional external governance for banks if the public interest views were to 
dominate the private interest views. According to the underlying objective and design of 
bank regulations for improving public welfare, we expect the impact of credit information 
sharing on crash risk to be less pronounced with intense regulation and powerful supervision. 
 Existing theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the effectiveness of bank 
regulation and supervision varies with the type of regulations under study (Barth et al. 2006; 
Barth et al. 2013a; Barth et al. 2013b). Therefore, we separately analyze three aspects of 
bank regulation and supervision related to the three pillars of the Basel Accords, namely 
capital adequacy, official supervisory power and market discipline. The Basel Accords are 
three sets of banking regulations (Basel I, II and III) issued by the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision (BCBS)28, which provides recommendations on banking regulations regarding 
capital risk, market risk, and operational risk. The Basel Accords are established to ensure 
that financial institutions have enough capital on account to meet obligations and absorb 
unexpected losses. 
4.2.4.1 Capital Regulation 
 On the theoretical side, traditional approaches to bank regulation suggest a positive 
impact of capital adequacy on bank performance and efficiency which is being driven by 
reduced moral hazard between shareholders and debt holders (Kim & Santomero 1988; 
Berger et al. 1995; Barth et al. 2006; Allen et al. 2011). Capital can serve as a buffer against 
losses and prevent failure (Allen et al. 2011). Regulation on capital adequacy requires the 
                                                
28 The BCBS was founded in 1974 as a forum for regular cooperation between its member countries on 
banking supervisory matters. The BCBS describes its original aim as the enhancement of "financial stability 
by improving supervisory knowhow and the quality of banking supervision worldwide." Later on, it turned 
its attention to monitoring and ensuring the capital adequacy of banks and the banking system. 
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amount of capital that banks need to set aside for potential risk (Allen & Gale 2000; Allen 
et al. 2011). If bank owners are required to set aside more capital, then the upside gains from 
greater risk-taking would be compensated by the potential downside loss of their capital 
(Kim & Santomero 1988; Berger et al. 1995; Allen et al. 2011). By putting bank equity at 
risk, capital requirements reduce gambling incentives (excessive risk-taking) and promote 
prudent behavior (Hellmann et al. 2000). Thus, capital adequacy regulations are believed to 
play an important role in aligning the incentives of bank owners with depositors and other 
creditors. In particular, a higher capital level can increase shareholders’ incentive to control 
risk and hence improving monitoring incentives (Berger et al. 1995). So, capital ratios 
induce banks to be more careful in lending and involve less risk-taking behaviors, especially 
excessive risk-taking (Keeley & Furlong 1990; Kaufman 1992; Barth et al. 2006; Mehran & 
Thakor 2011). With more stringent capital regulation, banks have an incentive to liquidate 
bad projects promptly and take early actions on bad loans. In comparison, banks with the 
less stringent capital requirement are likely to be less disciplined and tend to involve in more 
lending corruption than those with more capital requirement. Thus, we expect to see the 
impact of credit information sharing on crash risk to be more pronounced for banks in a bank 
regulatory environment with less stringent capital regulation. 
 However, capital regulations might increase banks’ risk-taking behaviors (Koehn & 
Santomero 1980; Buser et al. 1981; Kim & Santomero 1988; Besanko & Kanatas 1996; 
Blum 1999). As argued by Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Buser, Chen, and Kane, (1981), 
if stringent capital requirement reduces a bank’s value, bank owners may have an incentive 
to gamble and pursue riskier investment portfolio to compensate for the loss of utility, 
intensifying conflicts between owners and managers over bank risk taking. Hence, there is 
a no theoretical consensus on the effect of capital requirements on bank tendency to behave 
prudently. Nonetheless, our hypothesis is based on the underlying objective and design of 
capital adequacy regulation that enhances banks’ corporate governance and limit their risk-
taking behaviors. 
Hypothesis 3-A: The impact of credit information sharing on bank-specific stock price crash 
risk is expected to be more pronounced in a banking regulatory environment with less 
stringent capital regulation. 
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4.2.4.2 Official Supervisory Power 
 The Basel Committee, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank stresses the 
importance of supervisory quality and independence in monitoring and disciplining banks 
(Beck et al. 2006b). However, there are conflicting views about the benefits of strong 
supervision. On the one hand, as discussed early, bank supervisors have the incentive and 
expertise to overcome market imperfection. In this regards, some theoretical models argue 
that supervisors need significant powers to prevent banks from engaging in undesirable 
activities and from taking excessive risks, especially in light of the growing complexity of 
banking activities (Stigler 1971; Beck et al. 2006b). Therefore, strong and powerful 
supervisory agency is needed to enhance the bank corporate governance by directly 
monitoring and disciplining. 
 On the other hand, opponents argue that bank supervisors will not focus on 
overcoming market failures but will focus on their private interests/welfare; therefore, giving 
supervisors more power fosters corruption (Rossiter et al. 1961; Buchanan & Tullock 1962; 
Becker 1983; Shleifer & Vishny 1998; Djankov et al. 2002; Quintyn & Taylor 2003). Under 
this view, supervisors can use their power to extract favors from banks in the form of loans, 
bribes or donations for their own benefit or their entourage rather than seeking to improve 
public welfare. Powerful supervisors may also push banks to make a sub-optimal lending 
decision which reduces bank performance and efficiency. Under this condition, banks do not 
allocate loans based on risk-return criteria but the distribution of loans is influenced by 
corruption and political ties. Thus, this view suggests that powerful supervisory agencies 
tend to reduce the integrity of lending that leads to more lending corruption and impedes 
banking efficiency. Rather than focusing on the political influence of supervisors, when there 
is uncertainty about the supervisor’s ability to monitor banks’ asset choice, supervisors may 
pursue self-interest to gain reputation rather than social welfare (Boot & Thakor 1993). As 
argued by Boot and Thakor (1993), a self-interested supervisor may undertake socially sub-
optimal actions that distort banks closure policy and raise the liability of the deposit 
insurance fund leading. Although these two views are contradicted to each other, our 
hypothesis is based on the underlying objective and design of giving supervisors the power 
to improve the public welfare. 
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Hypothesis 3-B: The impact of credit information sharing on bank-specific stock price crash 
risk is expected to be more pronounced in a banking regulatory environment with low 
supervisory power. 
4.2.4.3 Private Monitoring (Market-based monitoring) 
 Private monitoring refers to the disclosure of information to officials, the public and 
specialized entities such as rating agencies and auditors. Promoting market discipline 
recognizes both the public interest view, which encourages the intervention of 
regulators/supervisors to fix market failure and the private interest view, which argue that 
supervisory agencies have an incentive to serve their own interest but not to ease market 
failure. This view of recognition refers to “private empowerment” (Hay & Shleifer 1998). 
As argued in Beck et al. (2006b), bank supervisory policies should focus on inducing banks 
to disclose accurate information to the public in order to enhance the ability and incentives 
of private agents/investors to overcome informational barriers and transaction costs. 
Consequently, private agents/investors can exert effective monitoring and governance over 
banks. 
 Since regulators/supervisors do not have an ownership stake in banks, so they have 
different incentives than private creditors when it comes to monitoring and disciplining 
banks (Barth et al. 2004, 2006). Bank shareholders and creditors have a greater incentive to 
monitor banks than regulators because of their on-going ownership and lending relationships 
(Levine 2005). In addition, banks might use power to excessively pressure politicians to 
influence regulators/supervisors to serve mainly the special interests of the banks (Shleifer 
& Vishny 1998). Thus, the heavy emphasis placed on official supervision of banks is 
questionable and it is important to place a greater reliance on market discipline to promote 
better functioning banks. However, excessively heavy reliance on private monitoring may 
not always be efficient. As argued in (Barth et al. 2004), private monitoring may not be 
effective in countries with a poorly developed capital market and legal system. In addition, 
the complexity of banks, especially in developed countries, may make it difficult for private 
sectors to monitor. In line with the argument above, we expect to see that market monitoring 
would affect the relationship between credit information sharing and stock price crash risk. 
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Hypothesis 3-C: The impact of credit information sharing on bank-specific stock price crash 
risk is expected to be more pronounced in a banking regulatory environment with low degree 
of market monitoring. 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
4.3.1.1 Data Source and Sample 
Our sample covers 1,402 listed banks in 55 countries during the period 2005 – 2013. 
For data in the year 2005, we only use it to construct all explanatory and control variables 
for predicting the dependent variable in the year 2006. We compile data from several 
different sources. To construct crash risk measures, we obtain data on stock return from 
Datastream (Thomson Reuters) and supplement with the Bankscope Database. 
Similar to previous two chapters, we take data on credit information sharing and the 
business extent of disclosure index (BDI) from the World Bank’s Doing Business Database. 
Data on IFRS adoption are taken from the IFRS Foundation website, Deloitte and Simon 
Fraser University in Canada. Other data are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) Database, the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators 
(WGI), the World Bank’s Bank Regulation & Supervision Survey Database, the Deposit 
Insurance Database, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the dataset from Easterly 
(2001), La Porta et al. (1999) and Djankov et al. (2007). Further descriptions and links to 
data sources can be found in Appendix A. 
 
4.3.1.2 Variable Measurement 
4.3.1.2.1 Dependent Variable 
Following Chen et al. (2001) and Hutton et al. (2009), we define crash risk as the 
occurrence of negatively extreme firm-specific weekly returns and the conditional skewness 
of return distribution. Conditional skewness, like mean and median, is an important 
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characteristic of the return distribution. Unlike prior studies that focus on stock performance 
and firm risk, which capture the mean (first moment) and variance (second moment) of 
return distribution, identifying crash risk focuses on conditional skewness, which is the third 
moment of the return distribution. Crash risk captures asymmetry in risk, especially 
downside risk, so it is important for investment decisions and risk management (Chen et al. 
2001; Kim et al. 2014). 
To examine the relationship between credit information sharing and future stock 
price crash risk, we construct two measures of asymmetry in stock-return that are commonly 
used in measuring crash likelihood in the crash risk literature. These variables are a negative 
conditional skewness (NCSKEW) and a Down-to-Up Volatility (DUVOL). They capture 
different aspects of the relative size and magnitude of stock price crash (Andreou et al. 
2015). Prior studies (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011b, a; Kim et al. 2014; An et al. 2015) 
also use these two indicators to measure stock price crash risk. This method ensures that the 
stock price crash risk can reflect firm-specific factors rather than broad market movements. 
To start constructing the two measures of crash risk, we initially need to calculate 
weekly stock returns. We collect the total return index (RI code) from Datastream and deal 
with RI as suggested by Ince and Porter (2006) and other previous studies (Jin & Myers 
2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a; An et al. 2015) on constructing crash risk. Similar 
to their construction, if RI is less than 0.01, then we set RI to be missing because Datastream 
rounds RI to the nearest tenth, which could exaggerate the proportion of zero-return. In 
addition, we delete an observation if the weekly stock return (Ret) is above 200% and 
reverses within one week, and truncate the absolute value of Ret at 0.5 for unusually large 
weekly returns. 
Following the previous literature (Hutton et al. 2009; An et al. 2015), we apply 
standard filters to remove firm-year observations according to the following criteria: 
• If there are fewer than 26 weekly stock returns available in a firm-
year, 
• If a firm is considered as American Depository Receipts (ADRs) or 
Global Depository Receipts (GDRs). 
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• Last, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 Next, we need to estimate the firm-specific weekly returns for each firm and year. 
Using firm-specific returns ensures that our crash risk measures reflect firm-specific factors 
rather than broad market movements (Kim et al. 2014). Specifically, we obtain the firm-
specific weekly return based on the residual return estimated from the expanded market 
model as follows: $",& = (" + *+,"$,,-,& + *#," $..0.,& + 12-,& + *3,"$,,-,&4+ + *5," $..0.,&4+ + 12-,&4++ *6,"$,,-,&4# + *7," $..0.,&4# + 12-,&4# + *8,"$,,-,&9++ *:," $..0.,&9+ + 12-,&9+ + *;,"$,,-,&9# + *+<," $..0.,&9# + 12-,&9#+ =",& 
(4-1) 
Where $",& is the stock return for firm > in week ?, $,,-,& is the local market return for country @ in week ?, $..0.,& is the U.S. market return in week ? (a proxy global market return), and 12-,& is the change in exchange rate for the currency of country @ against the U.S. dollar in 
week ?. We incorporate two lead and lag terms for the local and U.S. market index return to 
allow (correct) for nonsynchronous trading (Dimson 1979). 
 The firm-specific weekly return for firm > in week ?, (A",&), is measured by the 
natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from Equation (4-1), that is, A",& = log	(1 +=",&). We transform in such a way because the residuals (=",&)  from Equation (4-1) are highly 
skewed; as a result of transformation, they become a roughly symmetric distribution, even 
in the tails, which is our greatest concern. This transformation allows us to define crash and 
positive jumps symmetrically. Moreover, using actual returns rather than residuals would 
result in an abundance of crashes during broad market declines and jumps during advances. 
After we obtain firm-specific weekly returns  A",&, then we are able to construct two 
measures of crash risk accordingly. 
 The first crash risk measure is the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific 
weekly returns over a fiscal year (IJKL1A). Specifically, IJKL1A for a given firm in 
each year is calculated by taking the negative of the third moment of firm-specific weekly 
returns for each sample year and dividing (normalizing) it by the standard deviation of firm-
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specific weekly returns raised to the third power (Chen et al. 2001; Kim et al. 2011b). 
Specifically, for each firm > in a year, IJKL1A is computed as follows: 
IJKL1A",& = − N(N − 1)3/# A",&3 (N − 1)(N − 2) A",&# 3/#  (4-2) 
Where A",& is firm-specific weekly return as defined above, and N is the number of weekly 
return observation of year ?. The reason we scale the raw third moment by the standard 
deviation cubed allows for comparisons across stocks with different variances (Chen et al. 
2001); this is an usual way of normalizing skewness statistics (Greene 2003). We put the 
negative sign in front of the third moment in order to show that a higher value of IJKL1A 
indicates higher crash risk i.e. having a more left-skewed distribution. As some option and 
asset pricing applications require future skewness as an input, building a model that predicts 
skewness could therefore contribute to this line of research (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim & 
Zhang 2015). 
 As a robustness test, the second crash risk measure is the down-to-up volatility 
measure of the crash likelihood (QRSTU). For each firm > over a fiscal year, firm-specific 
weekly returns are classified into two groups, “down” and “up”. The first group with 
“Down” weeks consists of the returns that are below the yearly mean and the second group 
with “Up” weeks consists of the returns that are above the yearly mean. The standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns is estimated separately for each of these two 
groups, and the volatility of down-to-up is calculated by taking the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of the standard deviation of the group with “down” weeks to the standard deviation of 
the group with “up” weeks as shown below: 
QRSTU",& = VWX (NY − 1) A"Z,&#[\]^ (N_ − 1) A"`,&#.a  (4-3) 
Where A"Z,& and A"`,& are the firm-specific returns for down-weeks and up-weeks, 
respectively; NY and N_ are the numbers of up- and down- weeks in year ?, respectively. A 
higher value of QRSTU is associated with higher level of crash risk. 
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4.3.1.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
 Credit Information Sharing Proxy 
In this chapter, we also rely on the depth of credit information sharing index 
(Q1bcd&4+) to measure the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available 
through private credit bureaus and public credit registries. The detail of the depth of credit 
information sharing index can be found in Table 4-1. In addition to the depth of credit 
information sharing, we also isolate the impact of private credit bureaus and public credit 
registries due to the differences between private and public credit registries. 
The major difference between private credit bureaus and public credit registries is 
that participation in a public credit registry is compulsory to all banks in a country imposed 
by regulation. Also, public credit registries are managed by the public sector, usually by the 
central bank or banking supervisors. Unlike private credit bureaus, the development of 
public credit registries coincides with the banking regulatory and supervisory motivation 
(Majnoni et al. 2004). Thus, the coverage of public credit registries is usually larger than the 
coverage of private credit bureaus (Jappelli & Pagano 2002). However, although private 
credit bureaus are less comprehensive in coverage, they offer details on individual loans and 
combine credit data with other data sources such as leasing and finance companies, retail 
establishment, courts tax authorities (Miller 2003). In contrast, public credit registries 
provide merely credit data and the data is disseminated in consolidated form, so the 
information about individual loans is not available29. Furthermore, public credit registries 
usually set a minimum loan size and so collect information only on loans in excess of that 
minimum amount (Miller 2003). In addition, the data on public credit registries is only 
collected from banks and, in most cases, historical data are not made available through the 
public credit registries (Miller 2003). Due to these differences, it is worthwhile to examine 
whether private credit bureaus and public credit registries have different impacts on bank-
specific stock price crash risk. 
 To isolate the impact of private credit bureaus and public credit registries, we use the 
                                                
29 The total credit exposure of a borrower is often aggregated due to confidentiality concerns. Also, the 
names of the lending institutions are omitted before the data is distributed to others. 
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coverage of private bureaus (befS&4+) and public registries (bRg&4+) , to proxy for the 
information content of the information agencies. They are taken from the World Bank’s 
Doing Business database. The private bureau coverage is defined as the number of 
individuals and firms listed in a private credit bureau with information on repayment history, 
unpaid debts, or credit outstanding from the past five years scaled by adult population (the 
population age 15 and above according to the WDI database). Similarly, the public registry 
coverage is defined as the number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry 
with information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding from the past 
five years scaled by adult population (the population age 15 and above according to the WDI 
database). 
 Information Environment Proxy 
To proxy for the transparency of information environment, we follow the previous 
two chapters by employing the IFRS dummy and the Business Extent of Disclosure Index 
(BDI). The IFRS dummy is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country (and 
year) mandatorily adopt IFRS and zero otherwise. The value of one indicates that the 
information environment is more transparent. The list of countries with mandatory IFRS 
adoption is in Appendix B. For BDI, we assign a dummy variable equal to 1 for a country 
with a value of BDI lower than the sample 50th percentile and zero for those above the sample 
50th percentile. We name this dummy “LOW_BDI”. Thus, a LOW_BDI whose value equal 
to one (zero) indicates that the information environment is less (more) transparent. More 
detail of the components of BDI can be found in Appendix C. 
 Banking Regulation Variables 
We analyze three aspects of bank regulation related to the three pillars of the Basel 
Accords (Basel I, II, and III). Those pillars are capital adequacy, official supervisory power, 
market discipline. The first variable is Capital Stringency index, which is related to 
regulation on capital adequacy (Pillar 1). This variable is an index measuring the extent of 
both initial and overall capital stringency. It is constructed from several variables that 
indicate whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain 
market value losses from capital adequacy is determined. This variable is constructed by 
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adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the following fourteen 
questions: 
1. Whether the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement is in line with 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision guidelines 
2. Does the minimum ratio varies as a function of an individual bank’s 
credit risk? 
3. Does the minimum ratio varies as a function of an individual bank’s 
market risk? 
4. Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the 
following are deducted from the book value of capital: 
a. Market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? 
b. Unrealized losses in securities portfolios?  
c. Unrealized foreign exchange losses? 
5. What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? (1 if 
the fraction is less than 0.75 and 0 otherwise) 
6. Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities? 
7. Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be 
done with assets other than cash or government securities? 
8. Can initial capital contributions by prospective shareholders be in the 
form of borrowed funds? 
 The capital stringency index ranges from 0 to 10. Lower (higher) index indicates 
lower (higher) capital stringency. We assign a dummy variable equal to 1 for a country with 
a value of capital stringency index lower than the sample 50th percentile and zero for those 
above the sample 50th percentile. We name this dummy LOW_CAPITAL_STR. Thus, a 
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LOW_CAPITAL_STR whose value equal to one (zero) represents a group with low (high) 
capital stringency indices. 
The second variable is Official Supervisory Power index. This variable is an index 
measuring the power of supervisors in direct regulating and monitoring banks in each 
country. In general, powerful official supervisors could improve the governance of banks 
and promote competition (Levine 2003). A strong and independent supervisor would be able 
to prevent managers from engaging in an excessive risk-taking behavior. This variable is 
constructed by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the following 
fourteen questions: 
1. Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external 
auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 
2. Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the 
supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or 
senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 
3. Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for 
negligence? 
4. Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure? 
5. Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 
6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or 
management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential 
losses? 
7. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to 
distribute: 
a. Dividends? 
b. Bonuses? 
c. Management fees? 
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8. Can the supervisory agency legally declare – such that this 
declaration supersedes the rights of bank shareholders – that a bank 
is insolvent? 
9. Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to 
intervene, that is, suspend some or all ownership rights of a problem 
bank? 
10. Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory 
agency or any other government agency do the following: 
a. Supersede shareholder rights? 
b. Remove and replace management? 
c. Remove and replace directors? 
 The supervisory power index ranges from 0 to 14. Lower (higher) index indicates 
lower (higher) supervisory power. We assign a dummy variable equal to 1 for a country with 
a value of supervisor power index lower than the sample 50th percentile and zero for those 
above the sample 50th percentile. We name this dummy LOW_SUPER_POW. Thus, a 
LOW_SUPER_POW whose value equal to one (zero) represents a group with low (high) 
supervisory power indices. 
 The third variable is Private Monitoring Index, which is related to enhanced market 
discipline by promoting higher bank transparency and disclosure requirements. Specifically, 
this index measures the extent of regulation and supervisory policies in shaping the 
incentives and ability of private investors to monitor and exert effective governance over 
banks. This variable is constructed by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each 
one of the following fourteen questions: 
1. Whether bank officials are legally liable if the information disclosure 
is erroneous or misleading? 
2. Whether banks disclosure information such as: 
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a. Consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-bank 
financial subsidiaries? 
b. Off-balance sheet items?  
c. Accrued, though unpaid interest/principal of non-performing 
loan? 
d. Risk management procedures to the public? 
3. Whether banks must be audited by certified international auditors? 
4. Whether the largest ten banks are rated by international rating 
agencies? 
5. Whether the largest ten banks are rated by domestic rating agencies? 
6. Whether subordinated debt is allowable as part of capital? 
7. Whether there is no explicit deposit insurance system and no 
insurance was paid the last time a bank failed? 
 The private monitoring index ranges from 0 to 10. Lower (higher) index indicates 
less (more) private monitoring. We assign a dummy variable equal to 1 for a country with a 
value of private monitoring index lower than the sample 50th percentile and zero for those 
above the sample 50th percentile. We name this dummy LOW_MONITOR. Thus, a 
LOW_MONITOR whose value equal to one (zero) represents a group with low (high) private 
monitoring indices. 
4.3.1.2.3 Control Variables 
In accordance with previous literature, we include several control variables to isolate 
the effect of credit information sharing on crash risk. First, Chen et al. (2001) and Hong and 
Stein (2003) predicts that investor heterogeneity (the difference of opinions among 
investors)  causes greater crash risk. Thus, we control for investor heterogeneity by using 
the detrended stock trading volume (QcReI&4+) as a proxy as in Chen et al. (2001) and 
Hong and Stein (2003). The detrended stock trading volume (a change in stock trading 
volume) is calculated as the average monthly share turnover over the current year minus the 
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average monthly share turnover over the previous year, where monthly share turnover is 
calculated as the monthly share trading volume divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding during the month. Chen et al. (2001) find that firms with high stock turnovers 
are more crash prone. Moreover, we control for stock volatility and past return. The stock 
volatility (Kfhij&4+) is calculated as the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly stock 
returns over the past year. More volatile stocks are more likely to experience future stock 
price crashes (Chen et al. 2001). The past return (e1c&4+) is calculated as the arithmetic 
average of firm-specific weekly stock returns over the past year. This variable is a proxy for 
the level of stock market bubbles. Stocks with high past returns are also more likely to crash 
(Chen et al. 2001). Chen et al. (2001) argue that stocks with high past returns could show 
that a bubble has been building up, so these stocks could undergo a larger price drop when 
prices fall back to fundamentals (the bubble bursts). 
Furthermore, following Hutton et al. (2009), we also include the standard control 
variables. First, we control for bank-size, calculated as the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity in the past year (iS&4+). A positive relationship between firm size and stock 
price crash has been documented in several studies (Harvey & Siddique 2000; Chen et al. 
2001; Hutton et al. 2009). Second, we control for the market-to-book ratio (icgS&4+), 
calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in the past year. 
Glamour or growth stocks (those with high MTBV) are more likely to experience future price 
crashes (Chen et al. 2001; Hutton et al. 2009). Third, we control for financial leverage 
(U1S&4+), calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. A higher leverage ratio 
indicates a higher financial risk, which can result in crash risk. However, high leverage can 
increase profitability and thus reduce crash risk. Hutton et al. (2009) show that financial 
leverage is negatively related to crash risk. Fourth, we control for bank profitability and 
operating performance (eTj&4+), calculated as income before extraordinary items divided 
by lagged total assets. Hutton et al. (2009) also show that more effective operating 
performance is negatively associated with crash risk. Lastly, following Andreou et al. 
(2016), we include the capital ratio (Jjb&4+) as tier one risk-adjusted capital ratio and the 
bank’s deposits over total assets (Q1b&4+). 
To control for the differences in country-specific factors, we include gross domestic 
product per capita (hQbJ&4+), stock market capitalization (iLcJjb&4+) and a growth rate 
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of gross domestic product (hQbh&4+). Specifically, first, hQbJ&4+ is the natural logarithm 
of gross domestic product per capita measured in US dollars. Second, iLcJjb&4+ is the 
stock market capitalization scaled by gross domestic product. Lastly, hQbh&4+ is an annual 
growth rate of the gross domestic product. 
In the robustness tests, we incorporate six governance indexes from the WGI 
database. These indexes are control of corruption (JTeeRbcfTI&4+), government 
effectiveness (hTS_1ll&4+), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 
(bTUfcfJ&4+), regulatory quality (e1h_mRj&4+), rule of law (eRU1_UjA&4+) and voice & 
accountability (STfJ1_jJJ&4+). Definition of all variables can be found in Table 4-1. 
We also include conditional accounting conservatism of Khan and Watts (2009) as 
in Kim and Zhang (2015), Andreou et al. (2015) and Kousenidis et al. (2014). Accounting 
conservatism refers to the tendency of accountants to require a higher degree of verification 
to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses (Basu 1997; Kim & 
Zhang 2015). This type of conservatism allows to counteract the tendency of managerial bad 
news withholding and speed up the announcement of good news in audited financial 
statements and reveal unverifiable unfavorable information (Watts 2003; LaFond & Watts 
2008; Kothari et al. 2009; Ball et al. 2012; Hu et al. 2014). The faster recognition of bad 
news is usually termed news-dependent (or conditional) conservatism and, therefore, it is 
argued that conditional conservatism reduces the likelihood of a stock price crash (Hu et al. 
2014; Kousenidis et al. 2014; Kim & Zhang 2015).  
Following Khan and Watts (2009) on constructing conditional firm-year 
conservatism measure (J_KJTe1&4+), we first draw the Basu (1997) model, which measures 
asymmetric earnings timeliness, to estimate a firm-year measure of conservatism. The Basu 
(1997) yearly cross-sectional regression can be written as follows: 2- = *+ + *#Q- + *3-e- + *5-Q-e-& + =- (4-4) 
For firm j, where 2- is net income before extraordinary items scaled by the lagged market 
value of equity, e- is annual returns compounded from monthly returns over the 12-month 
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beginning of the fourth month after fiscal year end30, Q- is a dummy equal to one if e- is 
negative and zero otherwise, and =- is the error term. The timeliness of good news is 
represented by *3-. The measure of incremental timeliness for recognizing bad news over 
good news (or conditional conservatism) is *5-. More timely recognition of bad news in 
relation to good news is a sign of conservatism (Basu 1997). 
 Since the coefficients *3- and *5- in Basu (1997) regression are constant across 
firms, Khan and Watts (2009) take into variations in both firms and years by incorporating 
firm-specific characteristics into Equation (4-4). These firm’s characteristics, including size, 
market-to-book, and leverage, are chosen because conservatism varies with them, both 
theoretically and empirically (LaFond & Watts 2008). Hence, the timeliness of good news 
each year (*3-) and conditional conservatism each year (*5-) are expressed as linear 
functions of firm-year specific characteristics that are correlated with the timeliness of good 
news and conditional conservatism each year, respectively. The equations can be written as 
follows: G_KJTe1 = 	*3- = o+ + o#iLS- + o3ig- + o5&U1S- (4-5) 
 C_KJTe1 = 	*5- = q+ + q#iLS- + q3ig- + q5U1S- (4-6) 
Where o" and q", i=1-4, are constant across firms but vary over time since they are to be 
estimated by yearly cross-sectional regression. Firm-specific characteristics are iLS-, ig- 
and U1S-. iLS- is the natural logarithm of the market value. ig- is the ratio of the market 
to book value of equity and U1S- is leverage defined as the ratio of debt to equity. Thus, G_KJTe1 and C_KJTe1 vary across firms through cross-sectional variation in the firm’s 
characteristics (MKV, MB and LEV). 
 Equation (4-5) and Equation (4-6) are not regression models. Instead, they are 
substituted into Equation (4-4) to obtain Equation (4-7) below: 
                                                
30 Annual returns are obtained by cumulating monthly returns starting from the fourth month after the firm’s 
fiscal year end (Hyan, 1995; Basu, 1997; Khan and Watt, 2009. 
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2-& = *+& + *#&Q-& + e-& o+& + o#&iLS-& + o3&ig-& + o5&U1S-&+ 	Q-&e-& q+& + q#&iLS-& + q3&ig-& + q5&U1S-&+ r+&iLS-& + r#&ig-& + r3&U1S-& + r5&Q-&iLS-&+ r6&Q-&ig-& + r7&Q-&U1S-& + =-& 
(4-7) 
Where the first bracket term is Equation (4-5) and the second bracket term is Equation (4-6). 
We include the third bracket term as an additional term in Equation (4-7) because, as 
explained by Khan and Watts (2009), the regression Equation (4-7) includes interaction 
terms between returns and firm-characteristics, so we have to also control for the firm 
characteristics separately (the “main effects”). 
 As similar to Kim and Zhang (2015) and Kousenidis et al. (2014), instead of running 
yearly pooled cross-sectional regressions for each country, Equation (4-7) is estimated using 
five-year rolling panel regression for each country. Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) suggest 
that measuring the Basu (1997) conservatism metric using a longer horizon decrease the 
measurement error. In addition, the reason that we run the cross-sectional model for each 
country is due to cross country-level differences in financial reporting conservatism (Ball et 
al. 2008; Beatty et al. 2008). After the estimation of Equation (4-7), we calculate our 
conditional conservatism (C_KJTe1 or *5-&) by substituting the estimators o+&, o#&, o3& and o5& from Equation (4-7) into Equation (4-6). By construction, banks with higher C_KJTe1 
values are considered more conservative and thus they exhibit a smaller delay in expected 
loss recognition. Hence, it is a measure of asymmetric timeliness in recognizing bad news 
versus good news. 
4.3.1.2.4 Summary Statistics 
 Table 4-1 summarizes all definitions and sources of variables as well as their symbols 
used in this chapter. Table 4-2 reports the descriptive statistics for the key variables along 
with control variables used in our multivariate analysis. All variables are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% levels. Regarding the crash risk measures, the mean (median) value of negative 
conditional skewness (NCSKEW) is -0.0694 (-0.0384) and of a down-to-up volatility 
(DUVOL) is -0.0857 (-0.0777). In comparison to previous literatures on crash risk in the 
banking industry, our crash risk statistics are lower than those documented in Andreou et al. 
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(2016), which report -0.146 and -0.104 for NCSKEW and DUVOL, respectively. However, 
Andreou et al. (2016) focuses on U.S. banks, whereas we cover U.S. banks and other banks 
around the globe. Thus, the slight differences may be attributed to different samples as well 
as different timespan31. 
 Regarding the credit information sharing measures, the mean (median) value of 
credit information depth (DEPTH) is 5.46 (5) and the mean values of private bureau 
coverage (PRIV) and public registry coverage (PUB) are 0.771 and 0.115, respectively. It is 
clear that the sample has very high depth of credit information sharing across banks and 
years. Moreover, the mean values of PRIV and PUB suggest that, on average, the coverage 
of private credit bureaus is approximately 77% of total adult population, while the coverage 
of public credit registries is approximately 11%. The coverage of public credit registries is 
considered low compared to the coverage of private credit bureaus. Regarding the banking 
regulatory variables, the mean values of the capital stringency index (CAPITAL_STR), the 
supervisory power index (SUPER_POW) and the private monitoring index (MONITORING) 
is 6.91, 9.36 and 7.17, respectively. Three mean values of banking regulatory variables are 
considerably high on average. 
 According to the control variables, the average change in monthly trading volume as 
a percentage of shares outstanding (DTURN) is -0.0652. The average bank in our sample has 
a firm-specific weekly return (MEAN) of -0.23%, a market capitalization (MV) of $327 
million, a market-to-book ratio (MTBV) of 0.0278, and a weekly return volatility (SIGMA) 
of 0.0439. Moreover, as expected due to the nature of their operations, banks on average rely 
heavily on leverage with mean (LEV) of 0.909. They are also marginally profitable as 
captured by mean value of a return-on-asset ratio (ROA) of 0.005. Lastly, banks on average 
maintain a deposit-to-asset ratio (DEPOSIT) that equal to 0.72 and hold a tier 1 capital ratio 
(CAR_TIER1) that equal to 0.124. Regarding several country-level control variables, the 
GDP growth (GDPG) has a mean value of 2.03%, the stock market capitalization scaled by 
GDP (MKTCAP) has a mean value of 98.8% and a natural logarithm of GDP per capital 
(GDPPC) has a mean value of 10.4. 
                                                
31 In some studies of crash risk of non-bank firms, the authors report slightly higher NCSKEW and DUVOL 
than ours (for example An and Zhang 2013 as well as An et al. 2015). Again, the differences may be due to 
different nature of a business, different samples and different timespans.  
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 In addition to the variables used in the main regression, we also present the summary 
statistics of the following variables used either as additional controls or instrumental 
variables in robustness tests. The mean value of an accounting conservatism (C_SCORE) is 
1.76. Regarding a series of political and institutional quality indexes, a control of corruption 
index (CORRUPTION) has a mean value of 1.12, a government effectiveness index 
(GOV_EFF) has a mean value of 1.31, a political stability index (POLITIC) has a mean 
value of 0.382, a regulatory quality index (REG_QUA) has a mean value of 1.19, a rule of 
law index (RULE_LAW) has a mean value of 1.28, and lastly a voice and accountability 
index (VOICE_ACC) has a mean value of 0.903. 
 In addition, we also report the descriptive statistics of main variables grouped by 
countries displayed in Panel A of Table 4-3. The average depth of credit information sharing 
across countries and year is 4.44 meaning that there is a significant number of countries that 
have information sharing institutions with high depth. Furthermore, the average coverage of 
private credit bureaus and public credit registries in each country are 41% and 11%, 
respectively. Panel B of Table 4-3 provides another descriptive statistics of variables used 
to construct LOW_BDI, LOW_CAPITAL_STR, LOW_SUPER_POW and LOW_MONITOR. 
Across the bank-year observations, the mean values of the business extent of disclosure 
index (BDI), the capital stringency index (CAPITAL_STR), the supervisory power index 
(SUPER_POW) and the private monitoring index (MONITORING) is 6.92, 6.91, 9.36 and 
7.17, respectively. Three mean values of banking regulatory variables are considerably high 
on average. The mean of BDI is also high; however, by looking at the 25th percentile and 
75th percentile of BDI, we can see that the sample has very little variation in BDI and 
clustered at the value of 7. However, we still try to employ although there is little variation 
in the values. 
 Table 4-4 presents the yearly sample distribution of our main variables. The table 
shows that the sample size is slightly more than 900 throughout our sample period 2006 to 
2013. Note that all variables, except a measure of crash risk, are lagged by one year, so all 
variables in 2005 is used to predict crash risk in 2006 and so on. Our main crash risk measure, 
a negative conditional skewness (NCSKEW), indicates a considerable variation across years, 
with 2008 having the highest crash risk, a reflection of the financial crisis. The average depth 
of credit information sharing (DEPTH) is considerably high across years. At the same time, 
218	
	
the trend of private bureau coverage (PRIV) is downward whereas the trend of public 
registries coverage (PUB) is upward. On possible reason is that, more countries began to 
establish public credit registries, especially in developing and less developed countries. The 
average value of the business extent of disclosure index (BDI) is around 7 for every year. 
While the average supervisory power index (SUPER_POW) hoards around nine, the average 
capital stringency index (CAPITAL_STR) and private monitoring index (MONITOR) notably 
increase in 2009, especially private monitoring index. These increases indicate that bank 
regulation and supervision become more increasingly important since the financial crisis in 
2008. In addition, the remark increase in the average MONITOR after the financial crisis 
reflects that regulators pay more attention to market monitoring mechanism and attempt to 
promote bank transparency through more public information disclosure. 
 We also check the correlation among stock price crash risk measures, credit 
information sharing measures, information environment measures, banking regulatory 
variables and other control variables. The matrix of Pearson correlation of all variables is 
presented in Table 4-5, Table 4-6 and Table 4-7. We find that multicollinearity is not a 
serious problem. Most of the correlation coefficients are below 0.3. The crash risk measure, 
NCSKEW, is positively correlated with DEPTH and PRIV, while it is negatively correlated 
with PUB. The correlation coefficient of DEPTH and PRIV is 0.7721, which is quite high. 
This highly positive correlation suggests that a country with the high depth of credit 
information tends to have high coverage of private credit bureaus or vice versa. However, 
each variable enters the regression individually, so the problem of multicollinearity should 
be less of a concern. Opposite to PRIV, DEPTH is negatively associated with PUB. 
Moreover, the governance variables (CORRUPTION, GOV_EFF, POLITIC, REG_QUA, 
RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC) exhibit a very strong correlation with one another; therefore, 
each enters the regression one at a time. 
4.3.2 Methodology 
To test our hypothesis H1, we estimate the following regression that links our crash 
risk measure in year ? to credit information sharing measures in year ? − 1 and a set of 
control variables in year ? − 1: 
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JejKd",& = *< + *+JfK",&4+ + *s(2",&4+s )+<st# + *,(u",&4+, )+3,t++ + q& + (" + =",& (4-8) 
Where i, t and t-1 indicates the ith bank, year t and year t-1, respectively; JejKd& is measured 
by IJKL1A&, which is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns; JfK&4+ is one 
of the three proxies of credit information sharing, namely the depth of credit information 
sharing (Q1bcd&4+), private bureau coverages (befS&4+), and public registry coverages 
(bRg&4+), measured in year ? − 1. X contains bank-specific variables, consisting of QcReI&4+, Kfhij&4+, i1jI&4+, iS&4+, icgS&4+, U1S&4+, eTj&4+, Jje_cf1e1&4+ 
and Q1bTKfc&4+ as discussed in the data section. In addition, Y contains country-specific 
variables, consisting of hQbh&4+, iLcJjb&4+ and hQbbJ&4+ as discussed in the data 
section. q& is the year fixed effects; (" is the individual effects or the time-invariant 
component of the error term; and ε is an idiosyncratic error term or time-varying component 
of the error term. Like previous literatures on crash risk, we impose a one-year lag between 
the dependent and independent variables to test whether CIS in year ? − 1 can predict crash 
risk in year ?. Regarding to the hypothesis H1, the coefficient *+ in front of JfK&4+ is 
expected to be negative and significant for all three proxies of credit information sharing so 
that bank-specific stock price crash risk is lower with more credit information sharing. 
 To test our hypothesis H2, which is whether the relationship between credit 
information sharing and stock price crash risk varies with a degree of information 
environment, we augment Equation (4-8) with one of the two proxies of information 
environment and their interactions with each of the three proxies of credit information 
sharing. The new regression model for Equation (4-8) is as followed: JejKd",& = *< + *+JfK",&4+ + *#jKui",&4+ + *3jKui",&4+ ∗ JfK",&4+
+ *s(2",&4+s )+#st5 + *,(u",&4+, )+6,t+3 + q& + (" + =",& (4-9) 
Where i, t and t-1 indicates the ith bank, year t and year t-1, respectively; JejKd& is measured 
by IJKL1A&, which is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns; JfK&4+ is one 
of the three proxies of credit information sharing, namely the depth of credit information 
sharing (Q1bcd&4+), private bureau coverages (befS&4+), and public registry coverages 
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(bRg&4+), measured in year ? − 1; jKui&4+ is one of the two proxies of information 
environment, namely IFRS adoption (fleK&4+) and the business extent of disclosure index 
(UTA_gQf&4+). X contains bank-specific variables, consisting of QcReI&4+, Kfhij&4+, i1jI&4+, iS&4+, icgS&4+, U1S&4+, eTj&4+, Jje_cf1e1&4+ and Q1bTKfc&4+ as 
discussed in the data section. In addition, Y contains country-specific variables, consisting 
of hQbh&4+, iLcJjb&4+ and hQbbJ&4+ as discussed in the data section. q& is the year 
fixed effects; (" is the individual effects or the time-invariant component of the error term; 
and ε is an idiosyncratic error term or time-varying component of the error term. The 
hypothesis H2 predicts the coefficient *3 in front of the interaction term between jKui&4+ 
and JfK&4+ to be significantly positive for fleK&4+ and negative for UTA_gQf&4+ so that 
the impact of credit information sharing on stock price crash risk is less pronounced with 
mandatory IFRS adoption, while the impact is more pronounced with low BDI. 
 To test our hypothesis H3-A, which is whether the relationship between credit 
information sharing and stock price crash risk is affected by bank capital stringency, we 
augment Equation (4-8) with a LOW_CAPITAL_STR dummy and its interaction with each 
of the three proxies of credit information sharing. The new regression model for Equation 
(4-8) is as followed: JejKd",& = *< + *+JfK",&4+ + *#UTA_JjbfcjU_Kce",&4++ *3UTA_JjbfcjU_Kce",&4+ ∗ JfK",&4+ + *s(2",&4+s )+#st5+ *,(u",&4+, )+6,t+3 + q& + (" + =",& 
(4-10) 
Where i, t and t-1 indicates the ith bank, year t and year t-1, respectively; JejKd& is measured 
by IJKL1A&, which is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns; JfK&4+ is one 
of the three proxies of credit information sharing, namely the depth of credit information 
sharing (Q1bcd&4+), private bureau coverages (befS&4+), and public registry coverages 
(bRg&4+), measured in year ? − 1; UTA_JjbfcjU_Kce&4+ is a dummy variable whose 
value equal to one indicating a group of low capital stringency indices. X contains bank-
specific variables, consisting of QcReI&4+, Kfhij&4+, i1jI&4+, iS&4+, icgS&4+, U1S&4+, eTj&4+, Jje_cf1e1&4+ and Q1bTKfc&4+ as discussed in the data section. In 
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addition, Y contains country-specific variables, consisting of hQbh&4+, iLcJjb&4+ and hQbbJ&4+ as discussed in the data section. q& is the year fixed effects; (" is the individual 
effects or the time-invariant component of the error term; and ε is an idiosyncratic error term 
or time-varying component of the error term. The hypothesis H3-A predicts the coefficient *3 in front of the interaction term between UTA_JjbfcjU_Kce&4+ and JfK&4+ to be 
negative and significant so that the impact of credit information sharing on stock price crash 
risk is more pronounced with low capital stringency. 
 To test our hypothesis H3-B, which is whether the relationship between credit 
information sharing and stock price crash risk is affected by a supervisory power of bank 
regulators, we augment Equation (4-8) with a LOW_SUPER_POW dummy and its 
interaction with each of the three proxies of credit information sharing. The new regression 
model for Equation (4-8) is as followed: JejKd",& = *< + *+JfK",&4+ + *#UTA_KRb1e_bTA",&4++ *3UTA_KRb1e_bTA",&4+ ∗ JfK",&4+ + *s(2",&4+s )+#st5+ *,(u",&4+, )+6,t+3 + q& + (" + =",& 
(4-11) 
Where i, t and t-1 indicates the ith bank, year t and year t-1, respectively; JejKd& is measured 
by IJKL1A&, which is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns; JfK&4+ is one 
of the three proxies of credit information sharing, namely the depth of credit information 
sharing (Q1bcd&4+), private bureau coverages (befS&4+), and public registry coverages 
(bRg&4+), measured in year ? − 1; UTA_KRb1e_bTA&4+ is a dummy variable whose value 
equal to one indicating a group of low supervisory power indices. X contains bank-specific 
variables, consisting of QcReI&4+, Kfhij&4+, i1jI&4+, iS&4+, icgS&4+, U1S&4+, eTj&4+, Jje_cf1e1&4+ and Q1bTKfc&4+ as discussed in the data section. In addition, Y 
contains country-specific variables, consisting of hQbh&4+, iLcJjb&4+ and hQbbJ&4+ as 
discussed in the data section. q& is the year fixed effects; (" is the individual effects or the 
time-invariant component of the error term; and ε is an idiosyncratic error term or time-
varying component of the error term. The hypothesis H3-B predicts the coefficient *3 in 
front of the interaction term between UTA_KRb1e_bTA&4+ and JfK&4+ to be negative and 
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significant so that the impact of credit information sharing on stock price crash risk is more 
pronounced with low supervisory power. 
 To test our hypothesis H3-C, which is whether the relationship between credit 
information sharing and stock price crash risk is affected by a degree of private monitoring, 
we augment Equation (4-8) with a LOW_MONITOR dummy and its interaction with each of 
the three proxies of credit information sharing. The new regression model for Equation (4-8) 
is as followed: JejKd",& = *< + *+JfK",&4+ + *#UTA_iTIfcTe",&4++ *3UTA_iTIfcTe",&4+ ∗ JfK",&4+ + *s(2",&4+s )+#st5+ *,(u",&4+, )+6,t+3 + q& + (" + =",& 
(4-12) 
Where i, t and t-1 indicates the ith bank, year t and year t-1, respectively; JejKd& is measured 
by IJKL1A&, which is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns; JfK&4+ is one 
of the three proxies of credit information sharing, namely the depth of credit information 
sharing (Q1bcd&4+), private bureau coverages (befS&4+), and public registry coverages 
(bRg&4+), measured in year ? − 1; UTA_iTIfcTe&4+ is a dummy variable whose value 
equal to one indicating a group of low private monitoring indices. X contains bank-specific 
variables, consisting of QcReI&4+, Kfhij&4+, i1jI&4+, iS&4+, icgS&4+, U1S&4+, eTj&4+, Jje_cf1e1&4+ and Q1bTKfc&4+ as discussed in the data section. In addition, Y 
contains country-specific variables, consisting of hQbh&4+, iLcJjb&4+ and hQbbJ&4+ as 
discussed in the data section. q& is the year fixed effects; (" is the individual effects or the 
time-invariant component of the error term; and ε is an idiosyncratic error term or time-
varying component of the error term. The hypothesis H3-C predicts the coefficient *3 in 
front of the interaction term between UTA_iTIfcTe&4+ and JfK&4+ to be negative and 
significant so that the impact of credit information sharing on stock price crash risk is more 
pronounced with low private monitoring. 
 In the robustness test, we re-estimate Equation (4-8) to Equation (4-12) with the 
following modifications and augmentations. Instead of IJKL1A&, we measure JejKd& by 
223	
	
QRSTU&, which is a down-to-up volatility measure of the crash likelihood as described in 
the data section. Furthermore, we add some more country-level controls related to political 
and institutional quality indices (JTeeRbcfTI&4+, hTS_1ll&4+, bTUfcfJ&4+, e1h_mRj&4+, eRU1_UjA&4+, STfJ1_jJJ&4+) and more bank-specific control indicating 
the degree of accounting conservatism (J_KJTe1&4+). In addition, we provide an 
instrumental variable regression by employing a legal origin dummy (U1hjUTefhfI&4+), 
ethnic fractionalization (1cdIfJ_lejJ&4+) and latitude (UjcfcRQ1&4+) as instrumental 
variables for credit information sharing and stock price crash risk. 
4.4 Empirical Results, Robustness Tests and Additional Tests 
4.4.1 Empirical Results 
4.4.1.1 The Impact of Credit Information Sharing on Stock Price Crash Risk 
Table 4-8 shows the results of the model selection and diagnostic tests. We apply all 
tests to Equation (4-8) with no interaction terms. Afterward, we choose the estimation 
technique based on the tests and apply it to Equation (4-9), Equation (4-10), Equation (4-11) 
and Equation (4-12)32. Based on the results shown in Table 4-8, we prefer the fixed effect 
regression to the pool regression and the random effect regression. In addition, facing the 
problems of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, we adjust standard errors that are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and cluster standard errors at bank-level to account for within-
cluster correlation of the error term33 
 Table 4-9 shows the regression analysis for Equation (4-8) testing the relationship 
between credit information sharing and future bank-specific stock price crash risk. In Table 
4-9, the coefficient estimates for Equation (4-8) with crash risk measured by NCSKEW are 
reported in column 1 to column 3. As shown in column 1, when DEPTH, that is, the depth 
of credit information sharing index, is used as our test variable, the coefficients of DEPTH 
is not significant. This insignificant relationship between the depth of credit information 
                                                
32 Adding interaction terms would not significantly change the overall results of the tests much. 
33 More detail of model selection tests and diagnostic tests can be found in the Appendix F. 
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sharing index and future crash risk is not consistent with our first hypothesis, suggesting that 
higher depth of credit information may not be sufficient to reduce crash risk. 
Instead of the depth of credit information sharing, we rely on the private credit bureau 
coverages (PRIV) and the public credit registry coverages (PUB). As shown in the column 
2 of Table 4-9, the coefficient of PRIV is not significant. However, in the column 3 of Table 
4-9, the coefficient of PUB is highly significant (at 1% level) with an expected negative sign. 
The results show that only the relationship between information sharing through public 
credit registries and crash risk is significantly negative and consistent with our hypothesis 
H1. This significantly negative relationship between information sharing through public 
credit registries and crash risk suggests that banks are less likely to encounter crash risk in 
countries with more credit information sharing through public credit registries. 
This finding is in line with the notion that forcing banks to share borrower 
information among each other may improve bank transparency and discourage their loan 
officers to withhold bad news for an extended period. Consequently, the accumulation of 
bad news less likely lead to a stock price crash. In more detail, compulsory information 
sharing can help monitoring loan officers and preventing corruption in lending. Also, 
borrower information sharing from one bank improves comparability and provides benefits 
to another bank validating internal risk ratings, so loan officers are less likely to bias their 
borrower reports. Therefore, forcing banks to disclose and share borrower information tends 
to improve investors’ perception about banks’ performance, such that it also reduces a stock 
price crash risk. 
 To assess the economic significance of the results, we estimate the marginal effect 
of credit information sharing on crash risk holding all other variables at their sample mean. 
First, regarding a one-percentage increase of PUB, we find that it corresponds to a 0.005 
decrease in NCSKEW. Furthermore, we compare crash risk at the 10th and 90th percentile 
values of PUB and find that an increasing value of PUB from the 10th to the 90th percentile 
can additionally decrease NCSKEW by 0.028. 
The insignificant impact of information sharing through private credit bureaus on 
future crash risk suggests that the voluntary exchange of credit information among banks 
may not be sufficient to prevent bad news hoarding. Banks may self-select themselves into 
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sharing credit information and may share only information that makes them better off. 
Furthermore, joining the private credit bureaus is not compulsory and they are less regulated 
than the public credit registries (Majnoni et al. 2004). When less transparent banks are not 
obligated to share borrower information, they become lax in granting loans and their internal 
operations could become less disciplined. Thus, loan officers have the ability to hide bad 
prospects of their borrower that could affect their career performance. 
According to the depth of credit information sharing, it does not differentiate 
between the depth of private credit bureaus and public credit registries. High depth index 
does not mean that high depth of information is being shared through private credit bureaus 
alone or public credit registries alone or both. However, as we can see from the correlation 
matrix (Table 4-5), the positive correlation between PRIV and DEPTH suggests that 
countries with high coverage of private credit bureaus tend to have a high depth of credit 
information sharing, while the correlation between PUB and DEPTH is negative and quite 
low. Therefore, high depth of information sharing among banks does not mitigate crash risk, 
possibly due to its highly positive correlation with the private bureau coverage. 
 The coefficients of the control variables for all regressions are generally consistent 
with the findings of prior studies. First, we find that the coefficient of DTURN, which proxies 
for investor belief heterogeneity, is significantly positive, consistent with the results of Chen 
et al. (2001). Furthermore, the coefficients of SIGMA are positive and significant, suggesting 
that banks that have a higher return volatility are associated with higher future crash risk. In 
addition, we find that the coefficient of MV is significantly positive, implying that large 
stocks are more crash prone. Moreover, the coefficient of MTBV is significantly negative, 
implying that growth stocks are less likely to crash. Consistent with Hutton et al. (2009), 
Kim et al. (2011b), Kim et al. (2011a) among others, the estimated coefficient of ROA is 
negatively and highly significant for all regressions, suggesting that banks with good 
operating performance are less likely to experience a crash. Lastly, we find that future 
crashes are positively related to GDPPC, suggesting that banks in richer countries are more 
crash prone. 
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4.4.1.2 The Impact of Information Asymmetry on the Relationship between Credit 
Information Sharing and Stock Price Crash Risk 
 Due to the regression results in the previous section, the only PUB is found to be 
significant. Therefore, in this section, we only use PUB to test our hypothesis H2. We 
hypothesize that the impact of PUB on stock price crash risk is less pronounced in countries 
with more transparent information environment. Table 4-10 presents the regression results 
for Equation (4-9). We proxy the transparency of the information environment by IFRS and 
LOW_BDI. 
 The IFRS dummy with the value of one equals the information environment that is 
more transparent than the IFRS dummy with the value of zero. As shown in column 2 of 
Table 4-10, the coefficient of the interaction term between IFRS and PUB is positive and 
significant. The positive coefficient of the interaction term indicates that the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS attenuates the impact of credit information sharing on stock price crash 
risk. In other words, the impact of credit information sharing on stock price crash risk is less 
pronounced in countries with more transparent information environment. When the 
information environment is more transparent, loan officers have less ability to hide negative 
information about borrowers because borrower information is abundantly assessable to 
external investors and loan managers. 
 We also evaluate the moderating effect of IFRS on the relationship between credit 
information sharing and crash risk. In countries with no mandatory IFRS adoption, a one-
percentage increase of PUB will lead to a 0.009 decrease in NCSKEW. However, in countries 
with mandatory IFRS adoption, a one-percentage increase of PUB will lead to a 0.004 
decrease in NCSKEW. The marginal effect shows that it is 0.005 or approximately 58.62% 
less pronounced with mandatory IFRS adoption. Thus, the beneficial effect of credit 
information sharing tends to be less helpful in reducing crash risk in the more transparent 
information environment. 
 Besides mandatory IFRS adoption, the result using LOW_BDI as a proxy of the 
transiency of the information environment is displayed in column 4 of Table 4-10. The 
coefficient of the interaction term between LOW_BDI and PUB is negative but not 
significant. This negative coefficient of interaction term indicates that LOW_BDI has no 
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notable effect on the relationship between credit information sharing and stock price crash 
risk. The reason that the interaction term is insignificant is possible because there is not much 
variation in the value of the business extent of disclosure index in our sample (BDI on Panel 
B of Table 4-3) and most values cluster at the value of seven. Thus, in comparison to 
mandatory IFRS adoption, employing BDI as a proxy of the transparency of the information 
environment is not suitable. 
4.4.1.3 The Impact of Bank Regulation on the Relationship between Credit 
Information Sharing and Stock Price Crash Risk 
In general, bank regulators use bank regulations as an external mechanism to monitor 
banks so that they are more disciplined and do not engage in undesirable activities. If banks 
face strict regulatory environments, then they are more likely to behave prudently and have 
less ability to hide bad news. Thus, in this section, we test whether the relationship between 
credit information sharing and stock price crash risk varies with each of three aspects of bank 
regulations, consisting of capital stringency requirements, supervisory power, and private 
monitoring.  
Firstly, our hypothesis H3-A says that the impact of credit information sharing on 
crash risk is expected to be more pronounced with less stringent capital requirements. 
Secondly, our hypothesis H3-B says that the impact of credit information sharing on crash 
risk is expected to be more pronounced with low supervisory power. Lastly, our hypothesis 
H3-C says that the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk is expected to be more 
pronounced with a low degree of private monitoring. Table 4-11 reports all the regression 
results. 
In correspondence with the previous section, we use PUB to test our hypotheses. The 
column 1 and 2 of Table 4-11 present the regression results for Equation (4-10) regarding 
the impact of capital stringency requirements on the relationship between credit information 
sharing and crash risk. As shown in column 2, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
LOW_CAPITAL_STR and PUB is negative and significant. Consistent with our hypothesis 
H3-A, the negative coefficient of the interaction term suggests that the impact of information 
sharing through public credit registries on crash risk is more pronounced with less stringent 
capital requirements. If banks are not required to put a substantial amount of their equity at 
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risk, they may not be cautious in lending and might take an excessive risk like concealing 
bad news for an extended period.  
 By assessing the marginal effect of capital stringency requirements on the 
relationship between credit information sharing and crash risk, we find that a one-percentage 
increase of PUB will lead to a 0.005 decrease in NCSKEW when the capital stringency 
requirements are high.  However, when the capital stringency requirements are low, a one-
percentage increase of PUB will lead to a 0.038 decrease in NCSKEW. In comparison to the 
countries with high capital stringency requirements, the impact of information sharing 
through public credit registries on crash risk is seven times more pronounced (or 
approximately 0.034 differences) in the countries with low capital stringency requirements. 
Thus, our result indicates that less stringent capital requirements may induce loan officers to 
behave riskily and accumulate bad news, such that forcing banks to share borrower 
information tends to be more helpful in reducing crash risk. 
Column 3 and 4 of Table 4-11 present the regression results for Equation (4-11) with 
respect to the impact of the official supervisory power on the relationship between credit 
information sharing and crash risk. As shown in columns 4, the coefficient of the interaction 
term between LOW_SUPER_POW and PUB is negative and significant. Consistent with our 
hypothesis H3-B, the negative coefficient of the interaction term suggests that the impact of 
information sharing through public credit registries on crash risk is more pronounced with 
lower supervisory power. If bank supervisors do not have adequate powers to closely 
monitor banks, banks may engage in undesirable activities, notably complex banking 
activities. 
 We also evaluate the marginal impact of the supervisory power of the relationship 
between credit information sharing and crash risk. When the supervisory power is high, a 
one-percentage increase of PUB will lead to a 0.004 decrease in NCSKEW. However, when 
the supervisory power is low, a one-percentage increase of PUB will lead to a 0.056 decrease 
in NCSKEW. In comparison to the countries with high supervisory power, the impact of 
information sharing through public credit registries on crash risk is eleven times more 
pronounced (approximately 0.051 differences) in the countries with low supervisory power. 
Thus, our result indicates that, when banks are weakly regulated and monitored by their 
supervisors, they may behave opportunistically and hide bad news for an extended period, 
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such that forcing banks to share borrower information becomes more useful in reducing 
crash risk. 
 Column 5 and 6 of Table 4-11 present the regression results for Equation (4-12) 
concerning the impact of private monitoring on the relationship between credit information 
sharing and crash risk. As shown in columns 6, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between LOW_MONITOR and PUB is negative and significant. Consistent with our 
hypothesis H3-C, the negative coefficient of the interaction term suggests that the impact of 
information sharing through public credit registries on crash risk is more pronounced with a 
lower degree of private monitoring.  
High degree of the private monitoring means that banks are encouraged to disclosure 
more and accurate information to the public, so external investors have the ability and more 
incentives to overcome informational barriers and transaction costs. Therefore, in an 
environment with a low degree of private monitoring, banks are less transparent than those 
in an environment with high degree. In this regard, our result indicates that forcing banks to 
share borrower information tends to be more beneficial in an environment with a low degree 
of private monitoring.  
By estimating the marginal effect of private monitoring on the relationship between 
credit information sharing and crash risk, we find that a one-percentage increase of PUB will 
lead to a 0.005 decrease in NCSKEW when the degree of private monitoring is high. 
However, when the degree of private monitoring is low, a one-percentage increase of PUB 
will lead to a 0.046 decrease in NCSKEW. In comparison to the countries with high degree 
of private monitoring, the impact of information sharing on crash risk is nine times more 
pronounced (approximately 0.041 differences) in the countries with a low degree of private 
monitoring. This marginal effect indicates that less emphasizing private monitoring tends to 
reduce the beneficial impact of credit information sharing on crash risk. 
 Overall, the results suggest that three aspects of bank regulations have significant 
and sizable impacts on the link between credit information sharing and crash risk. Less 
stringent capital requirements, low supervisory power and less emphasizing private 
monitoring contribute to weaker regulatory environments to the extent that credit 
information sharing has a more pronounced impact on crash risk. In other words, when the 
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regulatory environments are weak, credit information sharing is more useful in reducing 
crash risk. Furthermore, among three aspects of bank regulations, we find that credit 
information sharing tends to be much more useful in reducing crash risk with less powerful 
bank supervisors than high capital stringency requirements and high emphasis on private 
monitoring. 
4.4.2 Robustness Tests 
 In this section, we perform several robustness tests of our main results. First, we 
employ another alternative measure of crash risk called “Down-to-Up Volatility” (DUVOL). 
Second, to confirm our main results regarding the hypotheses H2, H3-A, H3-B, and H3-C, 
we split the sample into two samples based on proxies of the transparency of the information 
environment and median values of bank regulatory variables. and then estimates each 
subsample separately. Third, we augment each of Equation (4-8), (4-9), (4-10), (4-11), and 
(4-12) with additional control variables to control for factors that can potentially affect bank-
specific stock price crash risk. Fourth, because the majority of banks in the sample are banks 
in the USA, so we try to exclude those banks to see whether our main results are still upheld. 
Last but not least, we address a possible endogeneity problem that may be associated with 
our previous regressions. Overall, our main results in the previous section are robust to these 
robustness tests. The following sections will discuss the robustness tests in detail. 
4.4.2.1 Alternative measure of stock price crash risk 
 As to test for the robustness of the main results, we consider another depended 
variable as an alternative measure of crash risk. We consider the down-to-up volatility 
measure (DUVOL). It is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of the 
group with “down” weeks (the returns below the yearly mean) to the standard deviation of 
the group with “up” weeks (the returns above the yearly mean. The method of calculation is 
outlined in the Data and Methodology section. 
 We re-estimate each of Equation (4-8), (4-9), (4-10), (4-11) and (4-12) by using 
DUVOL as a dependent variable. Table 4-12 presents the regression results for Equation 
(4-8) testing our hypothesis H1. We can see that crash risk measured by DUVOL is 
negatively and significantly associated with PUB but not DEPTH and PRIV. By evaluating 
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the marginal impact of PUB on DUVOL, a one-percentage increase of PUB will lead to a 
0.002 decrease in DUVOL. The significantly negative coefficient of PUB support our 
hypothesis H1. The result is similar to the main result in the previous section suggesting that 
bank-specific stock price crash risk is likely to be lower in the countries with more coverage 
of credit information sharing among banks through public credit registries. 
 Table 4-13 shows the regression results for Equation (4-9) when we use DUVOL as 
a dependent variable. As shown on column 2 of Table 4-13, the coefficient of the interaction 
between IFRS and PUB is positive and significant (at the 10% level) meaning that the impact 
of PUB on crash risk, as measured by DUVOL, is lower with IFRS adoption. The 
significantly positive interaction term is like the main result and support our hypothesis H2 
suggesting that the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk is lower with more 
transparent information environment as proxied by IFRS adoption. On the one hand, when 
the countries do not adopt IFRS, a one-percentage increase of PUB is associated with a 
0.00335 decrease in DUVOL. On the other hand, when the countries adopt IFRS, a one-
percentage increase of PUB is associated with a 0.00164 decrease in DUVOL. The impact 
of PUB on DUVOL is one-half time less pronounced with IFRS adoption. As shown on the 
column 4 of Table 4-13, the coefficient of the interaction between LOW_BDI and PUB is 
positive but not significant. Like the main result, the insignificant coefficient of the 
interaction term does not support our hypothesis H2 implying that the impact of credit 
information sharing on crash risk does not vary with different degree of business extent of 
disclosure index. 
 Next, Table 3-14 displays the regression results for Equation (4-10), (4-11) and 
(4-12) by using DUVOL as a dependent variable. The results are all in line with the main 
results. Regarding to the capital stringency index of Equation (4-10), the coefficient of the 
interaction between LOW_CAPITAL_STR and PUB on column 2 of Table 3-14 is 
significantly negative (at the 1% level) consistent with the hypothesis H3-A. It suggests that 
the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk is more pronounced when capital 
requirement is less stringent. Economically, on the one hand, when the capital stringency is 
high, a one-percentage increase of PUB is corresponding to a 0.00201 decrease in DUVOL. 
On the other hand, when the capital stringency is low, a one-percentage increase of PUB 
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will lead to a 0.01012 decrease in DUVOL. That is 0.00811 additional decrease in DUVOL 
when the capital stringency is low. 
 Regarding the supervisory power index of Equation (4-11), the coefficient of the 
interaction between LOW_SUPER_POW and PUB on column 4 of Table 3-14 is 
significantly negative (at the 5% level) consistent with the hypothesis H3-B. It suggests that 
the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk is more pronounced when the 
supervisory power is low. Economically, on the one hand, when the supervisory power is 
high, a one-percentage increase of PUB is corresponding to a 0.00193 decrease in DUVOL. 
On the other hand, when the supervisory power is low, a one-percentage increase of PUB 
will lead to a 0.01457 decrease in DUVOL. That is 0.01264 additional decrease in DUVOL 
when the supervisory power is low. 
 Regarding a private monitoring of Equation (4-12), the coefficient of the interaction 
between LOW_MONITOR and PUB on column 6 of Table 3-14 is significantly negative (at 
the 1% level) consistent with the hypothesis H3-C. It suggests that the impact of credit 
information sharing on crash risk is more pronounced when the private monitoring is low. 
Economically, on the one hand, when the private monitoring is high, a one-percentage 
increase of PUB is corresponding to a 0.00201 decrease in DUVOL. On the other hand, when 
the supervisory power is low, a one-percentage increase of PUB will lead to a 0.01169 
decrease in DUVOL. That is 0.968 additional decrease in DUVOL when the private 
monitoring is low. 
4.4.2.2 Subsample Analysis 
 To further test the robustness of the main results, we split the sample based on our 
tested variables, which include proxies of the transparency of the information environment 
and bank regulatory variables. Regarding the proxy of the transparency of the information 
environment, we focus on only the adoption of IFRS because BDI is found insignificant in 
the main results. Regarding IFRS adoption, the sample is split into two groups which one 
group consists of countries that adopt IFRS and another group consists of countries that do 
not adopt IFRS. The information environment in countries that adopt IFRS is relatively more 
transparent than those that do not adopt IFRS. With regards to banking regulatory variables, 
the sample is split into two groups based on the median value of each banking regulatory 
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variable. For each banking regulatory variable, one group consists of countries with values 
above the median value of the sample and another group consists of countries with values 
below the median value of the sample. We then estimate each subsample separately.  
Table 4-15 reports the regression results of each subsample based on IFRS adoption. 
Clearly, the coefficient of PUB in the subsample without IFRS adoption is negative and 
significant (at 10% level) whereas the coefficient of PUB is not significant in the subsample 
with IFRS adoption. The significant coefficient of PUB in the subsample without IFRS 
adoption suggests that credit information sharing is important and associated with lower 
crash risk when the transparency of information environment is low. Economically, in the 
subsample without IFRS adoption, a one-percentage increase of PUB is associated with a 
0.00782 decrease in NCSKEW. The insignificant coefficient of PUB in the subsample with 
IFRS adoption suggests that the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk is not 
only less pronounced but also not significant when the transparency of information 
environment is high. 
 Column 1 and 2 of Table 4-16 report the regression results of each subsample based 
on the median value of capital stringency index (CAPITAL_STR). Since the median value of 
CAPITAL_STR is 7, the first group contains countries with CAPITAL_STR above 7 whereas 
the second group contains countries with CAPITAL_STR below 7. Column 1 of Table 4-16 
reports the regression result of the above-median group and shows that the coefficient of 
PUB is not significant. In contrast, column 2 of Table 4-16 reports the regression result of 
the below-median group and shows that the coefficient of PUB is negative and significant 
(at 1% level). Thus, the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk only have a 
significant impact in the subsample with low capital stringency. Economically, in the below-
median group, a one-percentage increase of PUB is associated with a 0.00632 decrease in 
NCSKEW. 
 Column 3 and 4 of Table 4-16 report the regression results of each subsample based 
on the median value of supervisory power index (SUPER_POW). Since the median value of 
SUPER_POW is 10, the first group contains countries with SUPER_POW above 10 whereas 
the second group contains countries with SUPER_POW below 10. Column 3 of Table 4-16 
reports the regression result of the above-median group and shows that the coefficient of 
PUB is not significant. In contrast, column 4 of Table 4-16 reports the regression result of 
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the below-median group and shows that the coefficient of PUB is negative and significant 
(at 5% level). Thus, the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk only have a 
significant impact in the subsample with low supervisory power. Economically, in the 
below-median group, a one-percentage increase of PUB is associated with a 0.00527 
decrease in NCSKEW. 
 Column 5 and 6 of Table 4-16 report the regression results of each subsample based 
on the median value of private monitoring index (MONITOR). Since the median value of 
MONITOR is 8, the first group contains countries with MONITOR above 8 whereas the 
second group contains countries with MONITOR below 8. On the one hand, column 5 of 
Table 4-16 reports the regression result of the above-median group and shows that the 
coefficient of PUB is negative and significant (at 5% level). On the other hand, column 6 of 
Table 4-16 reports the regression result of the below-median group and shows that the 
coefficient of PUB is negative and significant (at 1% level). By comparison with the 
coefficient of PUB in the above-median group, the coefficient of PUB in the below-median 
group is much more significant (at 1% versus at 5% level) and even have much more 
magnitude. Specifically, a one-percentage increase of PUB decreases NCSKEW by 0.00413 
and 0.00759 for the above-median group and the below-median group, respectively. Thus, 
in comparison with the above-median group, the one-percentage increase of PUB in the 
below-median group leads to an additional decrease of NCSKEW by 0.00346. 
4.4.2.3 Additional Controls 
 In addition, we add a series of macro institutional indexes in our model to test the 
robustness of the results. These variables are six components of the World Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2011), which capture different aspects of the institutional 
environment. The detailed definition of the indexes can be found in the data section. These 
governance indicators enter the regression individually (one at a time) because they are 
highly correlated with one another. We re-estimate each of Equation (4-8), (4-9), (4-10), 
(4-11) and (4-12) with additional control variables. The regression results are presented in 
Table 4-17 to Table 4-21. Overall, none of the governance indicators is significant, and in 
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each column, the main results regarding the impact of credit information sharing on stock 
price crash risk are still upheld. 
4.4.2.4 Non-USA Sample 
 Next, we exclude banks in the USA to see whether our main results are still robust. 
The regression results are presented in Table 4-22 for Equation (4-8)  and Table 4-23 for the 
Equation (4-9) to (4-12). Overall, the results show that exclusion of banks in the USA does 
not change our main results. Our main results are still upheld. Specifically, on Table 4-22, 
we can only see that the coefficient of PUB in column 3 is significantly negative, except the 
coefficient of DEPTH and PRIV. Moreover, the coefficient of PUB is not only significant 
but also slightly more negative than the one in the main sample. 
Economically, a one-percentage increase in PUB is associated with a 0.006 decrease 
in NCSKEW. In addition, when a country does not adopt IFRS, a one-percentage increase of 
PUB will decrease NCSKEW by 0.008. However, when a country adopts IFRS, a one-
percentage increase of PUB will decrease NCSKEW by 0.005. That is 0.003 or 
approximately 37.5% less pronounced with IFRS adoption.  
By evaluating the interaction between PUB and LOW_CAPITAL_STR, we find that 
a one-percentage increase in PUB is associated with a 0.006 decrease in NCSKEW when the 
capital stringency requirements are high (LOW_CAPITAL_STR=0). In contrast, when the 
capital stringency requirements are low (LOW_CAPITAL_STR=1), a one-percentage 
increase in PUB is now associated with a 0.035 decrease in NCSKEW. We can see that the 
impact of PUB on NCSKEW is more pronounced when the capital requirements are less 
stringent. 
According to the interaction between PUB and LOW_SUPER_POW, we find that a 
one-percentage increase in PUB corresponds to a 0.006 decrease in NCSKEW when the 
supervisory power is high (LOW_SUPER_POW = 0). However, when the supervisory power 
is low (LOW_SUPER_POW = 1), a one-percentage increase in PUB now corresponds to a 
0.051 decrease in NCSKEW. We can see that the impact of PUB on NCSKEW is more 
pronounced when the supervisory power is low. 
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According to the interaction between PUB and LOW_MONITOR, the results show 
that a one-percentage increase in PUB is associated with a 0.006 decrease in NCSKEW when 
the degree of private monitoring is high (LOW_MONITOR = 0). In contrast, when the degree 
of private monitoring is low (LOW_MONITOR = 1), a one-percentage increase in PUB is 
now associated with a 0.035 decrease in NCSKEW. We can see that the impact of PUB on 
NCSKEW is more pronounced when the degree of private monitoring is low. 
4.4.2.5 Instrumental Variable Approach 
To avoid the problem of endogeneity, we rely on the instrumental variable 
approach34. Similar to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we choose instruments for DEPTH based 
on the literature on law and finance (Easterly & Levine 1997; LaPorta et al. 1998; La Porta 
et al. 1999; Beck et al. 2003; Acemoglu & Johnson 2005). These instruments are legal 
origins, ethnic fractionalization, and latitude35. Since these instrumental variables are time-
invariant, we perform a two-stage least square (2SLS) with pooled OLS estimations rather 
than fixed effects estimations. 
 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity shows that the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected at 1% (p-value=0.1930), so DEPTH can be treated as exogenous. Nonetheless, 
we perform robustness tests for Equation (4-8) to (4-12) by employing an instrumental 
variable approach. The test of instruments and the IV regression results are presented in 
Table 4-24 to Table 4-28. In all regression, the F-test of the excluded instruments in the 
corresponding first-stage regression shows that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1%. 
Thus, our instruments are relevant. The Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions cannot 
be rejected suggesting that the instruments are valid instruments, uncorrelated with the error 
term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
 Next, we continue to analyze the IV regression results of each table. The results are 
presented in Table 4-24 to Table 4-28. First, we analyze the IV regression results for 
Equation (4-8). On Table 4-24, the first column reports the second stage regression, while 
                                                
34 The reverse causality between credit information sharing and crash risk is less problematic because we 
investigate the impact of credit information sharing agencies on crash risk of individual bank firms. 
35 Refer to Appendix G for the rationales behind selecting instruments 
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the second column reports the first stage regression. The main result is still robust and 
consistent with our first hypothesis H1. The coefficient of DEPTH remains positive and 
significant. The result with IV approach confirms our main finding that bank stock price 
crash risk decreases with credit information sharing. Moreover, the IV coefficient is much 
larger than the coefficient of the fixed effect regression, indicating the presence of potential 
measurement error, which inflates the IV coefficient. Nonetheless, our conclusion does not 
depend on the instrumentation approach because DEPTH is not endogenous and poses no 
concern of endogeneity. 
 For the regression results of Equation (4-9) to (4-12), we split the sample into two 
subsamples based on the adoption of IFRS and the banking competition measure. Table 4-25 
presents the IV regressions of two subsamples that are split based on IFRS as a proxy of 
information environment transparency. The results are robust and consistent with our second 
hypothesis H2. The coefficient of DEPTH is only significant in the subsample without the 
mandatory IFRS adoption suggesting that the impact of credit information sharing on bank 
risk is more pronounced when the information environment is less transparent. 
 Table 4-26, Table 4-27 and Table 4-28 present the IV regressions of two subsamples 
which are split based on the median value of capital stringency index, supervisory power 
index and private monitoring index, respectively. Consistent with our hypothesis H3-A, 
Table 4-26 shows that the coefficient of PUB is merely significantly negative in the 
subsample with low capital stringency indexes. Consistent with our hypothesis H3-B, Table 
4-27 reveals that the coefficient of PUB is merely significantly negative in the subsample 
with low supervisory power indexes. Consistent with our hypothesis H3-C, Table 4-28 
shows that the coefficient of PUB is merely significantly negative in the subsample with low 
private monitoring indexes. The IV regression results in Table 4-26, Table 4-27 and Table 
4-28 suggest that the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk is more pronounced 
in the subsample with low capital stringency index, the subsample with low supervisory 
power indexes and the subsample with low private monitoring indexes, respectively. 
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4.4.3 Additional Tests 
4.4.3.1 Existence of Deposit Insurance Regime 
 In this section, we attempt to examine the impact of another aspect of bank regulation 
on the relationship between credit information sharing and stock price crash risk. We 
consider the existence of deposit insurance. Specifically, we include a deposit insurance 
dummy (DEPOSIT_INS), which takes a value of one if a country has explicit deposit 
insurance and a value of zero otherwise. As pointed out by Barth et al. (2006), deposit 
insurance intensifies the moral hazard problem in banking because depositors no longer face 
the risk of losing their savings, which diminishes their incentives and efforts at monitoring 
bank activities (Houston et al. 2010). 
 The deposit insurance scheme is a kind of depositor protection mechanism which 
internalizes risk of banking management (Keeley 1990). Theoretically, deposit insurance 
schemes are designed to prevent bank runs (when depositors attempt to withdraw their funds 
all at once) by supporting failing banks with necessary resources (Keeley 1990; Matutes & 
Vives 1996; Diamond & Dybvig 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008). There is also the 
potential for contagious bank runs on other healthy banks (Allen & Gale 2000). Therefore, 
many countries enact deposit insurance schemes to improve banking sector stability and 
reduce the probability of systemic crises (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 2002). However, 
since deposit insurance could protect the interest of depositors by guaranteeing deposits, 
depositors then have lower incentive to monitor and supervise bank’s risk-taking behavior 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga 2004; Ioannidou & Penas 2010), which will exacerbate the 
bank moral hazard problem as well as the likelihood of banking crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache 2002; Barth et al. 2004). Thus, deposit insurance can encourage excessive risk-
taking by banks and banks are likely to hoard bad news and become less disciplined which 
consequently could lead to crash risk. We expect that the impact of credit information 
sharing on the crash is expected to be more pronounced when there is the existence of deposit 
insurance. 
 The regression results are reported in the first two columns of Table 4-29. The 
interaction term between PUB and DEPOSIT_INS is negative and significant (at 1% level), 
suggesting that the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk is more pronounced 
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when a deposit insurance regime exists. This shows that, in comparison to no deposit 
insurance regime, the existence of deposit insurance regime causes banks to become less 
disciplined and engage in greater risk-taking; therefore, the role of credit information sharing 
on crash risk is more pronounced. 
4.4.3.2 Activity Restriction 
 As documented in Barth et al. (2006), proponents of restricting bank activities argue 
that broad financial activities may intensify moral hazard problems and provide banks an 
incentive to engage in risk-taking behaviors (Boyd et al. 1998). With their ability to engage 
in broad financial activities, banks may become extremely large and very complex. When 
they are very large and complex, they are hard to monitor and also too large to discipline 
(Laeven & Levine 2007). Thus, restrictions on banks’ activities help prevent moral hazard 
problems and the formation of extremely large and complex organization that are hard to 
monitor and discipline. By compelling banks to do what they do best and to maintain simple 
balance sheets, activity restrictions should lead to improved efficiency. Therefore, when 
banks are not restricted to engage in broader financial activities, then they expand themselves 
into securities activities, insurance activities, real estate activities or even nonfinancial 
activities and banks can extremely large and complex and less disciplined. As a result, banks 
are likely to engage in greater risk-taking such as hide bad news activities which may 
consequently lead to crash risk. 
 Opponents of restricting banks’ activities argue that such restrictions prevent banks 
from achieving economies of scope and scale in gathering and processing information about 
firms, building reputational capital and facilitating various types of services to customers 
(Barth et al. 2000; Laeven & Levine 2007). Furthermore, restricting banks’ activities could 
also hinder banks from diversifying their income sources and reduce their franchise value, 
which might cause them to engage in risk-taking behavior (Claessens & Klingebiel 2001; 
Barth et al. 2004). In addition, according to the private interest view, such restrictions only 
give discretion to the regulators and thereby increase their bargaining power, which is not 
necessarily good for the sector (Djankov et al. 2002). This view suggests that restrictions on 
banks’ activities hinders their efficiency and performance. 
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 Thus, if the underlying rationales behind restricting bank activity is true and banks 
can become extremely complex and hard to monitor when the rules on activity restriction is 
not very stringent, then we would expect to see the impact of credit information sharing on 
crash risk to be more pronounced (when the level of activity restriction low). However, the 
regression results in the last columns of Table 4-29 report that the interaction term between 
PUB and LOW_ACTIVITY_RES is positive but not significant, meaning that the impact of 
credit information sharing on crash risk does not vary with the level of activity restriction on 
banks. The insignificance of the interaction suggests that, although fewer restrictions on 
broad financial activities may cause banks to complex and hard to monitor/discipline, fewer 
restrictions also prevent banks from engaging in risk-taking behaviors as they can achieve 
economies of scope and scale and diversify their income sources. One force of fewer 
restriction tends to make banks less disciplined and engage in greater risk-taking, but another 
force of low restriction suggests that banks can diversify and behave prudently. These two 
forces may offset each other making the result, not in line with our prediction that the impact 
of credit information sharing on crash risk is more pronounced with low activity restriction. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter investigates the role of credit information sharing in reducing future 
stock price crash risk. Using a sample of 1,402 banks in 55 countries during 2005-2013, we 
find evidence that credit information sharing has a negative impact on future stock price 
crash risk of bank-specific returns. Our results hold only for information sharing through 
public credit registries, whereas information sharing through private credit bureaus has no 
significant impact on crash risk. Compared to public credit registries, private credit bureaus 
are not compulsory and less regulated, such that it may involve self-selection bias. Opaque 
banks may not join the bureaus in the first place to share borrower information. Overall, the 
results are robust to an alternative measure of crash risk, adding more control variables, a 
subsample analysis, and an instrumental variable approach. 
 Our findings are consistent with the notion that forcing banks to share borrower 
information sharing may discourage loan officers to hide bad news for an extended period 
and subsequently lead to a reduction in stock price crash risk. Specifically, credit information 
sharing can help to monitor loan officers and to prevent corruption in lending. In addition, 
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sharing borrower information from one bank will be beneficial to another bank’s manager 
validating internal risk ratings and preventing loan officers from biasing their borrower 
reports. Moreover, credit information sharing may improve comparability that discourages 
hiding bad news. Therefore, with more credit information sharing, loan officers are less 
likely to conceal negative information about their borrowers for an extended period. 
Consequently, negative information is less likely to be accumulated and the probability of 
an asset price crash decreases. 
 Furthermore, we proxy the transparency level of information environment by the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS and show that it attenuates the impact of credit information 
sharing on crash risk. The finding suggests that the negative relationship between credit 
information sharing and crash risk is less pronounced when the information environment is 
more transparent. In an environment with a higher level of information transparency, loan 
officers have less ability to conceal negative information about borrowers as more 
information is accessible to both investors and loan managers. Thus, in the more transparent 
information environment, information sharing may be less useful in lowering crash risk.  
Regarding bank regulations, we find evidence that the negative relationship between 
credit information sharing and crash risk is more pronounced with less stringent capital 
requirements, low supervisory power and low degree of private monitoring. Our results 
indicate that, when the banking regulatory environments are weak, it is more useful to reduce 
crash risk by forcing banks to share borrower information. This finding suggests that, amid 
the weakness of the regulatory environments, information sharing may discourage banks to 
undergo undesirable activities like concealing bad news, such that it leads to lower stock 
price crash risk. Of all three aspects of bank regulations, the results also reveal that credit 
information sharing is much more useful in reducing crash risk with less powerful bank 
supervisors than less stringent capital requirements and less emphasis on private monitoring. 
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Table 4-1: Summary of Variables, Symbols and Sources 
Variable Description Source 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
NCSKEW 
Negative 
Conditional 
Skewness of 
Returns 
It is a negative conditional skewness of firm-specific weekly 
returns over fiscal year. Specifically, IJKL1A for a give 
firm in a fiscal year is calculated by taking the negative of 
the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns for each 
sample year and dividing (normalizing) it by the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third 
power (Chen et al. 2001; Kim et al. 2011b). Specifically, for 
each firm > in a year, IJKL1A is computed as: IJKL1A",&= − N(N − 1)3/# A",&3 (N − 1)(N − 2) A",&# 3/#  
Higher NCSKEW indicates higher stock price crash risk 
Datastream; 
Bankscope 
DUVOL 
Down-to-Up 
Volatility of 
Returns 
It is the down-to-up volatility measure of the crash likelihood (QRSTU). For each firm > over a fiscal year, firm-specific 
weekly returns are classified into two groups, “down” and 
“up”. The first group with “Down” weeks consists of the 
returns that are below the yearly mean and the second group 
with “Up” weeks consists of the returns that are above the 
yearly mean. Then standard deviation of firm-specific 
weekly returns is estimated separately for each of these two 
groups; and the volatility of down-to-up is calculated by 
taking the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard 
deviation of the group with “down” weeks to the standard 
deviation of the group with “up” weeks as shown below: QRSTU",& = VWX (NY − 1) A"Z,&#[\]^ (N_ − 1) A"`,&#.a  
Higher DUVOL indicates higher stock price crash risk 
Datastream; 
Bankscope 
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
DEPTH 
Depth of Credit 
Information 
Sharing index 
An index that measures the scope and contents of credit 
information that being shared. It ranges from zero to six. The 
value of zero indicates that there is no public credit registry 
or private credit bureau operating in a country. The value of 
one is added to the index with each of the following 
characteristics: 
• Both positive and negative information are 
distributed. 
• Data on households and firms are distributed. 
• Data from retailers, trade creditors, and/or utility 
companies as well as financial institutions are 
distributed. 
• More than 2 years of data are available. 
• Data are collected and distributed on loans with 
value below 1% of income per capita. 
World 
Bank’s 
Doing 
Business 
database; 
Djankov et 
al. (2007) 
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• Laws give right to borrowers to inspect their own 
data. 
Higher DEPTH indicates more credit information 
PRIV 
Private Credit 
Bureau 
Coverage (%) 
The number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit 
bureau with information on repayment history, unpaid debts, 
or credit outstanding from the past five years scaled by the 
adult population 
Higher PRIV indicates more credit information (through 
private credit bureaus) 
World 
Bank’s 
Doing 
Business 
database; 
Djankov et 
al. (2007) 
PUB 
Public Credit 
Registry 
Coverage (%) 
The number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit 
registry with information on repayment history, unpaid 
debts, or credit outstanding from the past five years scaled 
by adult population 
Higher PUB indicates more credit information (through 
public credit registries) 
World 
Bank’s 
Doing 
Business 
database; 
Djankov et 
al. (2007) 
IFRS 
International 
Financial 
Reporting 
Standard 
(IFRS) adoption 
A dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 for a country 
(and year) that adopts IFRS and 0 otherwise. 
A value of one (zero) indicates more (less) transparent 
information environment 
IFRS 
foundation 
website, 
Deloitte and 
Simon Fraser 
University in 
Canada 
LOW_BDI 
Low Business 
Extent of 
Disclosure 
Index 
This dummy variable is derived from BDI (business extent 
of disclosure index). BDI measures the extent to which 
investors are protected through disclosure of ownership and 
financial information (World Bank’s Doing Business 2016). 
It ranges from 0 to 10 with higher value indicating more 
disclosure of ownership and financial information to 
investors. We assign a dummy variable equal to 1 for a 
country with a value of BDI lower than the sample 50th 
percentile and zero for those above the sample 50th 
percentile. 
A value of one (zero) indicates less (more) transparent 
information environment 
World 
Bank’s 
Doing 
Business 
LOW_CAPITAL_STR 
Low Capital 
Stringency 
Index 
This dummy variable is derived from CAPITAL_STR 
(capital stringency index). CAPITAL_STR is an index 
measuring the extent of both initial and overall capital 
stringency. This index is constructed from following 
questions: 
1. Whether the minimum capital-asset ratio 
requirement is in line with the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision guidelines 
2. Does the minimum ratio varies as a function of an 
individual bank’s credit risk? 
World 
Bank’s Bank 
Regulation 
and 
Supervision 
Survey 
Database 
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3. Does the minimum ratio varies as a function of an 
individual bank’s market risk? 
4. Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, 
which of the following are deducted from the book 
value of capital: 
a. Market value of loan losses not realized in 
accounting books? 
b. Unrealized losses in securities portfolios?  
c. Unrealized foreign exchange losses? 
5. What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part 
of capital? (1 if the fraction is less than 0.75 and 0 
otherwise) 
6. Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified 
by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? 
7. Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections 
of capital be done with assets other than cash or 
government securities? 
8. Can initial capital contributions by prospective 
shareholders be in the form of borrowed funds? 
The index ranges from 0 to 10. We assign a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for a country with a value of CAPITAL_STR 
lower than the sample 50th percentile and zero for those 
above the sample 50th percentile. 
A value of one (zero) indicates less (more) capital stringent 
requirement 
LOW_SUPER_POW 
Low Official 
Supervisory 
Power index 
This dummy variable is derived from SUPER_POW 
(supervisory power index). SUPER_POW is an index 
measuring the power of officers in supervising and 
monitoring banks in each country. This index is constructed 
from the following questions: 
1. Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet 
with external auditors to discuss their report without 
the approval of the bank? 
2. Are auditors required by law to communicate 
directly to the supervisory agency any presumed 
involvement of bank directors or senior managers in 
illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 
3. Can supervisors take legal action against external 
auditors for negligence? 
4. Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change 
its internal organizational structure? 
5. Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 
6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s 
directors or management to constitute provisions to 
cover actual or potential losses? 
World 
Bank’s Bank 
Regulation 
and 
Supervision 
Survey 
Database 
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7. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ 
decision to distribute: 
a. Dividends? 
b. Bonuses? 
c. Management fees? 
8. Can the supervisory agency legally declare – such 
that this declaration supersedes the rights of bank 
shareholders – that a bank is insolvent? 
9. Does the Banking Law give authority to the 
supervisory agency to intervene, that is, suspend 
some or all ownership rights of a problem bank? 
10. Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, 
can the supervisory agency or any other government 
agency do the following: 
a. Supersede shareholder rights? 
b. Remove and replace management? 
c. Remove and replace directors? 
The index ranges from 0 to 14. We assign a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for a country with a value of SUPER_POW lower 
than the sample 50th percentile and zero for those above the 
sample 50th percentile. 
A value of one (zero) indicates less (more) supervisory power 
LOW_MONITOR 
Low Private 
Monitoring 
Index 
This dummy variable is derived from MONITOR (private 
monitoring index). MONITOR is an index measuring the 
extent of regulation and supervisory policies in shaping the 
incentives and ability of private investors to monitor and 
exert effective governance over banks in each country. This 
index is constructed from the following questions:  
1. Whether bank officials are legally liable if the 
information disclosure is erroneous or misleading? 
2. Whether banks disclosure information such as: 
a. Consolidated accounts covering all bank and 
any non-bank financial subsidiaries? 
b. Off-balance sheet items?  
c. Accrued, though unpaid interest/principal of 
non-performing loan? 
d. Risk management procedures to the public? 
3. Whether banks must be audited by certified 
international auditors? 
4. Whether the largest ten banks are rated by 
international rating agencies? 
5. Whether the largest ten banks are rated by domestic 
rating agencies? 
6. Whether subordinated debt is allowable as part of 
capital? 
World 
Bank’s Bank 
Regulation 
and 
Supervision 
Survey 
Database 
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7. Whether there is no explicit deposit insurance system 
and no insurance was paid the last time a bank failed? 
The index ranges from 0 to 10. We assign a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for a country with a value of MONITOR lower 
than the sample 50th percentile and zero for those above the 
sample 50th percentile. 
A value of one (zero) indicates less (more) private 
monitoring index 
DEPOSIT_INS Deposit Insurance 
A dummy variable indicating if the country had or not 
explicit deposit insurance system and zero otherwise. 
A value of one (zero) indicates the existence (non-existence) 
of deposit insurance regime 
Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. 
(2008) 
LOW_ACTIVITY_RES Low Activity Restriction 
This dummy variable is derived from ACTIVITY_RES 
(activity restriction index). ACTIVITY_RES is an index 
measuring the overall restrictions on banking activities, 
which include securities activities, insurance activities, real 
estate activities and activities in nonfinancial firms. 
1. What are the conditions under which banks can 
engage in securities activities? 
a. Unrestricted = 1: A full range of these 
activities can be conducted in directly in 
banks. 
b. Permitted = 2: A full range of these activities 
are offered but all or some of these activities 
must be conducted in subsidiaries or in 
another part of a common holding company 
or parent. 
c. Restricted = 3: Less than the full range of 
activities can be conducted in banks, or 
subsidiaries, or in another part of a common 
holding company or parent. 
d. Prohibited = 4: None of these activities can be 
done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in 
another part of a common holding company 
or parent. 
2. What are the conditions under which banks can 
engage in insurance activities? 
a. Unrestricted = 1: A full range of these 
activities can be conducted in directly in 
banks. 
b. Permitted = 2: A full range of these activities 
are offered but all or some of these activities 
must be conducted in subsidiaries or in 
World 
Bank’s Bank 
Regulation 
and 
Supervision 
Survey 
Database 
248	
	
another part of a common holding company 
or parent. 
c. Restricted = 3: Less than the full range of 
activities can be conducted in banks, or 
subsidiaries, or in another part of a common 
holding company or parent. 
d. Prohibited = 4: None of these activities can be 
done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in 
another part of a common holding company 
or parent. 
3. What are the conditions under which banks can 
engage in real estate activities? 
a. Unrestricted = 1: A full range of these 
activities can be conducted in directly in 
banks. 
b. Permitted = 2: A full range of these activities 
are offered but all or some of these activities 
must be conducted in subsidiaries or in 
another part of a common holding company 
or parent. 
c. Restricted = 3: Less than the full range of 
activities can be conducted in banks, or 
subsidiaries, or in another part of a common 
holding company or parent. 
d. Prohibited = 4: None of these activities can be 
done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in 
another part of a common holding company 
or parent. 
4. Can banks own voting shares in nonfinancial firms? 
a. Unrestricted = 1: A bank may own 100% of 
the equity in any non-financial firm. 
b. Permitted = 2: A bank may own 100% of the 
equity in a non-financial firm but ownership 
is limited based upon a bank's equity capital. 
c. Restricted = 3: A bank can only acquire less 
than 100% of the equity in a non-financial 
firm. 
d. Prohibited = 4: A bank may not have any 
equity investment in a non-financial firm 
whatsoever. 
The index ranges from 0 to 16. We assign a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for a country with a value of ACTIVITY_RES 
lower than the sample 50th percentile and zero for those 
above the sample 50th percentile. 
A value of one (zero) indicates less (more) activity 
restrictiveness. 
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DTURN Detrended Stock Turnover The detrended average monthly stock turnover Datastream 
SIGMA 
Standard 
Deviation of 
bank-specific 
weekly return 
The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over 
the year 
Datastream 
MEAN 
Mean of bank-
specific weekly 
return 
The average arithmetric mean of firm-specific weekly return 
over the year 
Datastream 
MV Market Value of Equity The market value of equity Datastream 
MTBV Market-to-Book Value Ratio 
The natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided 
by the value of equity 
Datastream 
LEV Leverage Ratio A leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities to total assets  Datastream 
ROA Return on Assets 
A return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets 
Datastream 
CAR_TIER1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio A tier1 capital adequacy ratio Datastream 
DEPOSIT 
Total Deposit to 
Total Asset 
Ratio 
A ratio of total deposits to total assets Datastream 
C_SCORE 
Conditional 
Accounting 
Conservatism 
Score 
Accounting conservatism refers to the tendency of 
accountants to require a higher degree of verification to 
recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as 
losses (Basu 1997; Kim & Zhang 2015). Conditional 
conservatism measures the incremental timeliness for 
recognizing bad news over good news. Following Khan and 
Watts (2009), we calculate C_SCORE to measure the 
conditional accounting conservatism for each bank-year. 
First, we estimate the equation below using five-year rolling 
panel regression for each country. 2-& = *+& + *#&Q-& + e-& o+& + o#&iLS-& + o3&ig-& + o5&U1S-&+ 	Q-&e-& q+& + q#&iLS-& + q3&ig-&+ q5&U1S-&+ r+&iLS-& + r#&ig-& + r3&U1S-&+ r5&Q-&iLS-& + r6&Q-&ig-&+ r7&Q-&U1S-& + =-& 
Second, we obtain q+& to q5& from the estimation above and 
plug them into the following equation to obtain C_SCORE: C_KJTe1 = 	*5- = q+ + q#iLS- + q3ig- + q5U1S-  
 
Datastream 
and own 
calculation 
C
ou
nt
ry
-S
pe
ci
fic
 C
on
tro
ls
 
GDPG 
A growth rate 
of gross 
domestic 
products (GDP) 
This variable is a growth rate of GDP. It captures 
macroeconomic developments and a proxy for fluctuation in 
economic activities. 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI) 
MKTCAP Stock Market Capitalization The stock market capitalization scaled by GDP  
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI) 
GDPPC 
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
Per Capital 
The natural logarithm of GDP per capital 
World 
Development 
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Indicators 
(WDI) 
CORRUPTION 
Control of 
Corruption 
index 
This index captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests. 
World 
Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
(WGI) 
GOV_EFF 
Government 
Effectiveness 
index 
This index captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
World 
Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
(WGI) 
POLITIC Political Stability index 
This index measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including 
terrorism. 
World 
Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
(WGI) 
REG_QUA Regulatory Quality index 
This index captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
World 
Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
(WGI) 
RULE_LAW Rule of Law index 
This index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
World 
Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
(WGI) 
VOICE_ACC 
Voice and 
Accountability 
index 
This index captures perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens can participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. 
World 
Bank’s 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
(WGI) 
In
st
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LEGALORIGIN Legal Origin A dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country 
has English legal origin and otherwise zero. 
Djankov	et	
al.	(2007) 
ETHNIC_FRAC Ethnic fractionalization 
This variable captures the ethnic diversity in a country. It 
measures probability that two randomly selected people from 
a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic 
group. 
Easterly 
(2001) 
LATITUDE Latitude 
This variable measures the geographical latitude of a 
country. It is calculated as an absolute value of the latitude 
of the country scaled to take a value between zero and one 
La Porta et 
al. (1999); 
Central 
Intelligence 
Agency 
(CIA) 
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Table 4-2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Stdev. Min Max P25 P50 (Median) P75 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
  NCSKEW 7562 -0.069 1.150 -6.920 6.980 -0.637 -0.038 0.552 
  DUVOL 7562 -0.086 0.434 -3.590 3.020 -0.314 -0.078 0.151 
E
xp
la
nt
or
y 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 C
IS
 DEPTH 7562 5.460 0.988 0.000 6.000 5.000 5.000 6.000 
PRIV 7562 0.771 0.370 0.000 1.000 0.630 1.000 1.000 
PUB 7562 0.115 0.106 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.061 0.277 
A
SY M
 IFRS 7562 0.888 0.315 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LOW_BDI 7562 0.106 0.308 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
E
G
 
LOW_CAPITAL_STR 7077 0.287 0.452 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LOW_SUPER_POW 7077 0.294 0.456 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LOW_MONITOR 7077 0.409 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DEPOSIT_INS 7077 0.947 0.223 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LOW_ACTIVITY_RES 7077 0.612 0.487 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
B
an
k-
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
  DTURN 7562 -0.002 0.067 -0.942 0.794 -0.007 0.000 0.006 
  SIGMA 7562 0.044 0.028 0.001 0.259 0.026 0.035 0.052 
  MEAN 7562 -0.002 0.008 -0.137 0.029 -0.005 -0.001 0.002 
  MV 7562 5.790 2.250 -2.410 12.500 4.120 5.550 7.240 
  MTBY 7562 0.028 0.262 -0.143 13.600 0.010 0.014 0.020 
  LEV 7562 0.909 0.043 0.330 1.090 0.892 0.914 0.934 
  ROA 7562 0.005 0.015 -0.442 0.117 0.002 0.007 0.010 
  DEPOSIT 7562 0.720 0.160 0.000 0.982 0.654 0.762 0.830 
  CAR_TIER1 7562 0.124 0.056 -0.117 1.250 0.095 0.115 0.140 
  C_SCORE 7562 1.760 1.660 -7.640 5.040 0.858 2.040 3.100 
C
ou
nt
ry
-S
pe
ci
fic
 C
on
tr
ol
s   GDPG 7562 0.020 0.031 -0.148 0.180 0.008 0.023 0.034 
  MKTCAP 7562 0.988 0.380 0.076 3.380 0.727 1.050 1.300 
  GDPPC 7562 10.400 1.000 6.590 11.600 10.600 10.800 10.800 
  CORRUPTION 7562 1.120 0.739 -1.200 2.550 1.260 1.310 1.380 
  GOV_EFF 7562 1.310 0.616 -1.000 2.430 1.460 1.510 1.600 
  POLITIC 7562 0.382 0.644 -2.810 1.510 0.374 0.488 0.635 
  REG_QUA 7562 1.190 0.584 -0.728 1.970 1.120 1.400 1.540 
  RULE_LAW 7562 1.280 0.667 -1.180 2.000 1.320 1.580 1.610 
  VOICE_ACC 7562 0.903 0.622 -1.680 1.760 1.070 1.090 1.120 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
  LEGALORIGIN 7440 0.699 0.459 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
  ETHNIC_FRAC 7236 0.420 0.224 0.000 0.890 0.320 0.500 0.500 
  LATITUDE 7539 0.686 0.078 0.314 0.835 0.691 0.691 0.691 
The table presents summary statistic of variables. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns and DUVOL is a down-
to-up volatility of returns. CIS represents credit information sharing measures; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; 
PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); 
ASYM represents information environment proxies; IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; 
LOW_BDI is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low business extent of disclosure index and zero 
otherwise: REG represents banking regulatory variables;  LOW_CAPITAL_STR is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one 
if a country has low capital stringency index and zero otherwise;  LOW_SUPER_POW is a dummy variable whose value is equal 
to one if a country has low supervisory power index and zero otherwise; LOW_MONITOR is a dummy variable whose value is 
equal to one if a country has low private monitoring index and zero otherwise; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy variable whose value is 
equal to one when there exist deposit insurance regime in the country; LOW_ACTIVITY_RES is a dummy variable whose value is 
equal to one if a country has low activity restriction index and zero otherwise; DTURN the detrended average monthly stock 
turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of 
firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets 
calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is 
a ratio of total deposits to total assets; C_SCORE is a measure of accounting conservatism; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP 
is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital; CORRUPTION is a control 
of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability index; REG_QUA is a 
regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability index; LEGALORIGIN is 
252	
	
a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization; 
LATITUDE is a country's latitude scaled to take a value between zero and one. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 
4-1 in this chapter. Obs is observation. Stdev is for standard deviation. Min is minimum. Max is maximum. P25 is 25th percentile 
of the sample. P50 is 50th percentile (or median) of the sample. P75 is 75th percentile of the sample.  
Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics - Grouped by Country 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of our main variables grouped by countries 
Variable Obs. Mean Stdev. Min Max P25 
P50 
(Median) P75 
NCSKEW 55 -0.098 0.292 -0.586 0.909 -0.331 -0.091 0.084 
DUVOL 55 -0.100 0.153 -0.381 0.467 -0.215 -0.090 -0.036 
DEPTH 55 4.440 1.400 0.000 6.000 4.000 4.870 5.000 
PRIV 55 0.410 0.365 0.000 1.000 0.075 0.315 0.790 
PUB 55 0.114 0.215 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.061 0.141 
IFRS 55 0.830 0.343 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LOW_BDI 55 0.474 0.493 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LOW_CAPITAL_STR 55 0.665 0.403 0.000 1.000 0.333 1.000 1.000 
LOW_SUPER_POW 55 0.679 0.419 0.000 1.000 0.167 1.000 1.000 
LOW_MONITOR 55 0.284 0.312 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.192 0.417 
  
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for variables used to construct each of LOW_BDI, LOW_CAPITAL_STR, 
LOW_SUPER_POW and LO_MONITOR 
Variable Obs. Mean Stdev. Min Max P25 
P50 
(Median) P75 
Bank-year                 
BDI 7562 6.920 1.430 0.000 10.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 
CAPITAL_STR 7077 6.910 1.210 2.000 8.000 6.000 7.000 8.000 
SUPER_POW 7077 9.360 1.280 3.500 11.000 9.000 10.000 10.000 
MONITOR 7077 7.170 1.590 4.000 10.000 5.000 8.000 8.000 
Group by Countries               
BDI 55 6.330 2.610 0.000 10.000 5.000 7.000 8.000 
CAPITAL_STR 55 5.820 1.120 3.000 8.000 5.350 6.000 6.590 
SUPER_POW 55 8.480 1.610 3.500 11.000 7.920 8.670 9.860 
MONITOR 55 8.210 1.020 6.000 10.000 7.440 8.140 9.000 
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The table presents further descriptive statistics. Specifically, Panel A shows descriptive statistics of our main variables grouped by 
countries, while Panel B shows descriptive statistics for variables used to construct each of LOW_BDI, LOW_CAPITAL_STR, 
LOW_SUPER_POW and LOW_MONITOR. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns and DUVOL is a down-to-up 
volatility of returns; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult 
population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population);  IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country 
adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index; SUPER_POW is a 
supervisory power index; MONITOR is a private monitoring index; LOW_BDI is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a 
country has low business extent of disclosure index and zero otherwise: LOW_CAPITAL_STR is a dummy variable whose value is 
equal to one if a country has low capital stringency index and zero otherwise;  LOW_SUPER_POW is a dummy variable whose value 
is equal to one if a country has low supervisory power index and zero otherwise; LOW_MONITOR is a dummy variable whose value 
is equal to one if a country has low private monitoring index and zero otherwise. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 4-
1 in this chapter. Obs is observation. Stdev is for standard deviation. Min is minimum. Max is maximum. P25 is 25th percentile of the 
sample. P50 is 50th percentile (or median) of the sample. P75 is 75th percentile of the sample.  
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Table 4-4: Mean Value of Negative Conditional Skewness, Credit Information Sharing 
Measures and Bank Regulatory Variables 
Date Obs. Percent NCSKEW DEPTH PRIV PUB IFRS BDI 
CAPITAL 
_STR 
SUPER 
_POW MONITOR 
2006 953 12.60% -0.4478 5.5761 0.8348 0.0516 0.9570 6.9864 6.5058 9.4485 5.3554 
2007 873 11.54% 0.1233 5.5120 0.8023 0.0748 0.9255 6.9817 6.3919 9.3347 5.4289 
2008 950 12.56% 0.1707 5.4916 0.7762 0.0835 0.8663 6.8937 6.2100 9.2580 5.5139 
2009 977 12.92% 0.1307 5.4340 0.7497 0.1074 0.8700 6.9345 7.3255 9.4310 8.2379 
2010 961 12.71% -0.0429 5.4173 0.7415 0.1142 0.8626 6.8949 7.2761 9.3918 8.2623 
2011 975 12.89% 0.1151 5.4215 0.7337 0.1283 0.8708 6.8636 7.2347 9.3571 8.2903 
2012 959 12.68% -0.2267 5.4307 0.7673 0.1674 0.8728 6.9009 7.2181 9.3364 8.3028 
2013 914 12.09% -0.3823 5.4354 0.7664 0.1939 0.8829 6.9497 7.1791 9.3472 8.2896 
Total 7562 100.00% -0.0700 5.4648 0.7715 0.1150 0.8885 6.9257 6.9176 9.3631 7.2101 
The table presents the yearly sample mean of our main variables. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns and DUVOL 
is a down-to-up volatility of returns; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of 
adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country 
adopts IFRS or not; BDI is a business extent of disclosure index; CAPITAL_STR is a capital stringency index; SUPER_POW is a 
supervisory power index; MONITOR is a private monitoring index. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter. 
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Table 4-5: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variables NCSKEW DUVOL DEPTH PRIV PUB IFRS 
LOW 
_BDI 
LOW 
_CAPITAL 
_STR 
LOW 
_SUPER 
_POW 
LOW 
_MONITOR DEPOSIT_INS 
LOW_ 
ACTIVITY 
_RES 
NCSKEW 1.000            
DUVOL 0.912 1.000           
DEPTH 0.047 0.071 1.000          
PRIV 0.065 0.092 0.772 1.000         
PUB -0.063 -0.075 -0.193 -0.389 1.000        
IFRS -0.004 0.005 -0.052 0.095 -0.060 1.000       
LOW_BDI -0.027 -0.043 -0.422 -0.466 0.174 -0.048 1.000      
LOW_CAPITAL_STR -0.046 -0.065 -0.610 -0.724 0.244 -0.263 0.311 1.000     
LOW_SUPER_POW -0.021 -0.033 -0.521 -0.626 0.184 -0.275 0.384 0.727 1.000    
LOW_MONITOR 0.008 -0.003 0.032 -0.006 -0.105 -0.122 -0.070 0.048 0.008 1.000   
DEPOSIT_INS 0.003 0.011 0.243 0.278 -0.055 0.089 -0.204 -0.312 -0.299 -0.006 1.000  
LOW_ACTIVITY_RES 0.008 0.020 -0.055 -0.034 0.041 0.010 0.206 0.010 0.049 -0.698 0.030 1.000 
DTURN 0.005 0.000 0.068 0.078 -0.021 0.040 -0.018 -0.071 -0.071 0.013 0.037 0.000 
SIGMA 0.103 0.095 0.104 0.114 -0.084 0.124 -0.080 -0.167 -0.158 -0.347 0.076 0.342 
MEAN -0.094 -0.085 -0.063 -0.085 0.043 -0.067 0.054 0.101 0.089 0.121 -0.036 -0.128 
MV -0.016 -0.032 -0.222 -0.320 0.266 -0.218 0.233 0.342 0.403 0.047 -0.231 -0.065 
MTBY -0.014 -0.023 -0.086 -0.097 0.091 0.017 -0.010 0.076 -0.026 -0.005 0.003 0.005 
LEV 0.037 0.037 0.121 0.056 0.040 -0.195 -0.045 0.045 0.124 0.021 0.028 -0.076 
ROA -0.107 -0.101 -0.131 -0.149 0.057 0.004 0.068 0.155 0.073 0.180 -0.106 -0.184 
DEPOSIT -0.011 0.005 0.299 0.233 -0.261 -0.174 -0.293 -0.249 -0.386 -0.006 0.026 -0.110 
CAR_TIER1 -0.050 -0.049 -0.091 -0.032 -0.047 0.131 0.055 -0.003 -0.071 -0.088 -0.007 0.124 
C_SCORE -0.058 -0.017 0.126 0.143 -0.097 0.043 -0.058 -0.099 -0.133 -0.202 0.107 0.272 
GDPG -0.071 -0.067 -0.353 -0.382 0.101 0.025 0.117 0.361 0.250 0.213 -0.327 -0.345 
MKTCAP 0.034 0.057 0.376 0.402 -0.230 0.181 -0.220 -0.387 -0.408 0.362 0.081 -0.355 
GDPPC 0.090 0.116 0.466 0.671 -0.231 0.110 -0.244 -0.543 -0.359 0.057 0.253 0.159 
CORRUPTION 0.078 0.103 0.338 0.490 -0.277 0.021 -0.265 -0.329 -0.185 0.163 0.287 0.093 
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GOV_EFF 0.084 0.110 0.469 0.608 -0.285 0.074 -0.368 -0.462 -0.321 0.185 0.337 0.025 
POLITIC 0.072 0.099 0.337 0.482 -0.153 -0.039 -0.199 -0.318 -0.216 0.046 0.308 0.147 
REG_QUA 0.082 0.108 0.483 0.651 -0.277 0.182 -0.333 -0.529 -0.367 0.235 0.354 -0.001 
RULE_LAW 0.084 0.112 0.503 0.659 -0.322 0.155 -0.331 -0.521 -0.362 0.106 0.356 0.063 
VOICE_ACC 0.060 0.080 0.486 0.574 -0.259 0.156 -0.313 -0.390 -0.247 0.115 0.501 0.059 
LEGALORIGIN 0.023 0.046 0.583 0.586 -0.336 0.338 -0.425 -0.630 -0.625 -0.005 0.102 -0.113 
ETHNIC_FRAC -0.032 -0.028 0.172 0.053 -0.053 0.370 -0.185 -0.237 -0.337 -0.094 0.041 -0.108 
LATITUDE 0.065 0.065 0.079 0.174 -0.205 0.094 0.028 -0.126 0.121 0.066 0.262 0.029 
The table presents correlation matrix between variables. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns and DUVOL is a down-to-up volatility of returns; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; 
PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; LOW_BDI 
is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low business extent of disclosure index and zero otherwise: LOW_CAPITAL_STR is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has 
low capital stringency index and zero otherwise;  LOW_SUPER_POW is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low supervisory power index and zero otherwise; LOW_MONITOR is a dummy 
variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low private monitoring index and zero otherwise; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one when there exist deposit insurance regime in 
the country; LOW_ACTIVITY_RES is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low activity restriction index and zero otherwise;  DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA 
is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm 
of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; C_SCORE is a measure of accounting conservatism; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock 
market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital; CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political 
stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability index; LEGALORIGIN is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a 
country has English legal origin; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization; LATITUDE is a country's latitude scaled to take a value between zero and one. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 
in this chapter.  
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Table 4-6: Pearson Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
Variables DTURN SIGMA MEAN MV MTBY LEV ROA DEPOSIT CAR_TIER1 C_SCORE GDPG 
DTURN 1.000           
SIGMA 0.104 1.000          
MEAN -0.042 -0.516 1.000         
MV -0.019 -0.403 0.272 1.000        
MTBY -0.005 -0.001 0.019 0.037 1.000       
LEV 0.010 0.140 -0.119 0.055 0.001 1.000      
ROA -0.065 -0.477 0.412 0.270 0.031 -0.282 1.000     
DEPOSIT -0.006 0.132 -0.052 -0.382 0.026 0.100 -0.068 1.000    
CAR_TIER1 -0.029 -0.118 0.108 -0.082 0.014 -0.713 0.240 -0.081 1.000   
C_SCORE -0.029 0.107 -0.052 -0.209 -0.005 0.027 -0.083 0.138 0.028 1.000  
GDPG -0.103 -0.296 0.196 0.203 0.066 -0.114 0.315 0.029 0.080 0.088 1.000 
MKTCAP 0.037 -0.121 0.035 -0.111 -0.063 -0.087 0.093 0.202 0.052 0.163 0.134 
GDPPC 0.080 0.043 -0.080 -0.224 -0.115 0.019 -0.143 -0.060 -0.036 0.100 -0.468 
CORRUPTION 0.057 -0.026 -0.057 -0.190 -0.113 0.100 -0.096 -0.050 -0.071 0.062 -0.370 
GOV_EFF 0.071 0.010 -0.069 -0.257 -0.118 0.089 -0.119 0.037 -0.072 0.089 -0.395 
POLITIC 0.058 -0.036 -0.039 -0.108 -0.087 0.104 -0.092 -0.065 -0.076 0.121 -0.358 
REG_QUA 0.081 0.008 -0.070 -0.247 -0.117 0.052 -0.116 -0.050 -0.068 0.041 -0.422 
RULE_LAW 0.072 0.057 -0.094 -0.293 -0.131 0.079 -0.141 0.026 -0.070 0.108 -0.422 
VOICE_ACC 0.062 0.049 -0.067 -0.251 -0.074 0.198 -0.153 -0.032 -0.125 0.101 -0.497 
LEGALORIGIN 0.055 0.171 -0.086 -0.339 -0.067 -0.138 -0.039 0.321 0.055 0.151 0.011 
ETHNIC_FRAC 0.007 0.135 -0.032 -0.164 0.073 -0.174 0.078 0.290 0.139 0.089 0.321 
LATITUDE -0.001 0.033 -0.045 -0.114 -0.131 0.117 -0.122 -0.193 -0.084 0.060 -0.308 
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The table presents correlation matrix between variables. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns and DUVOL is a down-to-up volatility of returns; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; 
PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; LOW_BDI 
is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low business extent of disclosure index and zero otherwise: LOW_CAPITAL_STR is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has 
low capital stringency index and zero otherwise;  LOW_SUPER_POW is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low supervisory power index and zero otherwise; LOW_MONITOR is a dummy 
variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low private monitoring index and zero otherwise; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one when there exist deposit insurance regime in 
the country; DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return 
over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is 
a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; C_SCORE is a measure of 
accounting conservatism; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital; CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; 
GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability index; 
LEGALORIGIN is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization; LATITUDE is a country's latitude scaled to take a value between 
zero and one. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  
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Table 4-7: Pearson Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
Variables MKTCAP GDPPC CORRUPTION GOV_EFF POLITIC REG_QUA RULE_LAW VOICE_ACC LEGALORIGIN ETHNIC_FRAC LATITUDE 
MKTCAP 1.000           
GDPPC 0.301 1.000          
CORRUPTION 0.330 0.850 1.000         
GOV_EFF 0.439 0.857 0.953 1.000        
POLITIC 0.242 0.854 0.861 0.816 1.000       
REG_QUA 0.442 0.891 0.911 0.949 0.794 1.000      
RULE_LAW 0.432 0.883 0.944 0.967 0.828 0.950 1.000     
VOICE_ACC 0.236 0.696 0.791 0.798 0.702 0.803 0.827 1.000    
LEGALORIGIN 0.571 0.168 0.102 0.272 -0.050 0.298 0.331 0.174 1.000   
ETHNIC_FRAC 0.390 -0.385 -0.410 -0.243 -0.473 -0.253 -0.231 -0.267 0.723 1.000  
LATITUDE -0.112 0.488 0.445 0.409 0.410 0.402 0.435 0.417 -0.198 -0.436 1.000 
The table presents correlation matrix between variables. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns and DUVOL is a down-to-up volatility of returns; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; 
PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; LOW_BDI 
is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low business extent of disclosure index and zero otherwise: LOW_CAPITAL_STR is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has 
low capital stringency index and zero otherwise;  LOW_SUPER_POW is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low supervisory power index and zero otherwise; LOW_MONITOR is a dummy 
variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low private monitoring index and zero otherwise; DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one when there exist deposit insurance regime in 
the country; DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return 
over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is 
a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; C_SCORE is a measure of 
accounting conservatism; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital; CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; 
GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability index; 
LEGALORIGIN is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization; LATITUDE is a country's latitude scaled to take a value between 
zero and one. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  
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Table 4-8: Model Selection and Diagnostic Tests 
Panel A: Poolability Test 
F(1401, 6147) 1.62 
F(1401, 6147) P-value 0.00 
The test of poolability is performed to determine the presence of individual effects, αi in the regression model. H0: αi=0 for i = 1, 2, 
3…., N. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the individual effects exist and the OLS estimates suffer from the problem 
of omitted variables. 
  
Panel B: Hausman Test 
Chi-sq(13) 271.72 
Chi-sq(13) P-value 0.00 
The Hausman test is performed to choose between the fixed effect model and the random effect model. H0: difference in coefficients 
not systemic. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the fix effect regression model is preferable to the random effect. 
  
Panel C: Modified Wald Test for Groupwise Heteroskedasticity in Fixed Effect Regression Model 
Chi-sq(1402) 713.4 
Chi-sq(1402) P-value 0.00 
The modified Wald test is performed to test for the presence of groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals. H0: σ"# = σ# for i = 1, 2, 
3…., Ng, where Ng is the number of cross-sectional units. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that there exist the 
groupwise geteroskedasticity. 
  
Panel D: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 
F(1, 1114) 40.807 
F(1, 1114) P-value 0.00 
The Wooldridge test is performed to test for the presence of serial correlation. H0: no first-order autocorrelation. The rejection of the 
null hypothesis indicates that data does not have first-order autocorrelation. 
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Table 4-9: The Impact of Credit Information Sharing Measures on Bank Stock Price Crash 
Risk 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
(1) (2) (3) 
DEPTH -0.009     
  (-0.30)     
PRIV   0.028   
    (0.32)   
PUB     -0.462*** 
      (-2.72) 
DTURN 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 
  (2.08) (1.97) (1.76) 
SIGMA 3.064*** 3.017*** 2.972*** 
  (3.54) (3.53) (3.53) 
MEAN -3.821 -3.862 -4.005* 
  (-1.56) (-1.59) (-1.68) 
MV 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 
  (3.05) (3.02) (3.15) 
MTBV -0.024*** -0.023** -0.011 
  (-2.69) (-2.64) (-1.13) 
LEV -0.196 -0.222 -0.195 
  (-0.38) (-0.42) (-0.39) 
ROA -4.566*** -4.572*** -4.536*** 
  (-5.97) (-5.97) (-5.70) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.19) (-0.22) (-0.37) 
DEPOSIT 0.119 0.092 0.034 
  (0.77) (0.67) (0.25) 
GDPG -0.775 -0.573 -0.635 
  (-0.62) (-0.48) (-0.53) 
MKTCAP 0.002 -0.012 -0.017 
  (0.03) (-0.18) (-0.29) 
GDPPC 0.095*** 0.089** 0.085*** 
  (3.36) (2.63) (3.21) 
Constant -1.889*** -1.837*** -1.775*** 
  (-3.31) (-2.89) (-3.28) 
R-squared 0.061 0.061 0.063 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,562 7,562 7,562 
This table presents the regression for the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk. The dependent variable is crash stock 
measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing 
index; PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult 
population); DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly 
return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of 
equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio 
calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP 
growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital. Further 
detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-10: The Impact of Public Credit Registry Coverages on Bank Stock Price Crash 
Risk: The Role of Information Asymmetry 
Variable 
NCSKEW NCSKEW 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PUB -0.464*** -0.870*** -0.461*** -0.413* 
  (-2.69) (-6.91) (-2.72) (-1.70) 
IFRS -0.022* -0.052     
  (-1.77) (-1.17)     
IFRS * PUB   0.510*     
    (1.91)     
LOW_BDI     -0.012 -0.002 
      (-0.17) (-0.03) 
LOW_BDI * PUB       -0.121 
        (-0.40) 
DTURN 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
  (1.81) (1.84) (1.71) (1.72) 
SIGMA 3.007*** 2.989*** 2.967*** 2.980*** 
  (3.51) (3.53) (3.55) (3.56) 
MEAN -4.008* -3.986* -4.005* -3.994* 
  (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.68) 
MV 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
  (2.97) (2.87) (3.14) (3.13) 
MTBV -0.01 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 
  (-0.92) (-1.14) (-1.15) (-1.18) 
LEV -0.221 -0.258 -0.195 -0.199 
  (-0.44) (-0.51) (-0.39) (-0.40) 
ROA -4.512*** -4.532*** -4.537*** -4.533*** 
  (-5.59) (-5.67) (-5.69) (-5.71) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.39) (-0.45) (-0.37) (-0.39) 
DEPOSIT 0.018 0.003 0.028 0.032 
  (0.13) (0.02) (0.20) (0.23) 
GDPG -0.621 -0.616 -0.627 -0.662 
  (-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.55) 
MKTCAP -0.012 0.011 -0.018 -0.017 
  (-0.21) (0.18) (-0.31) (-0.30) 
GDPPC 0.085*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 
  (3.21) (3.07) (3.04) (3.04) 
Constant -1.707*** -1.588*** -1.764*** -1.775*** 
  (-2.90) (-2.72) (-3.19) (-3.18) 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 
This table presents the regression for the impact of information asymmetry on the relationship between public credit registry coverages 
and crash risk. The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; 
PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS is a 
dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; LOW_BDI is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a 
country has low business extent of disclosure index and zero otherwise; DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific 
weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by 
the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to 
total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm 
of GDP per capital. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all 
regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-11: The Impact of Public Credit Registry Coverages on Bank Stock Price Crash 
Risk: The Role of Bank Regulations 
Variable NCSKEW NCSKEW NCSKEW 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PUB -0.481*** -0.454** -0.463** -0.436** -0.465** -0.465** 
  (-2.78) (-2.53) (-2.57) (-2.40) (-2.63) (-2.63) 
LOW_CAPITAL_STR 0.226* -0.09         
  (1.89) (-0.49)         
LOW_CAPITAL_STR * PUB   -3.389***         
    (-3.55)         
LOW_SUPER_POW     0.016 0.138     
      (0.13) (1.17)     
LOW_SUPER_POW * PUB     -5.124***     
        (-3.69)     
LOW_MONITOR         0.041* 0.074 
          (1.71) -0.85 
LOW_MONITOR * PUB         -4.146*** 
            (-8.08) 
DTURN 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.22) (0.12) (0.16) 
SIGMA 3.247*** 3.293*** 3.170*** 3.180*** 3.205*** 3.319*** 
  (3.23) (3.21) (3.33) (3.38) (3.32) (3.32) 
MEAN -4.012* -3.938 -4.036* -3.967* -3.993* -3.765 
  (-1.71) (-1.65) (-1.72) (-1.68) (-1.70) (-1.53) 
MV 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.028** 0.029** 0.031*** 
  (2.62) (2.64) (2.62) (2.57) (2.66) (2.74) 
MTBV -0.004 -0.007 -0.009 -0.01 -0.009 -0.01 
  (-0.34) (-0.6) (-0.88) (-0.98) (-0.88) (-1.07) 
LEV -0.144 -0.133 -0.237 -0.311 -0.21 -0.228 
  (-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.51) (-0.65) (-0.45) (-0.47) 
ROA -4.604*** -4.630*** -4.593*** -4.578*** -4.612*** -4.640*** 
  (-5.82) (-5.92) (-5.82) (-5.68) (-5.83) (-5.75) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-0.29) (-0.18) (-0.53) (-0.70) (-0.49) (-0.63) 
DEPOSIT -0.098 -0.081 -0.098 -0.102 -0.11 -0.142 
  (-0.64) (-0.52) (-0.63) (-0.65) (-0.72) (-0.93) 
GDPG -0.516 -0.487 -0.517 -0.372 -0.513 -0.468 
  (-0.46) (-0.43) (-0.44) (-0.33) (-0.47) (-0.42) 
MKTCAP 0.006 -0.001 0.021 -0.005 0.015 -0.018 
  (0.11) (-0.02) (0.37) (-0.08) (0.25) (-0.32) 
GDPPC 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.077*** 0.084*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 
  (3.09) (3.05) (3.07) (3.45) (3.26) (3.48) 
Constant -1.577** -1.588** -1.550*** -1.500** -1.601*** -1.595*** 
  (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.68) (-2.58) (-2.69) (-2.68) 
R-squared 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.068 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 
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This table presents the regression for the impact of bank regulations on the relationship between public credit registry coverages 
and crash risk. The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of 
returns; PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); LOW_CAPITAL_STR is a dummy variable whose value is 
equal to one if a country has low capital stringency index and zero otherwise;  LOW_SUPER_POW is a dummy variable whose 
value is equal to one if a country has low supervisory power index and zero otherwise; LOW_MONITOR is a dummy variable 
whose value is equal to one if a country has low private monitoring index and zero otherwise;  DTURN the detrended average 
monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average 
arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of 
the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA 
is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital 
adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market 
capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital. Further detail of all variables are presented in 
Table 4-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-12: The Impact of Credit Information Sharing Measures on Bank Stock Price 
Crash Risk - DUVOL 
Variable 
DUVOL 
(1) (2) (3) 
DEPTH 0.003     
  (0.26)     
PRIV   0.024   
    (0.70)   
PUB     -0.199*** 
      (-2.97) 
DTURN 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (3.44) (3.36) (3.30) 
SIGMA 1.049*** 1.034*** 1.025*** 
  (3.44) (3.45) (3.41) 
MEAN -0.565 -0.580 -0.631 
  (-1.10) (-1.14) (-1.24) 
MV 0.007 0.008 0.008 
  (1.42) (1.42) (1.51) 
MTBV -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.012*** 
  (-4.72) (-4.89) (-3.23) 
LEV -0.056 -0.061 -0.045 
  (-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.23) 
ROA -1.592*** -1.589*** -1.574*** 
  (-6.49) (-6.43) (-6.30) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.96) (-0.99) (-1.12) 
DEPOSIT 0.030 0.023 0.004 
  (0.55) (0.48) (0.07) 
GDPG 0.082 0.119 0.058 
  (0.27) (0.38) (0.21) 
MKTCAP 0.024 0.021 0.022 
  (1.11) (0.91) (1.24) 
GDPPC 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
  (5.16) (4.01) (5.53) 
Constant -0.838*** -0.796*** -0.790*** 
  (-3.23) (-2.95) (-3.19) 
R-squared 0.049 0.049 0.051 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,562 7,562 7,562 
This table presents the regression for the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk. The dependent variable is crash stock 
measured by DUVOL. DUVOL is a down-to-up volatility of returns; DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; PRIV is 
private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); DTURN 
the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; 
MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability 
to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a 
tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock 
market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital. Further detail of all variables are 
presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-13: The Effect of Information Asymmetry on the Linkage between Public Credit 
Registry Coverages and Bank Stock Price Crash Risk - DUVOL 
Variable 
DUVOL DUVOL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PUB -0.199*** -0.335*** -0.198*** -0.189* 
  (-2.97) (-7.19) (-3.00) (-1.90) 
IFRS -0.001* -0.011     
  (-2.10) (-0.67)     
IFRS * PUB   0.171*     
    (1.73)     
LOW_BDI     -0.016 -0.014 
      (-0.75) (-0.58) 
LOW_BDI * PUB       -0.023 
        (-0.20) 
DTURN 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (3.52) (3.64) (3.19) (3.18) 
SIGMA 1.027*** 1.021*** 1.018*** 1.021*** 
  (3.45) (3.45) (3.43) (3.43) 
MEAN -0.632 -0.624 -0.631 -0.629 
  (-1.24) (-1.23) (-1.24) (-1.23) 
MV 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 
  (1.43) (1.36) (1.52) (1.51) 
MTBV -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
  (-2.92) (-3.01) (-3.24) (-3.02) 
LEV -0.047 -0.059 -0.045 -0.046 
  (-0.23) (-0.30) (-0.23) (-0.23) 
ROA -1.573*** -1.579*** -1.577*** -1.576*** 
  (-6.31) (-6.46) (-6.40) (-6.40) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.11) (-1.17) (-1.12) (-1.13) 
DEPOSIT 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 
  (0.05) (-0.05) (-0.09) (-0.08) 
GDPG 0.059 0.06 0.068 0.061 
  (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) 
MKTCAP 0.022 0.03 0.021 0.021 
  (1.19) (1.55) (1.13) (1.13) 
GDPPC 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
  (5.52) (5.34) (5.27) (5.10) 
Constant -0.786*** -0.746*** -0.775*** -0.778*** 
  (-2.96) (-2.82) (-3.14) (-3.12) 
R-squared 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 
This table presents the regression for the impact of information asymmetry on the relationship between public credit registry coverages 
and crash risk. The dependent variable is crash stock measured by DUVOL. DUVOL is a down-to-up volatility of returns; PUB is public 
credit registry coverage (% of adult population); IFRS and BDI are proxies of information environment; IFRS is a dummy variable 
indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; LOW_BDI is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low 
business extent of disclosure index and zero otherwise; DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the 
year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV 
is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real 
GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital. Further 
detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-14: The Effect of Bank Regulations on the Linkage between Public Credit 
Registry Coverages and Bank Stock Price Crash Risk - DUVOL 
Variable 
DUVOL DUVOL DUVOL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PUB -0.207*** -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.193*** -0.201*** -0.201*** 
  (-3.01) (-2.87) (-2.77) (-2.67) (-2.86) (-2.86) 
LOW_CAPITAL_STR 0.102* -0.069         
  (1.84) (-1.26)         
LOW_CAPITAL_STR * PUB   -0.811***         
    (-2.83)         
LOW_SUPER_POW     0.007 0.037     
      (0.17) (0.81)     
LOW_SUPER_POW * PUB     -1.264**     
        (-2.54)     
LOW_MONITOR         0.003* 0.01 
          (1.90) (0.35) 
LOW_MONITOR * PUB         -0.968*** 
            (-4.75) 
DTURN 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.29) (0.31) (0.30) 
SIGMA 1.102*** 1.113*** 1.067*** 1.070*** 1.072*** 1.099*** 
  (3.22) (3.21) (3.34) (3.37) (3.29) (3.31) 
MEAN -0.543 -0.525 -0.554 -0.537 -0.549 -0.496 
  (-1.03) (-0.99) (-1.05) (-1.01) (-1.02) (-0.91) 
MV 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
  (1.33) (1.33) (1.27) (1.24) (1.31) (1.34) 
MTBV -0.009** -0.006 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
  (-2.10) (-1.61) (-2.80) (-2.84) (-2.80) (-2.91) 
LEV -0.02 -0.018 -0.063 -0.081 -0.06 -0.064 
  (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0.32) (-0.41) (-0.30) (-0.31) 
ROA -1.605*** -1.611*** -1.600*** -1.596*** -1.602*** -1.608*** 
  (-6.74) (-6.84) (-6.74) (-6.54) (-6.82) (-6.80) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-0.96) (-0.88) (-1.24) (-1.33) (-1.23) (-1.28) 
DEPOSIT -0.027 -0.022 -0.026 -0.027 -0.029 -0.036 
  (-0.49) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.68) 
GDPG -0.017 -0.01 -0.017 -0.018 -0.029 -0.019 
  (-0.06) (-0.03) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.10) (-0.06) 
MKTCAP 0.027 0.025 0.034* 0.027 0.033* 0.026 
  (1.57) (1.44) (1.9) (1.52) (1.84) (1.5) 
GDPPC 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 
  (5.3) (5.23) (4.95) (5.26) (5.07) (5.21) 
Constant -0.731*** -0.734*** -0.719*** -0.707*** -0.721** -0.719** 
  (-2.68) (-2.68) (-2.73) (-2.72) (-2.60) (-2.61) 
R-squared 0.055 0.055 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.054 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 
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This table presents the regression for the impact of bank regulations on the relationship between public credit registry coverages 
and crash risk. The dependent variable is crash stock measured by DUVOL. DUVOL is a down-to-up volatility of returns; PUB is 
public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); LOW_CAPITAL_STR is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if 
a country has low capital stringency index and zero otherwise;  LOW_SUPER_POW is a dummy variable whose value is equal to 
one if a country has low supervisory power index and zero otherwise; LOW_MONITOR is a dummy variable whose value is equal 
to one if a country has low private monitoring index and zero otherwise;  DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetric mean of firm-
specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets 
calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is 
a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; 
GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  
Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are 
applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-15: Subsample Analysis for the Impact of Public Credit Registry Coverages on 
Bank Stock Price Crash Risk - grouped by Information Asymmetry 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
IFRS Adoption NON-IFRS Adoption 
(1) (2) 
PUB -0.341 -0.782* 
  (-1.59) (-2.16) 
DTURN 0.020*** 0.01 
  (4.08) (1.52) 
SIGMA 2.909*** 2.123 
  (3.38) (0.74) 
MEAN -4.568** 11.073 
  (-2.22) (1.15) 
MV 0.030** 0.015 
  (2.53) (0.38) 
MTBV -0.013 2.729 
  (-1.36) (1.3) 
LEV -0.45 1.447 
  (-0.84) (0.57) 
ROA -4.748*** 2.512 
  (-5.81) (0.86) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.003 0.012 
  (-0.79) (0.92) 
DEPOSIT -0.019 0.091 
  (-0.12) (0.18) 
GDPG -0.428 -1.944 
  (-0.35) (-0.77) 
MKTCAP 0.025 0.076 
  (0.39) (0.52) 
GDPPC 0.079*** 0.054 
  (2.89) (0.52) 
Constant -1.461** -2.557 
  (-2.50) (-0.95) 
R-squared 0.069 0.067 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time Dummies  Yes   Yes  
Observations 6,715 847 
This table presents the regression for the impact of public credit registry coverages on crash risk. The subsamples are grouped 
by a proxy of information environment. IFRS Adoption is a group of countries that adopts IFRS while Non-IFRS Adoption is a 
group of countries that does not IFRS.  
The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; PUB is 
public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the 
standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly 
return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by 
the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as 
income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of 
total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is 
the natural logarithm of GDP per capital. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy 
variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all 
estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-16: Subsample Analysis for the Impact of Public Credit Registry Coverages on 
Bank Stock Price Crash Risk - grouped by Bank Regulations 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
HIGH 
CAPITAL_STR 
LOW  
CAPITAL_STR 
HIGH  
SUPER_POW 
LOW  
SUPER_POW 
HIGH  
MONITOR 
LOW  
MONITOR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PUB -0.32 -0.632*** -0.418 -0.527** -0.413** -0.759*** 
  (-1.05) (-4.38) (-1.11) (-2.37) (-2.01) (-3.05) 
DTURN 0.023*** 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.003 0.206 0.001 
  (6.35) (3.29) (7.40) (0.42) (0.88) (0.13) 
SIGMA 2.301*** 5.307* 3.264** 2.028 5.030*** 1.082 
  (6.41) (1.84) (2.42) (1.23) (6.1) (0.44) 
MEAN -5.858*** 5.726 -5.248*** -2.098 -0.578 -13.291*** 
  (-4.60) (0.66) (-3.61) (-0.25) (-0.18) (-4.06) 
MV 0.014** 0.049** 0.031* 0.024 0.066*** -0.03 
  (2.79) (2.09) (2.04) (1.32) (7.05) (-1.10) 
MTBV 0.487 -0.018 0.004 1.881 -0.013 -0.032 
  (0.49) (-1.64) (0.38) (1.09) (-1.03) (-1.18) 
LEV -0.714 0.595 0.265 -0.911 -0.407 -0.481 
  (-1.03) (0.87) (0.86) (-1.50) (-0.64) (-0.70) 
ROA -5.091*** -1.783 -4.360*** -3.895*** -4.962*** -2.088 
  (-7.49) (-0.60) (-3.03) (-4.17) (-7.95) (-0.85) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.007 0.001 -0.013** 
  (-1.06) (0.64) (0.48) (-1.35) (0.26) (-2.59) 
DEPOSIT -0.033 -0.168 0.026 -0.268 0.251 -0.480** 
  (-0.16) (-0.74) (0.25) (-1.16) (1.2) (-2.45) 
GDPG -1.261 -0.158 -3.707* 0.48 -0.305 -3.626 
  (-0.72) (-0.13) (-2.06) (0.41) (-0.33) (-1.39) 
MKTCAP 0.019 -0.004 0.049 0.014 -0.099 0.274*** 
  (0.24) (-0.06) (0.54) (0.16) (-1.19) (2.88) 
GDPPC 0.090** 0.100*** 0.055 0.082*** 0.110*** -0.043 
  (2.68) (3.63) (1.36) (3.79) (5.32) (-0.91) 
Constant -0.948 -2.994*** -1.876* -0.732 -2.538*** 1.324 
  (-1.21) (-3.11) (-1.89) (-1.11) (-2.92) (1.45) 
R-squared 0.079 0.063 0.081 0.064 0.083 0.071 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 5,048 2,029 4,996 2,081 4,179 2,898 
This table presents the regression for the impact of public credit registry coverages on crash risk. The subsamples are grouped by 
banking regulatory variables. LOW_CAPITAL_STR is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low capital 
stringency index and zero for HIGH_CAPITAL_STR;  LOW_SUPER_POW is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a 
country has low supervisory power index and zero for HIGH_SUPER_POW; LOW_MONITOR is a dummy variable whose value is 
equal to one if a country has low private monitoring index and zero for HIGH_MONITOR; 
The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; PUB is public 
credit registry coverage (% of adult population); DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the 
year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; 
LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total 
assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capital. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are included in all 
regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
  
271	
	
Table 4-17: Estimation results with Additional Control Variables for the Impact of Public 
Credit Registry Coverages on Bank Stock Price Crash Risk 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PUB -0.462*** -0.448** -0.454** -0.467*** -0.468*** -0.467*** -0.492*** -0.466*** 
  (-2.72) (-2.60) (-2.62) (-2.69) (-2.75) (-2.77) (-2.90) (-2.76) 
DTURN 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
  (1.76) (1.68) (1.68) (1.71) (1.78) (1.78) (1.79) (1.94) 
SIGMA 2.972*** 3.027*** 3.023*** 3.017*** 2.955*** 2.965*** 2.944*** 3.055*** 
  (3.53) (3.57) (3.52) (3.51) (3.56) (3.52) (3.49) (3.66) 
MEAN -4.005* -3.963 -3.970 -3.986 -4.032* -4.013* -3.955 -3.839* 
  (-1.68) (-1.65) (-1.65) (-1.67) (-1.70) (-1.68) (-1.64) (-1.68) 
MV 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
  (3.15) (3.16) (3.16) (3.12) (3.11) (3.09) (3.02) (2.81) 
MTBV -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 -0.011 
  (-1.13) (-1.06) (-1.00) (-1.20) (-1.15) (-1.10) (-0.89) (-1.19) 
LEV -0.195 -0.252 -0.255 -0.255 -0.177 -0.181 -0.033 -0.227 
  (-0.39) (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.48) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.07) (-0.46) 
ROA -4.536*** -4.560*** -4.546*** -4.559*** -4.522*** -4.529*** -4.439*** -4.509*** 
  (-5.70) (-5.86) (-5.78) (-5.92) (-5.67) (-5.76) (-5.50) (-5.87) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.37) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.38) (-0.37) (-0.32) (-0.43) 
DEPOSIT 0.034 0.040 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.033 0.016 0.044 
  (0.25) (0.30) (0.24) (0.24) (0.20) (0.24) (0.12) (0.31) 
GDPG -0.635 -0.647 -0.595 -0.676 -0.714 -0.649 -1.069 -0.633 
  (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.49) (-0.58) (-0.64) (-0.56) (-0.99) (-0.53) 
MKTCAP -0.017 -0.020 -0.028 -0.015 -0.008 -0.013 -0.009 -0.022 
  (-0.29) (-0.37) (-0.51) (-0.27) (-0.15) (-0.23) (-0.17) (-0.40) 
GDPPC 0.085*** 0.071* 0.068 0.066** 0.098* 0.090** 0.098*** 0.086*** 
  (3.21) (1.95) (1.59) (2.14) (1.76) (2.06) (3.27) (3.31) 
CORRUPTION   0.023             
    (0.61)             
GOV_EFF     0.037           
      (0.59)           
POLITIC       0.033         
        (0.80)         
REG_QUA         -0.031       
          (-0.31)       
RULE_LAW           -0.010     
            (-0.16)     
VOICE_ACC             -0.052   
              (-1.16)   
C_SCORE               -0.165 
                (-0.95) 
Constant -1.775*** -1.615*** -1.598** -1.525** -1.879*** -1.824*** -1.962*** -0.851 
  (-3.28) (-2.74) (-2.50) (-2.24) (-3.07) (-2.79) (-3.42) (-0.77) 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 
This table presents the regression for the impact of public credit registry coverages on crash risk with additional control variables. 
The additional control variables are CORRUPTION, GOV_EFF, POLITIC, REG_QUA, RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC and C_SCORE. 
The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; PUB is public 
credit registry coverage (% of adult population); DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the 
year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; 
LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total 
assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capital; CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a 
political stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and 
accountability index; C_SCORE is a measure of accounting conservatism. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in 
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this chapter. Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-
level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Table 4-18: Estimation Results with Additional Control Variables for the Interaction Effect 
of Information Asymmetry and Public Credit Registry Coverages on Bank Stock Price 
Crash Risk 
Variable NCSKEW (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PUB -0.870*** -0.858*** -0.903*** -0.892*** -0.865*** -0.870*** -0.914*** -0.875*** 
  (-6.91) (-6.30) (-7.03) (-6.65) (-6.49) (-6.95) (-6.99) (-6.99) 
IFRS -0.052* -0.047 -0.050* -0.045 -0.049* -0.051* -0.042 -0.051* 
  (-1.77) (-1.57) (-1.70) (-1.54) (-1.68) (-1.75) (-1.54) (-1.77) 
IFRS * PUB 0.510* 0.511* 0.564** 0.531* 0.499* 0.509* 0.528* 0.510* 
  (1.91) (1.91) (2.12) (2.00) (1.80) (1.92) (1.96) (1.90) 
DTURN 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 
  (1.84) (1.80) (1.77) (1.84) (1.88) (1.83) (1.88) (2.03) 
SIGMA 2.989*** 3.033*** 3.046*** 3.023*** 2.979*** 2.989*** 2.943*** 3.071*** 
  (3.53) (3.58) (3.52) (3.51) (3.55) (3.51) (3.48) (3.66) 
MEAN -3.986* -3.947 -3.938 -3.964 -3.999* -3.987 -3.933 -3.820 
  (-1.68) (-1.65) (-1.63) (-1.66) (-1.69) (-1.67) (-1.63) (-1.67) 
MV 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.028** 
  (2.87) (2.89) (2.89) (2.86) (2.87) (2.86) (2.82) (2.57) 
MTBV -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.012 
  (-1.14) (-1.12) (-1.06) (-1.28) (-1.14) (-1.07) (-1.01) (-1.18) 
LEV -0.258 -0.305 -0.334 -0.313 -0.247 -0.258 -0.083 -0.289 
  (-0.51) (-0.60) (-0.63) (-0.58) (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.16) (-0.58) 
ROA -4.532*** -4.559*** -4.552*** -4.567*** -4.527*** -4.532*** -4.447*** -4.506*** 
  (-5.67) (-5.81) (-5.78) (-5.93) (-5.66) (-5.74) (-5.48) (-5.83) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.38) (-0.51) 
DEPOSIT 0.003 0.012 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.003 -0.008 0.013 
  (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (-0.06) (0.09) 
GDPG -0.616 -0.630 -0.567 -0.665 -0.655 -0.616 -1.062 -0.615 
  (-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.47) (-0.57) (-0.59) (-0.53) (-0.97) (-0.52) 
MKTCAP 0.011 0.007 -0.003 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.017 0.005 
  (0.18) (0.11) (-0.05) (0.19) (0.24) (0.18) (0.28) (0.09) 
GDPPC 0.081*** 0.068* 0.059 0.060* 0.087 0.081* 0.094*** 0.082*** 
  (3.07) (1.87) (1.38) (1.96) (1.53) (1.89) (3.15) (3.16) 
CORRUPTION   0.021             
    (0.55)             
GOV_EFF     0.047           
      (0.78)           
POLITIC       0.035         
        (0.82)         
REG_QUA         -0.015       
          (-0.15)       
RULE_LAW           -0.001     
            (-0.01)     
VOICE_ACC             -0.052   
              (-1.14)   
C_SCORE               -0.165 
                (-0.94) 
Constant -1.588*** -1.455** -1.361** -1.343* -1.645** -1.591** -1.807*** -0.667 
  (-2.72) (-2.39) (-2.02) (-1.92) (-2.40) (-2.22) (-2.86) (-0.59) 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 7,562 
This table presents the regression for the impact of information asymmetry (proxied by IFRS) on the relationship between public 
credit registry coverages and crash risk with additional control variables. The additional control variables are CORRUPTION, 
GOV_EFF, POLITIC, REG_QUA, RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC and C_SCORE.  
The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; PUB is 
public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or 
not; DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over 
the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; 
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MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated 
as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; 
MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital; CORRUPTION 
is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability index; 
REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability index; 
C_SCORE is a measure of accounting conservatism. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter. 
Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are 
applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-19: Estimation Results with Additional Control Variables for the Interaction Effect 
of Capital Stringency Regulation and Public Credit Registry Coverages on Bank Stock 
Price Crash Risk 
Variable NCSKEW (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PUB -0.454** -0.440** -0.447** -0.461** -0.453** -0.456** -0.479** -0.458** 
  (-2.53) (-2.41) (-2.42) (-2.52) (-2.51) (-2.52) (-2.65) (-2.57) 
LOW_CAPITAL_STR 0.090* 0.100* 0.096* 0.097* 0.090* 0.089* 0.090* 0.092* 
  (1.99) (1.94) (1.92) (1.93) (1.99) (1.99) (1.99) (1.90) 
LOW_CAPITAL_STR * PUB -3.389*** -3.358*** -3.368*** -3.375*** -3.388*** -3.397*** -3.369*** -3.393*** 
  (-3.55) (-3.52) (-3.50) (-3.50) (-3.55) (-3.56) (-3.55) (-3.56) 
DTURN 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.35) 
SIGMA 3.293*** 3.344*** 3.344*** 3.313*** 3.296*** 3.290*** 3.268*** 3.381*** 
  (3.21) (3.17) (3.16) (3.18) (3.20) (3.19) (3.18) (3.32) 
MEAN -3.938 -3.893 -3.906 -3.928 -3.935 -3.941 -3.883 -3.763 
  (-1.65) (-1.62) (-1.62) (-1.64) (-1.65) (-1.65) (-1.60) (-1.63) 
MV 0.029** 0.030** 0.030** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.028** 0.028** 
  (2.64) (2.63) (2.64) (2.63) (2.62) (2.62) (2.56) (2.38) 
MTBV 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.006 
  (0.60) (0.62) (0.68) (0.55) (0.60) (0.56) (0.79) (0.58) 
LEV -0.133 -0.183 -0.193 -0.167 -0.136 -0.127 -0.002 -0.164 
  (-0.29) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.34) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.00) (-0.36) 
ROA -4.630*** -4.669*** -4.651*** -4.656*** -4.632*** -4.627*** -4.550*** -4.604*** 
  (-5.92) (-6.16) (-6.07) (-6.15) (-5.98) (-6.02) (-5.83) (-6.08) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.17) (-0.18) (-0.14) (-0.22) 
DEPOSIT -0.081 -0.069 -0.082 -0.076 -0.081 -0.081 -0.095 -0.071 
  (-0.52) (-0.44) (-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.63) (-0.44) 
GDPG -0.487 -0.512 -0.447 -0.532 -0.477 -0.493 -0.855 -0.476 
  (-0.43) (-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.47) (-0.44) (-0.44) (-0.82) (-0.42) 
MKTCAP -0.001 -0.007 -0.016 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.005 -0.007 
  (-0.02) (-0.13) (-0.28) (-0.04) (-0.03) (0.01) (0.09) (-0.12) 
GDPPC 0.071*** 0.054 0.051 0.055* 0.069 0.073* 0.082*** 0.073*** 
  (3.05) (1.61) (1.29) (1.85) (1.26) (1.80) (3.07) (3.18) 
CORRUPTION   0.028             
    (0.69)             
GOV_EFF     0.044           
      (0.69)           
POLITIC       0.027         
        (0.59)         
REG_QUA         0.004       
          (0.04)       
RULE_LAW           -0.004     
            (-0.07)     
VOICE_ACC             -0.043   
              (-0.94)   
C_SCORE               -0.163 
                (-0.95) 
Constant -1.588** -1.423** -1.393** -1.410** -1.576** -1.610** -1.741*** -0.679 
  (-2.66) (-2.31) (-2.08) (-2.10) (-2.29) (-2.28) (-2.77) (-0.59) 
R-squared 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.069 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 
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This table presents the regression for the impact of capital regulation on the relationship between public credit registry coverages and crash 
risk with additional control variables. The additional control variables are CORRUPTION, GOV_EFF, POLITIC, REG_QUA, 
RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC and C_SCORE.  
The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; PUB is public 
credit registry coverage (% of adult population); CAPITAL_STR_LOW is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the capital stringency 
index is less than the median value of the sample and zero otherwise; DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the 
standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over 
the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; 
LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is 
real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital; 
CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political stability index; 
REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability index; C_SCORE 
is a measure of accounting conservatism. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter. Time dummy variables 
are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
  
276	
	
Table 4-20: Estimation Results with Additional Control Variables for the Interaction Effect 
of Supervisory Power and Public Credit Registry Coverages on Bank Stock Price Crash 
Risk 
Variable NCSKEW (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PUB -0.436** -0.430** -0.432** -0.441** -0.437** -0.448** -0.460** -0.440** 
  (-2.40) (-2.39) (-2.38) (-2.38) (-2.40) (-2.50) (-2.54) (-2.44) 
LOW_SUPER_POW 0.138 0.142 0.143 0.139 0.137 0.129 0.125 0.139 
  (1.17) (1.26) (1.24) (1.18) (1.17) (1.13) (1.10) (1.21) 
LOW_SUPER_POW * PUB -5.124*** -5.062*** -5.003*** -5.142*** -5.127*** -5.215*** -4.992*** -5.122*** 
  (-3.69) (-3.39) (-3.18) (-3.71) (-3.63) (-3.70) (-3.72) (-3.81) 
DTURN 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
  (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.44) 
SIGMA 3.180*** 3.195*** 3.194*** 3.194*** 3.178*** 3.169*** 3.163*** 3.265*** 
  (3.38) (3.37) (3.34) (3.36) (3.37) (3.37) (3.36) (3.51) 
MEAN -3.967* -3.953 -3.960 -3.959 -3.970* -3.974* -3.918 -3.796 
  (-1.68) (-1.66) (-1.67) (-1.67) (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.64) (-1.66) 
MV 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 0.027** 0.027** 0.027** 
  (2.57) (2.55) (2.55) (2.56) (2.55) (2.53) (2.52) (2.30) 
MTBV -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 
  (-0.98) (-0.96) (-0.93) (-1.04) (-0.96) (-1.03) (-0.83) (-1.04) 
LEV -0.311 -0.331 -0.333 -0.340 -0.308 -0.282 -0.195 -0.342 
  (-0.65) (-0.68) (-0.66) (-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.57) (-0.39) (-0.73) 
ROA -4.578*** -4.592*** -4.585*** -4.598*** -4.577*** -4.565*** -4.512*** -4.552*** 
  (-5.68) (-5.82) (-5.77) (-5.88) (-5.72) (-5.73) (-5.64) (-5.83) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
  (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.71) (-0.66) (-0.76) 
DEPOSIT -0.102 -0.096 -0.100 -0.097 -0.102 -0.106 -0.116 -0.092 
  (-0.65) (-0.63) (-0.65) (-0.63) (-0.67) (-0.70) (-0.78) (-0.57) 
GDPG -0.372 -0.372 -0.345 -0.406 -0.384 -0.418 -0.707 -0.360 
  (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.36) (-0.35) (-0.38) (-0.67) (-0.32) 
MKTCAP -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.011 
  (-0.08) (-0.11) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.07) (0.02) (0.01) (-0.19) 
GDPPC 0.084*** 0.078** 0.077* 0.072** 0.086 0.094** 0.093*** 0.086*** 
  (3.45) (2.34) (1.95) (2.21) (1.61) (2.40) (3.28) (3.55) 
CORRUPTION   0.010             
    (0.28)             
GOV_EFF     0.016           
      (0.25)           
POLITIC       0.021         
        (0.46)         
REG_QUA         -0.004       
          (-0.04)       
RULE_LAW           -0.021     
            (-0.34)     
VOICE_ACC             -0.036   
              (-0.81)   
C_SCORE               -0.159 
                (-0.92) 
Constant -1.500** -1.440** -1.431** -1.357* -1.513** -1.596** -1.628** -0.610 
  (-2.58) (-2.29) (-2.09) (-1.95) (-2.21) (-2.23) (-2.59) (-0.55) 
R-squared 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 
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This table presents the regression for the impact of supervisory power on the relationship between public credit registry coverages and 
crash risk with additional control variables. The additional control variables are CORRUPTION, GOV_EFF, POLITIC, REG_QUA, 
RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC and C_SCORE.  
The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; PUB is public 
credit registry coverage (% of adult population); SUPER_POW_LOW is a dummy variable taking a value of one if  the supervisory 
power index is less than the median value of the sample and zero otherwise; DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific 
weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the 
value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total 
assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capital; CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a political 
stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and accountability 
index; C_SCORE is a measure of accounting conservatism. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter. Time 
dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all 
estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
  
278	
	
Table 4-21: Estimation Results with Additional Control Variables for the Interaction Effect 
of Market Monitoring and Public Credit Registry Coverages on Bank Stock Price Crash 
Risk 
Variable NCSKEW (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PUB -0.465** -0.459** -0.463** -0.473** -0.470** -0.481*** -0.491*** -0.469*** 
  (-2.63) (-2.56) (-2.61) (-2.63) (-2.66) (-2.75) (-2.77) (-2.68) 
LOW_MONITOR 0.074* 0.078* 0.076* 0.085* 0.074* 0.071* 0.070* 0.070* 
  (1.85) (1.82) (1.83) (1.91) (1.85) (1.79) (1.79) (1.80) 
LOW_MONITOR * PUB -4.146*** -4.068*** -4.051*** -4.255*** -4.216*** -4.352*** -4.198*** -4.134*** 
  (-8.08) (-7.76) (-6.14) (-7.77) (-8.02) (-8.41) (-8.34) (-8.19) 
DTURN 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.37) 
SIGMA 3.319*** 3.340*** 3.331*** 3.353*** 3.301*** 3.297*** 3.291*** 3.398*** 
  (3.32) (3.30) (3.27) (3.30) (3.31) (3.30) (3.29) (3.44) 
MEAN -3.765 -3.746 -3.759 -3.737 -3.784 -3.778 -3.707 -3.603 
  (-1.53) (-1.51) (-1.52) (-1.50) (-1.53) (-1.53) (-1.48) (-1.51) 
MV 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 
  (2.74) (2.71) (2.68) (2.75) (2.69) (2.65) (2.65) (2.46) 
MTBV -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.008 -0.011 
  (-1.07) (-1.04) (-1.02) (-1.19) (-1.08) (-1.15) (-0.91) (-1.13) 
LEV -0.228 -0.247 -0.242 -0.273 -0.212 -0.187 -0.090 -0.260 
  (-0.47) (-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.53) (-0.45) (-0.39) (-0.19) (-0.55) 
ROA -4.640*** -4.658*** -4.646*** -4.681*** -4.630*** -4.618*** -4.554*** -4.613*** 
  (-5.75) (-5.89) (-5.84) (-6.07) (-5.75) (-5.76) (-5.64) (-5.91) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.65) (-0.59) (-0.69) 
DEPOSIT -0.142 -0.137 -0.142 -0.137 -0.145 -0.145 -0.156 -0.132 
  (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-1.08) (-0.84) 
GDPG -0.468 -0.476 -0.456 -0.524 -0.536 -0.513 -0.862 -0.462 
  (-0.42) (-0.43) (-0.41) (-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.48) (-0.84) (-0.41) 
MKTCAP -0.018 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.013 -0.008 -0.011 -0.023 
  (-0.32) (-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.38) (-0.22) (-0.13) (-0.20) (-0.42) 
GDPPC 0.079*** 0.072** 0.073* 0.057* 0.089 0.095** 0.091*** 0.081*** 
  (3.48) (2.04) (1.80) (1.85) (1.64) (2.42) (3.40) (3.60) 
CORRUPTION   0.012             
    (0.25)             
GOV_EFF     0.012           
      (0.17)           
POLITIC       0.038         
        (0.77)         
REG_QUA         -0.024       
          (-0.23)       
RULE_LAW           -0.032     
            (-0.50)     
VOICE_ACC             -0.045   
              (-0.99)   
C_SCORE               -0.155 
                (-0.91) 
Constant -1.595*** -1.531** -1.546** -1.356** -1.681** -1.742** -1.751*** -0.724 
  (-2.68) (-2.50) (-2.31) (-2.01) (-2.54) (-2.50) (-2.83) (-0.66) 
R-squared 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 
This table presents the regression for the impact of market monitoring on the relationship between public credit registry coverages and 
crash risk with additional control variables. The additional control variables are CORRUPTION, GOV_EFF, POLITIC, REG_QUA, 
RULE_LAW, VOICE_ACC and C_SCORE.  
The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; PUB is public 
credit registry coverage (% of adult population); MONITOR_LOW is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the private monitoring 
index is less than the median value of the sample and zero otherwise; DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is 
the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly 
return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the 
value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to 
total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capital; CORRUPTION is a control of corruption index; GOV_EFF is a government effectiveness index; POLITIC is a 
political stability index; REG_QUA is a regulatory quality index; RULE_LAW is a rule of law index; VOICE_ACC is a voice and 
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accountability index; C_SCORE is a measure of accounting conservatism. Further detail of all variables are presented in Table 4-1 in 
this chapter. Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-
level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-22:  Non-USA Sample Analysis 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
(1) (2) (3) 
DEPTH -0.010     
  (-0.26)     
PRIV   0.033   
    (0.28)   
PUB     -0.572*** 
      (-3.93) 
DTURN 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 
  (1.79) (1.65) (1.74) 
SIGMA 4.101* 4.149* 3.848* 
  (1.93) (1.96) (1.79) 
MEAN 4.600 4.464 4.346 
  (0.72) (0.71) (0.68) 
MV 0.036* 0.034* 0.040** 
  (1.82) (1.80) (2.18) 
MTBV -0.030** -0.027** -0.012 
  (-2.54) (-2.46) (-1.08) 
LEV -0.509 -0.626 -0.643 
  (-0.64) (-0.76) (-0.96) 
ROA -3.527*** -3.511*** -3.419*** 
  (-3.99) (-4.09) (-3.99) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  (-0.30) (-0.33) (-0.58) 
DEPOSIT 0.139 0.119 0.024 
  (0.71) (0.66) (0.14) 
GDPG -0.271 -0.113 -0.200 
  (-0.23) (-0.11) (-0.20) 
MKTCAP 0.023 0.023 0.014 
  (0.34) (0.34) (0.25) 
GDPPC 0.111*** 0.107*** 0.100*** 
  (4.31) (3.57) (4.26) 
Constant -1.950** -1.806* -1.710** 
  (-2.33) (-1.86) (-2.27) 
R-squared 0.0376 0.0377 0.0435 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,135 3,135 3,135 
This table presents the regression for the impact of public credit registry coverages on crash risk when the sample excludes banks 
in the USA. The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; 
DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing index; PRIV is private credit bureau coverage (% of adult population); PUB is public 
credit registry coverage (% of adult population); DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over 
the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of 
equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to 
total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capital. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  Time dummy variables are 
included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-23:  Non-USA Sample Analysis (Continued) 
Variable NCSKEW NCSKEW NCSKEW NCSKEW 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PUB -0.574*** -0.802*** -0.599*** -0.570*** -0.585*** -0.553*** -0.612*** -0.602*** 
  (-3.86) (-5.53) (-4.19) (-3.85) (-3.95) (-3.68) (-4.22) (-4.11) 
IFRS -0.030* -0.049             
  (-2.51) (-0.70)             
IFRS * PUB   0.287***             
    -2.16             
LOW_CAPITAL_STR     0.168* -0.051         
      (1.95) (-0.26)         
LOW_CAPITAL_STR * PUB     -2.935***         
        (-2.80)         
LOW_SUPER_POW         0.030 0.142     
          (0.25) (1.26)     
LOW_SUPER_POW * PUB         -4.615***     
            (-3.04)     
LOW_MONITOR             0.158** -0.050 
              (2.04) (-0.25) 
LOW_MONITOR * PUB             -2.852*** 
                (-2.28) 
DTURN 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 
  (1.17) (1.09) (0.54) (0.51) (0.55) (0.69) (0.44) (0.49) 
SIGMA 3.877* 3.811* 4.615** 4.698** 4.555** 4.157* 4.783** 4.629** 
  (1.78) (1.76) (2.08) (2.13) (2.06) (1.80) (2.18) (2.05) 
MEAN 4.342 4.379 3.959 4.009 4.040 4.413 3.922 4.495 
  (0.68) (0.68) (0.53) (0.54) (0.54) (0.58) (0.52) (0.59) 
MV 0.039** 0.038** 0.040** 0.039* 0.039* 0.038* 0.041** 0.042** 
  (2.14) (2.06) (2.01) (1.99) (1.94) (1.89) (2.15) (2.19) 
MTBV -0.011 -0.012 -0.008 0.001 -0.012 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 
  (-0.92) (-1.03) (-0.70) (0.05) (-1.08) (-1.13) (-1.35) (-1.23) 
LEV -0.651 -0.666 -0.435 -0.406 -0.525 -0.606 -0.532 -0.605 
  (-0.97) (-0.99) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-0.82) (-0.94) (-0.83) (-0.95) 
ROA -3.393*** -3.416*** -3.565*** -3.609*** -3.560*** -3.536*** -3.569*** -3.571*** 
  (-3.96) (-3.99) (-4.34) (-4.40) (-4.31) (-4.33) (-4.29) (-4.23) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
  (-0.59) (-0.61) (-0.42) (-0.32) (-0.62) (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.82) 
DEPOSIT -0.011 -0.026 -0.164 -0.154 -0.162 -0.192 -0.182 -0.204 
  (-0.06) (-0.14) (-0.74) (-0.69) (-0.75) (-0.89) (-0.84) (-0.94) 
GDPG -0.143 -0.127 0.257 0.282 0.311 0.470 0.306 0.246 
  (-0.14) (-0.12) (0.26) (0.28) (0.30) (0.45) (0.32) (0.25) 
MKTCAP 0.013 0.026 0.017 0.006 0.025 -0.005 0.017 0.003 
  (0.24) (0.45) (0.30) (0.10) (0.45) (-0.08) (0.33) (0.05) 
GDPPC 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.088*** 0.091*** 
  (4.09) (3.93) (4.33) (4.33) (4.23) (4.29) (3.86) (4.09) 
Constant -1.626** -1.539* -1.695* -1.724** -1.669* -1.529* -1.588* -1.536* 
  (-2.02) (-1.87) (-1.99) (-2.01) (-1.99) (-1.78) (-1.88) (-1.82) 
R-squared 0.0433 0.0432 0.0507 0.0519 0.0499 0.0520 0.0509 0.0516 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,135 3,135 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
This table presents the regression for the impact of public credit registry coverages on crash risk when the sample excludes banks in the 
USA. The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns; PUB is public 
credit registry coverage (% of adult population); IFRS is a dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts IFRS or not; 
LOW_CAPITAL_STR is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low capital stringency index and zero otherwise;  
LOW_SUPER_POW is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low supervisory power index and zero otherwise; 
LOW_MONITOR is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has low private monitoring index and zero otherwise;  
DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; 
MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; 
ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy 
ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by 
GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital. Further detail of all variables is presented in Table 4-1 in this chapter.  Time 
dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all 
estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-24: IV Approach for the Impact of Public Credit Registry Coverages on Bank Risk 
Price Crash Risk 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
IV 
2nd-Stage 
IV 
1st-Stage 
(1) (2) 
PUB -1.068***   
  (-2.61)   
DTURN 0.001 0.000 
  (0.41) (0.32) 
SIGMA 2.752*** -0.169*** 
  (3.95) (-3.97) 
MEAN -5.161*** -0.071 
  (-2.65) (-0.48) 
MV 0.034*** 0.008*** 
  (4.25) (10.38) 
MTBV 0.027 0.008** 
  (0.93) (2.56) 
LEV 0.086 0.277*** 
  (0.17) (5.08) 
ROA -4.985*** -0.247*** 
  (-4.40) (-2.78) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.003 -0.000 
  (-0.90) (-1.37) 
DEPOSIT -0.179 -0.087*** 
  (-1.59) (-7.97) 
GDPG -1.019* -0.162*** 
  (-1.75) (-2.66) 
MKTCAP 0.117*** -0.034*** 
  (3.08) (-7.14) 
GDPPC 0.053*** -0.015*** 
  (3.09) (-6.34) 
LEGALORIGIN   0.140*** 
    (21.25) 
ETHNIC_FRAC   -0.049*** 
    (-5.07) 
LATITUDE   -0.374*** 
    (-14.58) 
Constant -1.370** 0.086 
  (-2.46) (1.28) 
R-squared 0.028 0.270 
First Stage F-test 189.8   
Second Stage F-test 16.53   
Hansen J-Test 4.109   
Hansen J P-Value 0.128   
Observations 7,236 7,236 
This table presents the instrumental variable regression for the impact of public credit registry coverages on crash risk. The 
instruments are legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and latitude. The 2nd-stage regression is reported in the odd column, while 
the 1st-stage regression is reported in the even column.  
The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns. PUB is 
public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the 
standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly 
return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the 
value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total 
deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capital; LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English 
legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; 
LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude of a country. Time dummy variables are included in all 
regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the country-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
283	
	
Table 4-25: IV Approach for the Interaction Effect of Information Asymmetry and Public 
Credit Registry Coverages on Bank Risk Price Crash Risk 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
IFRS Non-IFRS 
IV 
2nd-Stage 
IV  
1st-Stage 
IV  
2nd-Stage 
IV  
1st-Stage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PUB -0.656   -1.202*   
  (-1.24)   (-1.65)   
DTURN 0.027 0.001* 0.000 0.000 
  (1.29) (1.65) (0.22) (1.17) 
SIGMA 2.852*** -0.085** 1.444 0.408 
  (3.86) (-2.08) (0.46) (1.49) 
MEAN -5.629*** -0.106 19.343** 1.689** 
  (-2.83) (-0.72) (2.52) (2.31) 
MV 0.024*** 0.006*** 0.049* 0.010*** 
  (2.62) (7.68) (1.72) (3.48) 
MTBV 0.022 0.010*** 3.409 -0.357*** 
  (0.71) (2.91) (1.59) (-2.82) 
LEV -0.446 0.192*** 2.889** -0.083 
  (-0.84) (3.48) (2.26) (-0.57) 
ROA -5.208*** -0.078 3.764 -1.856*** 
  (-4.48) (-1.15) (0.85) (-3.83) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.006 -0.001** 0.017* 0.002** 
  (-1.45) (-2.17) (1.75) (2.37) 
DEPOSIT -0.272** -0.128*** 0.544 0.300*** 
  (-2.05) (-9.14) (1.46) (6.78) 
GDPG -1.050 -0.096 -1.071 -0.271** 
  (-1.51) (-1.40) (-0.99) (-2.48) 
MKTCAP 0.164*** -0.051*** 0.230 0.093*** 
  (3.32) (-11.77) (1.30) (4.17) 
GDPPC 0.051*** -0.011*** -0.028 -0.026*** 
  (2.74) (-5.05) (-0.35) (-3.12) 
LEGALORIGIN   0.165***   0.098*** 
    (13.53)   (4.71) 
ETHNIC_FRAC   0.012   0.092*** 
    (0.62)   (2.76) 
LATITUDE   -0.251***   -0.773*** 
    (-9.67)   (-10.93) 
Constant -0.652 0.073 -4.332*** 0.326** 
  (-1.02) (0.98) (-3.15) (2.55) 
R-squared 0.030 0.268 0.079 0.649 
First Stage F-test 113.7   83.36   
Second Stage F-test 16.21   3.650   
Hansen J-Test 3.086   1.568   
Hansen J P-Value 0.214   0.456   
Observations 6,440 6,440 796 796 
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This table presents the instrumental variable regression for the impact of information asymmetry (proxied by IFRS) on the relationship 
between public credit registry coverages and crash risk. The instruments are legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and latitude. IFRS 
Adoption is a group of countries that adopts IFRS while Non-IFRS Adoption is a group of countries that does not IFRS; The 2nd-stage 
regressions are reported in the odd columns, while the 1st-stage regressions are reported in the even columns.  
The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns. PUB is public 
credit registry coverage (% of adult population); DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the 
year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; 
LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG 
is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital; 
LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise zero; 
ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures 
the geographical latitude of a country. Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
  
285	
	
Table 4-26: IV Approach for the Interaction Effect of Capital Stringency Regulation and 
Public Credit Registry Coverages on Bank Risk Price Crash Risk 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
HIGH 
Capital Stringency index 
LOW 
Capital Stringency index 
IV 
2nd-Stage 
IV  
1st-Stage 
IV  
2nd-Stage 
IV  
1st-Stage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PUB 0.119   -1.136***   
  (0.23)   (-2.88)   
DTURN 0.028 0.001 0.013*** 0.000 
  (1.20) (1.09) (4.27) (0.00) 
SIGMA 2.717*** -0.049 4.107** 0.247 
  (3.27) (-1.40) (2.08) (1.21) 
MEAN -5.432** -0.140 2.065 -0.307 
  (-2.50) (-1.60) (0.36) (-0.42) 
MV 0.010 0.004*** 0.059*** 0.014*** 
  (1.03) (4.87) (3.48) (8.48) 
MTBV 2.185 -0.306*** 0.015 0.002 
  (1.21) (-3.29) (0.52) (0.54) 
LEV -1.212* 0.134*** 0.685 0.050 
  (-1.87) (2.89) (0.75) (0.41) 
ROA -5.287*** -0.007 -4.838* -1.095*** 
  (-4.19) (-0.14) (-1.79) (-2.59) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.013** -0.000 0.010 -0.001* 
  (-2.49) (-1.22) (1.58) (-1.66) 
DEPOSIT -0.148 -0.081*** -0.188 -0.017 
  (-0.83) (-4.65) (-1.10) (-0.97) 
GDPG -1.982** -0.081 0.765 0.087 
  (-2.04) (-1.06) (0.76) (0.56) 
MKTCAP 0.255*** -0.003 0.103* -0.034*** 
  (3.23) (-0.36) (1.92) (-4.58) 
GDPPC 0.040 -0.029*** 0.106*** 0.016*** 
  (0.59) (-4.67) (4.37) (3.40) 
LEGALORIGIN   0.248***   0.173*** 
    (11.31)   (19.65) 
ETHNIC_FRAC   -0.316***   0.068*** 
    (-7.71)   (3.82) 
LATITUDE   0.012   -0.484*** 
    (0.47)   (-15.04) 
Constant 0.294 0.185** -3.157*** -0.167 
  (0.28) (2.02) (-3.32) (-1.40) 
R-squared 0.026 0.375 0.046 0.287 
First Stage F-test 77.45   215.6   
Second Stage F-test 11.91   8.341   
Hansen J-Test 0.0218   0.844   
Hansen J P-Value 0.989   0.656   
Observations 4,933 4,933 1,830 1,830 
This table presents the instrumental variable regression for the impact of capital regulation on the relationship between public 
credit registry coverages and crash risk. The instruments are legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and latitude. CAPITAL_STR is 
a capital stringency index: For each column, HIGH signifies the above-median group of CAPITAL_STR, while LOW signifies the 
below-median group of CAPITAL_STR. The 2nd-stage regressions are reported in the odd columns, while the 1st-stage 
regressions are reported in the even columns. The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a 
negative conditional skewness of returns. PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); DTURN the detrended 
average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the 
average arithmetric mean of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to total 
assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 
capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the stock 
market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital; LEGALORIGIN is dummy variable 
whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic fractionalization 
which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical latitude of a country. 
Time dummy variables are added into all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are 
applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
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**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
Table 4-27: IV Approach for the Interaction Effect of Supervisory Power and Public Credit 
Registry Coverages on Bank Risk Price Crash Risk 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
HIGH 
Supervisory Power index 
LOW 
Supervisory Power index 
IV 
2nd-Stage 
IV  
1st-Stage 
IV  
2nd-Stage 
IV  
1st-Stage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PUB -0.654   -1.126*   
  (-0.90)   (-1.79)   
DTURN 0.032 0.001 0.013*** -0.000 
  (1.30) (1.53) (2.84) (-0.09) 
SIGMA 3.410*** -0.106*** -0.005 -0.349* 
  (3.99) (-2.88) (-0.00) (-1.79) 
MEAN -5.468** -0.059 -0.477 -0.629 
  (-2.52) (-0.55) (-0.09) (-0.93) 
MV 0.027** 0.002*** 0.023 0.012*** 
  (2.52) (3.63) (1.45) (6.69) 
MTBV 0.022 0.008** 1.447 -0.658*** 
  (0.71) (2.50) (0.97) (-2.65) 
LEV 0.008 0.135*** -0.302 -0.057 
  (0.01) (2.74) (-0.27) (-0.47) 
ROA -4.746*** -0.113 -5.828*** -0.508** 
  (-3.38) (-1.42) (-2.66) (-2.07) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.006 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003** 
  (-1.08) (-1.45) (-0.08) (-2.47) 
DEPOSIT -0.343* -0.085*** -0.261 -0.106*** 
  (-1.81) (-7.36) (-1.41) (-5.57) 
GDPG -1.265 0.211*** -0.460 -0.280** 
  (-1.21) (3.07) (-0.47) (-2.10) 
MKTCAP 0.161* -0.062*** 0.208*** -0.005 
  (1.74) (-8.86) (3.58) (-0.55) 
GDPPC 0.053 -0.010** 0.067*** -0.001 
  (1.37) (-2.15) (2.79) (-0.23) 
LEGALORIGIN   0.190***   0.137*** 
    (16.55)   (12.43) 
ETHNIC_FRAC   -0.165***   0.066*** 
    (-5.38)   (3.14) 
LATITUDE   -0.439***   -0.260*** 
    (-10.14)   (-6.49) 
Constant -1.127 0.356*** -0.893 0.082 
  (-1.32) (5.78) (-0.83) (0.61) 
R-squared 0.032 0.464 0.034 0.177 
First Stage F-test 242.3   69.74   
Second Stage F-test 13.56   5.649   
Hansen J-Test 4.467   0.409   
Hansen J P-Value 0.107   0.523   
Observations 4,938 4,938 1,825 1,825 
This table presents the instrumental variable regression for the impact of supervisory power on the relationship between public 
credit registry coverages and crash risk. The instruments are legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and latitude. SUPER_POW is 
a supervisory power index: For each column, HIGH signifies the above-median group of SUPER_POW, while LOW signifies 
the below-median group of SUPER_POW. The 2nd-stage regressions are reported in the odd columns, while the 1st-stage 
regressions are reported in the even columns. The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a 
negative conditional skewness of returns. PUB is public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); DTURN the detrended 
average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the 
average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to 
total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a 
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tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the 
stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital; LEGALORIGIN is dummy 
variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic 
fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical 
latitude of a country. Time dummy variables are added into all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering 
at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
Table 4-28: IV Approach for the Interaction Effect of Market Monitoring and Public Credit 
Registry Coverages on Bank Risk Price Crash Risk 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
HIGH 
Private Monitoring index 
LOW 
Private Monitoring index 
IV 
2nd-Stage 
IV  
1st-Stage 
IV  
2nd-Stage 
IV  
1st-Stage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PUB -0.421   -1.793**   
  (-0.94)   (-2.20)   
DTURN 0.160 -0.023 0.004 -0.000 
  (0.75) (-1.41) (0.45) (-0.24) 
SIGMA 5.716*** -0.146*** 0.008 -0.312*** 
  (6.63) (-2.59) (0.00) (-2.60) 
MEAN 0.015 -0.306* -16.126*** 0.344 
  (0.01) (-1.75) (-4.07) (1.21) 
MV 0.062*** 0.007*** -0.006 0.007*** 
  (5.73) (6.94) (-0.43) (6.83) 
MTBV -0.007 0.007** 0.023 -0.010 
  (-0.23) (2.19) (0.40) (-0.90) 
LEV 0.321 0.300*** -0.682 0.143** 
  (0.52) (3.90) (-0.73) (2.47) 
ROA -5.056*** -0.065 -5.998* -1.105*** 
  (-4.16) (-0.80) (-1.80) (-4.06) 
CAR_TIER1 0.003 -0.001** -0.014* -0.001** 
  (0.59) (-2.31) (-1.88) (-2.51) 
DEPOSIT 0.064 -0.187*** -0.673*** -0.040*** 
  (0.43) (-8.78) (-3.11) (-2.97) 
GDPG 0.975 0.055 -10.291*** -0.818*** 
  (1.29) (0.73) (-5.93) (-2.96) 
MKTCAP -0.108* -0.038*** 0.484*** 0.034*** 
  (-1.76) (-5.05) (6.89) (3.35) 
GDPPC 0.126*** -0.009*** -0.174*** -0.048*** 
  (6.25) (-3.29) (-3.96) (-6.77) 
LEGALORIGIN   0.203***   0.160*** 
    (12.54)   (13.35) 
ETHNIC_FRAC   0.026   -0.114*** 
    (1.04)   (-7.18) 
LATITUDE   -0.403***   -0.250*** 
    (-11.72)   (-7.83) 
Constant -3.146*** 0.036 2.918** 0.410*** 
  (-4.43) (0.39) (2.54) (5.00) 
R-squared 0.054 0.307 0.030 0.268 
First Stage F-test 167.8   72.40   
Second Stage F-test 17.39   8.700   
Hansen J-Test 4.233   4.629   
Hansen J P-Value 0.120   0.0988   
Observations 3,940 3,940 2,823 2,823 
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This table presents the instrumental variable regression for the impact of market monitoring on the relationship between public 
credit registry coverages and crash risk. The instruments are legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and latitude. For each 
column, HIGH signifies the above-median group of MONITOR, while LOW signifies the below-median group of MONITOR. 
The 2nd-stage regressions are reported in the odd columns, while the 1st-stage regressions are reported in the even columns. 
The dependent variable is crash stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns. PUB is 
public credit registry coverage (% of adult population); MONITOR is a private monitoring index; DTURN the detrended 
average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MEAN is the 
average arithmetric mean of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liability to 
total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; CAR_TIER1 is a 
tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; MKTCAP is the 
stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital; LEGALORIGIN is dummy 
variable whose value is equal to one if a country has English legal origin and otherwise zero; ETHNIC_FRAC is an ethnic 
fractionalization which captures the ethnic diversity in a country; LATITUDE is a latitude which measures the geographical 
latitude of a country. Time dummy variables are added into all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustering at the bank-level are applied in all estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4-29: Additional Tests – The Impact of Public Credit Registry Coverages on Bank 
Stock Price Crash Risk: The Role of Other Aspects of Banking Regulations 
Variable 
NCSKEW 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PUB -0.430** 1.041** -0.464** -0.563*** 
  (-2.50) -2.55 (-2.59) (-3.18) 
DEPOSIT_INS -0.114** -0.08     
  (-2.24) (-1.47)     
DEPOSIT_INS * PUB   -1.529***     
    (-3.69)     
LOW_ACTIVITY_RES   -0.068 -0.102 
      (-1.64) (-1.47) 
LOW_ACTIVITY_RES * PUB     0.681 
        (1.20) 
DTURN 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (1.34) (1.39) (0.13) (0.13) 
SIGMA 3.122*** 3.053*** 3.407*** 3.524*** 
  -3.64 -3.61 (3.41) (3.28) 
MEAN -3.848 -3.768 -3.943* -3.862 
  (-1.58) (-1.51) (-1.69) (-1.66) 
MV 0.026** 0.026** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
  -2.59 -2.58 (2.68) (2.67) 
MTBV -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.017 
  (-0.48) (-0.10) (-0.28) (-1.24) 
LEV -0.311 -0.295 -0.313 -0.319 
  (-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.69) (-0.70) 
ROA -4.487*** -4.473*** -4.522*** -4.585*** 
  (-5.76) (-5.72) (-5.56) (-5.65) 
CAR_TIER1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-0.50) (-0.48) (-0.52) (-0.57) 
DEPOSIT -0.031 -0.032 -0.063 -0.051 
  (-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.41) (-0.33) 
GDPG -0.957 -1.432 -0.501 -0.661 
  (-0.94) (-1.34) (-0.45) (-0.59) 
MKTCAP 0.01 0.017 0.027 0.053 
  -0.18 -0.33 (0.49) (0.78) 
GDPPC 0.079*** 0.075*** 0.086*** 0.088*** 
  -3.2 -2.96 (3.64) (3.58) 
Constant -1.368** -1.349** -1.611*** -1.663*** 
  (-2.43) (-2.38) (-2.78) (-2.80) 
R-squared 0.063 0.064 0.067 0.068 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,562 7,562 7,077 7,077 
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This table presents the regression for the impact of other regulations on the relationship between public credit registry coverages 
and crash risk. The other bank regulations consists of a deposit insurance and activity restrictions. The dependent variable is crash 
stock measured by NCSKEW. NCSKEW is a negative conditional skewness of returns. PUB is public credit registry coverage (% 
of adult population); DEPOSIT_INS is a dummy whose value is equal to one when there exist deposit insurance regime in the 
country; LOW_ACTIVITY_RES is a dummy variable whose value is equal to one when an activity restriction index is low; 
DTURN the detrended average monthly stock turnover; SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly return over the 
year; MEAN is the average arithmetic mean of firm-specific weekly return over the year; MV is the market value of equity; MTBV 
is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the value of equity; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total 
liability to total assets; ROA is a return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
CAR_TIER1 is a tier1 capital adequacy ratio; DEPOSIT is a ratio of total deposits to total assets; GDPG is real GDP growth; 
MKTCAP is the stock market capitalization scaled by GDP; GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital. Time dummy 
variables are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering at the bank-level are applied in all 
estimations. 
*     indicates significance at the 10% level 
**   indicates significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
 This thesis provides an analysis of the economic consequences of information 
sharing among banks about their borrowers’ information. By using a sample of banks around 
the globe during the period of 2005 to 2013, we attempt to address the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank lending, bank risk, and bank-specific stock price crash. We rely 
on the Bankscope database for bank-level data and the World Bank’s Doing Business 
database for measures of credit information sharing in each country. In addition, we 
supplement with several other databases, consisting of Datastream, IFRS Foundation 
website, Deloitte, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (WDI), the 
World Bank’s Global Financial Development database (GFDD), and the World Bank’s 
Banking and Supervision Survey database. 
 In chapter 2, our objectives are to investigate the impact of credit information sharing 
on bank lending and how, and to what extent, information asymmetry and the creditor 
protection affect it. Investigating the sample of 16,009 banks in 113 countries during 2005 
to 2013, we find that credit information sharing promotes bank lending. The result suggests 
that banks in countries with more credit information sharing tend to extend more loans than 
those in countries with less credit information sharing. This finding is line with the 
theoretical literature predicting that credit information sharing facilitates bank lending 
decision. With more information sharing, banks are more willing to lend as the asymmetric 
information between banks and borrowers are less problematic.  
When banks share borrower information with each other, the asymmetric 
information between banks and borrowers is less problematic due to several reasons. Firstly, 
information sharing improves the knowledge of loan applicants’ characteristics, such that 
banks can differentiate between risky and safe borrowers. Secondly, when borrower 
information is shared among banks, borrowers are not held up to one bank which can charge 
higher interest rate due to its information monopoly. Thirdly, knowing that banks will share 
among each other their borrowers' default records, borrowers need to be more disciplined 
and exert more effort to repay. Lastly, over-borrowing is less likely as banks share 
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information about borrowers’ indebtedness. Thus, banks are more confident in lending and 
more likely to lend with more credit information sharing. 
Furthermore, we investigate the impact of information environment on the 
relationship between credit information sharing and bank lending. When the information 
environment is more transparent, borrower information should be abundantly available and 
accessible to the public, such that the asymmetric information between banks and borrowers 
is less severe. According to our results, we find that the impact of credit information sharing 
on bank lending is less pronounced in countries with mandatory IFRS adoption and greater 
extent of business disclosure. These findings suggest that credit information sharing has a 
weaker impact on bank lending when the information environment is more transparent.  
 We also study the impact of creditor protection on the relationship between credit 
information sharing and bank lending. When borrowers default, stronger creditor protection 
allows banks to grab collaterals, force repayments, or even gain control of the debtor. In this 
regard, banks are encouraged to take more risks by extending loans to a broader and 
potentially riskier set of borrowers, regardless of the asymmetric information between banks 
and borrowers. According to the empirical results, we find that credit information sharing 
only affects bank lending through its interaction with credit rights. This finding shows that 
credit information sharing reduces bank lending in countries with well-protected creditors, 
while it has no notable effect on bank lending in countries with low creditor protection. 
There are two implications of this finding. Firstly, we can infer that credit information 
sharing reduces an increase in lending from stronger creditor protection. Secondly, credit 
information sharing is complementary to creditor rights, such that some degree of creditor 
protection is required to guarantee the effect of information sharing on lending. 
 In chapter 3, our objectives are to examine the impact of credit information sharing 
on bank risk and how, and to what extent, information asymmetry and banking competition 
affect it. Studying the sample of 15,558 banks in 105 countries during 2005 to 2013, we 
discover that credit information sharing has a negative impact on bank risk. This finding 
suggests that banks in countries with more credit information sharing tend to be less risky. 
We can infer that, while credit information sharing encourages banks to extend more loans 
(Chapter 2), it does not necessarily lead to riskier lending. The results in chapter 3 suggest 
that credit information sharing induces banks to lend safely, fostering bank stability.  
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 The negative association between credit information sharing and bank risk is 
consistent with theoretical literature predicting that credit information sharing contributes to 
lower bank risk. Firstly, theory suggests that credit information sharing reduces adverse 
selection problem associated with lending so that banks can distinguish between risky and 
safe borrowers. By knowing the characteristics of borrowers, banks make better judgments 
concerning lending and lend safely. Secondly, sharing borrower information eliminates 
information differences across banks, such that borrowers are not held up to one bank, and 
they have less incentive to pursue the high-risk investment, which may lead to higher default 
probability. Thirdly, information sharing exerts a disciplinary effect on borrowers because 
they fear that their default information will be available to other banks and they may have to 
face an outright exclusion from the credit markets. Lastly, information sharing reveals the 
overall indebtedness of borrowers, so borrowers are not able to over-borrow and end up 
default. Therefore, sharing of borrower information among banks contributes to lower 
default rate and promote bank stability. 
We also examine the impact of information environment on the relationship between 
credit information sharing and bank risk. According to the results, we find that mandatory 
IFRS adoption and greater extent of business disclosure attenuates the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank risk. These results suggest that, compared to less transparent 
information environment, credit information sharing has a weaker effect on bank risk in a 
more transparent information environment. When the information environment is less 
opaque, the asymmetric information between banks and borrowers becomes less 
problematic. More borrower information is available and accessible to the public, such that 
promoting information sharing among banks may be less helpful in reducing bank risk.  
Moreover, we explore the impact of banking competition on the relationship between 
credit information sharing and bank risk. The empirical results show that the impact of credit 
information sharing on bank risk is more pronounced in the more competitive banking 
market. Banks in the highly competitive banking market have fewer incentives to screen and 
monitor their borrowers. When banking market becomes more competitive, the average 
quality of borrowers decreases. Rejected applicants can continue to apply at other banks, so 
low-quality applicants are likely to receive credits as more banks compete in the market. 
Furthermore, when several banks compete fiercely in the credit market, each bank has a 
294	
	
small pool of borrowers, such that borrower information is so dispersed compared to the less 
competitive market. Moreover, banks in less competitive banking market have higher 
capacity and stronger incentives to screen and monitor, such that borrowers do not pursue 
risky investment activities. Thus, the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
exacerbate as the banking market becomes more and more competitive. In these regards, our 
finding suggests that the benefits of information sharing in helping to reduce bank risk tends 
to be more pronounced in the more competitive banking market. 
In chapter 4, our objectives are to explore the impact of credit information sharing 
on bank-specific stock price crash risk and how, and to what extent, information asymmetry 
and bank regulations affect it. Studying the sample of 1,402 listed-banks in 55 countries 
during 2005 to 2013, we conclude that credit information sharing through public credit 
registries reduces crash risk, whereas the depth of credit information sharing and information 
sharing through private credit bureaus have no significant effect on crash risk. The result 
shows that banks are less likely to encounter stock price crash risk in countries with more 
borrower information sharing through public credit registries. 
The negative association between information sharing through public credit 
registries and crash risk suggests that forcing banks to share borrower information among 
each other may reduce bank opacity and discourage their loan officers to withhold bad news 
for an extended period, such that crash risk is reduced. Because bank transparency is 
enhanced and loan officers refrain from hiding bad news, the unanticipated release of bad 
news is also less likely to occur and less likely to generate stock price crash. To be more 
precise, compulsory information sharing can help monitoring loan officers and preventing 
corruption in lending. Also, borrower information sharing from one bank improves 
comparability and provides benefits to another bank validating internal risk ratings so that 
loan officers are less likely to bias their borrower reports. Thus, forcing banks to disclose 
and share borrower information with each other tends to enhance investors’ perception about 
banks’ performance, such that information sharing reduces stock price crash risk. 
The insignificant effect of information sharing through private credit bureaus on 
crash risk suggests that the voluntary exchange of credit information among banks may not 
be adequate to prevent loan officers from hiding bad news. Banks may self-select themselves 
into sharing credit information and may share only information that makes them better off. 
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Moreover, joining the private credit bureaus is not compulsory, and they are less regulated 
than the public credit registries. Therefore, opaque banks may not join the credit bureaus to 
share borrower information in the first place. 
Furthermore, we examine the effect of information environment on the relationship 
between credit information sharing and crash risk. In an environment with more transparent 
information, loan officers have less ability to hide negative information about borrowers 
because more information is accessible to external investors and loan managers. According 
to the empirical results, we find that the impact of credit information sharing on crash risk 
is less pronounced in more transparent information environment proxied by the mandatory 
IFRS adoption. Therefore, when the information environment is less opaque, borrower 
information sharing tends to be less helpful in reducing crash risk. 
We also examine the impact of banking regulatory environments on the relationship 
between credit information sharing and crash risk. Bank regulations are usually viewed as 
external mechanisms implemented by bank regulators to monitor banks and encourage them 
to be more disciplined. If banks face strict regulatory environments, they are more likely to 
allocate capital efficiently and have less ability to conceal bad news. 
By conducting an empirical analysis, we analyze three aspects of bank regulations, 
consisting of capital stringency requirements, supervisory power, and private monitoring. 
Firstly, we find that the relationship between information sharing through public credit 
registries and crash risk is more pronounced with less stringent capital requirements. If banks 
are not required to put a substantial amount of their equity at risk, they may not be cautious 
in lending and might take excessive risk. In this regard, our result suggests that less stringent 
capital requirements may induce loan officers to behave riskily and conceal bad news, such 
that forcing banks to share borrower information tends to be more helpful in reducing crash 
risk.  
Secondly, we find that the relationship between information sharing through public 
credit registries and crash risk is more pronounced with low supervisory power. Bank 
supervisors need adequately high powers to closely monitor and prevent banks from 
engaging in undesirable activities, notably complex banking activities. Thus, our result 
suggests that, when bank supervisors weakly regulate banks, banks may behave 
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opportunistically and hide bad news for an extended period, such that forcing banks to share 
borrower information is more useful in reducing crash risk. 
Thirdly, we find that the relationship between information sharing through public 
credit registries and crash risk is more pronounced with a low degree of private monitoring. 
Less emphasizing private monitoring means that banks are not encouraged to disclosure 
more and accurate information to the public so that investors have fewer abilities and fewer 
incentives to overcome informational barriers. Thus, banks are opaquer in an environment 
with a low degree of private monitoring than those in an environment with a high degree. In 
this regard, our result suggests that forcing banks to share borrower information tends to be 
more beneficial for an environment with a low degree of private monitoring.       
According to the empirical analysis of bank regulations, our findings suggest that, 
when the banking regulatory environments are weak, it is more useful to reduce crash risk 
by forcing banks to share borrower information. Among three aspects of bank regulations, 
our findings also reveal that credit information sharing is much more useful in reducing crash 
risk with less powerful bank supervisors than less stringent capital requirements and less 
emphasis on private monitoring. It suggests that the issue of hiding bad news could be more 
problematic whenever less power is given to bank supervisors to oversee banking sectors.  
5.2 Policy Implications 
There are various policy implications of this study. Policymakers may focus on 
establishing and promoting information sharing institutions to enhance information sharing 
among banks and the availability of credit information. Well-established information sharing 
institutions can alleviate the information problems faced by banks in the credit market. The 
information problem between banks and borrowers makes banks reluctant to extend credit. 
With the improved availability of credit information, it is possible to encourage banks to 
lend and achieve a better credit allocation in the economy. 
Policymakers can design policies that enhance the scope, accessibility, and quality 
of credit information available through information sharing institutions, especially private 
credit bureaus. Since private credit bureaus tend to surpass public credit registries in the 
comprehensiveness of the data and services they provide to lenders, policymakers should 
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not design public credit registries so that it may choke the creation of private credit bureaus. 
In order to not choke the creation of private credit bureaus, they should consider selectively 
limiting the scope and/or depth of information provided by the public registry. However, 
public credit registries can be an effective tool to improve the amount and quality of 
information available on borrowers in emerging economies with non-existent or under-
developed information sharing institutions. While policymakers support the establishment 
of private credit bureaus, they could frequently regulate these bureaus to ensure data privacy 
rather than attempting to enhance credit information per se. 
When policymakers decide to uphold information sharing among banks, they also 
need to consider the transparency of the information environment. Our study shows that 
information environment has a significant implication on the impact of credit information 
sharing on bank lending, bank risk, and crash risk. When the information environment is 
very opaque, the information problems become more problematic. Thus, policymakers may 
improve the situation by encouraging banks to share information among themselves and 
elevate the quality of credit information available through information sharing institutions. 
Moreover, our findings indicate that credit information sharing has no notable impact 
on bank lending with very weak creditor rights. Some degree of creditor protection is 
necessary to guarantee the effect of credit information sharing on lending. Therefore, credit 
information sharing is complementary to the protection of creditors. Policies that promote 
credit information sharing should also stimulate the development of creditor protection. 
Policymakers should also aim at promoting information sharing mechanisms when 
the banking market is very competitive so that the problem of adverse selection and moral 
hazard can be less of a concern and banks become more stable amid fierce competition. Our 
results do not only highlight the importance of bank competition on bank stability, as the 
literature has extensively shown, but also the influence of bank competition on the beneficial 
impact of credit information sharing on bank stability. 
 To prevent stock price crash risk in the stock markets, policies may need to focus on 
the establishment and improvement of public credit registries and those policies should be 
designed that force banks to share their borrowers’ credit information This compulsory 
sharing could allow bank regulators to effectively monitor banks’ tendency to hoard bad 
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news and to limit the downside risk in the stock market. Moreover, compulsory information 
sharing mechanism should be implemented in an environment with low information 
transparency. In addition, when the banking regulatory environments are weak, regulators 
could encourage banks to be more transparent and disciplined by using compulsory 
information sharing mechanism, as opposed to voluntary sharing via private credit bureaus. 
More importantly, the findings in this study could provide useful information for investors 
and shareholders that are seeking to manage tail risk in the stock market and to investors 
who want to incorporate crash risk in their portfolio and risk management decisions. 
5.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
 In this study, we use the depth of credit information sharing index from the World 
Bank’s Doing Business to test our predictions in chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4. This 
index is a good proxy measuring the scope, coverage, and accessibility of credit information 
available through information sharing agencies in each country. However, this depth index 
for each country is publicly available only in a single index aggregating six individual 
features. Thus, it would be helpful if data underlying the depth of credit information index 
becomes publicly available so that this information can easily be used for research. Also, 
information on each individual bank’s participation in information sharing would be more 
useful in examining the impact of information sharing on lending.   
When the data underlying the depth of credit information sharing index become 
publicly available, it is also interesting to distinguish the sharing of positive and negative 
information. Sharing of both types of information reduces credit risk (Jappelli & Pagano 
2002). However, dissemination of negative information may reduce banks’ profit, and thus 
carries the risk of an increased probability of a crisis if information sharing does not emerge 
endogenously among banks (Dell'Ariccia & Marquez 2006). Testing different impact of 
types of information sharing requires a very careful distinction between the two different 
mechanisms through which information sharing systems emerge. The depth of the credit 
information sharing index we use in this thesis summarizes six different features of the 
information sharing arrangement, including whether the positive or negative information is 
distributed. However, they are aggregated and not publicly available. Therefore, it would be 
helpful if data underlying the depth of credit information index and how they have changed 
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since the start of the survey became publicly available so that this information can handily 
be used for research. 
Another possible extension is to distinguish between credit to households and 
enterprises. This is because household and enterprise credit has different implications for 
economic activity. Theory and empirical studies document that enterprise credit contributes 
to economic growth (Levine 2005), whereas credit to households either has no effect of 
growth (Beck et al. 2008) or that it even reduces growth (Jappelli & Pagano 1994). In 
addition, household and enterprise also differ in the complexity of their balance sheet 
presenting different information challenges to banks. Thus, we left to future study and 
answer the question “Does credit information sharing affect lending to households and 
enterprises in similar ways? 
Due to the importance of private credit bureaus, future research extension can 
examine whether the effect of credit information sharing depends on the extensiveness of 
information sharing as proxied by the number of private credit bureaus a bank is partnering 
within a given year. In comparison with a bank partnering with a single private credit bureau, 
a bank that is a partner of multiple private credit bureaus at a time is, on average, presumably 
able to make better-informed lending decisions, which, might, in turn affect the volume of 
loans it grants. 
Instead of using an accounting-based risk indicator like Z-Score, future research can 
employ a market-based indicator like the Distance-to-Default model of Merton (1987). In 
comparison to the use of accounting-based models, the market-based measure of risk has the 
following pros: first, market variables are unlikely to be influenced by firm’s accounting 
policies; second, in the efficient markets, stock prices reflect all available information; third, 
market prices reflect future expected cash flows and this should be more appropriate for use 
for prediction purposes.  
 Moreover, we can improve upon our competition measure and make it more efficient 
than the conventional Lerner index (Koetter et al. 2008; Ariss 2010; Koetter et al. 2012). 
Koetter et al. (2012) have argued that the conventional way of estimating the Lerner index 
assumes both profit efficiency (optimal choice of prices) and cost efficiency (optimal choice 
of inputs by firms). Consequently, the estimated conventional price-cost margins do not 
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correctly measure the true extent of market power (competition). Impliedly, the conventional 
Lerner index measures “actual” (exercised) market power, while Koetter et al. (2012) 
purpose an adjustment to the conventional Lerner index that results in “efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index”. Further information about the adjusted-Lerner index can be found in the 
appendix. Both the Lerner index and the adjusted-Lerner index have their own merits and 
drawbacks (Clerides et al. 2015). Therefore, given the objectives of this research agenda, we 
leave the adjusted-Lerner index for future research and focus on the Lerner index as the most 
widely used due to its simplicity and intuitive interpretation. 
 Although we have controlled for many factors such as bank fixed effects and year 
fixed effects in our panel data regression, omitted variable bias remain a potential concern. 
If unobservable factors are not time-invariant – if they move up and down over time within 
categories in a way that is correlated with the variables included in the regression – then the 
omitted variable bias still prevail. We have attempted to control such time-varying factors, 
it is impossible to rule out this possibility of potential time-varying omitted variables. We 
have employed an instrumental variable approach to account for the problem of potential 
endogeneity; however, a superior approach to address potential endogeneity due to time-
varying omitted variables or simultaneity is to apply a dynamic panel model using the 
general method of moments instrumental variable (GMM-IV) approach proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). But because the estimation of GMM-IV approach involves first-
differencing the equations, it may render the significance of our main regressor, credit 
information sharing, because it is quasi-time invariant. 
 We address the problem of endogeneity by using instrumental variables techniques 
with the legal origin as one of the instruments for the credit information sharing measure. 
Yet, although this approach has been popular in the literature, notably after the pioneering 
work of La Porta et al. (1997), it is without criticism. To be specific, La Porta et al. (2008) 
emphasize that “legal origins influence many spheres of lawmaking and regulation, which 
makes it dangerous to use them as instruments”. However, following Barth et al. (2009) and 
Houston et al. (2010), we push forward with instrumental variables analysis and, at the same 
time, acknowledge that our instrumental variables analysis is without criticism. 
Beyond the impact in the banking industry, the impact of credit information sharing 
may carry over to macro-level concerning economic development and poverty reduction. 
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Unequal access to finance has long been recognized as a critical mechanism for generating 
persistent income inequality and slower economic growth (Beck et al. 2007). Since previous 
research shows that credit information sharing improves access to credit, creates job and 
increases the probability of detecting lending corruption (Barth et al. 2009; Brown et al. 
2009; Ayyagari et al. 2016), all these would translate into better credit allocation, resulting 
in higher economic growth and a reduction in poverty. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A Definition of Data Sources 
Name Definition and Link Note 
BankScope Database 
(Access via University 
of Durham) 
The Bankscope database, which is provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings, had comprehensive 
coverage in most countries, accounting for more than 90% of all banking assets in each country 
globally. Each bank report consists of up to 200 data items and 36 pre-calculated financial ratios from 
a detailed balance sheet and income statement (BankScope, 2016). 
https://library.dur.ac.uk/record=b2796117~S1 
Expire 
since 
November 
2016 
BankScope Database 
(Access via Wharton 
Research Data 
Services WRDS) 
The Bankscope database, which is provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings, had comprehensive 
coverage in most countries, accounting for more than 90% of all banking assets in each country 
globally. Each bank report consists of up to 200 data items and 36 pre-calculated financial ratios from 
a detailed balance sheet and income statement (BankScope, 2016). 
https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/query_forms/navigation.cfm?navId=50 
Expire 
since 
December 
2016 
Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA)'s The 
World Fact Book 
The World Factbook provides information on the history, people, government, economy, geography, 
communications, transportation, military, and transnational issues for 267 world entities (CIA 2017). 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2011.html 
  
327	
	
Datastream (Access 
via University of 
Durham) 
Datastream is a largest and comprehensive database providing historical financial information, which 
includes worldwide coverage of stock market and bond indices, equities, company fundamentals, 
currencies, interest rate, fixed income securities, derivatives and other key international economic 
indicators for 175 countries and 60 markets (Datastream, 2016). 
  
Deposit Insurance 
Database 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/Deposit_Insurance_Database_July2015.xlsx 
  
Djankov et al. (2007) 
Dataset 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/jfe_2007__dataset_oct08.xls   
Easterly and Levine 
(2001) Dataset 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/Lost_Decades_Social_Indicators_and_Fixed_Factors.xls 
  
International Financial 
Reporting Standard 
(IFRS) Data 
http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Pages/Jurisdiction-profiles.aspx (IFRS Foundation) 
http://www.iasplus.com/en/jurisdictions (Deloitte) http://www.adoptifrs.org/countries.aspx (Simon 
Fraser University in Canada) 
 
LaPorta et al. (1998) 
Dataset 
http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/images/uploads/faculty/rafael-laporta/Law_Fin.xls   
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LaPorta et al. (1999) 
Dataset 
http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/images/uploads/faculty/rafael-laporta/Quality_of_Govt.xls   
World Bank's Banking 
Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
(Version I) 
The World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey is a unique source of comparable world-
wide data on how banks are regulated and supervised around the world. The Version I survey was 
launched by Barth et al. (2001) in 2001 containing information for 117 countries. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/Caprio_2000_banking_regulation_database.xls 
  
World Bank's Banking 
Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
(Version II) 
The World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey is a unique source of comparable world-
wide data on how banks are regulated and supervised around the world. The Version II survey, by 
Barth et al. (2006), contains the regulatory environment at the end of 2002 in 152 countries. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/Caprio_2003_banking_regulation_database.xls 
  
World Bank's Banking 
Regulation and 
The World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey is a unique source of comparable world-
wide data on how banks are regulated and supervised around the world. The Version III survey, by 
Barth et al. (2008a), contains and describes the regulatory environment in 142 countries in 2005/2006. 
Dataset 
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Supervision Survey 
(Version III) 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/Banking_regulation_Survey_III_061008.xls 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/Caprio_2003_Guide.doc 
Survey 
Questionai
re and 
Guidance 
World Bank's Banking 
Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
(Version IV) 
The World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey is a unique source of comparable world-
wide data on how banks are regulated and supervised around the world. The Version IV compiled by 
Barth et al. (2013a), provides information on bank regulation and supervision for up to 143 
jurisdictions. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLOBALFINREPORT/Resources/8816096-
1346865433023/8827078-1347152290218/Bank_Regulation.xlsx 
Dataset 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLOBALFINREPORT/Resources/8816096-
1346865433023/8827078-1347152290218/Guidelines_Questionnaire_sections.pdf 
Survey 
Questionai
re and 
Guidance 
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World Bank's Doing 
Business 
The Doing Business project provides objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement 
across 189 economies and selected cities at the subnational and regional level. By gathering and 
analyzing comprehensive quantitative data to compare business regulation environments across 
economies and over time, the Doing Business project encourages economies to compete towards more 
efficient regulation; offers measurable benchmarks for reform; and serves as a resource for academics, 
journalists, private sector researchers and others interested in the business climate of each economy 
(World Bank Doing Business 2016). 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Custom-Query 
  
World Bank's Global 
Financial Development 
Database (GFDD) 
The Global Financial Development is an extensive dataset of financial system characteristics for 203 
economies. The database includes measures of (1) size of financial institutions and markets (financial 
depth), (2) degree to which individuals can and do use financial services (access), (3) efficiency of 
financial intermediaries and markets in intermediating resources and facilitating financial transactions 
(efficiency), and (4) stability of financial institutions and markets (stability). 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/762771441897023024/GlobalFinancialDevelopmentDatabaseSepte
mber2015.xlsx 
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World Bank's World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
The WDI database is the primary World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from 
officially-recognized international sources. It presents the most current and accurate global 
development data available, and includes national, regional and global estimates. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators 
  
World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
The WGI database provides six governance indicators gathered from several survey institutes, think 
tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms (World 
Bank 2016). They are constructed from 276 individual variables taken from 31 different sources 
produced by 25 different organizations. These six composite of WGI are useful for cross-country 
governance comparison and for evaluating broad trends over time (Kaufmann et al. 2011). 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators 
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Appendix B The List of Countries and IFRS Adoption 
 
Country	
Effective	Date	of	
Mandatory	IFRS	
Adoption	
ALGERIA	 	
ANGOLA	 	
ARGENTINA	 2012	
ARMENIA	 2011	
AUSTRALIA	 2005	
AUSTRIA	 2005	
BANGLADESH	 1987	
BELARUS	 2016	
BELGIUM	 2005	
BENIN	 	
BOLIVIA	 	
BOSNIA	AND	HERZEGOVINA	 2006	
BOTSWANA	 2007	
BRAZIL	 2010	
BULGARIA	 2005	
BURKINA	FASO	 	
BURUNDI	 	
CAMEROON	 	
CANADA	 2011	
CHAD	 	
CHILE	 2010	
CHINA	 	
COLOMBIA	 2015	
COSTA	RICA	 2005	
COTE	D'IVOIRE	 	
CROATIA	 2005	
CZECH	REPUBLIC	 2005	
DENMARK	 2005	
DOMINICAN	REPUBLIC	 2014	
ECUADOR	 2010	
EGYPT	 	
EL	SALVADOR	 2011	
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ETHIOPIA	 	
FINLAND	 2005	
FRANCE	 2005	
GERMANY	 2005	
GHANA	 2007	
GREECE	 2005	
GUATEMALA	 2008	
HONDURAS	 	
HONG	KONG	 2005	
HUNGARY	 2005	
INDIA	 	
INDONESIA	 	
IRELAND	 2005	
ISRAEL	 2008	
ITALY	 2005	
JAMAICA	 2002	
JAPAN	 2016	
JORDAN	 1997	
KAZAKHSTAN	 2005	
KENYA	 1999	
KUWAIT	 	
KYRGYZSTAN	 2003	
LATVIA	 2005	
LEBANON	 	
LESOTHO	 	
LITHUANIA	 2005	
MACEDONIA	(FYROM)	 2010	
MADAGASCAR	 	
MALAWI	 	
MALAYSIA	 2012	
MALI	 	
MEXICO	 2012	
MONTENEGRO	 	
MOROCCO	 	
MOZAMBIQUE	 2010	
NAMIBIA	 2005	
NEPAL	 2016	
NETHERLANDS	 2005	
NEW	ZEALAND	 2007	
NICARAGUA	 	
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NIGER	 	
NIGERIA	 2012	
NORWAY	 2005	
OMAN	 1986	
PAKISTAN	 2013	
PANAMA	 	
PAPUA	NEW	GUINEA	 	
PARAGUAY	 2014	
PERU	 2012	
PHILIPPINES	 	
POLAND	 2005	
PORTUGAL	 2005	
REPUBLIC	OF	KOREA	 2011	
REPUBLIC	OF	MOLDOVA	 2011	
ROMANIA	 2005	
RUSSIAN	FEDERATION	 2015	
SAUDI	ARABIA	 2017	
SENEGAL	 	
SIERRA	LEONE	 2006	
SINGAPORE	 2018	
SLOVAKIA	 2005	
SLOVENIA	 2005	
SOUTH	AFRICA	 2005	
SPAIN	 2005	
SRI	LANKA	 2012	
SWEDEN	 2005	
SWITZERLAND	 	
SYRIAN	ARAB	REPUBLIC	 	
THAILAND	 	
TOGO	 	
TUNISIA	 	
TURKEY	 2008	
UGANDA	 1998	
UKRAINE	 2012	
UNITED	ARAB	EMIRATES	 2012	
UNITED	KINGDOM	 2005	
UNITED	REPUBLIC	OF	
TANZANIA	 2004	
UNITED	STATES	OF	AMERICA	 	
URUGUAY	 2009	
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VENEZUELA	 2005	
ZIMBABWE	 1996	
 
Appendix C The Components of The Business Extent of Disclosure Index 
(BDI) 
 
Source: World Bank’s Doing Business (2016) 
Assumptions about the business 
The business (Buyer): 
• •  Is a publicly traded corporation listed on the economy’s most 
important stock exchange. If the number of publicly traded 
companies listed on that exchange is less than 10, or if there is no 
stock exchange in the economy, it is assumed that Buyer is a large 
private company with multiple shareholders. 
• •  Has a board of directors and a chief executive officer (CEO) who 
may legally act on behalf of Buyer where permitted, even if this is 
not specifically required by law. 
• •  Has a supervisory board (applicable to economies with a two-tier 
board system) on which 60% of the shareholder-elected members 
Figure 5-1: How well are minority shareholders protected 
from conflicts of interest? 
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have been appointed by Mr. James, who is Buyer’s controlling 
shareholder and a member of Buyer’s board of directors. 
• •  Has not adopted any bylaws or articles of association that differ 
from default minimum standards and does not follow any 
nonmandatory codes, principles, recommendations or guidelines 
relating to corporate governance. 
• •  Is a manufacturing company with its own distribution network. 
 
Assumptions about the transaction 
• •  Mr. James owns 60% of Buyer and elected two directors to Buyer’s 
five-member board. 
• •  Mr. James also owns 90% of Seller, a company that operates a 
chain of retail hardware stores. Seller recently closed a large number 
of its stores. 
• •  Mr. James proposes that Buyer purchase Seller’s unused fleet of 
trucks to expand Buyer’s distribution of its food products, a proposal 
to which Buyer agrees. The price is equal to 10% of Buyer’s assets 
and is higher than the market value. 
• •  The proposed transaction is part of the company’s ordinary course 
of business and is not outside the authority of the company. 
• •  Buyer enters into the transaction. All required approvals are 
obtained, and all required disclosures made (that is, the transaction 
is not fraudulent). 
• •  The transaction causes damages to Buyer. Shareholders sue Mr. 
James and the other parties that approved the transaction. 
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Extent of disclosure index 
 The extent of disclosure index has five components: 
• •  Which corporate body can provide legally sufficient approval for 
the transaction. A score of 0 is assigned if it is the CEO or the 
managing director alone; 1 if the board of directors, the supervisory 
board or shareholders must vote and Mr. James is permitted to vote; 
2 if the board of directors or the supervisory board must vote and Mr. 
James is not permitted to vote; 3 if shareholders must vote and Mr. 
James is not permitted to vote. 
• •  Whether it is required that an external body, for example, an 
external auditor, review the transaction before it takes place. A score 
of 0 is assigned if no; 1 if yes. 
• •  Whether disclosure by Mr. James to the board of directors or the 
supervisory board is required.(1) A score of 0 is assigned if no 
disclosure is required; 1 if a general disclosure of the existence of a 
conflict of interest is required without any specifics; 2 if full 
disclosure of all material facts relating to Mr. James’s interest in the 
Buyer-Seller transaction is required. 
• •  Whether immediate disclosure of the transaction to the public, the 
regulator or the shareholders is required. A score of 0 is assigned if 
no disclosure is required; 1 if disclosure on the terms of the 
transaction is required but not on Mr. James’s conflict of interest; 2 
if disclosure on both the terms and Mr. James’s conflict of interest is 
required. 
• •  Whether disclosure in the annual report is required. A score of 0 is 
assigned if no disclosure on the transaction is required; 1 if 
disclosure on the terms of the transaction is required but not on Mr. 
James’s conflict of interest; 2 if disclosure on both the terms and Mr. 
James’s conflict of interest is required. 
338	
	
• The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater 
disclosure. In Poland, for example, the board of directors must 
approve the transaction and Mr. James is not allowed to vote (a score 
of 2). Poland does not require an external body to review the 
transaction (a score of 0). Before the transaction Mr. James must 
disclose his conflict of interest to the other directors, but he is not 
required to provide specific information about it (a score of 1). Buyer 
is required to disclose immediately all information affecting the 
stock price, including the conflict of interest (a score of 2). In its 
annual report Buyer must also disclose the terms of the transaction 
and Mr. James’s ownership in Buyer and Seller (a score of 2). 
Adding these numbers gives Poland a score of 7 on the extent of 
disclosure index. 
 
Appendix D Adjusted-Lerner Index 
 Koetter et al. (2012) point out that the conventional computation of Lerner Index 
does not measure the true extent of market power. They argue that the Lerner index approach 
assumes both profit efficiency (optimal choice of prices) and cost efficiency (optimal choice 
of inputs by firms). Thus, they propose a new form of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner Index: 
 !"#$%&'"	)'*+'*,- = /,- + &1,- − 3456,- ∗ 8/,- + &1,-  (A-1) 
Where /,- is the bank i’s profit at time t; &1,- is the total cost; 3456,- is the marginal cost 
and 8 is the total output. Similar interpretation to the conventional Lerner index, the 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner index ranges from zero to one with larger values indicating less 
competition (greater market power). This approach has been used by Ariss (2010), Koetter 
et al. (2008) and Koetter et al. (2012). 
Appendix E Distance-To-Default (DtD) Model 
Furthermore, the Distance-To-Default will be calculated by incorporating both 
market-based and accounting-based variables. The model is used to estimate the distance-
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to-default, which is the distance between the expected value of the firm's assets and the 
default point and then divides this difference by the estimated volatility of the firm in a time 
horizon. The distance-to-default is simply the number of standard deviations that the firm is 
away from default The firm is considered as default when the value of firm's asset falling 
below the default point. The face value of the debt is regarded as the default point in the 
Merton's Model. The larger the number is in the Distance-to-default, the less chance the 
company will default. And the distance-to-default is further used to generate the probability 
of default of a firm. More detail and its calculation can be found in the appendix. 
To calculate the distance-to-default, we first need to find the value of the firm’s asset 
and the asset’s volatility from the market value of the firm's equity and the equity's volatility, 
given the outstanding and maturity of debt. The maturity of the debt is chosen and the debt’s 
book value is set to equal the face value of the debt. To calculate the default probability, the 
distance to default is substituted into a cumulative density function to calculate the 
probability that the value of the firm will be less than the face value of debt at the maturity 
of the debt. Further detail of the calculation will be elaborated below. 
The foundation for the Merton DD model lies with the structural model of default 
developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Merton extended the work of 
Black and Scholes (1973) on option pricing theory in the default prediction of the firm, along 
with certain strong assumptions. Later in late 1980s, KMV Corporation developed the 
application of Merton's model to forecast default of the firm and the model becomes known 
as the KMV-Merton Model. This model views equity as a standard call option on the assets 
of a firm, with a strike price equal to the face value of the debt with T as a time-to-maturity. 
At time T, equity holders exercise their option and pay off the debt holders if the value of 
the firm’s assets is greater than the face value of its debt. Otherwise, if the value of the assets 
is insufficient to fully repay the firm’s debts, the call option becomes worthless, and equity 
holders let it expire. In this scenario, the firm files for bankruptcy, and ownership is assumed 
to be transferred to the debt holders at no cost, whereas the payoff for equity holders is zero 
(Fu et al. 2014). Thus, the probability of bankruptcy is the probability that the call option 
will expire worthless (when the value of asset < the face value of the debt at time T). 
According to Bharath and Shumway (2008), the Merton DD model estimates the 
market value of debt by applying the classic Merton (1974) bond pricing model. The Merton 
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model makes two particularly important assumptions. The first is that the total value of a 
firm follows geometric Brownian motion as followed: 
 "96 = :96"& + ;696"< (A-2) 
Where 96 is the total value of the firm, µ is the expected continuously compounded return 
on 96, ;6 is the volatility of firm value and dW is a standard Wiener process. The second 
critical assumption of the Merton model is that the firm has issued just one discount bond 
maturing in T periods. Under these assumptions, the equity of the firm is a call option on the 
underlying value of the firm with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt and 
a time-to-maturity of T. Furthermore, the value of equity as a function of the total value of 
the firm can be described by the Black-Scholes-Merton Formula. By put-call parity, the 
value of the firm’s debt is equal to the value of a risk-free discount bond minus the value of 
a put option written on the firm, again with a strike price equal to the face value of debt and 
a time-to-maturity of T. 
 Given the assumption of assets distributed following a Generalized Brownian 
Motion, the application of the standard Black–Scholes option pricing formula (Black and 
Scholes, 1973) yields the closed-form expression showing that the equity value of a firm 
satisfies: 
 9= = 96> "? − @'AB5>("D) (A-3) 
Where 9= is the market value of the firm’s equity, @ is the face value of the firm’s debt, * is 
the instantaneous risk-free rate under risk-neutrality, > ∗   is the cumulative standard 
normal distribution function. And "? and "D are expressed as followed: 
 "? = F> 96@ + * + ;6D2 H;6 H  
(A-4) 
 
 "D = "? − ;6 H (A-5) 
The Merton DD model makes use of two important equations. The first is the Black-Scholes-
Merton Equation (13), expressing the value of a firm’s equity as a function of the value of 
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the firm. The second links the volatility of the firm’s value (;6) to the volatility of its equity 
(;=). Under Merton’s assumptions the value of equity is a function of the value of the firm 
and time, so it follows directly from Ito’s lemma that 
 ;= = 969= I9=I96 ;6 (A-6) 
In the Black-Scholes-Merton model, it can be shown that JKLJKM is equal to >("?), so that under 
the Merton model’s assumptions, the volatilities of the firm and its equity are related by  
 ;= = 969= >("?);6 (A-7) 
And "? is defined as above in the equation (14) 
 The Merton DD model basically uses these two nonlinear equations, (13) and (17), 
to translate the value and volatility of a firm’s equity into an implied probability of default. 
In most applications of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, it describes the unobserved value 
of an option as a function of four variables that are easily observed (strike price, time-to-
maturity, underlying asset price, and the risk-free rate) and one variable that can be estimated 
(volatility). However, in the Merton DD model, the value of the option is observed as the 
total value of the firm’s equity (9=), while the value of the underlying asset (or 96 which is 
the total value of the firm in the Merton DD Model) is not directly observable.  
Thus, 96 and ;6 are not directly observable in the Merton DD model and must be 
recovered by solving the equation (13) and (17) simultaneously. Once the numerical solution 
of both 96 and ;6 are obtained, the distance-to-default can be calculated as followed: 
 @&@ = F> 96@ + : − ;6D2 H;6 H  
(A-8) 
where µ is an estimate of the expected annual return of the firm’s assets. The corresponding 
implied probability of default, sometimes called the expected default frequency (or EDF), is 
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 /N=O5PQ = > −@&@ = > − F> 96@ + : − ;6D2 H;6 H  
(A-9) 
 DtD can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations the value of a firm’s 
asset is away from its default point. This standardization across firm size and volatility can 
be used to rank firms in terms of their relative credit worthiness. The three key inputs in 
calculating the DtD (market capitalization, debt, and the volatility of equity) implies that it 
can be influenced by the leverage ratio (debt/(equity + debt)) and volatility of the firm. A 
higher value of DtD can be obtained either because the leverage of the firm is low or because 
the volatility is low or both (Fig. 3). 
 The Distance-to-default is recovered implicitly from observed information from the 
balance sheet and market price of firm’s liabilities. The calculation of distance-to-default is 
made on a yearly basis. The value of the firm’s equity (9=) is computed as the yearly average 
of daily market capitalization (number of common shares * share prices). The volatility of 
the firm’s equity (;=) is based on the daily stock returns. Following Fu et al. (2014), the 
volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns multiplied by the 
square root of the average number of trading days in the year (set at 252 trading days). 
Using this model to quantify distance to default requires some practical 
compromises. The real debt contracts are not all written with a single terminal date. What 
then about debt of longer maturity? At longer time horizons, if there is trend asset growth, 
default becomes relatively unlikely. So this suggests that longer term debt should not have 
such a big impact on default probabilities (Milne 2014).. To overcome this problem, a 
common procedure used by Moody’s KMV (Vasicek, 1984) and also employed here, is to 
adopt a one-year horizon (T = 1), but to weight longer term debt (with maturity > 1 year) at 
only 50% of face value. The default point will then be equal to the face value of short-term 
liabilities plus a half of the long-term liabilities. In other words, debt (@) is calculated as 
100% of deposits and short term debt and 50% of long term debt. This meant that insurance 
liabilities and also trading liabilities (other than short term unsecured and repo funding) had 
a zero weighting. 
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 In order to obtain the value of firm’s assets (96) and asset volatility (;6), the two 
nonlinear simultaneous equation (13) and (17) must be solved, given the observed debt (@) 
and equity’s value (9=) and volatility (;=). The procedure is outlined in the previous section. 
The description is shown on the table below. 
 
Parameter Symbol Notes 
Volatility of (common) 
Equity 
;= Using historical stock return data 
Market Value of (common) 
Equity 
9= or R Share Price * Shares Outstanding (Market 
Capitalization) 
Face Value of Debt (Default 
Point) 
@	or	S	 100% of deposits and short term debt and 
50% of long term debt 
Risk-Free Interest Rate *	 The choice of the 3 Month Treasury Bill as the risk free rate is very common but not 
universal. Some choose 1 Month Treasury 
Bills (4 week) where these are available 
Time H Liabilities will mature in 1 year 
Market Value of Assets 96 or 9 or ! Option-Pricing Model 
Volatility of Assets ;6	or	;K	or	;	 Option-Pricing Model 
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Appendix F Model Selection and Diagnostic Tests 
We conduct model selection tests and several diagnostic tests to choose an 
appropriate estimation technique. In each chapter, all the tests are applied to the equations 
without interaction terms and the chosen estimation techniques are then applied to the rest 
of equations with interaction terms. Adding interaction terms would not significantly change 
the overall results of the tests much. Specifically, in Chapter 2, all tests are applied to 
Equation (2-2) with no interaction terms and the chosen estimation techniques are then 
applied to Equation (2-3) and Equation (2-4).. In Chapter 3, all the tests are applied to 
Equation (3-9) that does not include interaction terms and the chosen estimation technique 
are then applied to Equation (3-10) and (3-11). Lastly, in Chapter 4, all the tests are applied 
to Equation (4-8) and the chosen estimation techniques are then applied to Equation (4-9), 
(4-10), (4-11) and (4-12). 
A starting point is to test whether we can estimate a pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression. The objective of pooling a time series of cross-sections is to widen the 
database in order to get better and more reliable estimates of the parameters of the model. 
But we must know whether we can pool data or not. The OLS estimators are biased and 
inconsistent if the individual effects present in the regression. Thus, we perform a poolability 
test. In other words, we test for the presence of individual effects, T,, in our regression 
model. Formally, the poolability test has its null hypothesis the OLS model, where UV: T, =0 for X = 1, 2, 3…., N.  Its alternative hypothesis is the fixed-effect (FE) model. We consider 
the F statistics according to the construction principle: 
S?AYZ[ = (R\\O − R\\]) (> − 1)R\\] ((H − 1)> − _)  (5-1) 
where R\\O denotes the residual sum of squares under the null hypothesis, R\\] the residual 
sum of squares under the alternative. Under UV, the statistic S?AYZ[ is distributed as F with (> − 1, H − 1 > − _) degrees of freedom. The two sums of squares evolve as intermediate 
results from OLS and from FE estimation. When the null hypothesis is rejected that all T, 
are zero, the OLS estimates suffer from the problem of omitted variables and they are biased 
and inconsistent under the presence of the individual effects. 
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 Next, we perform the Hausman test to choose between fixed-effect (FE) model and 
random-effect (RE) model. The fundamental distinction between FE and RE models is the 
assumption that the individual effects, T,, are correlated or uncorrelated with the regressors. 
The regressors are DEPTH and other bank- and country-specific controls. In the FE model, 
the T, are permitted to be correlated with the regressors, while continuing to assume that 
these regressors are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error a,,-. In contrast, the RE model 
assumes that T, is purely random and uncorrelated with the regressors. Thus, to decide which 
model to use, we perform the Hausman test.  
 The Hausman principle can be applied to all hypothesis testing problems, in which 
two different estimators are available, the first of which b of the FE model is efficient under 
the null hypothesis, however inconsistent under the alternative, while the other estimator b 
from the RE model is consistent under both hypotheses. The construction of Hausman test 
statistic is based on Φ = b − b. Because of the consistency of both estimators under the 
null, this difference, Φ, will converge to zero, while it fails to converge under the alternative. 
According to Hausman, the statistic d = Φe(fg*	Φ)A?Φ, where fg*	Φ = fg*	b − fg*	b 
follows from the known properties of both estimators under the null hypothesis and from 
uncorrelatedness. The statistic d is distributed as hD under the null hypothesis, with degrees 
of freedom corresponding to the dimension of b. The rejection of the null hypothesis shows 
that individual effects are nor random and we should use the fixed-effect model. 
 Moreover, we test for the groupwise heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the fixed-
effects regression by performing a modified Wald test, proposed by Baum (2001). When the 
error process is homoscedastic (or constant variance) within cross-sectional units, but its 
variance differs across units we call this groupwise heteroskedasticity. The standard error 
component assumes that the regression disturbances are homoskedastic with the same 
variance across time and individuals. This may be a restrictive assumption for panels. The 
null hypothesis specifies that: UV:	;,D = ;D (5-2) 
for X = 1, 2, 3…., Ng, where Ng is the number of cross-sectional units. The resulting test 
statistic is distributed Chi-squared under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. When 
heteroskedasticity is present, the standard errors of the estimates will be biased. The rejection 
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of the null hypothesis suggests that the heteroskedasticity exists. However, we can deal 
heteroscedasticity by estimating standard errors that are robust to conditional 
heteroscedasticity. The robust standard errors are sometimes called the White-Huber 
standard errors or the Sandwich estimators of variance. 
 Because serial correlation in linear panel-data models biases the standard errors and 
causes the results to be less efficient, we also need to identify serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic error term in a panel-data model. We rely on the method discussed by 
Wooldridge (2010) and implemented by Drukker (2003). The method uses the residuals 
from a regression in first-differences as shown in the equations below. j,- − j,-A? = k,- − k,-A? b + a,- − a,-A?  (5-3) 
 ∆j,- = ∆k,-b + ∆a,- (5-4) 
Where ∆ is the first-difference operator. The procedure begins by estimating the parameters b by regressing ∆j,- on ∆k,- and obtaining the residuals a,-. Central to this procedure is 
Woodridge’s observation that, if the a,- is not serially correlated, then the residuals from the 
regression of the first-differenced variables should have an autocorrelation of -0.5 [i.e. 1m** ∆a,-, ∆a,-A?  = -0.5]. Given this observation, the procedure continues regressing the 
residuals a,- from the regression with first-differenced variables on their lagged residuals 
and tests whether the coefficient on the lagged residuals is equal to -0.5. Under the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation, the coefficient on the lagged residuals in a regression of 
the lagged residuals on the current residuals should equal to -0.5 (Drukker 2003; Wooldridge 
2010). The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the errors are autocorrelated. 
However, we can adjust standard errors by clustering at the panel level to account for the 
within-panel correlation in the regression of a,- on a,-A?. 
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Appendix G Instrumental Variables Approach 
We select instrumental variables for credit information sharing measure based on the 
literature on law and finance. These variables are legal origin, ethnic fractionalization and 
latitude. These variables have been previously used in Barth et al. (2009), Houston et al. 
(2010), Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2012) and Fu et al. (2014) as instruments.  
According to law and finance perspective, the literature (La Porta et al. 1999; Beck 
et al. 2003) shows that historical legal origins help explain the international differences in 
the financial system and development today. Legal origins can be thought of as exogenous 
because it was imposed by colonial power in many emerging countries (La Porta et al. 1999; 
Acemoglu & Johnson 2005). Moreover, Djankov et al. (2007) also find that that legal origins 
have a pronounced impact in credit market institutions. In addition, the legal origin itself 
does not directly affect bank lending, but it may have an indirect impact through other 
channels such as institutions and regulations. Therefore, we include a dummy of legal origin, 
which take a value of one if legal origin is English and zero otherwise. According to Djankov 
et al. (2007), the English legal origin consists of the common law of England and its former 
colonies. Other legal origins include: first is the German legal origin consisting of the laws 
of the German countries in Central Europe and in East Asia, where the German law was 
imposed on; second is the French legal origin consists of the civil law of France, of countries 
Napoleon conquered, and of their former colonies; third is the Nordic legal origin consisting 
of the laws of the Scandinavian countries; and last is the group of socialist countries. 
 We use ethnic fractionalization as one of instruments because Easterly and Levine 
(1997) shows that ethnic diversity explains difference in public policies across country. 
Economies with greater ethnic diversity tend to choose institutions that allow those in power 
to expropriate resources from others (Easterly & Levine 1997; Beck et al. 2003, 2006a). We 
use latitude as another instrument based on the theory of endowment. The theory of 
endowment suggests that geographical location and the disease environment help shape the 
political and financial institutional development (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Beck et al. 2003). 
Specifically, Beck et al. (2003) provide strong evidence that geographical endowment has 
substantial impacts on the formation of long-lasting institutions that shape the financial 
development. 
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